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Volume XIX Spring 1975 Number 1

*Reflections on*

President Ford's State of the World Message; U.S. Middle East Diplomacy; Portugal Moves to the Left; "Peace Is At Hand" in Indochina

*Articles on*

**Defense of Europe**
Correcting NATO's Inferiority in Conventional Military Strength
Comparing U.S.-Allied and Soviet Nuclear Force Capabilities

**United Nations**
The Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat
UN Peacekeeping and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict

**Resources and Energy**
Prospects for a Uranium Cartel
International Conflict Over Resources: The Case of Manganese Nodules

*Additional Articles on*

The United States and the Sino-Soviet Confrontation
American Labor's Continuing Involvement in World Affairs
Thailand's Kra Canal: Site for the World's First Nuclear Industrial Zone
The Role of Outside Powers in the Cambodian Conflict
The Soviet Collective Security System

*Book Reviews*

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
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THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
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# *Reflections on the Quarter*

## The State of the World Message

THE State of the World message delivered by President Ford to a joint session of Congress on April 10, 1975 was the fifth such message by an American Chief Executive since 1970. A Nixon-Kissinger innovation, the State of the World addresses were intended to accomplish three objectives: (1) to symbolize Presidential interest in foreign policy and Executive primacy in conducting it; (2) to stress the growing interdependence of international and domestic developments; and (3) to build a consensus in support of American foreign policy.

Initially, the State of the World message provided a description of the so-called new international realities for which the Nixon Doctrine had been designed. Three realities were paramount: the Soviet Union's mounting nuclear capacity, which had already brought about a condition described as parity between the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals; the emergence of Western Europe and Japan as new economic centers of power; and the growing potential of the People's Republic of China, both as an antagonist to the Soviet Union and as a world power in its own right. The Nixon Doctrine proposed to maintain and codify nuclear parity through arms control negotiations; to update American alliance relationships, allowing the allies more scope and placing upon them greater burdens; and to create a new "structure of peace" resting on the interplay of cooperative American, Chinese and Soviet interests.

More immediately, the United States had to deal with the unfolding Vietnam tragedy. The Nixon Administration was able to reconcile its solution — "Vietnamization" and negotiation — with its broader concepts of foreign policy: Soviet-American détente (SALT I, the Nixon-Brezhnev visits) and the "opening" to China (the Shanghai communiqué). The Nixon State of the World messages soon acquired a self-congratulatory tone that rose to a crescendo in the 1973 version after the Paris peace accords were signed. The Departments of State and Defense both put out their own massive companion statements in that year, as the Administration basked in apparent success.

After the visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the United States in June 1973, the Administration's fortunes turned down sharply. While the Watergate scandal undermined Nixon's prestige, the October Middle East war shook the foundations of his foreign policy. The President and Dr. Kissinger



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tried to preserve détente, initiate negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis, and deal with the oil embargo in the face of strong public suspicions over the Soviet role in the war and the American alert. These problems were compounded by a transatlantic quarrel, as the United States and the West European allies engaged in mutual recriminations over "consultation" and each other's behavior during the Middle East crisis. By year's end, Dr. Kissinger was engaged in strenuous "shuttle diplomacy" as he sought to arrange separation of forces agreements between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel.

In the spring of 1974 the State Department explained that the President and the Secretary of State had no "time" to issue a State of the World message. Nixon's preoccupation with Watergate and Kissinger's exhaustive efforts to prevent war in the Middle East were succeeded in early summer by the President's triumphal tour throughout the Middle East and his inconsequential final visit to Moscow. He returned to the tape scandal and resignation.

Something had gone wrong. The Middle East war, the oil embargo and energy crisis, the behavior of American allies and their economic vulnerability, all undermined the "structure of peace" based on détente, partnership and new centers of power. During the summer of 1974, Cyprus erupted in civil war as a group of Greek Cypriots, backed by the sagging military regime in Athens, overthrew Archbishop Makarios. Britain and the United States temporized, in effect favoring Greece and the coup-makers. To the surprise of London and Washington, Turkey invaded the island and the Greek colonels abdicated in favor of the self-exiled democrat and civilian Constantine Karamanlis.

The Turks used American weapons, supplied under NATO auspices, to capture two-thirds of Cyprus. This violated American law, and the Congress soon required a suspension of American arms supplies to Turkey unless there was "progress" toward resolving the dispute. Kissinger's magic touch was resisted by all parties, each bearing him grudges over his actions — or inaction — at the beginning of the crisis. No progress occurred; the Greeks withdrew their military forces from NATO, emulating the French; and the Turks were befuddled and angered by the Congressional cut-off.

The Ford Administration fared no better during the final, tortuous passage of the Trade Bill in December 1974, with its controversial linkage of limited ($300 million) trade credits to Soviet emigration policy. A complicated series of understandings — or misunderstandings — between the Soviet government, Dr. Kissinger and Senator Jackson was promptly invalidated when Moscow rejected the entire agreement. American allies in Western Europe, including financially pressed Britain, and Japan soon extended $8 billion in credits to the Soviet Union.



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The first quarter of 1975 harbored even greater problems for U.S. foreign policy. The military coup d'état that overthrew Portugal's dictatorship on April 25, 1974 had not led to the establishment of a new civilian government. Instead, an increasingly sinister alliance between a small group of officers and the Portuguese Communist Party (heavily financed by Moscow) moved the country steadily toward a new dictatorship, this time with a "neutralist" or "socialist" foreign policy. NATO's bases in Portugal and the American facility in the Azores Islands were jeopardized. Both the Western alliance and the United States seemed unable to assert their influence to protect common interests.

Events in Southeast Asia rapidly moved from the ominous to the disastrous. By early April, communist forces conquered Cambodia. The South Vietnamese retreat from indefensible positions became a rout. In the Middle East, Kissinger gambled on a new Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement which quickly fell afoul of major political differences; the Secretary's two-week shuttle mission ended in failure on March 23. Amid strained American-Israeli relations, President Ford ordered a "reassessment" of American policy in the Middle East. Reports from Washington indicated that a general reassessment of American foreign policy was also under way.

The State of the World address delivered by Ford to a joint session of Congress on April 10 gave little evidence of new thinking. As in the first message of 1970, much space was given to Vietnam, little to accomplishments, and a great deal to anticipated progress. Ford stated that the United States had more "consultation" and "equity" in its major alliances than ever before. Relations with the Soviet Union were more stable though still "competitive": progress on nuclear arms control had been registered in the Vladivostok agreement, the details of which were still to be revealed. The United States still retained its historic "opening" to China on the basis of the Shanghai communiqué. (Taiwan was not mentioned in the speech.) A new "dialogue" with Latin America, better relations with Africa, and U.S. leadership on new issues such as energy, food, environment and the law of the sea rounded out the achievements of U.S. foreign policy — and the Nixon Doctrine.

The President offered "straight talk" on Vietnam, comparing American — more specifically Congressional — refusal to sustain aid to Saigon with the increasing assistance extended to Hanoi by Moscow and Peking. Consequently, the 1973 Paris accords, violated openly by Hanoi, were ineffective. The United States had several options in the face of Saigon's declining military fortunes. To do nothing was unthinkable; to intervene militarily was impossible; to continue the old level of assistance was insufficient. So the President asked for a billion dollars instead of $300 million ($722 million for military as-



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sistance, the rest "humanitarian"); he also requested modification of the law against use of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia in order to provide military protection for an emergency evacuation of Americans and endangered South Vietnamese friends or employees. He hoped such assistance would "stabilize" the military situation and facilitate a political solution. American credibility was at stake and the world needed to be shown united American support behind foreign policy.

The rest of the speech was devoted to a broad discussion of other policy elements, stressing partnership with friends and allies, especially after Vietnam; more negotiation with potential adversaries; and progress on energy, raw material and environmental problems. The President chided Congress for its prohibition against U.S. military aid to Turkey, for the Trade Act's provisions on Soviet emigration policies, for economic discrimination against OPEC members that did not participate in the oil embargo. He promised continued peace initiatives in the Middle East. He declared that the Soviet-American relationship based on mutual restraint could not be sustained if the United States appeared to be weak and irresolute, and added his own slogan to the vocabulary of détente: "As long as I am President, we will not permit détente to become a license to fish in troubled waters. Détente must be a two-way street." With respect to China, he promised an acceleration in the improvement of relations.

The State of the World message closed with a review of "one of the finest success stories in our foreign policy . . . our cooperative effort with other major energy-consuming nations"; a vigorous defense of the intelligence services; a promise to maintain strong American military forces "in this critical hour"; and an appeal for unity, Congressional cooperation with Executive leadership, courage, constancy and compassion.

Ford's analysis and recommendations failed to address some of the major international problems facing America. On Soviet-American relations, his remarks did little to clarify the ambiguous meaning of détente and conflicting expectations of Soviet behavior. Kissinger had also failed to stem growing complaints that détente was a one-way street, particularly in the Middle East.

On March 7, 1974, testifying before the Senate Finance Committee on the Trade Bill, Secretary Kissinger defended his foreign policy achievements: "We ended the war in Vietnam under terms we had essentially laid down, made progress in the Middle East . . . settled the Berlin issue . . . . you cannot really find that we have been taken advantage of. . . ." In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on December 3, 1974, however, the Secretary of State admitted that Soviet actions during the Middle East war had violated the Principles signed so solemnly by Nixon and Brezhnev in June of 1973. In



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early April 1975, he was complaining that the Soviet and Chinese governments had made a mockery of the Paris accords. Détente notwithstanding, "potential adversaries" seemed to possess a "license to fish in troubled waters."

The President's speech portrayed a drastically curtailed Nixon Doctrine and a world hard pressed by reverses. There was no more talk of centers of power, only of more consultation among allies; the obstacles ahead in Chinese-American rapprochement were barely discussed. The President warned of a credibility crisis should Saigon not be assisted, but the program he offered was simply a higher level of aid long after the moment when such aid could effectively sustain the Paris accords.

The State of the World message offered a mixture of those concepts and policies of the Nixon era still thought to be defensible. It described the state of American foreign policy rather more than the actual international situation. The priority in that policy remains the preservation of détente with the Soviet Union. There is a belated shift to the theme of strengthening alliances and there are hints and traces of the old framework of the Nixon Doctrine. With more special pleading for unity than its predecessors, the speech bore witness that the six-year effort to create a new consensus had failed. Nonetheless, the President did not indicate any real reassessment of the major elements of the policy he inherited. Instead, he seemed to suggest that American interests abroad had been harmed more by Congressional intervention than by fundamental conceptual errors.

President Ford's first State of the World message advanced no new concepts, nor did it evidence any strong effort to revise inherited policies. Unless major changes are underway, however, the Administration will be troubled increasingly by Congressional and public sentiment that détente has become a "one-way street." The difficulties involved in a new partnership with allies are of long standing and will not be resolved by "better" consultation. Formidable economic and energy issues have been tackled largely in piecemeal fashion. Finally, as the United States and Western Europe appear to lose ground politically and militarily to the Soviet Union, the China "opening" may narrow perceptibly. Ford and Kissinger may soon be forced to recognize that no American consensus can be created in support of a foreign policy that no longer corresponds to international realities.

## Misstep in the Middle East

NEGOTIATIONS toward a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, begun so dramatically in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, had bogged down by the end of 1974. The separation of forces agreements among Egypt, Israel and Syria, reached through Secretary of State Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, took advantage of the military exhaustion and politi-



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cal weakness of all parties, providing them with a welcome respite. The step-by-step approach avoided the more delicate questions of the "final" settlement (such as the Palestinian issue) and demonstrated that there could be some Israeli withdrawal without infringing upon Israeli security. By appearing to confirm the basic Egyptian strategy of relying on the Soviet Union to make war in order to force the United States to make Israel withdraw, Dr. Kissinger's tactics left Moscow holding a temporarily useless card.

In the breathing space afforded by these agreements, Israel rebuilt her military position with American assistance. In addition to diplomacy and arms in the Middle East, the United States grappled with the energy crisis. Emergency sharing agreements were reached with other industrial nations. The economic decline of the oil-consuming states and their sixty-to-ninety-day petroleum stockpiles reduced their vulnerability to an embargo. Despite President Nixon's resignation and increasing controversy over Soviet behavior in the Middle East and elsewhere, Kissinger was able to preserve the détente and to sanctify it anew with President Ford at the Vladivostok summit.

The Arab states had not fared well. Egypt and the Soviet Union became dissatisfied with each other's basic strategy — the Soviets interested in "controlled tension" and a "package" settlement imposed by the powers, Egypt wary of further Soviet involvement and unable to accept the stalemate implied in "controlled tension." Sadat's American strategy cost him in military preparedness; Moscow retaliated by building up the Syrians through an impressive array of the most modern arms, while delaying spare parts and denying Egypt the same arms. Meanwhile, the Rabat Conference forbade individual political settlements with Israel and elevated the PLO as the "sole" representative of the Palestinians. This raised the Arabs' price for settlement while restricting their tactical flexibility. Secretary Brezhnev's scheduled January trip to Cairo stepped up the pressure for Soviet participation in negotiations — and for an urgent American effort to effect further Israeli withdrawal.

Brezhnev's trip was postponed, for reasons as yet unexplained. Although Soviet arms shipments — including MiG-23's — resumed in earnest, the time seemed ripe for an American political initiative. The Israelis were also interested. In a December 1974 interview, Premier Rabin argued frankly for an Israeli policy designed to gain more "time," even if this required further Israeli withdrawals in the context of "military" agreements. Egypt should be prevented from returning to Soviet influence and Israeli-American relations should be treated delicately. A military agreement between Egypt and Israel, with Egyptian "political" undertakings to the United States, might provide the ideal solution. By preventing another war, an oil embargo, and economic problems for the West, Israel's policy would not jeopardize President Ford's



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wishes for economic recovery. But in any case, where Egypt's political undertakings were to be indirect and secretive, that is, not directly with Israel, Rabin insisted that Israel's military position remain intact; specifically, "the passes in Sinai will remain in our hand."

Rabin's statements seemed to offer Kissinger some hope that a fresh Israeli-Egyptian agreement might prolong American domination of the negotiating process and protect the détente against further damage from the clash of U.S.-Soviet ambitions in the Middle East. He set out on February 9 to test the critical aspects of the situation, visiting Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. After a cheerless conference with President Assad, who was adamantly opposed to the "step" approach, Kissinger artfully referred to "the indispensable role of Syria in a final solution of the problems of the Middle East." On February 18, in London, he expressed the hope that "the Soviet Union will understand that any step toward peace is in the interest of everybody." Back in Washington, the Secretary concluded that progress had been made toward establishing a "framework" for negotiation.

Under Secretary of State Sisco gave a more substantial clue to both the framework and Dr. Kissinger's crucial problem when he declared in a television interview that the prospective agreement would have to gain the approval of Israel's parliament, the support of the Egyptian people, and "broad support" in the Arab world. This meant that Egypt could hardly break ranks with Syria or Saudi Arabia: Assad could drag Egypt into a war and Faisal's money and oil power were crucial to Egypt's position. The Syrians in turn were influenced by Moscow, which disliked and undercut Kissinger's approach from the start.

Given these strong suspicions and the chronic "outbidders" (Sadat's phrase) among his Arab brothers, the Egyptian President needed considerable Israeli concessions even to reach a purely military agreement with Israel. Even in February it was evident that Egypt would demand the return of the critical Mitla and Gidi passes through the Sinai mountain ranges and the Abu Rodeis oil fields, source of half of Israel's oil consumption. In effect, this would force Israeli military lines to the pre-June 1967 boundaries, strung out south to Sharm a Sheikh, with Israeli airpower withdrawn from the Bir Gifgafa airfields near the passes. Israel's oil supply would become dependent entirely upon the Shah of Iran, who was newly engaged in patching up his dispute with Iraq and increasing his financial and political stakes in good relations with the Arab states. In return, the Egyptian government could not give public political declarations unacceptable to Syria, Saudi Arabia and the "broad" Arab world. Foremost among these was nonbelligerency.

The "belligerency" issue had a long and unpleasant history. After the Israeli war for independence,



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Egypt and Israel signed a general armistice agreement at Rhodes on February 24, 1949, which prohibited "warlike and hostile acts." Despite this agreement and UN resolutions clarifying the intent of the armistice to end the military phase of the Palestine problem, Egypt persistently declared that a "state of war" or a state of "belligerency" existed with Israel, justifying seizure of Israeli or Israel-bound cargoes in the Suez Canal, a blockade of the Strait of Tiran, hostile propaganda and an economic boycott. Egypt's attitude conformed precisely to the traditional Islamic rule that temporary truces may be made with enemies of Islam, but not peace.

From the Israeli point of view, restoration of the armistice agreement through the cessation of belligerency would be the first step toward peace and a strong indication of Egypt's ultimate intentions. Nonetheless, Kissinger was apparently encouraged by Premier Rabin's remarks that Israel would not insist upon public declarations the Egyptians could not make. In addition, President Assad of Syria in a March 3 *Newsweek* interview seemed to moderate his opposition. Syria was interested in a new interim agreement with major simultaneous Israeli withdrawals on the Golan Heights and Sinai-Jordan fronts; the state of belligerency would be terminated after total Israeli withdrawal and establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; a formal peace treaty might be negotiated thereafter. Kissinger hailed this as a major breakthrough, signifying at least Syrian readiness not to interfere with the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, thus lending Egypt more flexibility. The negotiations could then concentrate upon the "nuances," including practical measures between Israel and Egypt on the one hand, and undertakings between Egypt and the United States on the other.

Other events lent urgency to the task of forging a fresh American diplomatic triumph. The rise of the Communist Party in the councils of Portugal's new military regime presented important problems for NATO. In addition, the Portuguese were unlikely to allow the American air bases in the Azores to be used again for the refueling of U.S. aircraft in a resupply effort for Israel.

Washington's preference for another interim agreement that could avoid deadlocks over main issues, keep the Egyptians out of Soviet clutches, and prevent war or embargo was already out of touch with the realities of March 1975. Unlike in the previous year, neither Egypt nor Israel was in such political or military distress that a separation of forces was mandatory. Furthermore, the main issues at hand could not be obscured by concentration on the modes. For Israel, the vital mechanism of exchanging territory for peace would be tried; Rabin and his government early adopted the principle that the extent of the withdrawal would depend on the quality of peace. For Egypt, the main principle of Sadat's strategy would be tested: Could the Ameri-



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cans force maximum military concessions out of Israel while allowing Egypt to minimize Moscow's influence, avoid a fresh military contest, and dominate the Arab war coalition?

Since the Egyptians had manifestly less political flexibility and it was in both U.S. and Israeli interests to consider Moscow's influence, the United States concluded from the start that Israel must make the greater concession. Nonbelligerency was out of the question; Sadat's frequent observation that the exchange of tourists and ambassadors was a matter for the next generation suggested that nonbelligerency was the maximum the Arabs would give even after total Israeli withdrawal and satisfaction of Palestinian rights. Instead, the Egyptians eventually offered to permit a UN force to occupy the passes under an annual mandate, after Israeli withdrawal; to "see" what could be done about propaganda and the boycott; and — most significantly — to pledge a "non-recourse" to force until the next agreement was reached. The Israelis were being asked to yield significant military positions in return for a new cease-fire agreement with a longer fuse.

During his fifteen-day shuttle between Egypt and Israel (March 9-23), Kissinger was unable to alter the Egyptian demand. In Jerusalem he admitted that no one could guarantee Egyptian behavior not to resort to force if war broke out on the Golan Heights. He was reduced to arguing that a bad agreement on this basis was still better than no agreement, for failure would restore Soviet influence in Cairo, increase military tension, face Israel with a hostile Soviet-Arab array in Geneva, and put strong European pressure on Washington.

At the worst possible moment, the rout of the South Vietnamese army and obvious Congressional reluctance to extend new military assistance to Saigon undermined Kissinger's prestige and arguments. The Israelis, profoundly uneasy with the Secretary's indirect style, discounted American influence in Cairo if the agreement should be violated and had good reason to doubt the Ford Administration's capability to execute foreign policy commitments. They feared that the proposed agreement would set a bad precedent: Israeli military concessions without Arab political concessions. It did not begin to satisfy the provision of UN Security Council *Resolution 242, which called for* the exchange of territory in return for peace. The weighty arguments in favor of an agreement — the Ford Administration's need for a diplomatic triumph, Israel's dependency on U.S. arms and money, and the danger that renewed tensions held for U.S.-Soviet détente — were countered by Israeli estimates that these conditions were likely to persist and that Israel would eventually face the same pressures even if she accepted the deal. In short, the agreement would give the United States and Israel a few more months of repose but would weaken Israel's



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military and diplomatic bargaining position later.

The Israeli coalition government was more united on a particular course of action than its past performances might have suggested. In the end, Israel did not depart from Premier Rabin's formula that an interim agreement of purely military character between Israel and Egypt was possible — but in that case the Sinai passes would not be yielded, for there must be no substantial change in Israel's military position. In the crucial discussions of the extraordinary Sabbath cabinet meeting, held on March 24, the government attempted a further compromise: half the passes and the oilfields in exchange for practical "elements" of nonbelligerency. Kissinger knew this was not enough. Pressure was brought to bear in the form of a stern letter from President Ford, promising a "reassessment" of American policy toward Israel if Jerusalem's intransigence stymied the negotiations — an ill-timed gesture that certainly stymied any inclination in the Israeli cabinet to yield to American pressure. The cabinet met again on Saturday, and a day later the U.S. Secretary of State announced officially the failure of his mission.

In his press conference of March 26, Kissinger acknowledged that the step-by-step approach had suffered a setback. A reassessment of U.S. policy — not directed against Israel — would be necessary. Within twenty-four hours Ford declared that had Israel been more flexible — "you can say [taken] a greater risk" — there might have been "real insurance for peace in the short haul as well as in the long pull." Kissinger himself, while in public refusing to affix blame, in private expressed chagrin at the Israeli position. The full orchestration of a great power's displeasure, ranging from canceled ministerial visits to delays in new military and financial agreements, surprised and angered the Israelis.

Were the Egyptians returning to Moscow in the wake of Kissinger's failure? Had the chances of war increased? For the moment, Sadat did not change course. He continued to stress that only the Americans could pressure Israel and complained about Moscow's arms and credit policies, which favored Syria. On March 29 he announced a three-month extension of the mandate for the UN force in Sinai and the reopening of the Suez Canal for June 5, leaving vague the question of Israel-bound cargoes. The Syrian government soon followed suit, extending the mandate of the UN force in the Golan to the same date as the Sinai force. These gestures, however, indicated only that the Arabs were unprepared to make war. The Kissinger mission had not failed Sadat entirely, for it had provoked an American-Israeli conflict.

The fragility of Middle East political relationships was exposed anew on March 25 when a deranged or vengeful nephew of King Faisal murdered the Saudi Arabian monarch. Within twenty-four hours, the new king Khaled



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had been selected, although effective authority was thought to reside in Crown Prince Fahd, with other personalities carefully balanced according to tribe and loyalty. The dead king, the new king and Fahd were all sons of the prolific founder of Saudi Arabia, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud. Khaled pledged to continue Faisal's policies intact, although there were hints of a less "centralized" administration.

Most commentators viewed Faisal's assassination as yet another blow to the U.S. position. Certainly Faisal had advertised himself (and had been regarded) as Washington's friend. Seventy years old at the time of death, he had governed Saudi Arabia since March 1964, replacing his brother Saud in a bloodless coup after the latter had brought the wealthy kingdom to near bankruptcy. Faisal proved to be a conservative reformer, inaugurating new development schemes and better economic management, within the framework of Islamic law and piety. His foreign policy was governed by his view that Zionism and communism were godless allies in a war against civilization which both Christian and Muslim states must oppose. He wanted U.S. support in strengthening his rule and his kingdom and in return would hamper the spread of "radicals" among the Arabs, which was in his interest anyhow. But the late king's reputation as a force for stability and a friend of the United States should not be exaggerated. Faisal launched an embargo against the United States in 1967, and another in 1973. He financed the Egyptian and Syrian war of October 1973 and gave millions to the PLO for its terror campaign.

The failure of the Kissinger mission and the death of Faisal unleashed no new forces in the Middle East; they simply reconfirmed the survival of old influences. Already there are signs that the American-Israeli quarrel will be patched over, although Jerusalem will be cooler to Dr. Kissinger in the future. The Soviets and Arabs are moving to resume the Geneva Conference, although Moscow wants to avoid immediate paralysis over the PLO. Foreign Minister Gromyko has begun to speak of "specific" guarantees for Israel with Soviet participation. In addition to private bilateral contacts, there were even rumors that the Soviet Union wished to resume diplomatic relations with Israel.

Sadat undoubtedly hopes that U.S.-Israeli relations have been damaged permanently by recent events. Meanwhile he has begun familiar maneuvers to strengthen the Arab war option. His Foreign Minister, Fahmy, has gone to Moscow for arms. Egypt and Syria have agreed to coordinate their policies in the presence of their main financier, King Khaled. Finally, efforts are afoot to draw Jordan once again into a reactivated "eastern front," presenting Israel with a potential three-front war.

Diplomatic developments in the Middle East have not been confined to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Iranian-Iraqi agreement signed in Algiers on March 6 re-



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lieved Iraq of the Kurdish rebellion while gaining for Iran uncontested passage through the Shatt al Arab waterway leading to the Persian Gulf. Paradoxically, the settlement of this long-festering dispute, assisted by the Egyptian President, has now promoted a Syrian-Iraqi quarrel deriving from ideological contention and Syrian control of the Euphrates irrigation levels through a Soviet-built dam.

All of this attests to the only conviction common to all parties in the Middle East dispute: a stalemate is intolerable. It is less tolerable for the Soviets and the Arabs than for the United States, and less tolerable for the United States than for Israel. Kissinger's year-and-a-half effort to achieve Israeli withdrawals without damaging the détente, risking Israeli security, or requiring major Arab political concessions, has foundered on the basic issues of territory, security, Arab intentions, Israeli fears and the Soviet arms supply. His Middle East gamble failed in the context of sharp American global reverses, amid increasing doubts over the effectiveness of American foreign policy. Strategic questions — the ultimate settlement, the U.S.-Israeli relationship, and the value of American guarantees — will soon be at the forefront, whether in Geneva or in further bilateral negotiation. Tested above all will be the American-Soviet détente, that semi-competition supposedly characterized by restraint and relaxation of tensions which remains the centerpiece of American foreign policy.

## Portugal Moves to the Left

SHORTLY after the overthrow of Premier Marcello Caetano in a smoothly executed military coup on April 25, 1974, the Armed Forces Movement promised the Portuguese people that a democratically elected government would rule Portugal in the future. The population's jubilant response to the portending demise of the fifty-year-old system of authoritarian rule was short-lived, however, as it became clear that the most likely outcome of the April coup would be the simple replacement of one dictatorship by another. All signs in the past several months point to the establishment of a leftist military dictatorship in Portugal.

The Armed Forces Movement took power with the express intention of relinquishing it to a popularly elected government within one year. But in the months since the coup controlling members of the AFM have completely reversed their original position and are now strongly determined to control the future course of Portuguese politics. Contributing to this striking shift in attitudes was an apparent recognition by the power-brokers within the AFM that the country would not freely elect to follow the leftist course they themselves favored. With the unswerving support of the Portuguese Communist Party, headed by Alvaro Cunhal, the AFM has moved steadily to ensure that its ideology will prevail in the country regardless of the presumedly countervailing wishes of the electorate.



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The slippage in the AFM's commitment to withdraw from politics became evident as early as last July, when the first cabinet appointed in the wake of the coup was reshuffled to effect a much greater representation of the military within its previously largely civilian ranks. Reportedly prompted by a desire to forestall the consolidation of political power by General Antonio Sebastiao Ribeiro de Spinola, the newly appointed President, and by the inability of cabinet members to reach a consensus on critical policy issues, the Armed Forces Movement replaced several civilian officials with military figures. In its most significant and politically prophetic decision at the time, it replaced Adelino de Palma Carlos, the civilian Premier, with Brigadier General Vasco dos Santos Goncalves, among the most radical leaders of the AFM and a reputed Marxist.

The AFM's assertiveness increased steadily thereafter. In September General Spinola was deposed, allegedly because he was plotting a return of authoritarianism to the recently liberated nation. General Francisco da Costa Gomes, a moderate member of the AFM although not a participant in the April coup, was appointed in his stead. On several occasions the AFM refused to extend government protection to conferences and rallies organized by moderate or rightist groups. Extreme leftist groups were similarly denied protection. Only the Communist Party was to receive the wholehearted support of the AFM's ruling members. By their refusal to intervene in the operation of the press, despite the skewed coverage resulting from the media's control by communist-dominated journalist unions, and by their sanctioning of a single, CP-dominated federation of trade unions, AFM leaders demonstrated unambiguously that the breadth of the political spectrum they would tolerate was narrowing to exclude all but the Communist Party and like-minded groups.

By the time the widely heralded constituent assembly elections were held, in late April 1975, they had been deprived of much of their original significance. The radical leftists in command of the Armed Forces Movement had effectively usurped the mandate of the assembly to draft a new constitution by making clear that they would not condone any document not compatible with their own philosophy. Premier Goncalves was distressingly explicit in delineating the assembly's latitude to propose a constitution. "We need," he noted, "a new, truly democratic constitution which guarantees the victories already achieved. The new constitution cannot go against the achievements of the Armed Forces Movement and the progressive forces of the Portuguese people. This new constitution cannot betray the spirit of the program of the AFM. This must be very clear in all our minds. . . . We shall not lose through elections what has cost the Portuguese so much."

In these circumstances, neither the elections to the constituent assembly nor the subsequent legislative assembly elections offer much hope for a reversal of the process



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by which Lisbon is rapidly being transformed from a rightist to a leftist dictatorship. At best, the elections may exercise some restraining influence on the AFM leadership by demonstrating the strength of centrist views within the population at large. That the people overwhelmingly favor a moderate political course was shown conclusively by the April 25 elections. With 90 per cent of the population voting, the Socialists and the Popular Democrats garnered almost 65 per cent of the total vote. The Communist Party and its ally, the Popular Democratic Movement, received less than 17 per cent of the electorate's support. Because the AFM to date has manifested little deference to public opinion, however, alienated groups acting extralegally appear to represent the only potential for aborting the transition to the left.

Disaffected elements within the armed forces remain the most probable source of effective opposition to continued rule by the Supreme Council. It is quite likely that the bulk of Portugal's military forces are alienated from the philosophies of the Goncalves leadership. The AFM comprised only a relatively small percentage of the armed forces, and it was itself cross-cut by a number of different political philosophies and was unable to reach a consensus on anything other than the desirability of dismantling Portugal's colonial system and ousting Caetano.

That pools of dissatisfaction exist within the military was evidenced most dramatically in mid-March, when officers opposed to the politics of the Goncalves regime attempted a countercoup. Because the coup was so ineptly executed, speculation arose that it was masterminded by the regime to justify a pre-planned purge of its military opposition. Officers who fled into exile after the abortive coup have not denied that there actually was such an attempt but have suggested that it was triggered by rumors spread by the regime to the effect that mass executions were imminent.

The leftist leaders of the AFM moved rapidly to extirpate opposition within the Movement's own ranks, the military forces as a whole and the Portuguese business community. Within days of the March 11 coup attempt, the AFM peremptorily discharged the Council of State, Junta of National Salvation, and Coordinating Commission of the AFM and announced that political power would henceforth be wielded by a leftist-dominated and exclusively military Supreme Council of the Revolution. Unseating the moderates who had only recently defeated more radical officers in elections to councils of the army and air force, the AFM leadership also reconstituted the Assembly of the Armed Forces to diminish the influence of moderate officers.

Despite these moves, it remains unlikely that all potentially dangerous resistance within the military has been quashed. Reportedly, broad segments of the armed forces and the internal security police remain alienated from the Goncalves leadership and unre-



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liable in the event of a confrontation with the Premier's opponents. While the departure of General Spinola has deprived moderate and conservative officers of a readily available, popular and legitimate leader, dissident officers may yet stage a successful coup, encouraged by the results of the recent elections to the constituent assembly.

A more amorphous source of danger to the long-term survival in power of the Goncalves leadership is the economy. Long stagnant under the Salazar and Caetano regimes, the Portuguese economy is plagued by the highest inflation rate in Western Europe, a severely depressed agricultural sector, and massive unemployment, although the latter is hidden by large-scale emigration of the civilian labor force to Western Europe. Long-suffering but buoyed by the promise of an energized economy following the change of regime, the Portuguese population may be unwilling to tolerate silently the setbacks that could result from ideologically motivated nationalization of key economic sectors.

The present constellation of political power may shift as a result of forces internal to the leadership as well, since the durability of the mutually convenient alliance between the radical AFM leadership and the Portuguese Communist Party is uncertain. The Communist Party has been the AFM's most ardent supporter, having identified the Movement early on as the most probable fount of political power in post-Caetano Portugal. Its interest in maintaining the alliance for the indefinite future is obviously related to its inability to gain power otherwise, since it commands no force comparable to that of the Movement and enjoys the support of no more than about 17 per cent of the electorate.

However, AFM interest in the PCP is not as compelling, even though the radical AFM members share many of the communists' philosophical predispositions. Both groups, for example, seem determined to impose rigid political restrictions on the nine million Portuguese people and to break the hold over the economy of a relatively small number of families in the process. In addition, the AFM is quite willing to capitalize on the Communist Party's control of the trade union movement, although that control appears to be waning.

It is in the sphere of foreign policy that interests may diverge sufficiently to abrogate the alliance. The speed with which Lisbon opened diplomatic relations with Moscow and several East European nations, as well as the variety and frequency of missions thereafter exchanged, indicates that the AFM is as interested as the Communist Party in expanding relations with communist states. The establishment of a special interministerial commission chaired by Premier Goncalves and including Socialist Party leader and former Foreign Minister Mario Soares as well as Cunhal as members, to handle relations with the Soviet Union demon-



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strates that the AFM also shares the Communist Party's predilection for a more radical approach to relations with Moscow than the Foreign Ministry might be expected to take.

There nevertheless exists a potential for a clash between PCP inclinations and those of the AFM concerning the extent to which Lisbon-Moscow relations should be improved and the status of Lisbon's ties to NATO, the European Community and the United States. To date, the year-old regime has temporized on the question of Portugal's continued membership in NATO and the future status of the Lajes Air Force Base in the Azores. The signals issued have been conflicting, as President Costa Gomes stresses the importance of NATO to Portugal, Goncalves maintains that the issue will ultimately be decided by the representatives of the people, and a Portuguese representative in Washington affirms the nation's membership in the alliance.

The Azores base has been subject to similar obfuscation. Goncalves stated flatly that the Azores would not be available for use against the Arab nations but added, in the same breath, that the question of U.S. use of the Azores in the event of another Middle East war would be decided at the time at the highest levels. Negotiations on the Azores base have been suspended by mutual agreement, apparently because neither the U.S. nor the Portuguese governments is ready to formalize the type of U.S. access.

While CP leader Cunhal has not objected outright to the continuation of either Lisbon's membership in NATO or the U.S.-Portuguese agreement on the Azores — contenting himself with the statement that "Castro can accept his Guantanamo and I can accept the Azores" — he presumably remains opposed to the nation's participation in the North Atlantic alliance and its extension of Azores facilities to the United States. Nor could he have been pleased that President Ford was the first foreign leader to be visited by a post-Caetano head of state.

Whether this split will persist is unclear. The Salazar and Caetano regimes perceived both the Azores agreement and Lisbon's membership in NATO as satisfying security concerns, extending sorely needed prestige to the country, ensuring military and financial assistance, and according with their own fierce opposition to communism. The current regime is neither concerned about a Soviet threat to Portuguese security nor, obviously, philosophically opposed to communism. It is doubtful, moreover, that a regime of the AFM's political complexion would see any prestige deriving from membership in NATO. *Financial* considerations are likely to continue as a factor favoring continued participation, as is the opposition within some sections of the military that is likely to be aroused should Portugal pull out of NATO or the Azores agreement.

If balancing the country's diverse and conflicting interests in NATO results in a decision by the AFM to remain within the organ-



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ization or to continue to allow the United States access to the Azores, these decisions could have a disruptive effect on the PCP-AFM alliance. A similar effect could result from an extended association agreement with the European Community, although negotiations between Lisbon and Brussels are currently suspended because of the uncertain political conditions in Lisbon. Whether PCP-AFM disagreement on foreign policy escalates to an actual rupturing of their alliance, however, will depend to a large degree on whether the AFM decides to oust the CP from the government. The CP is unlikely to initiate a complete break because it has nowhere else to go.

Already, the PCP's role in the events in Portugal since last April has had repercussions elsewhere in Western Europe. Most noticeably affected was the Italian Communist Party, which had the misfortune to be holding its national congress just when the Portuguese Christian Democratic Party was banned from participating in the upcoming elections. The Italian Christian Democratic Party, in attendance at the PCI congress, demanded that the party dissociate itself from the Portuguese Communist Party and walked out of the congress when such a statement was not immediately forthcoming. Although the PCI congress ended with a disavowal of the PCP, the incident and the events in Portugal are expected to lead to a decline in Communist Party support in the Italian elections scheduled for June and to a setback in PCI chances for participation in government. Heads of leftist parties elsewhere in Western Europe have expressed concern that the Portuguese experience could ultimately benefit conservative parties throughout the area, as voters respond by shifting their allegiances toward more conservative forces in fear of a replay of the Portuguese experience.

The restraint with which Moscow has welcomed developments in Portugal apparently stems from apprehensions similar to those expressed by European leftist leaders. Too warm an embrace of the new Portuguese regime, Moscow seems to fear, would discourage the emergence of similar regimes in other countries and adversely affect the Soviet effort to persuade the West that it is more interested in stabilizing and expanding East-West relations than in overturning noncommunist governments. The most outspoken gesture by Moscow vis-à-vis Lisbon during the past year has been its request for fishing fleet facilities at Madeira, although numerous delegations have been exchanged between the two countries.

The response by the West to the evolution of Portuguese politics since April 1974 has also been muted, although several NATO countries, including the United States, have voiced their concern to Lisbon about the latter's movement away from a commitment to democracy. The only concrete action to date by NATO has been its exclusion of Portugal from discussions in the organization's



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Nuclear Planning Group and the imposition of restrictions on Lisbon's access to classified information. Problems for the alliance, which lacks a mechanism to oust a member nation, may arise if Portugal continues to shift leftward but refuses to withdraw from NATO.

The two primary goals of the Armed Forces Movement have been substantially achieved in the brief period since the 1974 coup. Premier Caetano has retired into oblivion, and Portugal's empire is well on its way into history. Perhaps most significant to the Portuguese population, however, is the AFM's failure to reintroduce democracy to Portugal, a failure which has only small prospects of being rectified in the near future.

## Indochina: "Peace" is at Hand

INITIATION of the long-awaited communist spring offensives in Indochina gave North Vietnam, together with its Viet Cong, Khmer Rouge and Pathet Lao allies, a series of victories that brought Hanoi within reaching distance of its principal goals: the subjugation of Indochina and supremacy in mainland Southeast Asia.

The precariousness of the military situation in Cambodia and South Vietnam, and to a different extent in Laos, had long been apparent to most strategic analysts. Neither the 1973 Paris "peace" accords nor the Nobel Prizes awarded to two of their principals had sufficed to guarantee anything remotely approximating peace in the region. The fragile coalition in Laos, which had given de facto recognition to the partition of that country between communist and noncommunist forces, seemed likely to continue only so long as Hanoi's attention was concentrated on South Vietnam. In South Vietnam, the progressive growth in North Vietnamese combat strength, coupled with a substantial increase in the levels of Soviet and Chinese military aid and an equally substantial decrease in U.S. aid to Saigon, brought about a significant deterioration in the country's military position. The International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), hamstrung by the opposition of the Hungarian and Polish contingents, was ineffectual, as were diplomatic protestations by some Western states about North Vietnamese violations of the 1973 accords. Finally, events in Cambodia seemed to be moving inexorably toward the demise of the noncommunist government in Phnom Penh, which by early spring controlled little more than the capital city and a few enclaves.

The end came first in Cambodia. Despite Administration appeals, the U.S. Congress consistently opposed any substantial increases in military or humanitarian assistance. A Congressional fact-finding team, which included some outspoken opponents of U.S. involvement in Indochina, did return with recommendations that enough aid be given to get Phnom Penh through the monsoon season and, possibly, improve the chance



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of a negotiated settlement. But the situation had worsened rapidly in the meantime. With fighting between Khmer Rouge and government forces taking place on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, Lon Nol relinquished control of the government and sought sanctuary elsewhere. Several other high-ranking officials did likewise, although many — including Premier Long Boret — remained behind. In mid-April, after an emergency airborne evacuation of several hundred U.S. and other civilians from Phnom Penh and the abandonment of the U.S. Embassy, the Cambodian government capitulated to the Khmer Rouge. Five years of war had ended.

Although the United States had hoped a communist victory in Cambodia could be forestalled, the loss of that country was not unexpected. The South Vietnam debacle, however, caught most observers by surprise. It began in early March with the opening of a North Vietnamese offensive against several positions in the Central Highlands. Within two weeks, the South Vietnamese armed forces (ARVN) sustained a defeat at Ban Me Thuot and lost that key provincial capital to the communists. That defeat, plus the belief of the four ARVN corps commanders that the military situation in the north and Central Highlands had turned against them, prompted President Nguyen Van Thieu to order the evacuation of the northern and highland provinces in order to concentrate his forces in the more populous coastal regions. Thieu and his generals, while reluctant to abandon provinces that had been defended at great cost in both the 1968 "Tet" and 1972 "Easter" communist offensives, obviously felt that the increasingly unfavorable balance of power in those areas made such a move unavoidable.

The South Vietnamese move was strategically correct, yet it turned out to be a fatal error. The ARVN withdrawal, which prompted the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees first toward the coastal areas and then southward, was poorly planned and poorly executed. It quickly degenerated into a rout, unraveling defenses and causing the loss of the two northern corps areas in their entirety. Hué was abandoned, Da Nang fell virtually without a fight, and the other coastal cities and provinces fell in rapid succession. More disturbing to military analysts was the disintegration of Saigon's best divisions, coupled with the almost unimpeded advance of communist forces southward. A temporary stand outside Saigon and in the Delta only delayed President Thieu's resignation, the collapse of the forces defending Saigon and the Delta region, and the final unconditional surrender by President Duong Van Minh.

An immediate politico-military question was why South Vietnam had collapsed so quickly after its armed forces had fought well in recent years. The final brief defense of the Saigon area suggested that the disintegration of the elite northern formations was not in-



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dicative of an inability or unwillingness to fight. Instead, the ARVN had simply attempted the most difficult of all military operations — a fighting withdrawal — and had not been capable of the effort. Once begun, the disintegration could not be halted until the retreating units literally outpaced the pursuing communists. The brief respite thus gained permitted a determined stand in the Saigon area, but by that time the military situation had deteriorated to such a point that even direct U.S. military intervention might not have been able to stabilize it.

This raises questions about the degree of U.S. responsibility for the defeat, no matter how politically sensitive they may be. In his April 10 address to the Congress, President Ford stated the obvious — if embarrassing — point that since 1973 the preservation of an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam had been contingent on two conditions: (1) U.S. determination to guarantee North Vietnam's compliance with the Paris accords, and (2) continuation of American military aid to South Vietnam at a level sufficiently high to allow it to defend itself. Passage of the War Powers Act in August 1973 precluded action to force Hanoi to abide by its treaty obligations, and steady Congressional reduction of the level of U.S. military aid meant that the United States reneged on its own explicit pledge and thus significantly reduced the mobility and material readiness of the ARVN.

The net impact of these developments produced a psychological malaise in South Vietnam as destructive as the material deficiencies. It became clear to Saigon's forces — and particularly to their commanders — that the days of further U.S. support were numbered. Equally clear was the fact that Soviet and Chinese support for North Vietnam not only continued but was increasing rapidly, in gross violation of the Paris accords. Under the combination of lessened American backing, Hanoi's stepped-up aggression, and the disruption of the ARVN forces in the withdrawal from the highlands, *sauve qui peut* became the understandable (if self-defeating) policy. President Ford's appeal to the Congress on April 10 for $722 million in military aid for South Vietnam plus $250 million in humanitarian aid, and for authorization to use U.S. forces to evacuate South Vietnamese who had supported the war effort, received little support from the representatives of the American people — or from the people themselves.

In his resignation speech on April 21, President Thieu claimed that South Vietnam had been betrayed and abandoned by the United States, which he said had pledged to support Saigon in the event of a renewed North Vietnamese offensive. Opponents of U.S. intervention in the war responded that any such guarantees had no legal standing. Nevertheless, there is considerable truth to the remark made by South Vietnam's Ambassador to the United States, Tran Kim Phuong, that



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"probably it is safer to be an ally of the communists and it looks like it is fatal to be an ally of the United States" — at least in the absence of any clear-cut U.S. success in a conflict.

For the foreign policy community, the central issue is the impact of the Indochinese collapse on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and the credibility of U.S. commitments. A sharp political debate in the United States over the causes of the failure of America's Indochinese policy seems certain, with a good chance of reopening divisive questions about responsibility for the outcome. What course that debate will take cannot be ascertained. Meanwhile it seems likely that the credibility of U.S. commitments to other nations will be adversely affected, as much by the U.S. attitude toward the final collapse of Cambodia and South Vietnam as by the fact of that collapse. While the foreign reaction to what appears to be a combination of political inconstancy and moral apathy on the part of the United States will be felt most strongly in Southeast Asia, it will also have profound consequences elsewhere.

There now seems to be more substance to the much-denigrated "domino theory" than some critics of U.S. policy have been willing to grant. Military defeat in Indochina does not necessarily mean the overrunning of the rest of Southeast Asia, but it means a substantial deterioration in the U.S. position in that area. Neutralism in Laos seems likely to be an early victim of the communist conquest of the rest of Indochina. Australia and Japan have raised serious questions about the credibility of U.S. defense guarantees. The Philippines and South Korea have expressed similar reservations, but in a sharper manner. Indonesia, one of the staunchest anti-communist states since the abortive 1965 communist coup, moved toward an accommodation with Hanoi, as did Malaysia and Singapore. Thailand, too, has called for both the withdrawal of U.S. forces by 1976 and a political accommodation with Hanoi and other communist states.

One of the problems with linkage politics at any level is that failure in one area is even more likely than success to spill over into other areas. Thus, while a success in one part of the world (e.g., Indochina) *may* increase the possibility of success in other disputes, the bankruptcy of America's Indochinese policy will almost certainly impede U.S. diplomatic efforts elsewhere. President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger are endeavoring to reassure other American allies — especially the NATO nations, Japan and Israel — that the United States will stand by its commitments to them. Nonetheless, all of our allies are likely to take a far more cautious view of U.S. support henceforth. Their own interest requires it, for few countries will see any advantage in depending strongly on a "protector" whose willingness to support them *under conditions of protracted adversity* has less credibility today than at any



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other time since the end of World War II.

Finally, the events attending the collapse of Indochina under communist assault have been instructive on three points. First, the utility to the United States of détente — already called into question because of developments in the Middle East and Portugal — has diminished. Détente all too clearly means an agreement by the United States to restrain itself and its allies, coupled with a willingness by the Soviet Union and China to take advantage of that restraint.

Second, the massive outpouring of refugees in the face of communist advances cast little doubt on the South Vietnamese people's governmental preferences. Even knowing that flight would entangle them in the continuing combat, peasants and urban residents again "voted with their feet" to express their opposition to the communists. Thieu may not have been our idea of a good leader, but the South Vietnamese knew what the alternative was. This lesson should not have needed explaining. Given the opportunity, large numbers of Cubans, East Germans, North Koreans, Hungarians and other peoples have chosen flight rather than communism, and there was no reason to assume that the South Vietnamese (many of whom had previously fled North Vietnam after 1954) should feel otherwise.

Above all, there was a depressing lack of firm leadership in Washington as the defeat unfolded. Individual Americans, particularly those who assisted in the flight of Vietnamese orphans to the United States, performed better than either the Executive or the Congress. In part, this was undoubtedly due to the conflict of interests between a Republican Administration and a Democratic Congress, with all the consequences that division of authority can have on U.S. policy. In part, it reflected a barely disguised wish to be done with Southeast Asia — perhaps understandable in a people who had become disenchanted with the Indochina war, but a catastrophe for the peoples of Cambodia and South Vietnam. In the aftermath of the Indochina tragedy, our policy may recover a sense of direction, and other states may stand with us if only for the lack of a better alternative. But a substantial part of our prestige and our credibility is gone, perhaps beyond recovery.



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# THE UNITED STATES AND THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION

*by Harold C. Hinton*

THE only major powers that are at all likely to go to war with each other in the near future are the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It is practically certain that were they to do so on a large scale the outcome, whatever its exact shape, would include a defeat for China, a serious destabilization of the Far Eastern balance, and a material setback to American interests.

All this has been true since 1969. Inasmuch as there has been no Sino-Soviet war, however, the world has tended to become anesthetized to the problem. It is perhaps partly for this reason that Peking has been trying since 1973 to recapture the world's attention and focus it on Moscow by asserting that the main thrust of Soviet "expansionism" is in the direction variously of Europe, the Middle East, the United States or Japan, rather than China. Furthermore, the Chinese defense budget, and the ICBM program in particular, has evidently been cut somewhat since the fall of Lin Piao in 1971, and Peking would therefore appear irresponsible if it did not portray the Soviet threat as diminished while in reality continuing to counter it energetically by means of a combination of political and military methods.

Underneath this calmer surface, the Sino-Soviet confrontation remains as serious as ever in its potentialities. Indeed there are reasons to regard the 1974 and 1975 military campaigning seasons as one of the most tense and dangerous periods since 1969. It may be, therefore, that the United States should do more than it has done so far to promote its interests with respect to the Moscow-Peking confrontation.

One of the reasons is that China's nuclear missile force continues to grow and has more or less reached the point where it could hit major Soviet cities, possibly including Moscow, and even survive to some extent a Soviet first strike. This is a situation that must seriously disturb the Soviet leadership, in view of its often repeated and at least partly sincere insistence that Peking is militarist, expansionist and bitterly anti-Soviet. From the Soviet point of view there is obviously a case to be made for attacking this



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menace before it grows even worse. Such action might hope not only to dispose of the Chinese threat but to demonstrate to the rest of the world the risks of an anti-Soviet course.

A second reason is Moscow's apparent recovery from the initial shock administered by the remarkable Sino-American détente, which on the Chinese side has been motivated greatly by a desire for a counterweight — there has been no question of an actual guarantee or shield — against what has been perceived as a formidable Soviet threat. It has become clear that the United States regards its relationship with the Soviet Union as more important to its interests than its relationship with China. Conspicuous illustrations of this point are the fact that President Nixon conferred with Brezhnev three times but with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai only once, and that in the autumn of 1973 Secretary Kissinger postponed a scheduled visit to China because of a Middle East war in which the Soviet Union was involved to some degree. This sort of thing appears to have diminished the effectiveness of the Sino-American détente as a restraint on possible Soviet military action against China.

Third, there have been incidents between China and the Soviet Union since the beginning of 1974 that have tended to increase the level of tension. These seem in some measure to have grown out of the political resurgence, beginning in the summer of 1973, of the extreme radicals in China, who favor a dual adversary strategy — i.e., one of simultaneous struggle against, or defiance of, American "imperialism" and Soviet "social-imperialism." Although Premier Chou En-lai, who holds a more moderate view, retained effective control over China's foreign policy and remained probably the most important single influence in its domestic politics as well, at least down to his illness of mid-1974, he evidently found it advisable not to try to prevent a limited radicalization in both fields.

Since as long ago as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Chou himself has skillfully cultivated the image of a Soviet threat as a means of promoting the restabilization of China's domestic politics and the normalization of its foreign relations, which he desires as a corrective to the near-chaos induced by the Cultural Revolution. His efforts toward this end have been made easier and more effective because the threat is real, not imaginary. Chou has found the image of a Soviet threat, and to some degree the political ferment generated by the radicals as well, useful as an aid in reducing the power of the Military Region commanders —



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that of the central military establishment having already been diminished through the purge of Defense Minister Lin Piao and his immediate supporters in 1971. In December 1973 the eight most powerful Military Region commanders were transferred, without being awarded political positions and power in their new bailiwicks comparable to those they had accumulated in their former ones.

It is probably significant that this important step was taken at a time when Moscow was still somewhat preoccupied with the Middle East, and when the onset of winter had made military operations in Inner Asia difficult; at minimum, the timing may have helped Chou to rebut possible charges that the transfers would tend to weaken China's defenses and might invite a Soviet attack. The process of reducing the influence of the regional military, Chou's problem on the right, almost inevitably involved concessions to the radicals, his problem on the left. It was less damaging to make these concessions in the field of foreign policy, by way of a carefully limited revival of the dual adversary strategy, than in domestic politics, where Chou continued to "go against the tide" (a currently fashionable phrase in China) of the radical resurgence.

On January 20, 1974, Peking executed a virtually classic exercise in the dual adversary strategy. A Chinese attack drove South Vietnamese forces off the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Although on the face of it this affair represented a blow at a client of the United States, it is also true that Soviet naval vessels had been sighted in the area shortly before, and that North Vietnam as well as South Vietnam claims the Paracels. Peking may have wanted to reassert its own claim partly out of fear that in the event of Hanoi acquiring control over South Vietnam it might allow the Soviet Union a base on the islands in accordance with Moscow's slogan of Asian "collective security," which Peking abominates. At the same time, Peking expelled three Soviet diplomats and two of their wives on the charge of espionage and made the affair the occasion for a fresh wave of anti-Soviet propaganda.

In March an incident occurred that was potentially more serious, because the Soviet military evidently feel acute concern over Peking's capabilities and intentions and resent intensely any Chinese action against themselves, notably Lin Piao's ambush of a Soviet unit on the Ussuri River on March 2, 1969. On March 14, 1974, a Soviet helicopter with three men aboard strayed across



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the Central Asian border and fell into Chinese hands. In demanding the men's return, Moscow asserted, first privately and then publicly, that they had been on a medical evacuation mission and had not intended to violate the border. On the other hand, the area in question is about 2,000 miles from Moscow, approximately the range of an IRBM. It seems possible that the helicopter crew had been reconnoitering, from the air or even on the ground, Chinese missile sites on which work had been suspended for the winter, and had been prevented by bad weather or mechanical trouble from returning to the Soviet side of the border. The fact that their comrades did not attempt a rescue in response to their radio appeal for help tends to reinforce the plausibility of this interpretation.

Peking delayed its first public comment on the incident until March 23, by which time it had reason to feel more secure because the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, David Bruce, had returned the day before after an absence of several weeks. It was also the day before Secretary Kissinger was due to arrive in Moscow and therefore an appropriate occasion for Peking to remind him and the world that his Soviet hosts were not to be trusted; the Chinese statement did this by accusing the helicopter crew of espionage.

A recent Soviet émigré who lived in Irkutsk before leaving the USSR has stated that the usual tension in that area over the Chinese menace (as it is perceived to be) was increased in April 1974 by a serious Sino-Soviet clash on the Sino-Mongolian border, which was not reported in the press of either side or in the West.

On May 3 Moscow warned in seemingly threatening language of "inevitable consequences" if the helicopter crew were not returned soon. This threat may not have been quite so menacing as it appeared, however. It almost coincided with the May Day celebration, which in the Soviet case has not included a military parade since 1968, probably because in 1969 the Soviet military had worried their civilian colleagues by making too much propaganda on their own behalf out of the tension on the Sino-Soviet border. The May 3, 1974 statement may have been intended in part to compensate them for their continued absence from the May Day celebration and as a response to their pleas for further action on behalf of the helicopter crew.

In any case, Peking faced a difficult dilemma, the solution to which is not clear even yet. On the one hand, to try, convict and punish the helicopter crew would further provoke an already



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dangerously aroused adversary. On the other hand, simply to return the crew would open Chou En-lai to potentially damaging charges from his radical critics of being soft on "social-imperialism." (Furthermore, Chou may regard a moderate increase in the level of Sino-Soviet tension as useful if it reassures anyone in the United States who fears that recent strains in the Sino-American relationship stemming from the resurgence of the Chinese radicals might foreshadow a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.) In the fall of 1974, as the approach of another winter promised to militate soon against military action in Inner Asia, high Chinese officials began to indicate to visiting foreigners that the crew would in fact be tried.

Meanwhile, Leonid Ilyichev, head of the Soviet delegation to the Sino-Soviet border talks that have been in progress intermittently in Peking since October 1969, returned to Peking after an absence of roughly a year, but only for a few weeks. The talks evidently continue to make little progress. They have been concerned recently with a serious dispute over the location of the border near the junction of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, a perennial focus of tension because of its proximity to the Soviet city of Khabarovsk.

On November 6, 1974, Peking sent a relatively conciliatory message to Moscow on the occasion of the October Revolution's anniversary. Unlike some earlier Chinese statements, it did not describe the differences of "principle" (i.e., of ideology and vital national interest) between the two sides as irreconcilable, and it did not insist that the early Sino-Russian boundary treaties be recognized as "unequal." It proposed a nonaggression pact, something Moscow had been suggesting since 1971, but seemed to link it with an agreement on a mutual troop withdrawal from the border, something Moscow has been resisting since 1969. It stated, with what degree of accuracy is uncertain, that its two demands had been accepted by Premier Kosygin in September 1969.

The Chinese message to Moscow seems to have arisen largely out of Peking's belief that the United States had come to take China's bad relations with the Soviet Union for granted and, as a result, had gained a sense of confidence that Peking found uncomfortable. Chinese leaders evidently wanted to de-emphasize their differences with the Soviet Union at the time of the Ford-Brezhnev summit meeting at Vladivostok — Peking indicated in private that it had no objection to the chosen site, while expressing some public reservations for propaganda effect — and promote



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a seventh Kissinger visit to China, which indeed took place after the Vladivostok summit. The main Chinese interest in this Kissinger visit was to invite President Ford to China, in order to balance the Vladivostok summit and involve him personally in Sino-American relations as President Nixon had been involved. Similarly, it is probably significant that Brezhnev's rejection of the proposals contained in the Chinese message of November 6 was postponed until November 26, after the Vladivostok summit. In reality, this episode provided no convincing evidence of important change in the shape of the confrontation. Peking's public demand for an agreement on a mutual troop withdrawal tends to confirm the view that the Soviet military buildup near the border is still a source of serious and justified — although not always acknowledged — concern to the Chinese side.

In his speech to the National People's Congress in January 1975, Chou En-lai repeated a cliché of current Maoist propaganda by asserting that the "fierce contention" between the United States and the Soviet Union "is bound to lead to world war some day," a meaningless statement except that it may be designed to disrupt the Soviet-American détente, which Peking finds objectionable. Of greater interest and significance was Chou's "advice" to the "Soviet leadership to sit down and negotiate honestly, do something to solve a bit of the problem and stop playing such deceitful tricks." On reflection, however, this "advice" appears to have been a bit of posturing for effect at home and abroad, especially in the United States. Chou must have known that the Soviet delegation to the border talks would soon return to Peking (it did so in mid-February) and must have hoped that its return would be interpreted as acceptance of his "advice." While a breakthrough in the border talks is always a possibility, there is no concrete sign of one yet, and if one occurs it will be on the strength of something more substantial than Chou's "advice."

The rapid North Vietnamese and Viet Cong advances in the early months of 1975 brought the long war in South Vietnam to a close in late April. This sudden development presumably eliminates, or at least greatly reduces, Hanoi's need for Soviet (as well as Chinese) war matériel, including what had been moving across China by rail. Moscow's felt need to keep matériel moving to North Vietnam, for the sake of its effect both on the military situation in Indochina and on Soviet credibility as the main champion of the worldwide communist cause, should be correspondingly reduced. Similarly, an end of the war probably reduces



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the damage to its prestige that Moscow would suffer in the eyes of the international Left in the event it attacked China: "united action" on behalf of North Vietnam would no longer be necessary. In short, one disincentive to such an attack was removed with the end of the Vietnam war.

## II

A confrontation as serious as the one between China and the Soviet Union could have arisen only out of a prolonged political dispute.

After Stalin's death, and especially after 1959, the relatively close relationship that had existed during his last years gave way to a vituperative adversary relationship focusing on a variety of ideological and political issues. This dispute escalated rapidly after the surfacing in late 1962 of acute policy and propaganda differences between Moscow and Peking over the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian border war. In 1963 and 1964, for the first time in public, Peking rashly reminded Moscow and the world of the existence of a historic dispute over the location of the Sino-Soviet border and implied that it wanted the return of at least some of the territory taken from the Manchus by the Tsars. More recently, and especially since 1969, Peking has backed away from this dangerous position and has insisted that it is demanding no more than minor adjustments of the existing frontier and a formal Soviet admission that the original boundary treaties were "unequal," or in other words unjust and invalid because imposed by force. Moscow has failed to acknowledge publicly that it understands Peking is not actually claiming large tracts of Soviet territory, probably because such an admission would deprive the Soviet side of an emotionally charged propaganda issue.

In about 1960 Chinese military personnel, presumably at the direction of newly appointed Defense Minister Lin Piao, began to stage small-scale crossings of the Sino-Soviet border, probably to demonstrate contempt for and defiance of the "paper bear" of Soviet "revisionism." Although the Soviets were irritated by this development, it was apparently not until 1965 that Moscow began to feel alarm at what it took to be an emerging Chinese military threat to Asia, including Soviet Asia. In that year Peking began to construct an ICBM testing range, and the beginning of an official Japanese campaign to recover jurisdiction over Okinawa from the United States suggested that American regional containment of China from the east might soon come to an end. Accordingly,



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Soviet forces, including offensive ones, were introduced early in 1966 into the Mongolian People's Republic, where only a few hundred miles of fairly easy terrain lie between them and Peking. During the next few years Moscow began trying to bring Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact and succeeded in rewording its bilateral alliances with the East European countries so that they apply against "any state or group of states," obviously including China.

Moscow's concern over its Chinese problem mounted higher than ever during the Cultural Revolution, mainly because the sacred principle of rule by a communist party apparatus was being violently flouted, and because Chinese militants staged provocative anti-Soviet demonstrations along the border.

The conviction prevailing among these militants, evidently including Lin Piao, that the Soviet Union was a paper bear, received a rude shock from the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the subsequent proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which seemed to suggest that Moscow was reserving the right to intervene similarly in China or any other "socialist" country. Furthermore, the invasion was obviously designed in part as a lesson to West Germany, with which Moscow had been charging (falsely) that Peking was in some sort of collusion. Upon reflection, however, Lin, who was Mao Tse-tung's designated successor and a leading exponent of the dual adversary strategy, saw no sufficient reason to change his mind. Mainly for domestic political reasons and evidently in the belief that Moscow was too "revisionist" and too preoccupied with Central European questions to retaliate, he organized what foreign electronic intelligence sources indicated to be an ambush of a Soviet patrol on a disputed island in the Ussuri River on March 2, 1969. To Lin's surprise, and probably with adverse effects on his political fortunes, the Soviet side retaliated massively at the same spot a fortnight later, rapidly built its forces near the border to formidable levels, and applied various pressures on Peking including a virtual ultimatum (in a statement dated June 13) to begin negotiations on the boundary dispute by September 13 at the latest.

Peking eventually saw no choice but to yield, although without admitting publicly that it was doing so, and border negotiations accordingly got under way on October 20. They were viewed with disfavor from the beginning by the Chinese radicals and partly for that reason soon became deadlocked. The Chinese position has been essentially that there should be prompt agreement on a cease-fire and a mutual troop withdrawal, followed by



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the conclusion of a new, "equal," boundary treaty that would in effect reaffirm the existing border, except for small areas that Peking alleges Moscow has occupied in excess of what was conceded in the "unequal" treaties. The latter should be declared invalid.

The Soviet side claims to be willing in principle to make minor adjustments in the frontier but refuses to admit that the old treaties were "unequal" and that a completely new one is therefore necessary. Since 1971 it has accepted the main channel (rather than the Manchurian bank, as previously claimed) of the Amur and Ussuri rivers as the boundary except in the immediate vicinity of Khabarovsk. It refuses to agree to a cease-fire and a troop withdrawal prior to resolution of the other issues. It has continued its military buildup in the border region to a level approximating fifty divisions, including those stationed in the Mongolian People's Republic, backed by a vast array of airpower, nuclear missiles, and so forth.

Whatever Moscow's exact intentions, this situation creates a serious threat to China's security, and it has been a major — although not the sole — consideration impelling Peking to seek détente with Washington. The détente in turn has undoubtedly exerted a moderating influence on Soviet policy toward China, and toward the United States as well. A sense of imminent Sino-American rapprochement was probably what motivated Secretary Brezhnev in February 1971 to make a secret offer, repeated publicly in 1973, of a nonaggression pact with Peking. Lin Piao, who was still essentially committed to the dual adversary strategy and was not pro-Soviet as those who overthrew him charge, probably interpreted this offer as a sign of Soviet irresolution and an argument against the need for an opening to the United States, without going so far as to favor actual acceptance of the Brezhnev proposal. Mao and Chou, on the other hand, were committed to the view that the Soviet threat was real and serious, that an adversary relationship with Moscow must be maintained for this and other reasons, and that a "tilt" toward the United States was essential. Their policy prevailed, although its victory was not necessarily definitive until after Lin's fall, and even though Chinese propaganda has continued, partly for domestic reasons, to talk as though the dual adversary strategy were still in effect. Once Lin's overthrow had been accomplished, concrete preparations for the Nixon visit to China could and did get under way. Soviet pressures had contributed heavily toward driving Wash-



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ington and Peking much closer together than they had been at any time since 1949.

## III

If a Sino-Soviet war occurs, it will almost certainly be the consequence of a Soviet initiative; no sensible outside observer seriously supposes that China will attack the USSR on a large scale. The sources of Soviet hostility to China are therefore of greater practical importance than those of Chinese hostility to the Soviet Union. Indeed, some understanding of the former is essential in order to comprehend the confrontation. Besides, if Soviet hostility to China should turn out on examination to be significantly exaggerated compared with the objective justification for it, as was the case with American hostility to China in the 1950's, there is at least a chance of an eventual mellowing of the Soviet attitude such as the one that has recently occurred in the United States.

Underlying the Soviet dislike of China is a profound racial and historical apprehensiveness regarding threats from Asian peoples, of whom the Chinese are the most numerous and currently the most menacing. Since the mid-1950's, some Western observers have been aware of Soviet nervousness about possible Chinese demographic pressures on the comparatively empty expanses of Soviet Asia. But the Chinese have already expanded approximately to their natural geographic limits; for various reasons including the stony barrier of the Gobi and other such obstacles, they pose no real demographic threat to Soviet Asia, or for that matter to any other part of Asia. Their current political dynamism and the anti-Soviet propaganda with which they are bombarded by their leaders, although disturbing to the Soviet elite and people, have produced no fundamental change in this situation.

Soviet leaders insist, with some degree of seriousness, that the Chinese leadership has abandoned Marxism-Leninism — by Moscow's definition the Soviet interpretation is the orthodox version — and has thus isolated itself from the mainstream of international communism. It is true that far more communist parties tend to take their ideological and political cue from Moscow than from Peking, but it does not necessarily follow that the Chinese have no right to interpret the original doctrine in their own, or Mao's, way. What the Soviet leadership calls orthodoxy is its own adaptation, which like the Chinese version differs from



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the original in some significant respects. Moscow is probably eager to show Peking in the worst possible political light as part of the preparations for an intended conference of communist parties, which if actually held will be the first of its kind since 1969. In reality, the complex ideological issue is not of fundamental importance in the present context, since although ideological differences can contribute to an atmosphere of hostility they are not likely to become an immediate cause of war.

Of much greater practical importance is the frequently expressed Soviet conviction that China has turned to militarism and expansionism and has become a threat to Soviet security as well as to the peace of Asia and the world. This perception has been closely related to the occasional optimistic remarks by Mao and other Chinese leaders about the likely consequences of a thermonuclear war, the progress of the Chinese nuclear and missile programs since the mid-1960's, the rise of militant Defense Minister Lin Piao to the status of Mao's heir apparent after 1965, the frenzy of the Cultural Revolution, the clashes of 1969 on the Ussuri River, Chinese insistence on the "unequal" character of the existing boundary treaties, the takeover of political power at the regional level by the Chinese military in 1967, and the rapidly diminishing value of the American military presence in Asia and the Western Pacific as a deterrent to possible Chinese adventurism. Formidable as this catalogue of horrors seems at first sight, none of these things is as bad as it appears from Moscow's current perspective; to a considerable extent they are a function of Peking's domestic politics. The Chinese nuclear force, for example, is obviously designed for deterrence, and Peking has neither the ability nor, in all probability, the intention to turn it into anything resembling a full-fledged first-strike capability.

Even Russians who do not view China as a military threat tend to consider it a political one. Chinese propaganda loudly proclaims Peking's detestation of Soviet "revisionism" and "social imperialism" and even broadcasts to that effect in local languages to Soviet Central Asia and the Ukraine. Since 1969 Chinese diplomacy has worked industriously and skillfully against Soviet interests in almost all parts of the world, notably in Asia and Europe, besides cultivating a better relationship with the United States that could serve as a restraint on Soviet behavior toward China. Again, all this is less alarming than the Soviet leadership claims to believe. The current phase of Chinese foreign policy is unquestionably anti-Soviet, but it has an essentially defensive



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purpose. Chinese propaganda can be irritating, but it is hardly dangerous by itself; experience has shown that it does not necessarily foreshadow direct action against the proclaimed objects of its dislike.

Not all of the professed Soviet concern over and dislike of China appears to be genuine, at least at the elite level. China has become a symbol that might have had to be invented for propaganda exploitation if it did not already exist, inasmuch as Moscow's détente with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany has reduced the utility of these familiar demons for purposes of domestic and external political mobilization. Peking makes a reasonably satisfactory substitute and a target against which the Soviet people, the Warsaw Pact powers and the international communist movement can be rallied, or urged to rally, under Moscow's leadership. The confrontation with China can be exploited as a means of making the Soviet Union more respectable and acceptable in Western eyes. This conscious manipulation of China as a demon figure, in a way reminiscent of American policy in the 1950's, coexists uneasily with the genuine fear and dislike already discussed; it is seldom easy to tell where one begins and the other leaves off.

## IV

Quite apart from the question of basic attitudes, there are powerful objective reasons why the Soviet Union, in its own interest, ought not to attack China, and why it therefore may not. Its economy, its political system, the military balance between itself and the United States, and its foreign relations as a whole would be subjected to severe strain. It would almost certainly suffer Chinese retaliation, both conventional and nuclear. Presumably for reasons like these the idea of an attack is controversial in Moscow, and to date the negative arguments and votes have prevailed.

If, as seems probable, the powerful Soviet military buildup has not been carried on with the main purpose of launching an attack on China, what may be its objectives, and what do they suggest about the future course of the Sino-Soviet confrontation?

Clearly the most urgent single objective has been to deter the supposedly expansionist Chinese from moving militarily in any direction, either against Soviet Asia (including the Mongolian People's Republic) or against noncommunist Asia in the wake of the American disengagement. To the limited extent that such



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deterrence may have been necessary, its purpose has been achieved so far. If only on account of concern over possible Soviet actions and a desire to cultivate the United States, Peking has been on something close to its best behavior in Asia in the last few years, apart from a few cases of residual support for "people's war" motivated largely by considerations of domestic Chinese politics.

On the whole, Soviet policy toward China is compatible with the theory that Moscow's game, at least as visualized to date, is essentially to wait out the remainder of Mao Tse-tung's life or active career, hope for a subsequent shift in China's leadership and policies favorable to Soviet interests, and if such a shift does not materialize, then to apply politico-military pressures from a position of strength to foster the desired trend. This theory suggests two questions: What are the chances of a spontaneous trend toward Sino-Soviet détente developing after Mao's departure? What would be the chances and probable consequences of Soviet pressures or intervention in the absence of such a spontaneous trend? Although only tentative answers can be given to these important questions, one can say that, in view of the accumulation of issues and tensions, there is little likelihood of a Sino-Soviet détente or rapprochement *before* Mao's departure, and perhaps also during Brezhnev's tenure.

Clearly, although Mao's death may reduce the intensity of the ideological and political issues dividing Peking and Moscow, it will not evaporate all the forces making for Sino-Soviet tension, such as the mutual sense of threat and the felt need on both sides for a demon figure to be exploited at home and abroad. On the other hand, Mao's death *might* create a situation or trend in China conducive to a significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. How real is this possibility?

At first blush, it might seem fairly real. There is a good chance that the departure of the leading Maoist will be followed by a sharp reduction in the actual, if not the apparent, influence of his most enthusiastic supporters, including his wife Chiang Ching. Since they have also been the loudest advocates of the dual adversary strategy, at least one major irritant in Sino-Soviet relations may be alleviated. In addition, it seems possible that a successor Chinese leadership inevitably preoccupied with internal problems, nervous about Soviet intentions, and perhaps uncertain of its popular support, might make some conciliatory gesture toward Moscow — over the border dispute, for example.

On the whole, however, a Chinese move toward détente with



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the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of Mao's death seems improbable as long as Peking continues to calculate, as it evidently does at present, that an actual Soviet attack is improbable because of divided counsels in Moscow and the overall strength of China's politico-military position. In the absence of serious fear of an imminent attack, it is likely to opt, at least for the time being, for a continuation of the confrontation with Moscow and the "tilt" toward the United States. These policies appear to have been built into the thinking of the mainstream of the Chinese leadership. Foreign China-watchers see no evidence of any significant "healthy forces" (Moscow's term for pro-Soviet foreign communists), at least since the early months of the Cultural Revolution — though there appear to be elements, probably including some of the military, that favor further efforts to reduce the level of tension with the colossus of the north.

The probable reluctance of the post-Mao leadership to initiate a rapprochement might be overcome if Moscow proposed sufficiently sweeping concessions for the sake of achieving such a rapprochement. But to be acceptable these would almost certainly have to include a drastic thinning out of the Soviet forces near the Chinese border, and Moscow would be bound to defer such a move until it was sure of the shape of the new leadership in Peking and the direction of its policies. The present Soviet leadership offered Peking an accommodation after it overthrew Khrushchev in 1964, but it was in a less anti-Chinese mood then and had not begun to create a massive military presence near the Sino-Soviet border. Moreover, that Soviet offer was rejected; although Mao undoubtedly played a critical role in its rejection, Moscow can have no assurance that his successors would be more receptive to a similar offer. On the whole, therefore, it seems improbable that in the aftermath of Mao's death either side will take an initiative sufficient to produce a Sino-Soviet détente.

In that case, what are the chances of Soviet military pressures or intervention of some sort? The temptation to such a course, already considerable, will probably be even greater then, but it does not necessarily follow that the temptation will be indulged. If it is, the ensuing Soviet military action will probably be designed and launched with one of two objectives: to promote the emergence of a relatively pro-Soviet leadership and line in Peking, or to inflict a military defeat on China of sufficient proportions to eliminate it as a serious threat for a long time to come. But these two objectives are mutually exclusive, and a single act of intervention could not



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achieve both: if China were defeated in war by the Soviet Union, there is almost no chance that whatever Chinese leadership survived or emerged would be pro-Soviet in any significant sense. In all likelihood the Soviet leadership, emotional as it is on the subject of China, understands this. Furthermore, the Moscow regime's self-image and the requirements of its external relations dictate that military action against China for either purpose must have some semblance of political rationale or justification. The so-called Brezhnev Doctrine appears inadequate by now to perform this function.

If it is true that there are no sizeable Chinese "healthy forces," either in China or in exile in the Soviet Union, the possibility that Moscow might consider it desirable and feasible to seize Peking by means of an armored thrust from Mongolian territory and install a collaborationist regime seems remote. Not only would such a move be lacking in political utility and credibility, but it would most likely have military consequences approximating those of a full-scale Sino-Soviet war.

Another scenario is a Soviet ultimatum, public or covert, to the post-Mao leadership to take certain actions or face a Soviet attack, the latter's exact shape probably being left to Peking's imagination. There is no doubt that American threats to attack China in the era of John Foster Dulles — however serious they may have been — produced some significant although unadmitted policy changes on Peking's part. It should be noted, however, that Peking was not being asked on those occasions to alter the composition of its leadership or the direction of its general political line or to modify its territorial claims, as Moscow would probably demand, but only to relax certain outward pressures that were troublesome to the United States. The concessions to be required by the USSR would probably fall under the heading of the unspecified "irreconcilable differences of principle" that Peking has insisted since 1969 divide it from Moscow and would therefore be refused, at least in part. In short, Peking would probably prefer to risk war rather than yield to a Soviet ultimatum on a matter of "principle," although it would presumably hope that the threat was a bluff or that it could be deterred through the overall strength of China's politico-military position.

There seems to be little chance, then, that Soviet pressures short of full-scale war could produce sufficient changes in the post-Mao leadership and line in Peking to bring about a genuine Sino-Soviet détente or rapprochement. It is of course possible that the situa-



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tion would not be viewed from the Kremlin in the same way, and therefore an attempt to apply such pressures might be made.

A Soviet effort to eliminate the perceived Chinese threat is a separate question. There is no compelling reason why a given Soviet action with that purpose should not be taken before Mao's death rather than afterward, except that Moscow might reason that the Chinese leadership would be less effective militarily as well as politically after his death; against that possibility would have to be set the countervailing one that a Soviet attack might unite the Chinese leadership and people as never before.

A Soviet attack on China could take the form of a "surgical strike" against her nuclear facilities and missile sites, a conventional attack against areas and targets near the border, an attempted transformation through military occupation of the territories north of the Great Wall into a Soviet sphere of influence, a strategic thermonuclear attack, a (least likely) full-scale invasion in depth, or some combination of these.

The anti-nuclear "surgical strike," probably with nuclear weapons, might be threatened unless Peking agreed to subject its nuclear testing program and arsenal to the sort of restrictions and controls that Moscow has begun to accept. Since in Peking's eyes international agreements and controls partake of the nature of "principle," such an ultimatum would likely be rejected. An actual attack on China's nuclear facilities and arsenal, whether or not following an ultimatum, would probably lead directly to a general Sino-Soviet war and would therefore not be launched unless the Soviet leadership had already decided to initiate or risk such a war. The same is true of limited conventional attacks at any level above that of localized border clashes.

A general Sino-Soviet war, whatever its exact origins, might involve the use of nuclear weapons on a large scale. Even if it did not, the costs would be exceedingly high for both sides and not merely for China, which would presumably be defeated to one degree or another. The Soviet Union could expect to suffer Chinese nuclear and conventional attack in the area near the border, and nuclear attack in some areas fairly far from the border. The strain on the economy, the political and military systems, and the external relations of the victor, as well as on those of the loser, would be enormous; indeed, Soviet dissenter Amalrik has predicted the breakup of the Soviet Union in the event of a major Sino-Soviet war.

Even if the Soviets should destroy China's nuclear potential and



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crush her conventional forces, nothing short of a full-scale Soviet occupation of China of indefinite duration, which would be impractical for many reasons, could guarantee that the inevitably bitter anti-Soviet mood in China would not produce a leadership dedicated to rebuilding Chinese power, probably with a view to getting revenge. Even if China broke up, in some sense of the term, under the impact of defeat, it would reunite in time, as it has in the past. Furthermore, any Soviet military action powerful enough to produce a major Chinese defeat would obviously create some risk of war with the United States as well, and indeed might not be initiated unless the Kremlin had decided to risk or launch a general war.

Any major Soviet attack on China would require a propaganda justification, which would most likely be that Peking had committed aggression against the USSR or one of its friends — say India, in the event of another Indo-Pakistani war. Such a charge would be extremely difficult to make credible, except perhaps in the Soviet Union and countries with pro-Soviet regimes, unless Peking were to behave in a far more bellicose manner than it has recently given any signs of intending to do.

In its efforts to avoid Soviet military action against itself Peking is likely to continue its existing strategy. This consists, in the first place, of maintaining the highest attainable level of internal political unity, which among other things requires outward loyalty to the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung, at least a nominal place in the leadership for some of the radical Maoists, and a relationship between the center and the Military Regions in which the former's pre-eminence is restored roughly to the pre-Cultural Revolution level. Improvement of military preparedness will presumably continue at a significant rate, the aim being to maintain an effective deterrent combining formidable potential for defense with some retaliatory capability. Peking will likely proceed with its efforts to cultivate sympathy and a common sense of antagonism toward Moscow wherever it can, especially in the United States, Japan, Western Europe, and even in the international communist movement; exploit its seat in the United Nations Security Council as a source of partial protection; and continue relying on policy differences and internal weaknesses within the Soviet Union and playing on them to the extent possible by means of propaganda.

If the consequences of direct Soviet military action against China seem unattractive by any standard, what would be the probable outcome of Soviet abstention from such action, both before



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Mao's death and afterward? At least two critical variables appear to be involved: the future composition of China's leadership and the thrust of its policies, and the degree to which the Soviet Union may be prepared to ease its military pressures and approach Peking in a spirit of compromise as the United States has done in recent years.

Most helpful in promoting a Sino-Soviet rapprochement would be a movement on both sides toward a free, plural, or "open" political and social system. This appears to be out of the question for a long time to come. But without it happening each of the two elites will feel, subconsciously at any rate, the need for a demon figure to be manipulated in domestic and foreign propaganda, and under current conditions the most appropriate such figure is China for the Soviet Union and vice versa. It is mainly through this ideologically and politically imposed need for a demon, as well as for some semblance of revolutionary momentum abroad, that the political systems of the major communist powers pose their threat to world peace, which in the long run is a real one. The architects of the American policy of détente with the Soviet Union and China appear to be taking insufficient account of this situation.

A genuine Sino-Soviet détente could probably emerge only if Peking agreed to reduce its anti-Soviet propaganda at home and abroad and submit to some sort of arms control measures, if Moscow agreed to reduce considerably its military presence near the Chinese frontier, and if both sides reached a settlement of the border dispute. A degree of cooperation with respect to third countries would be helpful, but probably not indispensable. There is a possibility that an accommodation along these lines will eventually emerge — always assuming that the Soviet Union does not attack China — if only because the current state of confrontation is dangerous and fatiguing to both sides, even if in some respects it is politically useful.

In the meantime, the most plausible prospect is a protracted confrontation, in which mutual deterrence, policy differences on both sides (especially the Soviet), and a continuing sense that the time is not right for war and that the disadvantages of fighting outweigh those of not fighting, will preserve a precarious balance between the adversaries. Nevertheless, more violent eventualities cannot be ruled out.



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## V

The role of the United States in the Sino-Soviet relationship has been a complex and important one. A common sense of acute threat from the United States was a major factor in the genesis of the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1949-1950. Later in the 1950's the United States contributed substantially to the emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute, principally by denying control over Taiwan to Peking and driving it to press Moscow to an unacceptable degree for aid and support in connection with the projected "liberation" of Taiwan.

As the Sino-Soviet dispute has escalated to the level of confrontation, the United States has benefited from its existence, without quite being able to exploit it actively. In particular, the confrontation has made Moscow less assertive in Europe (although not everywhere else) and Peking less assertive in Asia, since each has had to cultivate détente with the United States in a more or less competitive fashion.

Would a trend away from confrontation between China and the Soviet Union, in the direction of either reconciliation or war, be against the American interest?

In the short run, a trend toward reconciliation would probably go against American interests, but, as already suggested, such a development is unlikely in the short run. In the long run, a Sino-Soviet reconciliation would not necessarily be disadvantageous to the United States. It could not, realistically speaking, be imposed on Moscow's terms; it would have to be the result of compromise. Such a compromise would hardly occur on the same basis as the one of 1949-1950, which took place on a platform of unquestioned Soviet seniority and a common sense of confrontation with the United States. Peking is no longer in a mood or position to concede seniority to the Soviet Union, if only for internal political reasons, and neither side feels itself to be in a state of confrontation with the United States to the same degree as twenty-five years ago. In other words, there is little chance that the Sino-Soviet relationship of the late Stalin years, which was highly adverse to American interests, could be restored. Any disadvantages to the United States of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement that occurred as an aspect or outgrowth of the mellowing of both political systems would probably be greatly outweighed by advantages from the mellowing process itself.



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The opposite possibility, that of a Sino-Soviet war or a large-scale Soviet military intervention in China for political purposes, would be a serious threat to American interests, even if the United States did not become directly involved. It would almost certainly destabilize the multilateral balance of power in Asia that Washington has been laboring to foster since about 1969. Japan might be given the necessary stimulus, now lacking, to "go nuclear." China, which when weak or defeated has been the unwitting source of most of the international tension in the Far East for the past century or more, would probably be defeated to one degree or another, with adverse effects on its ability to play a constructive role in maintaining the multilateral balance. It might even again become the occasion of wars among other powers. The Soviet Union, however exhausted, would presumably emerge victorious in some sense, in a better relative position to promote its interests on the Asian mainland, and possibly less reluctant to use force elsewhere.

To date the United States, consciously or not, has played an important role in deterring a Soviet attack on China. This has been true in spite of the fact that Washington has not given China an alliance or military guarantee of any kind and probably would not have done so had it been asked, as it apparently has not been. (To each party, such an arrangement would seem contrary to its political traditions and current external commitments and likely to arouse the Soviet Union to a dangerous degree.) The most that has been intended on either side, evidently, has been to create in the official Soviet mind a significant level of uncertainty about what the American response to a Soviet attack on China would be.

It appears that this uncertainty was created, at least for a time. As early as 1966, Moscow began to worry that a common concern about a possible crunch in Vietnam might be creating a level of Sino-American understanding disadvantageous to Soviet interests. As Sino-Soviet tension peaked in 1969, Moscow felt keen curiosity regarding the American position, and some time that summer it sent a secret inquiry to the highest level of the U.S. government regarding its attitude toward a possible Soviet attack on China; the answer, which has never been published, was designed to discourage, but how strongly it was worded is not certain. A public statement by then Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson in mid-September did little more than deplore the existence of the Sino-Soviet confrontation and deny any intent on the part of the United States to exploit it.



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Since then the United States has said little, publicly and officially, about the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Nothing has been said or done to suggest an American commitment of any kind to China's security or to alarm Moscow with the thought that such a commitment might be in the making; Secretary Kissinger has never been accompanied to Peking by an aide specializing in Soviet affairs.

On the strength of recent trends and events in Sino-Soviet relations, however, the United States should do more than it has done so far to discourage, if not actually deter, a Soviet attack on China. It need not proclaim that it would go to war with the Soviet Union in the event of such an attack. Rather, it could state publicly — a private communication would not carry sufficient weight — that the Soviet-American détente is reversible and might definitely be reversed if the Soviets attacked China. In that event, the whole of American policy toward the USSR would be open to reconsideration. The probable results of this process should not be indicated in advance; it could usefully be left to Moscow to wonder what they might be.

In this connection, Secretary Kissinger's assertion that the Soviet-American détente is "irreversible" is an obstacle, but it is one that needs to be eliminated in any event: no political relationship is really irreversible. The Soviet public position is that détente is indeed reversible. Kissinger has said that the superpower détente rests on an urgent need to avoid mutual destruction and has rationalized the measures taken in the name of détente as necessary to create a momentum toward peace. But many of the steps taken and concessions made by the United States in the name of détente go far beyond what is necessary for that purpose. There is no need to bribe the Soviet Union not to attack the United States; it is in no mood or position to do so. The problem is not that there is a serious likelihood of a Soviet-American war; it is that the Soviet Union may get much of what it wants by political means while the United States contents itself with largely illusory diplomatic triumphs. Furthermore, Secretary Kissinger obviously has no power to bind future American, to say nothing of Soviet, leaderships.

The Secretary of State has also proclaimed a posture of "equidistance" for the United States between Moscow and Peking and a desire not to intervene in or exploit the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Against this, a credible argument can be made that for the United States to stand aside while Moscow bullies and threatens



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Peking, which is a possible interpretation of the equidistance concept, is not really neutrality but suggests fear of the Soviet Union and perhaps a secret pleasure that China is absorbing so much of Moscow's attention and energy.

The current American policy of coddling Chinese sensitivities where nonessentials are involved — for example by refusing to allow U.S. ships to help search for South Vietnamese survivors of the Chinese attack on the Paracel Islands in January 1974 — is similarly unsatisfactory, for it tends to delay the day when the Chinese emerge from their psychological shell and begin to interact with other governments and peoples on a more nearly normal basis. This is clearly an inadequate substitute for effectively supporting their legitimate vital interests by actively cultivating uncertainty in the Soviet mind regarding the American response to possible Soviet military pressures on China.



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# DAMPING NUCLEAR COUNTERFORCE INCENTIVES: CORRECTING NATO'S INFERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY STRENGTH*

*by Steven L. Canby*

IN the past, whether NATO's strategy has been nicknamed "trip wire" or "flexible response," it has been based on an asymmetrical, but roughly comparable, power relationship vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact: NATO deterred the Soviets with the threat of strategic nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union deterred the United States with stronger conventional forces and IRBM's aimed at Western Europe. This military asymmetry — making each side vulnerable to the unique power advantage of the other — aroused fear, feelings of insecurity and misinterpreted intentions on both sides. Nevertheless, until the late 1960's, an uneasy balance was maintained between NATO's strategic capability on the one hand, and Soviet ground strength on the other.

Now even this tenuous equilibrium has been perturbed: the Soviets have achieved effective parity in strategic nuclear systems, but there has been no corresponding increase in NATO's conventional military power. NATO can no longer overcome its conventional weaknesses in war-fighting and crisis management by emphasizing nuclear weapons or even counterforce capabilities.[1] Its only

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[1] The present debate on counterforce options is predicated on the fear that Soviet technological strides in Multiple Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV's) could erode the present U.S. advantage and, given SALT I, actually place the United States at a disadvantage in counterforce and overall strategic capabilities.

The purpose behind the options policy is to ensure that the United States has a matching capability. However, this raises a potential political-military dilemma. Advocates argue that it enhances the credibility of the American strategic deterrent, but opponents can also argue that it dangerously lowers the nuclear threshold or even weakens deterrence by permitting the United States to temporize against an all-out strategic response to a Warsaw Pact attack. The way out of this impasse is recognizing that counterforce options serve both deterrent and crisis management purposes. In the latter role, they are often viewed as competitive with, rather than



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remaining choice, which has appeared infeasible to date, is the development of comparably strong conventional forces. Realistic suggestions for improving NATO's military posture should therefore focus on reducing the cost of these needed forces within the context of graduated deterrence and forward defense.

If NATO could obtain conventional comparability with the Warsaw Pact countries at no more cost — and possibly at even less cost — than is now budgeted, many of its pressing military and political difficulties would disappear. Moreover, comparability in Soviet-NATO conventional forces could contribute profoundly to European political normalization and arms control arrangements. For example, strong conventional forces would diminish European concern over exclusive U.S. control of the nuclear deterrent and U.S. concern over being forced into the too-early use of nuclear weapons by a European trigger such as the newly deployed French Pluton. Furthermore, conventional comparability would resolve most Western objections to mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) and by-pass many current questions about that issue. Comparability would, in effect, depoliticize the conventional Soviet military threat to Western Europe and provide the mutual security needed for political experimentation and policy flexibility. A stable new milieu would thus emerge in which decision-makers could focus on the overarching problems of European security — German reunification, East-West relations and European integration.

Although many earlier analysts have agreed with the basic thrust of this article — that the prime deficiency underlying many of NATO's political tensions is its conventional military inferiority — the few studies directly addressing this crucial problem cluster around four basic recommendations, all of questionable analytic value. These four approaches are discussed in the next section. The third section focuses on the Soviet Union's strategic choices and its successful creation of a strong, strategy-relevant conventional capability with fewer resources than those available to NATO. In contradiction to the existing literature and in direct response to the Soviet model, an alternative approach to correcting NATO's conventional military inferiority, accompanied by specific guidelines for implementing it, is suggested in section four.

complementary to, conventional forces. The competitive role readily raises the specter of nuclear warfare and Pandora's box. The complementary role visualizes strong conventional forces as the primary means of crisis management, with the counterforce capability as the measure of last resort and the retardant to Soviet use.



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## Four Approaches to Overcoming NATO's Conventional Inferiority

For some time analysts have been conscious of the paradoxical nature of NATO's weakness. NATO greatly outspends its opponents and has larger military forces. Even in the crucial central region, its forces are slightly larger and more expensively equipped than those of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).[2] Yet a wide range of professionally competent observers in the United States and Europe contend that the Soviet Union and its allies enjoy a marked degree of conventional military superiority over their potential NATO foes.[3]

Four basic solutions to this paradox have been advanced to date. Each is treated below.

### *Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW's)*

The case that TNW's can substitute for conventional force is based on two axioms: (1) a trade-off exists between manpower and firepower, and (2) a successful attacker must have at least a three-to-one advantage over the defender.

*Ceteris paribus*, firepower is a substitute for manpower: that is, if the opponent has no means of reacting, NATO's TNW's could substitute for conventional military manpower. But the opponent can reduce the value of this substitution by changing his tactics and can negate it by responding with TNW's. If the opponent responds with TNW's, the relative advantage of firepower tends to be canceling and each side is likely to have higher casualties. Thus, numerous studies have quite plausibly concluded that NATO's manning requirements would *increase* should both sides use TNW's.

While both sides are now armored and NATO may have better weapon delivery systems, Soviet ground forces are much better structured and prepared for tactical nuclear *war-fighting*.[4] NATO

[2] In ground forces alone, NATO plus France have 1,070,000 men in Central Europe versus 935,000 for the Warsaw Pact. NATO plus France have another 120,000-man advantage in tactical air forces. Published statistics usually imply a WTO superiority because of the French exclusion and the Eastern practice of assigning most forces, rather than just a fraction, to their alliance. *The Military Balance, 1974-75* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974).

[3] NATO plus France have twenty-nine divisions; the Warsaw Pact, fifty-eight. Western divisions in general, however, have a higher state of combat readiness, qualitatively superior equipment, and about 25 per cent greater "foxhole" strength. The major Soviet advantage is the bloc's rapid mobilization and reinforcement system. Whereas NATO could reinforce its division count by two to five divisions in the first thirty days, the comparable WTO figure is twenty-five to fifty divisions.

[4] An extensive literature developed in the late 1950's on the question whether



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military planners, under U.S. tutelage, have tended to think of nuclear weapons as simply bigger guns. Perhaps because of this bias, or as a result of their own experiences in strategic nuclear analysis, Western defense intellectuals have tended to view tactical nuclear weapons being used as strategic exchanges writ small or as instruments in crisis management. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been less bemused by theories and have concentrated upon integrating tactical nuclear weapons into a war-fighting system.[5]

The three-to-one generalization, a carry-over from conventional tactics, has led many to believe that TNW's inherently favor the defender. Neglected is the fact that the defender gains his three-to-one advantage by entrenching himself but pays for this conventional enhancement by becoming more easily targetable with nuclear weapons. If the defender is postured in well-supported but few big battalions, a few TNW's could then easily blast a gap in which to pour armored forces. In this situation — in which NATO can be readily imagined — TNW's will always be a dangerous option against a blitzkrieg-oriented opponent. NATO, because of its war-fighting style, also has the more vulnerable lines of communication, supply depots, command and control centers and air bases. A defender could at best stalemate such an armored attack with sophisticated target acquisition and timely and accurate weapon delivery. As long as NATO retains its vulnerabilities, TNW's are unlikely to be of much avail in war-fighting.

Tailored nuclear weapon effects do not strike at this fundamen-

nuclear weapons favored the defense or the offense. Most notable in these discussions was the failure of analysts to investigate the military structure of the opposing forces. It was commonly accepted that the United States had a ground force compatible with tactical nuclear war because the U.S. Army had proclaimed its pentomic divisional organization in 1957. In reality, the reverse was true, as belatedly recognized by the Army itself in its 1962 Reorganized Objective Army Division (ROAD). One problem was that the Soviets were mechanized while the U.S. and NATO European armies remained largely foot-infantry forces until the early 1960's. Foot infantry lacks the tactical mobility, armor shielding and small-arms fire necessary for the close-in protection of dispersed units. All are required for tactical nuclear warfare. Problems still remaining are that the Soviets have equipped themselves better for tactical nuclear warfare, and their blitzkrieg doctrine and organization are better suited for it than NATO's. For an excellent summary of Soviet tactics on the nuclear battlefield, see Trevor Cliffe, *Military Technology and the European Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 89, August 1972), pp. 31-34.

[5] The Soviets (1) have provided themselves with small, highly mobile units, i.e., eighteen maneuver battalions per 12,000-man mechanized division and 17,000-man division slice (the division itself plus its proportionate share of nondivisional units) versus the United States' twelve battalions per 16,000-man division and 48,000-man division slice; (2) use a linear shock tactic which is more difficult to target than NATO's more triangular "two up and one back" staying power tactic; (3) have designed their tanks with nuclear warfare specifically in mind, and (4) have trained their troops under simulated nuclear conditions much more extensively than has NATO.



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tal structural deficiency in NATO's military posture. Such improvements, by making tactical nuclear weapons useful for finite point targets rather than for indiscriminate area targets, reduce collateral damage and permit close-in fighting with nuclear weapons. However, the very features that make "mini-nukes" attractive also undercut their value as a substitute for conventional forces. The key feature is really not the nuclear feature, but precision guidance. Without high accuracy, mini-nukes, because of a large random delivery error, would still produce widespread collateral damage, could still not be used too close to friendly troops, and would not be good tank killers because of their relatively small radius of *immediate* kill against tanks and the Soviet practice of deploying armor (at the regimental level) in linear formations.

Terminal guidance removes the delivery limitation from TNW's. But it enhances conventional weapons even more; high accuracy gives conventional weapons new capabilities — in particular a tank-busting capability for the artillery. Terminal guidance essentially allows conventional weapons the same capabilities it gives TNW's on the battlefield: close-in tank killing. More conventional weapons are required to equal the military capability of TNW's, but this is not a serious constraint if the targets are visible.[6] This is not to say that TNW's will not retain special advantages, such as targeting tank units in forested assembly areas where conventional weapons would be ineffective, or supporting counterattacks with non-mobility-hindering weapon effects; but it does diminish their relative advantage over conventional weapons, particularly if it is considered that TNW's will almost certainly have greater firing restrictions, and hence greater targeting delays, than conventional weapons.

Another difficulty of the "clean and small weapon" approach is its implicit assumption that both sides have similar tactical nuclear postures and would abide by the same rules. This is not now the case. To date the Soviets have emphasized large-yield, indiscrimi-

[6] For illustration, the present U.S. division has more than 100 forward observers and artillery and mortar tubes capable of firing a "smart" shell. Since an observer can guide in a shell every fifteen seconds, "smart" artillery could as an upper limit kill every armored vehicle in a Soviet division within minutes. As currently envisaged, however, laser-guided artillery will probably prove an ineffective tank-buster due to such operational realities as terrain intervisibility, response time, vulnerability of laser designators to detection and counterfire, collocation of forward observers with maneuver units, vulnerability of artillery communications to electronic countermeasures, and counterbattery fire. Tactical aircraft and attack helicopters are likely to fare even worse. Nevertheless, the potential of terminal guidance remains potent, provided new tactics and organizations are designed around the new technology rather than the present practice of constraining new technology by the organizational forms of the old.



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nate terrain fire weapons, many of them based in the Soviet homeland. That itself precludes the possibility of "limiting" a tactical nuclear war. Should the Soviets adopt similar clean and small weapons for the battlefield, NATO's original problem of insufficient combat forces would re-emerge.

In short, as long as NATO maintains its present military posture, substituting TNW's for conventional forces will prove illusory. Without a viable conventional defense, NATO will also lack a viable tactical nuclear war-fighting capability. Conversely, if NATO had a viable conventional capability, TNW's would be unnecessary as a conventional forces substitute. But this is not to deny TNW's an important role. They are needed for the deterrence link, for countering a one-sided Warsaw Pact use,[7] and for providing nuclear options below an all-out response. The new family of TNW's are particularly attractive in this latter category. Their tailored weapon effects (accuracy, prompt radiation only, salting, and earth-penetration) can be useful for crisis management and for a counterforce strategy. The military value of these tailored effects is largely against interdiction-type (not battlefield) targets — indicating again their limits as a substitute for conventional forces.

*Technological Superiority*

This school of thought is driven by a quantity-quality trade-off: numerical inferiority in *combat* forces can be offset by technological superiority. Against technically less advanced countries unable to produce a sophisticated war-fighting machine, offsetting quantitative inferiority with technological superiority has been a historically attractive proposition (at least up to the Vietnam war). Against countries with similar technologies, of course, this solution becomes questionable.

The empirical evidence suggests that a technology over its life span tends toward an "S" shape: increasing returns to scale in its early growth period, diminishing returns during its maturing phases.[8] Thus, in Figure I, as both N (NATO) and W (Warsaw Pact) move along the same "S" curve, N's equipment costs ($\Delta c$) increase faster than W's if N desires to maintain a constant level of technological superiority ($\Delta \bar{p}$). This implies that if both sides

[7] As Robert Lawrence rightly points out, the Soviets have (at least until recently) viewed nuclear weapons as an integral part of their blitzkrieg offense rather than as a means of shoring up a faltering conventional capability. "On Tactical Nuclear War," *Révue Militaire Générale*, January/February 1971, p. 257.

[8] Erich Jantsch, *Technological Forecasting in Perspective* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1967).



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FIGURE I

PERFORMANCE AS A FUNCTION OF COST:
AN ILLUSTRATIVE "S" CURVE




rely on similar technologies with similar rates of advance, the side seeking qualitative superiority can maintain it only by increasing budgetary allocations or by diverting funds from force structure to technology. However, ever-larger military budgets are no longer politically acceptable in the Western democracies, and reducing force structures would increase any existing combat inferiority gap and feed a demand for still greater technological superiority. Obviously, trying to offset quantitative force inferiority solely by exploiting new technology is a policy marked by constantly diminishing returns.

A technological solution to the imbalance is achievable only if the technological leader can improve the performance of his forces at costs equal to or less than those incurred by his opponent attempting to catch up. But because innovative technology always costs more than imitative technology, and because the cost of improving any aspect of technology at a steady rate increases with time (marginal improvements in a mature technology tend to cost more and take longer than major improvements in a new tech-



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nology), technological solutions to force imbalances are practical only if revolutionary technologies are periodically introduced.

Even if new technologies become periodically available for exploitation, an important caveat must be recognized: the innovative technology will need to be applied by military institutions, which in many instances are composed of elements committed by tradition and instinct to preserving their expertise in familiar experience-proven areas. Without institutional adaptiveness, potential technological superiority can be meaningless. The technologically inferior opponent may be more innovative, in practice, because of readiness to accept doctrinal innovations and institutional changes. If the side with technological superiority is doctrinally lagging, new technology can even be counterproductive. NATO introduced tactical nuclear weapons to buttress its inferiority on the ground: tactical weapons inherently ought to favor the defense. But with two-sided deployment, it soon became apparent that NATO's relative position had worsened because of the ease with which the Soviets could target its large and relatively scarce maneuver battalions and vulnerable logistic and air base complexes. This analogy may also hold true for "smart" weaponry, for it is the Soviets who have multiplicity of targets and potential delivery systems.

*Territorial or Militia Defense*

A third school holds that modern antitank weaponry allows a new role for the citizen soldier, as an alternative to NATO's hyperexpensive standing forces.

West German territorial forces, it has been suggested, could provide logistical support and rear area security for allied combat formations. This proposal downplays combat and visualizes wartime mobilization of skilled personnel so as to reduce the need for military logistical units and to increase the "teeth-to-tail" ratio (i.e., more combat troops in proportion to support) of regular military forces. It has also been proposed that militia forces be used to "hedgehog" the stone villages sitting across the West German transport net by defending their own villages. These would be integrated into an overall defense by the armored formations. Provided the Germans can indeed mobilize as rapidly as they have historically, these suggested uses of territorials are difficult to fault.

On the other hand, militia forces alone, even with prepared barriers, cannot be expected to fight against *deployed* combat formations in the relatively open terrain of Central Europe. The



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militia's total numbers may be large, but at any one point their density is too low and they are not likely to be well enough organized to resist regular mechanized troops with supporting artillery. Nor, once the front is penetrated, can they be shifted to other sectors. Their task is thus to stay in place and attrit the enemy over time. In the interim, the decisive battle must be fought and won with regular deployed forces to prevent enemy occupation.

A peasant behind every tree with a *panzerfaust* is a romantic image. The citizen soldier cannot be expected to attack Soviet mechanized columns with short-range, bazooka-like antitank weapons. If small groups are to attack enemy combat forces, they need a long-range, indirect-fire standoff weapon which gives them an opportunity to fade away after shooting. These weapons are feasible but do not yet exist.

In short, if the real value of militia forces is attriting the attacker over space and time, large militia forces are a misconception. Large groupings cannot withstand the enemy and are too big for fading. The requirement is, rather, a small, elusive force. New technology is not likely to change this conclusion. Better standoff weapons with higher rates of fire increase the relative attractiveness of elusive forces. Large militia combat forces in open country are a hindrance; their manpower can be much more effectively used in hedgehogged villages, rear area security, and in the logistical support of regular combat forces as envisaged by the newly organized German Territorial Forces.

*Economic School*

Whereas the previous approaches fail to come to grips with the paradox of NATO's military wealth and combat inferiority, the economic school has gained currency in official and academic circles in the United States for facing this issue squarely. The dominant characteristics of this body of analysis are its use of resource inputs to measure the problem and its application of the prescriptions of economic theory to solve them. This orientation has led to a two-part conclusion: a conventional balance exists or nearly exists in Europe, and, since at worst only a marginal shortfall exists, any shortfall can be explained by the alliance's failure to make the best collective use of its military expenditures through economic rationalization and specialization.

This conclusion reflects the influence of classical economic theory where market-place forces are assumed to bring competitors to comparable efficiency levels and where output can be viewed



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as a straightforward function of inputs. The analysts who develop this argument ignore the complex functional processes whereby military power, or output, is generated from military resources, or input. The market analogy is of dubious validity in a military "industry" that is insulated from the "competitive market," i.e., the test of the battlefield. If two opponents generate military power through mechanisms that involve materially different doctrines, styles of warfare, tactics and organizations, and if one mechanism is more efficient in certain contexts than the other, the comparison of inputs as an indicator of overall combat effectiveness can be pedantically irrelevant at best and dangerously misleading at worst. Driven by their comparative input accounting methodology, analysts of this school have been forced to lump together units of measure, such as tanks, guns or aircraft, in ways that gloss over critical distinctions in capability and systematically ignore the larger mechanism in which those resources play their role on each side.

Finally, the "equal efficiency school," in its emphasis on static indicators, tends to dismiss the Soviet Union's mobilization capabilities and thus fails to take account of a major advantage of the Soviet military mechanism — its ability to flesh out rapidly a large number of cadre divisions. NATO is unable to match this capability because of policies geared to individual replacement of losses and the need to augment a large logistical tail with a large proportion of its reserves.

The linchpin for this school's credibility is the widely quoted finding that while the Warsaw Pact has twice as many tanks, NATO has 50 per cent more antitank (AT) weapons.[9] However, this count and, more important, its inference are questionable.

The U.S. mechanized infantry battalion, prior to 1970, had eight major AT weapons (defined as generally capable of defeating medium tanks at ranges of 1,000 meters or more) and eighteen short-range (and not very effective) 90mm recoilless rifles allocated on the basis of two per rifle platoon. The mechanized infantry division inventory (with six mechanized battalions per division as in Europe) was therefore forty-eight major and 117 infantry (including nine in the military police company) AT weapons.[10] The Soviet inventory for a comparable motorized infantry division was

[9] Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 148. For a detailed critique of their indicators, see Steven L. Canby, *NATO Military Policy: Obtaining Conventional Comparability with the Warsaw Pact* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, R-1088-ARPA, June 1973).

[10] *Reference Book: The Division* (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, RB 61-1, April 1970).



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36 major (exclusive of gun artillery) and 72 intermediate (i.e., crew-served, less than 90mm) antitank weapons, and 280 infantry RPG-7's with a caliber of 82 mm.[11] The AT average for the rest of NATO approximates the Soviet average; German divisions have a high AT count, but British and Benelux divisions have a low AT count. Thus, given that the Warsaw Pact had as many motorized divisions in Central Europe as NATO had total divisions, *the widely reported claim that NATO has a 50 per cent superiority in antitank weapons over the Warsaw Pact could not possibly have been true.*

The source of this erroneous weapons count was the use of 90mm as the cut-off caliber in counting antitank weapons. All AT weapons 90mm or over were lumped together as equally effective; all below 90mm were excluded. By this arbitrary device, NATO in general and the United States in particular looked very good indeed: U.S. rifle platoon weapons counted, but comparable German and Warsaw Pact rifle platoon weapons which had slightly lower calibers were excluded. Moreover, this antitank analysis implied several dubious inferences. Foremost is the claim that NATO's 45 per cent disadvantage in tanks is largely offset by its 50 per cent advantage in antitank weapons. Even assuming the validity of that count, such an inference presumes that antitank weapons are at least as effective as tanks. NATO, however, even after post-1970 increases in major antitank weapons, has about 2.5 times more tanks than major AT weapons; the Warsaw Pact, 4 times. Until recently, even large AT weapons have not had the power, range, mobility or crew protection to compete with tanks except under special "surprise" conditions. (Hence, the well-known cliché that a tank is the best antitank weapon.) It has also been argued that infantry antitank weapons have historically "enabled the defender to exert an exchange ratio of 3 to 1."[12] Even were this true (and it is doubtful due to the technical characteristics of these weapons in World War II and the vulnerability of their crews to tank and accompanying infantry and artillery counterfire), the infantry has seldom been able to concentrate enough antitank weapons at the point of contact. Hence, a large number of AT weapons and a local exchange ratio of 3:1 do not necessarily imply anything at the aggregate or macro level.

The economic school's prescriptions have been greater standardization, division of labor and economies of scale. Its rationale

[11] FM 30-102, Department of the Army, Washington, October 1969.
[12] Enthoven and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 148.



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— which guides so much official U.S. thinking — is questionable. Clearly, if the problem is organizational and due to NATO's present tactical concepts, as argued in this article, the economic arguments — while useful — do not have sufficient power to solve NATO's deficiencies. They presume the very concepts that cause the deficiency. They may improve the effectiveness of the presumed system, but the system may nevertheless be obsolescent.

The economic arguments can also be questioned empirically. Geoffrey Ashcroft, in his detailed analysis of NATO logistics, questions the practicality of them as well as the potential savings. For instance, in weapons development and procurement, Ashcroft suggests that even stringent practices would produce savings of only 8 to 9 per cent.[13] Since the United States and the West European countries spend about a third of their military budget on development and procurement, savings from common procurement and associated procedures would yield overall budgetary savings of only about 3 per cent. Similarly, by decomposing logistic functions, Ashcroft notes that economies from logistic consolidation are mainly in base or depot organization (i.e., storage, repair and transport) and estimates that a common logistic system for AFCENT (Allied Forces Central Europe) would save Britain only $8 to $15 million annually — equivalent to 1.5 to 3 per cent of total British Army of the Rhine costs.[14]

The economic argument's major themes are division of labor and economies of scale. Eliminating redundancies is one way of attaining economies of scale; but while it is true that the existence of national forces means national ministries and overheads, it does not follow that the elimination of national identities would produce significant savings. The most efficient countries seem to be among the smallest — Israel and Sweden. Even within NATO, the smaller European countries have a better aircraft-to-people ratio than the larger ones. If the United States is any example, consolidation might well bring a European "Pentagon" into being that would be larger than the sum of its national components. Most important, field forces, the bulk of the forces, are not subject to economies of scale. For instance, in the U.S. military, field forces are postured by a building-block methodology which implies reproduction of the basic blocks by linear proportionality and some

[13] Geoffrey Ashcroft, *Military Logistic Systems in NATO: The Goal of Integration; Part I: Economic Aspects* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 62, November 1969), p. 7.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 29.



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*dis*economies of scale, due to a pyramiding of ever-larger command and control headquarters. Moreover, if size did lead to economies of scale, one would expect the U.S. military to have relatively small divisional slices and high aircraft-to-people ratios. But this is not so.

The rationale for division of labor within NATO is that efficiency could be obtained if each country specialized in the military component in which it held a comparative advantage. Carried to the extreme, this implies that the United States should provide the most sophisticated components, like nuclear weapons and airpower, while other countries provide more labor-intensive forces like ground forces. A more moderate position is the recent Dutch proposal for national specialization of tactical air missions. The Dutch argument is that under present arrangements, they have a 20,000-man air force with 160 combat aircraft. Under division of labor, they apparently envisage that with an increment of 5,000 men they could double their combat aircraft. But what remains unexplained is how Sweden can man 600 combat aircraft with only 18,000 men, half of them conscripts. This suggests that while specialization will help, a much larger dividend is available from doctrinal and organizational changes.

In short, economic arguments produce marginal but not significant savings or increases in combat effectiveness. Wartime slices remain 40,000 and aircraft-to-people ratios remain high. The arguments have merit but they are not panaceas and their focus often needs shifting. For instance, standardization is less important for its direct financial savings than its military advantages and indirect savings potential. In particular, if restructuring is adopted, allied interoperability (i.e., cross-operation and support among national forces) becomes militarily important and a way to average out and minimize national logistical demands in *wartime,* since national military establishments will be differentially committed at any one time.

*Summary*

These four approaches have not been universally accepted because of their apparent inconsistencies. The tactical nuclear and technological superiority schools seek to offset NATO's conventional deficiency by greater expenditures when NATO in fact is already outspending its opponent. The economic school recognizes the paradox of spending more and obtaining less, but ends up



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either denying the existence of the problem or evaluating NATO's deficiencies as manifestations of incongruencies with economic theory. The militia school seeks a radical departure from accepted military norms, but its solution is militarily suspect and strategically inappropriate for areas as vital as Germany.

All four approaches skirt NATO's doctrinal and organization precepts. None comes to grips with why NATO requires *wartime* divisional slices of over 40,000 while the Warsaw Pact requires a slice only half as large to accommodate the same "foxhole" strength. None points out that the NATO notion (of relatively few but high-quality, sustainable combat forces) and the Soviet concept (of larger numbers of smaller, less sustainable forces equipped with cheap, relatively unsophisticated equipment) represent differing war-fighting philosophies.

## The Soviet System: How the Soviets Achieve Conventional Military Superiority from Resource Inferiority

While Western Europe rebuilt its postwar strength under shelter of the American security umbrella, the Soviets managed to rebuild an even more devastated economy and to retain and further develop a conventional force capable of holding Western Europe "hostage" as an indirect counter to the U.S. nuclear threat. Overwhelming ground power coincidentally resolved their potential Eastern Europe problems. The question that has never been fully explored is how they could create such a force with fewer potential resources and a smaller peacetime military budget.

The Soviets achieved their objectives by maximizing their force visibility. This was accomplished by finding ways to minimize *logistical* support needs so that most of their resources could be channeled into high-visibility *combat units*. While often equipped with older and technically inferior weapons, the Soviets have developed a superior mechanism for waging the only type of conventional war they could expect to win against NATO — a short, intensive campaign that forecloses NATO's ability to mobilize its superior overall resources into a war-fighting capability over time. Doctrinally, they have overcome technical inferiority by stressing tactics and operating practices that minimize the need for high-quality equipment. Organizationally, they have streamlined their forces by recognizing the economies inherent in blitzkrieg warfare and "steamroller" battlefield tactics. Finally, while the Europeans



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have tended toward a U.S.-type reserve and replacement system, the Soviets have retained and modified for armored warfare the German-developed continental mobilization system designed to flesh out a large army rapidly and to surge over the opponent in a series of quick campaigns.

*Organizational Implications of Soviet Military Doctrine*

The Soviets' strategic linchpin is their blitzkrieg doctrine. German tank tactics provide the model for overwhelming an opponent quickly. The tactic is to concentrate on narrow sectors of the front in order to break through the opponent's defenses and then to pour into his rear areas, enveloping his main forces and paralyzing his reactions. If only one or two breakthroughs are required because of the opponent's weakness or lack of depth, the enemy can be defeated in a matter of weeks, as occurred early in World War II. Against stronger opponents, a series of breakthroughs may be required before the enemy is sufficiently weakened and collapses.

Another important aspect of blitzkrieg tactics is their effect on logistical requirements — which the Soviets alone seem to recognize. Divisions designed to swamp enemy defenses need no elaborate infrastructure. First, if a breakthrough is decisive against a relatively weak opponent whose position lacks depth, the war will be over before the armored breakthrough force needs extensive maintenance, repair and replacement. NATO potentially holds this vulnerable defensive position because, at a march rate of 100 km per day, as called for in Soviet doctrine, the Rhine River and the Dutch border are only one to three days' march from the border in middle and north Germany. In such circumstances, a large logistical tail organic to Soviet divisional units not only would constitute an unnecessary expense, diverting resources from greater numbers of combat units, but would also restrict divisional mobility by requiring protection and clogging road space.[15]

Furthermore, blitzkrieg tactics use armored forces in such a way as to minimize the need for logistical and indirect fire support, *except* in the heavy fighting of the breakthrough phase. Before the breakthrough, most divisions are idle in reserve assembly areas.

[15] This does not mean that the streamlined Soviet divisions are incapable of heavy fighting without support from higher headquarters. The Soviets hedge against this possibility by providing their divisions with enough organic support until they can be reinforced from higher headquarters. This phenomenon is best evidenced by the high ratio of artillery tubes and cheap multiple rocket launchers organic to divisions. This facilitates fire-support coordination with maneuver units, though the fire support cannot be sustained without higher-level resupply effort.



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After a breakthrough, an armored penetration exploiting the enemy's disorganization requires relatively little artillery and logistical support. Providing all divisions and corps (usually called "armies" in the Soviet lexicon) with their own logistical capability for such infrequent occurrences as breakthroughs of organized defenses would obviously be inefficient.

In this model, centralizing logistical assets under higher commanders and allocating them according to the demand for services is attractive because (1) the Soviets have the resources to create more divisions than can be conveniently put into battle simultaneously, (2) divisions in combat require differing amounts of support according to the task being performed, and (3) losses among support troops are always much smaller than among combat maneuver units.[16] This means that logistical imbalance is feasible; more combat units can be created than can be logistically supported in combat at any one time. Thus, once a minimum level of divisions is reached, it becomes possible to strip support from divisions and build support frameworks at higher command levels from which a large number of unit replacement divisions can operate.

*Mobilization and Reinforcement*

The 167 Soviet divisions represent widely different states of wartime availability, which can be roughly measured in terms of unit strength and equipment levels. Some, such as the Group Soviet Forces Germany, are kept near full strength; others are maintained at three-quarters to one-quarter personnel strength. The common and key element is the cadre skeleton, which provides a command structure and a functioning team that can be rapidly fleshed out upon mobilization.

Most equipment on hand is stored to reduce maintenance, to maximize equipment readiness, and to minimize wear and tear.[17]

[16] For instance, in World War II, U.S. Army enlisted casualty rates were ten times higher in infantry, armor and armored cavalry than the average for the other branches. Even within a division, a rifleman was, respectively, 15.4 or 24 times more likely to become a casualty than a divisional truck driver or vehicle mechanic. G. W. Beebe and M. E. Debakey, *Battle Casualties* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1952), pp. 38, 42.

[17] U.S. Army FM-100-10, *Combat Service Support*, Department of the Army, October 1968, pp. 10-11, states: "Proper maintenance of equipment increases its period of economical usefulness, reduces supply requirements and conserves resources for other purposes." Thus, while the U.S. Army stresses maintenance to obtain these three objectives, the Soviet army stresses *training* substitutes so that valuable equipment *does not have to be used*.



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This feature is crucial in the Soviet military system not only because of the lean logistic system but so that older equipment can still be used for lower-readiness Soviet divisions and most client divisions.

WTO planning envisages divisions becoming operationally ready at staggered intervals according to their peacetime manning levels. Staggered readiness meshes with the Soviets' style of fighting and the limitations imposed by their transportation system's ability to move tracked vehicles on flatbeds from the USSR to Central Europe. In the offense, they accept the inevitability that, for the sake of time and other advantages, many of their attacking units will be decimated. The large but staggered number of mobilized divisions are to serve as replacement divisions so that the momentum of attack can be maintained.[18]

## Restructuring: An Alternative Approach to Correcting NATO's Conventional Deficiencies

The contention of the restructuring alternative is that U.S. and NATO forces are organized, equipped and run on precepts that have become questionable because of the most probable Soviet attack plan and the ever-present possibility of nuclear escalation. Accordingly, the force composition for the defense of Western Europe should not be based on strategies of massive retaliation or World War II-scale mobilization. By grappling with the too-long-ignored problems of efficiency — how the inputs get turned into outputs; what kinds of outputs are desired; what kinds of doctrine and organization are therefore indicated; and how new technology can remove constraints upon military organizations, deployment and fighting style — NATO can attain a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact even with significant manpower and budgetary reductions.

The structure and operating practices of NATO's forces must be adjusted to fit present conditions. In particular, the "all-purpose" British and American model that has influenced European mili-

[18] This tactic takes advantage of a NATO weakness and offsets a Soviet weakness. The Soviets now train extensively at night in order to be able to fight what is called the continuous twenty-four-hour battle, in which their units keep up an incessant round-the-clock pressure against the enemy — the object being to exhaust NATO's units physically while theirs are replaced and the process repeated. (B. Berrett, *Fighting Vehicles of the Red Army* [New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1969].) By maintaining their momentum with large numbers of combat units, they are able to saturate the enemy with combat power and offset the need for flexibility and initiative at the company-grade level. Thus, the Soviets' relative inferiority in command flexibility and initiative may be less important than some analysts assert.



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tary thinking is not sufficiently attuned to existing realities in Europe. It is oriented toward infantry warfare, not the armored blitz that the Pact is prepared to execute. Standardized equipment, suitable for global geographic and climatic extremes, is unnecessarily expensive to procure and maintain for the moderate requirements of Western and Central Europe. Nor is a self-supporting expeditionary organization required, because local European resources can be tapped and *armored warfare does not require the logistical balance that an infantry-style, across-the-front deployment requires.* In addition, even if the force were to be deployed linearly across-the-front, short conflicts require less maintenance (equipment can be permitted to run down), fewer engineers (road and rail networks will suffer less destruction), and fewer medical troops than longer conflicts. A military force postured logistically for a short war can usually also fight a long war if necessary, provided long lead-time items have been pre-ordered and economic resources are available. But a military force structured for a long war — and consequently weak in short-war capabilities — may not survive to marshal its potentially superior power.

Essentially, the Soviets have no alternative to their plan for a blitzkrieg war, so this is the kind of attack NATO must be postured to repulse.[19] NATO does not have the required force today. While the alliance's political leaders talk about a strategy of flexible response and rapid escalation to the tactical nuclear level should conventional efforts fail, NATO forces are currently best suited for a conventional offensive war of moderate pace and lengthy duration against similarly organized forces. While the political leadership speaks of defense, the military planners have structured their forces according to the time-honored adage that the best defense is a good offense.

This obvious gap between stated policy and military implementation has effectively blinded many at the political and military levels to the fact that NATO could buy a defense against the Soviet conventional threat in Europe at less than present cost. As the defender, NATO should be able to buy adequate forces at less expense than the WTO because it need not project offensive military power other than in counterattacks within a basically defensive strategy, and new technology inherently is more advantageous to the defense than the offense. For example, a defensive force can

[19] For a catalogue of reasons why the Soviets would be disinterested in a protracted conventional conflict in Europe, see Canby, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-86.



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rely extensively on pre-positioned supplies and mobilized civilian assets, while an attacking force needs a better developed logistic system to maintain its more actively used combat equipment, to move its supplies forward, and to repair a transport network damaged by a retreating enemy.

Because the Soviets have designed their forces to peak early with pencil-like armored thrusts, NATO can design its force posture to counter the WTO's initial combat capability without creating a long-run vulnerability. It would then have at least as great a war-fighting capacity as the Pact in the initial conventional category, while improving its tactical nuclear posture and retaining superiority in mobilization potential. In short, replacing the current NATO long-run and across-the-front offensive capabilities with larger numbers of smaller divisional forces and greater reserves designed to counter penetration tactics would have an optimizing effect: greater deterrence, greater conventional and tactical nuclear war-fighting capabilities, a higher nuclear threshold, major cost savings from simpler equipment, and sharp reductions in military components no longer central to the task of immobilizing movement on the battlefield.

*Guidelines for a U.S. and NATO Posture*

NATO's deployment today may be characterized as a thin forward wall. But a Soviet-type armored blitzkrieg can only be stopped by a defense in depth, since even a strong wall can always be penetrated and the battle shifted to the defender's reserves. The crucial implementing problem is obtaining more combat forces so that a defense in depth with large reserves can be adopted. The goal must be to absorb the shock of an enemy penetration, without providing lucrative targets for enemy nuclear weapons. A NATO force that can be deployed forward and in depth for physical occupation of terrain and counterattack will require a higher teeth-to-tail ratio, a system which can more easily shift forces from one part of the front to another, and a mobilization system to flesh out large numbers of peacetime cadre divisions.

The feasibility of increasing NATO's combat units from present troop strengths is easily established by analyzing Soviet military practices and assumptions. Just as the Soviets have obtained their slim forces through recognizing the organizational implications of the blitzkrieg, NATO too can opt for a war of moderate length, small but numerous highly surgeable units with little organic sus-



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taining and staying power, frameworks for expandable logistical support, and rapidly mobilizable reserve units. Moreover, by being on the defense, NATO has the advantage of not having to project its forces forward and should consequently be able to have smaller adjusted divisional slices than the Warsaw Pact.

The purpose of restructuring would be to obtain the reserves necessary for armored warfare and tactical nuclear war-fighting. With large reserves, the defender can parry penetration attempts until additional reserves can be brought up and adjacent sectors thinned so as to provide depth to the identified penetration area. With large reserves, the defender can conduct a defense in depth using either a mobile defense or a checkerboard defense with small company-sized strong points physically occupying the potential penetration area.[20]

The problem, of course, is how to create this defense in depth without increasing present troop levels — in fact, at the same time that strengths may actually be reduced through MBFR. To get a higher teeth-to-tail ratio for their forces, U.S. and European decision-makers will have to choose a new force model: the current all-purpose, expeditionary-style force capable of indefinite and sustained Eisenhower-like across-the-front offensive operations is unnecessarily expensive and tactically outmoded for conventional warfare in Europe. Whatever the final force posture chosen, NATO's army should be *specialized for Europe and oriented toward a short, defensive conventional conflict, but prepared for transition to tactical nuclear war-fighting and a sustained counter-offensive, if necessary.*

With this overview in mind, the following specific guidelines are recommended for implementation:

(1) *From an Anti-Infantry Oriented Mechanized Force to an Anti-Vehicular, Counterblitzkrieg Force.* While NATO's Central Front divisions are mechanized, its doctrinal concepts and actual deployment have evolved from an infantry heritage. For example, as late as 1962, three of the five U.S. divisions in Europe were still of the regular foot-infantry type. Armored warfare means more than just adding tanks and armored personnel carriers to mount the infantry; it also implies different tactics, organization and deployment.

(2) *From Firepower and Staying Power to Shock Power.* An infantry doctrine calling for linear deployment stresses firepower because of its

[20] For an elaborate development of this theme, see Steven L. Canby, *The Alliance and Europe: Part IV, Military Doctrine and Technology* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 109, Winter 1974/5), pp. 16-17, 23-24.



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need to support strung-out maneuver forces. Armored doctrine calls for shock power. Shock power requires highly mobile, concentratable maneuver units. Such forces can be obtained only by streamlining maneuver forces at the expense of their staying power (ability to absorb casualties and still function) and organic logistic assets.

(3) *From Logistical Balance to Logistical Imbalance.* In armored warfare only the fraction of the forces in the penetration area need be heavily engaged at any one time. Placing logistical resources into line units to support sustained combat is like matching spear tips and spear shafts on a one-to-one basis: when the spear tip is lost, the shaft is rendered useless. Unbalancing permits maintaining several spear tips per shaft. This provides logistical sustainability where needed, at the expense of built-in sustainability for any one unit.

(4) *From an Individual Replacement to a Unit Replacement System.* In accordance with a blitzkrieg-postured force, NATO should replace combat losses by a unit replacement system. Individual replacement is infeasible in a high-intensity combat environment because the large numbers of necessary replacements cannot be efficiently absorbed. In high-intensity blitzkrieg and tactical nuclear warfare, fresh cohesive units are necessary to replace units that have been destroyed or require regrouping from high combat losses.

(5) *From an Expeditionary-Style to Reliance upon European Infrastructure.* NATO militaries, and the American in particular, should forgo those self-contained services that can be provided by readily mobilizable European assets. German territorial commands should be explicitly tasked for wartime transport, construction and LOC (line of communications) maintenance, and rear-area security and protection. German territorial services should be pushed all the way up to divisional rear boundaries. The concept should be to release resources for a large divisional "crust," with only enough rearward logistics of national origin to maintain stationed forces in peacetime and to provide them with a unilateral "crisis" capability.

(6) *From All-Purpose Maneuver Forces to Specialized Ground-Holding and Strike Forces.* By restructuring, more divisions can be provided and they can also be downgraded as entities. Divisions could then be regarded as specialized components of a larger scheme: most would be cheap *ground-holding* forces and a lesser number would be expensive *strike* forces. Such a stance, while emphasizing the defense, retains a counteroffensive capability. For instance, in World War II only 18 per cent of the German order of battle was panzer and panzer grenadier (though in NATO's case virtually all divisions would be armored for protected mobility and firepower). Specialization simplifies training, facilitates reliance upon organized reserves, allows a higher teeth-to-tail ratio, and lowers equipment costs, particularly for the ground-holding divisions.[21]

[21] For an elaboration, see *ibid.*, pp. 23-24.



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(7) *From an Indefinite Sustained War to a Hedged Short War.* An army field force specifically organized for armored blitzkrieg warfare need not be particularly sensitive to length-of-war scenarios. For ground forces, the difference is mainly in the number of supporting maintenance and medical troops. NATO forces should nevertheless be *organizationally* structured for a thirty- to sixty-day ground battle. The possibility of a longer war can be hedged by storing more than sixty days' supplies of ammunition and spare parts (but not bulk fuel or material available from the European economy) and by beefing up maintenance and medical troops by D+60.

The big savings from a short war orientation are from naval sea lane forces and a redesigning of tactical air forces for missions and tactics more appropriate for armored warfare.

(8) *From High Peacetime Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Activity to Damped Activity.* NATO, and the United States in particular, need to redesign their peacetime training habits, and combat equipment should be garaged rather than left in weather-exposed vehicle parks. The key to damped O&M is improved training made possible by going to unit replacement and multiyear training cycles versus present annual cycles caused by personnel turnover. Present training cycles require too large a percentage of a soldier's time and too much use of combat equipment, which reduces equipment readiness and raises O&M demands.

(9) *From All-Purpose Equipment to Equipment Specialized for the European Environment.* The United States does not require — at least for its stationed forces — equipment suitable for global weather and geographic extremes in Western Europe's moderate climate and extremely elaborate transport networks. For instance, trucks do not need multifuel engines and not all of them need cross-country traction.

(10) *From High-Quality Equipment to Larger Numbers of Simple, Rugged Equipment.* Multipurpose-induced complexity should in general be phased out in favor of more specialized equipment. This process is facilitated by simplifying functional tasks and changes in tactics. For instance, artillery can be divided into expensive tube artillery for targets requiring relative accuracy and cheap rocket artillery for target saturation.

(11) *For the United States: From CONUS Reinforcement by Divisions to Reinforcement by Many Small Composite Packages.* The United States presently cannot reinforce rapidly — regardless of the airlift available — because of bottlenecks inherent in reinforcing by specified large units: CONUS standdown, in-theater absorption, and in-theater shakedown. Reinforcing by components of an in-theater battalion can eliminate these bottlenecks. With large numbers of component packages attached to divisions in the CONUS, readiness can be rotated so as to preclude an impossible burden on any one unit. By pre-positioning the component's equipment with its parent battalion, in-theater reception can be increased by skirting the need to funnel through large air terminals near the present large depots, which are



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themselves too congested for a rapid breakout of equipment. By marrying with an already functioning parent battalion, the command staff and logistical structure is already in place, minimizing the inherent confusion of a large organization moving into an unfamiliar location. Without the confusion of large numbers, sub-unit commanders can rapidly sort themselves out, integrate themselves into their parent battalion, and acclimatize themselves for actual combat within days.

Organizationally this procedure would involve increasing the number of companies per battalion from three to four and adding two maneuver battalions per division base. All equipment would be prepositioned with the parent battalion, but the fourth company plus part of the battalion overhead would be assigned to a U.S.-based division. Reserve readiness would also be enhanced by assigning reserve packages to replace the departed active force packages in wartime. This change permits a 50 per cent reinforcement of the in-theater force in a two-week period. At present strength levels, this change plus restructuring would permit the United States to field nine division-equivalents in peacetime and fourteen division-equivalents by M day + 14. (Presently the U.S. Army has about eleven sets of division-equivalent equipment in Europe and can field five to six divisions by M+30 days.)

(12) *For the Europeans: From a Few High-Readiness Divisions and a Large Manpower Reserve Pool to a Large Number of Structured Divisions.* NATO's problem is that, while its active divisions are generally of high quality and can be sustained indefinitely (war reserve stocks permitting) with large numbers of reserves individually fed in as losses occur, it has too few divisions to withstand the Soviet strategy of swamping its defenses with large numbers of unit-replacement-type divisions, most of which are only partly manned cadre divisions in peacetime. Thus, if NATO is to withstand a Soviet mobilization "tidal wave," it too must adopt a similar mobilization stance—which after all is nothing more than a return to the traditional continental mobilization system. Restructuring and cadre divisions could allow the Continental Europeans, within the constraints of present active and reserve personnel strengths, to increase their twenty-two-division structure on the continent to fifty-nine divisions, while still permitting NATO (including U.S., UK and Canadian forces) to maintain the same number of highly ready Category-I-type divisions currently in Germany to guard against a surprise attack from a comparable number of Warsaw Pact divisions in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

(13) *From Multipurpose, Low-Sortie-Rate Tactical Airpower to a Cheap, Specialized and Surgeable Tactical Air Fleet.*[22] Restructured army forces and new technology will change the role of tactical airpower. Once coherently deployed, army forces no longer need air support; air defense and the pace of operations foreclose the opportunities for deep interdiction, and new technology offers more attractive alternatives.

[22] For a detailed exposition on this thesis, see *ibid.*, pp. 36-41.



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Tactical airpower retains two major missions: battlefield interdiction (specifically, disruption and attrition of enemy forces in the penetration area where air defense will not be coherent) and the derived mission of local air superiority. Even though manned aircraft may be more costly than competitive systems for normal operations, tactical airpower remains irreplaceable when friendly ground forces are disorganized. Tactical airpower must therefore be seen as an emergency force filling a void until inherently slow-moving army forces can redeploy.

During such crises, tactical airpower must generate high sortie rates. Aircraft characteristics satisfying this requirement are not demanding; but they do require a shift from today's expensive multipurpose aircraft (whose design is driven by questionable long-range interdiction and air base attack missions) to simple, robust, specialized aircraft capable of generating high sortie rates for periods of days from forward dispersal bases. During noncrisis periods, battlefield interdiction is not required and air cover demands will be low. The vulnerable maintenance bases can therefore be located well rearward (e.g., in the United Kingdom, outside the MBFR guidelines area). During these lulls, tactical airpower can be reconditioned; as likely contingencies arise, aircraft can be deployed to forward dispersal strips.

(14) *From Focusing on Proxy Indicators of Effectiveness and One-to-One Replacement of New for Old Weapons to Recognizing the Doctrinal and Organizational Implications of New Technology.* Present tactics and organization are premised upon present and past technologies, and hence are valid only for a specific time and place of historical evolution. As technology evolves, so must the "superstructure" — the organization, tactical doctrine and choice of weapons — in which the latest technology is embedded. Specifically, NATO must not think of technology as merely improving and replacing old weapons with new weapons, as increasing firepower, or as a means of shoring up outmoded tactical concepts. Focusing on proxy indicators of effectiveness (like lightness for army weapons, or speed, payload and the like in the case of aircraft) can lead to only marginal improvements in the weapon and in the military payoff. On the contrary, the big payoff is from discerning how new technology can remove present constraints and permit new ways of organizing, deploying and fighting the military force.

## Conclusion

Political tensions in postwar Europe have been aggravated by military asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Pact: the Soviets have feared U.S. strategic weapons, and NATO has been mesmerized by Soviet conventional capabilities. The Soviets have now acquired an equal strategic footing, while NATO, rather than solving its conventional deficiency, continues to be preoccupied with second thoughts about the credibility and use of its destructive nuclear weapons.



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This analysis of NATO's conventional deficiency indicates that the military problem is primarily structural and cannot be solved by new technology or the incremental approaches of recent years. Solving its conventional deficiency by restructuring its conventional military forces is one way — perhaps the only way — that NATO can break out of the insecure status quo without significant adverse political or military consequences.

Many of NATO's policy dilemmas — mutual and balanced force reductions, intra-alliance anxieties, and even the nuclear control issue — stem from the absence of conventional parity with the Warsaw Pact forces. Correcting this deficiency would remove or reduce these dilemmas and provide the alliance with new and attractive policy options.



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# A COMPARISON OF U.S.-ALLIED AND SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCE CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES

*by S. T. Cohen and W. C. Lyons*

AFTER more than two decades of tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) development and deployment by the United States and, to a lesser extent, some of our allies, the actual utility of these weapons and their associated forces remains, to Western strategists, the most poorly understood component of our military defense. They were first developed and used as military devices for mass destruction — an image that has persisted up to the present time. As a consequence, their use in a limited theater war in support of a conventional field army has seemed almost contradictory.

The initial deployments of American tactical nuclear weapons tended to reinforce this feeling of contradiction, since the early weapon yields were of the order of the nuclear bombs dropped on Japan to speed the termination of the Second World War. However, it should be appreciated that these TNW's were developed in the late 1940's and early 1950's when the USSR had developed little strategic nuclear capability, let alone any tactical nuclear forces. Under such conditions the West could be certain that mass destruction would be limited to the enemy and his territory.

During the 1950's the Soviets developed their nuclear weapons production capability at a far more rapid pace than Western experts thought possible, so that by the late 1950's they were able to deploy TNW systems in the Central European theater area. When this deployment became known, it was evident that the use of such weapons by the United States and its European allies against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies would not produce the one-sided devastation originally envisioned by Western advocates of TNW's. At that moment the West's tactical nuclear employment doctrine became obsolete, and a new credible doctrine has yet to emerge.

Even though the United States has made an effort (largely ineffectual in recent years) to keep tactical nuclear technology up to date, there has been considerable skepticism in the West as to the



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utility of these weapons for anything short of general nuclear warfare. A debate over TNW's has raged off and on during the intervening years, but with no resolution. Recently Congress has stepped into this arena with a view to clarifying the issue and determining what ought to be done about the many thousands of tactical nuclear weapons the United States has deployed abroad.

In the forefront has been Senator Stuart Symington, operating as Chairman of both the Joint Atomic Energy Committee's Military Applications Subcommittee (which controls the government's funds for nuclear weapon development) and the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In his introductory, and highly critical, remarks in March 1974 to the subcommittee hearings on tactical nuclear weapons, the Senator stated:

> The significance of our nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe becomes all too apparent when one realizes that the destructive force, in TNT equivalent, of the nuclear weapons we currently have stockpiled on European soil alone is more than 20 times that of the combined total force of all the air ordnance expended in World War II, the Korean War, and the war in Vietnam.
>
> Given the unprecedented destructive force of said weapons, one would assume the existence of carefully thought out and agreed upon plans for their use and control.
>
> That is not correct, however. As but one example, in the first of these hearings . . . the Subcommittee was told by a former official of the Defense Department that, thus far, the United States military has had almost no success in the attempt to develop doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the European battlefield.
>
> In the course of hearings held last year by the Military Applications Subcommittee to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. military officials acknowledged that our European allies still have grave reservations about the deployment of nuclear weapons in their countries.
>
> [A NATO war game exercise, conducted in 1955, indicated] that German casualties (resulting from the use of 268 of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons on German territory), not including those attributable to residual radiation, were estimated at between 1.5 and 1.7 million dead and 3.5 million wounded. These figures compare with total German civilian casualties throughout the entire Second World War of 305,000 killed and 780,000 wounded.
>
> These statistics are all the more appalling when one notes that the exercise in question was held before the Soviets had acquired their major tactical nuclear capability, presently available to their forces; and, therefore, was predicated on the use of nuclear weapons only by NATO forces.
>
> In light of these considerations, it becomes increasingly clear that



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the Congress will be remiss in its responsibility if it does not undertake a thorough review of U.S. nuclear deployments in Europe.[1]

This statement is all the more significant when it is remembered that Senator Symington was himself involved in this issue, as Secretary of the Air Force, when initial considerations were being given to the development of TNW systems. Now, more than twenty years later, the Senator's remarks indicate that the tactical nuclear weapons argument has come full circle and that many of the highest officials in the U.S. and allied governments are raising serious questions concerning the rationale behind the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons.

However, the above account covers literally only half of the overall problem. In all of the recent Congressional hearings pertaining to the tactical nuclear question, it is most important to note, the testimony and discussions have focused essentially on U.S. and allied tactical nuclear capabilities and lack of doctrine. Major emphasis was placed on the negative aspects of these weapons. There has been but a modicum of discussion about Soviet tactical nuclear weapons; and the "lip service" given to Soviet tactical nuclear force capabilities and doctrine has been cast, not so much in the light of possible military significance, but rather in terms of the additional mass destruction (to West Germany, in particular) that would result from Soviet employment. It appears to have been tacitly assumed that the Soviets do not understand any better than Western strategists the relationship between tactical nuclear forces and possible future theater conflicts. This assumption may be quite incorrect.

What seems by and large to be missing in the TNW debate throughout the years (not only in Congressional hearings, but in most of the U.S. professional literature as well) is an accounting of precisely what the Soviets have been doing in the field of tactical nuclear weapons development, deployment and doctrine. Moreover, insufficient attention has been given to comparing Soviet capabilities and doctrines with those of the West.

## II

The details of Soviet nuclear warheads, strategic and tactical, have defied accurate definition by Western experts. This was emphasized in 1971 when Dr. Carl Walske, then Assistant to the

[1] Stuart Symington, statement in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Hearings* before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, March 1974, pp. 49-50.



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Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, stated: "We have little certain knowledge of the Soviet warhead designs. . . . We do not know what the Soviets have accomplished in their test program since 1963. . . ."[2] However, warhead designs are not really critical to our understanding of Soviet ground forces. What is essential is to know the types of TNW delivery systems deployed, plus the technical limitations for individual classes of weapon systems and the actual theater area differences, e.g., threat characteristics, geography, terrain. Such information will indicate to us the kinds of actions Soviet forces might be capable of carrying out.

War motives and weapon employment intentions can be altered quickly, but forces in the field take considerable time to change. Therefore, the character of these forces provides a more tangible and credible element for assessing the doctrinal options available to them. This does not mean that we should downplay the Soviets' doctrinal statements regarding how they believe theater nuclear combat should be conducted. On the contrary, an understanding of Soviet doctrine is of crucial importance, and those statements — of which there appear to be a wealth — in general are consonant with the manner in which they have deployed their tactical nuclear forces.

There are two principal geographic areas of the world in which the Soviets have vital interests requiring continued or increased military support — including nuclear weapons: the Far Eastern and European theaters. The former appears to be the less complicated area to analyze with regard to obtaining clear relationships between Soviet political and economic motives, deployed military forces to support these motives, and ultimately the force employment doctrine best coinciding with the motives and deployed forces. Given an understanding of these relationships in the Far East, a more accurate assessment can be made of the overall character of Soviet tactical nuclear forces facing the United States and its allies in the far more complex European theater. Before undertaking these assessments, a brief review of U.S.-allied and Soviet tactical nuclear weapons is in order.

## III

Because of the complex and competitive nature of the various service elements of its armed forces, the United States, nearly

[2] Testimony by Carl Walske, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, to the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organizations, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, July 1971, pp. 131-132.



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from the beginning of its tactical nuclear weapons program, has developed and deployed specialized tactical nuclear weapons for each service. This development philosophy has provided the United States and its allies[3] with a large variety of tactical nuclear weapon systems: surface-to-surface unguided free-flight rockets, surface-to-surface guided missiles (SSM's), artillery projectiles, aircraft-deliverable bombs and air-to-surface missiles, air defense missile warheads, and atomic demolition munitions (ADM's).[4] These systems are deployed in various theaters throughout the world.

The French have developed and deployed aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons which can be utilized in tactical conflict, and recently they deployed a new nuclear-capable, land-mobile surface-to-surface guided missile, the Pluton. French TNW systems are deployed only in the European theater.

There are five short-range surface-to-surface rocket and missile systems deployed by the West, all having warhead yields in the kiloton range:

*Honest John* — an unguided ballistic rocket with a range of about 40 km; first deployed by the United States in 1953.

*Sergeant* — a guided ballistic missile with a range of about 140 km; deployed by the United States in 1962.

*Pershing* — a guided ballistic missile intended to perform deep interdiction missions, with a range of about 700 km; deployed by the United States in 1962.

*Lance* — a guided ballistic missile with a range of about 110 km; deployed by the United States in 1974.

*Pluton* — a guided ballistic missile with a range of about 120 km; deployed by the French in 1975.[5]

The two artillery weapons capable of delivering nuclear projectiles, the 155mm self-propelled (SP) howitzer and the 203mm (8-inch) SP howitzer, were deployed by the United States in the mid-1960's; both have nuclear projectiles with yields in the kiloton category and firing ranges of about 16 km.[6]

[3] Practically all of the allies' nuclear weapon systems are of U.S. design and construction, and allied forces in most cases reflect U.S. force structures. French weapons and forces are the exception.

[4] See R. T. Pretty and D. H. Archer, editors, *Jane's Weapon Systems 1973-74* (London: Sampson Low, 1974); Trevor Cliffe, *Military Technology and the European Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 89, August 1972); Laurence W. Martin, *Arms and Strategy* (New York: McKay, 1973).

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Cliffe, *op. cit.*, p. 35.



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Western aircraft capable of performing tactically oriented missions with nuclear bombs or air-to-surface missiles are:[7]

| *Fighter-Bombers* | *Radius (km)* |
|---|---|
| F-104 | 900 |
| F-4 | 1000 |
| F-111 | 3000 |
| Buccaneer | 1800 |
| Jaguar | 600 |
| Mirage IIIE | 540 |
| *Medium Bombers* | |
| FB-111 | 4000 |
| Vulcan | 4000 |
| Mirage IV | 1800 |

The Soviets have extensively deployed three tactical nuclear short-range surface-to-surface rockets and missiles in the Far Eastern and European theater areas:[8]

*FROG* (free rocket over ground) — an unguided ballistic rocket that first entered the inventory in 1957. Since that time, a modernization program produced a FROG-7 model in 1965. FROG-7 has a range of about 75 km, about three times that of FROG-1 and almost twice that of Honest John.

*Scud* — a guided ballistic missile that became operational in 1959. In 1965, a model improvement — the Scud-B — entered the force. It has a range of about 300 km, essentially double the range of Scud-A and also double the range of Sergeant and Lance.

*Scaleboard* — a guided ballistic missile that entered the inventory in 1969. It has a range of about 800 km, somewhat greater than that of Pershing.

Soviet tactical aircraft believed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons are:[9]

| *Fighter-Bombers* | *Radius (km)* |
|---|---|
| MiG-21 (Fishbed) | 400 |
| MiG-23 (Flogger) | 800 |
| Su-7 (Fitter) | 300 |
| *Light Bombers* | |
| Il-28 (Beagle) | 1000 |
| Yak-28 (Brewer) | 1200 |
| *Medium Bombers* | |
| Tu-16 (Badger) | 4000 |
| Tu-22 (Blinder) | 2000 |

[7] Cliffe, *op. cit.;* Martin, *op. cit.;* John W. Taylor, editor, *Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1973-74* (London: Sampson Low, 1974).
[8] Cliffe, *op. cit.;* Pretty and Archer, editors, *op. cit.*
[9] Cliffe, *op. cit.;* Martin, *op. cit.;* Taylor, editor, *op. cit.*



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A comparison of the above data shows that, in the main, Soviet tactical rockets and missiles have a substantial range advantage over Western counterparts; they have undergone extensive modification since they were first fielded, while American systems have not. The Soviets seem to have chosen not to deploy short-range nuclear artillery weapon systems, nor is there evidence of an ADM capability. U.S. tactical aircraft, on the other hand, seem to have greater operational range capabilities than do Soviet aircraft.

## IV

In order to gain a clearer understanding of the overall character of Soviet theater forces, it is appropriate to compare the political and economic motives, the deployed theater forces, and the doctrines these forces could support in the principal areas where they are deployed: the Far East and Europe.

### *Far East*

The Soviets regard eastern Siberia as of vital importance economically and strategically. The area is rich in the mineral and petroleum reserves so essential to the development of Soviet industrial power. Furthermore, as a result of the German invasion of the USSR during World War II, a great deal of Soviet industrial might has been constructed in the territories considerably east of the Urals. The interest in the Far Eastern theater area, then, is to a great degree the result of a formerly perceived threat from the West.

The Soviets, however, have experienced continuing difficulties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) over these eastern territories since the mid-1960's: the Chinese not only have directly opposed Moscow on ideological principles, but have claimed certain portions of Siberia, including sizeable areas around Lake Balkhash to the northwest of China, around Lake Baikal above Mongolia, and along the Amur and Ussuri rivers to the northeast. Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops have occurred in these areas since the mid-1960's, the most serious erupting during 1969 in the Ussuri River area.[10]

As the ferocity of the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict has escalated, the Soviets have increased their military commitment to this area. At present, in the Far Eastern theater, they have

[10] See Harrison E. Salisbury, *War Between Russia and China* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).



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deployed some 45 divisions made up of 500,000 troops, close to 10,000 tanks, about 250 nuclear-capable fighter-bombers, and on the order of 100 tactical nuclear missiles.[11]

*Europe*

The Soviet involvement in the European theater is highly complex with regard to political and economic motives and possible military action. The World War II experience has left a lasting impact on Soviet attitudes concerning any military conflict with NATO — in particular, the West German forces. During World War II, the Soviet Union suffered far greater losses at the hands of German troops than did the United States, Britain and France.

According to Soviet accounts, the threat in Europe stems from the possibility of a "surprise attack" from the West that would trigger a major conflict. Whether the Soviets might have other "reasons" for becoming embroiled in an armed conflict with NATO forces is far from clear. In the European theater, they and their Warsaw Pact allies now deploy some 75 divisions comprising 750,000 troops, almost 20,000 tanks, about 800 nuclear-capable fighter-bombers, and close to 700 tactical nuclear missiles.[12]

To understand the different characteristics of Soviet forces deployed in the Far East and Europe, we should examine the amount of firepower support (both conventional and nuclear) Soviet ground combat forces have available in each area. Below is a rough comparison of the tactical firepower support ratios[13] for the two theaters:

| | *Theaters* | |
|---|---|---|
| | *Far East* | *Europe* |
| Tanks | 15 | 25 |
| Nuclear missiles | 1/5 | 1 |
| Nuclear-capable fighter bombers | 1/2 | 1 |

These ratios suggest some important features regarding the Soviets' concept of battle in the two theaters. The majority of the PRC military troop and equipment supply centers are located about 1,000 km (or more) from the border area.[14] Tactical nuclear missiles and the rather "short-legged" tactical aircraft cannot reach

[11] *The Military Balance 1974-1975* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), p. 48.
[12] Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 174; *The Military Balance 1974-1975, op. cit.*, p. 8.
[13] Defined here as the number of offensive weapons (i.e., tanks, aircraft and nuclear missiles) per thousand ground troops.
[14] Salisbury, *op. cit.*, p. 42.



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these targets, so the ratios of these weapons are smaller in the Far East. Indicative of a defensive concept of combat in the eastern theater is the smaller ratio of tank support and the apparently smaller commitment to an offensive ground attack role for the Red Army. These tank ratios suggest that Soviet ground forces may be there to defend against PRC forces that survive attacks by longer-range nuclear-capable medium bombers and probably some IR/MRBM's.

By contrast, the forces in the European theater seem to be significantly oriented toward the offense. The tank support for ground combat forces is more than 50 per cent greater. Nuclear missile support is several times that in the Far East. In this connection, a statement by the Chief Marshal of Tanks, P. A. Rotmistrov, seems to summarize Soviet intentions for conflict in Europe: "In battle, when an avalanche of attacking tanks follows immediately after nuclear strikes, the anti-tank weapons which have not been wiped out by these strikes will be quickly destroyed by the fire from these tanks as soon as they are located."[15]

## V

The only land area where NATO and Soviet forces face each other directly is the European theater. This theater, therefore, has become the major concern of Western strategists and the focal point for tactical nuclear weapon development and deployment.

The NATO alliance has a formidable array of conventional and nuclear forces facing the Soviets and their Pact allies: 31 divisions comprising almost a million troops, about 9,000 tanks, 900 nuclear-capable fighter bombers, about 400 tactical nuclear missiles, and 1,400 nuclear-capable artillery tubes. Added to this are approximately 25,000 antitank weapons—about five times the size of the Soviet/Pact inventory.[16]

Estimating the firepower support ratios for the U.S. and allied forces in this theater and using the Soviet European-theater ratios

[15] P. A. Rotmistrov, *Nauka i Zhizn'*, April 1968.

[16] See Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 134; Kenneth Hunt, *The Alliance and Europe: Part II, Defense with Fewer Men* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 98, Summer 1973), p. 35; *Report of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program*, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, March 1974, p. 29; Wolfgang Heisenberg, *The Alliance and Europe: Part I, Crisis Stability in Europe and Tactical Nuclear Weapons* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 96, Summer 1973), p. 22.



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from the previous section, a rough comparison can be made of U.S./NATO and USSR/WTO capabilities:

| | *U.S./NATO* | *USSR/WTO* |
|---|---|---|
| Tanks | 10 | 25 |
| Nuclear missiles | ½ | 1 |
| Nuclear artillery | 1½ | 0 |
| Nuclear-capable fighter bombers | 1 | 1 |

The above ratios lend further support to the relatively offensive nature of Soviet forces compared with NATO forces. USSR/WTO conventional forces possess more than twice the tank support, and in nuclear firepower they have about twice the tactical surface-to-surface missile capability and significantly more medium bomber support. Only in the category of nuclear artillery does NATO have a firepower support advantage — indeed, a monopoly — but the short-range nature of this artillery tends to limit these weapon systems to basically defensive use.

Underlying U.S.-NATO policy for TNW employment has been a high expectation that war in Europe will be nonnuclear and that NATO forces will have sufficient political-military warning to prepare for a conventional onslaught from the East. Should NATO's conventional defenses become incapable of holding Pact forces, this policy contains the option for NATO to initiate a limited number of highly selective nuclear strikes against the aggressor's ground forces to persuade the Soviets to halt their attack and move from a military to a political resolution of the problem.[17]

There are, to be sure, NATO guidelines concerned with the process of complex evaluation and decision-making following a military request for use of tactical nuclear weapons. However, they can hardly be construed as providing doctrinal guidance to NATO's military forces regarding effective war-fighting operations involving bilateral employment of nuclear weapons.

In essence, U.S.-NATO policy for the employment of these weapons is based on a limited set of nuclear options, which rely on the hope that the Soviets share an apprehension over their possible use. It is assumed in NATO capitals that both sides will place highest priority on conventional means for solution of military problems. The use of tactical nuclear weapons is believed to

[17] See Steven Canby, *The Alliance and Europe: Part IV, Military Doctrine and Technology* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 109, Winter 1974), p. 1.



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pose escalatory risks which are highly disproportionate to possible immediate military advantages; and the West believes the Soviets similarly recognize such risks.

The underlying assumptions of this policy can be questioned. Soviet doctrinal literature offers little support for the supposition that Soviet planning for conflict with NATO will be based on an extensive and detectable mobilization period. In this vein, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal A. A. Grechko has stated:

> The time factor has particular significance in combat readiness. During the wars of the past, rather extended times were given for bringing the troops into a state of readiness. At present, the enormous speed of the missiles and aircraft requires that troops be brought into a state of full combat readiness in literally a few minutes. Only under this condition can we count on the effective repelling or thwarting of surprise attacks by the aggressor and the successful execution of combat missions, particularly by the missile troops, the air defense, and aviation units where time is counted in seconds.[18]

Obviously, this need for swift mobilization, supposedly to thwart an enemy surprise attack, would also be an essential factor in the preparation of a Soviet pre-emptive attack. There are other statements suggesting that the concept of surprise nuclear attack is part of the Soviets' theater doctrine. In 1971, Major General I. E. Krupchenko asserted that

> The employment of nuclear weapons has greatly increased the role and significance of surprise in combat and has raised the requirement for its attainment.[19]

At about the same time Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, one of the Red Army's leading theoreticians on ground combat, wrote:

> To attain the greatest effectiveness, it is recommended that the nuclear strike be launched at the start of the firepower preparation unexpectedly for the enemy. Pre-emption in launching a nuclear strike is expected to be the decisive condition for the attainment of superiority over him and the seizure and retention of the initiative.[20]

Although it is entirely possible that the Soviets, were they some day to decide to attack NATO, might select a conventional option such as that underlying U.S.-NATO policy, statements such as these give little support to this possibility. One person who has

[18] A. A. Grechko, *On Guard for Peace and the Building of Communism* (Washington: Department of Commerce, Technical Information Service, December 1971), p. 52.

[19] I. E. Krupchenko, *Military History* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), p. 343.

[20] A. A. Sidorenko, *The Offensive (A Soviet View)* (Moscow, 1970; U.S. Air Force translation), p. 115.



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strongly declared himself on this issue is Britain's former Defense Minister, Denis Healey, who in 1970 stated:

I don't think it would, in fact, make sense for NATO to aim at an all-out conventional defense against an all-out Warsaw Pact conventional attack because all Soviet training and exercises assume the use of nuclear weapons from the word 'go', so I think an all-out conventional attack is very unlikely. . . . the other side would use nuclear weapons to begin with and there's a great deal of evidence for that, both in the exercises they do and what they write in their strategic journals.[21]

Even if the Soviets lean more heavily toward tactical nuclear weapons, by no means have they ignored the value of conventional forces when employing TNW's. In 1970 Lieutenant General I. Zavilov explained:

The art of conducting military operations with the use of nuclear weapons and that of employing conventional forces have many fundamental differences. But they are not in opposition, are not mutually exclusive, and are not isolated one from the other; on the contrary, they are closely correlated and are developing as a single body.[22]

And Sidorenko, backing up Zavilov, declared:

In spite of the fact that nuclear weapons will become the chief means of defeating the enemy, their roles and capabilities cannot be made absolute. . . . In a number of cases, regimental-size units or smaller will have to perform various combat actions including the attack, without use of nuclear weapons, using only conventional organic "classic" means of armament.[23]

In this context, a phrase from Marshal of Tanks Rotmistrov, cited earlier, bears repeating:

In battle, when an avalanche of attacking tanks follows immediately after nuclear strikes. . . .[24]

From a statement made in 1963 by Marshal V. I. Chuikov it appears that the Soviets were not simply engaging in academic exercises on the possible uses of tactical nuclear weapons.

The results of experimental research and various exercises carried out in recent times have shown that units and formations of the Soviet land troops can operate successfully for a long time in zones with high levels of radioactive and chemical poisoning. They have also mastered successfully ways of effectively neutralizing these areas.[25]

[21] Interview with Denis Healey on "The Nuclear Genie," Radio 4 (London), Aspects of Government Series, April 7, 1970.
[22] I. Zavilov, "Nuclear Weapons and War," *Red Star* (Moscow), October 30, 1970.
[23] Sidorenko, *op. cit.*, p. 222.
[24] Rotmistrov, *op. cit.*
[25] Marshal V. I. Chuikov, "Soviet Land Forces in Nuclear War," *Izvestiya*, December 21, 1963.



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This conclusion seems to contradict one made around that time by then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara:

> It is inconceivable to me how you send troops through an area in which there may have been literally hundreds of nuclear bursts. . . . It is as though the people who were writing the statements had never really had exposed to them the destructive power of nuclear weapons.[26]

Some have assessed Soviet tactical nuclear doctrine as dictating rather massive indiscriminate assaults on NATO forces in and around the highly populated areas of Western Europe. To buttress this thesis it is pointed out that the Soviets may have little political or economic reason to occupy Western Europe or leave it intact. We do not know how much devastation of Europe would be caused by their employment of tactical nuclear weapons, for our knowledge of Soviet nuclear warheads is too limited to allow a reliable estimation of their destructive power. However, we do know that the Soviets express great concern over the ability of their ground forces to operate in areas where excessive physical destruction has occurred. In their writings there are hints that urban collateral damage is an undesirable effect — suggesting limitations on tactical nuclear employment:

> Under the conditions prevailing in a city, employment of nuclear weapons is limited inasmuch as they entail extensive destruction, piled rubble and regions which are almost impossible not only for the enemy but for friendly troops.[27]

In addition to this concern, they have expressed a preference for prompt nuclear radiation effects (over blast effects) as a battlefield kill mechanism.[28] Were this preference for "radiation kill" translated into warhead requirements, the yields of their tactical nuclear warheads could readily be an order-of-magnitude less than the levels ascribed to them by U.S. analysts who have made determinations on the basis of blast effects.

In summary, the Soviets' force deployment in Europe and declaratory doctrinal statements related to war with NATO indicate quite clearly that they are prepared to use tactical missile forces as their principal means of carrying out swift and decisive attacks on NATO troop and supply centers in the immediate

[26] William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 97.
[27] Maj. Gen. A. K. Shovkolovich, Col. F. I. Konasov and Col. S. I. Tkach, *Combat Action of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in a City* (Moscow, 1971; U.S. Army Translation No. K-1400), p. 6.
[28] Maj. Gen. G. Biryukov and Col. G. Melnikov, *Antitank Warfare* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 69.



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rear (and beyond) of the front lines. As these initial attacks conclude, the more conventional armored forces would then pass through the attacked areas and destroy any remaining resistance. These tactics make maximum use of long-standing Soviet expertise (i.e., their technological advantage in missile development and production in the late 1950's and early 1960's and the Red Army's tank combat prowess).

## VI

It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine which of the above tactical nuclear combat philosophies and force organizations is more credible and potentially more successful for the conduct of actual nuclear combat in the European theater. The results of any analysis would be highly suspect because of the limited knowledge we have of Soviet weapon systems and battle movements and the uncertainty regarding U.S. and allied battle movements. Put another way, our understanding of the dynamics of tactical nuclear conflict is, at best, vague.

What we can detail are the relative strengths and weaknesses of each side's tactical nuclear forces, both in force capabilities and apparent doctrines.

### *U.S.-NATO*

U.S. ground forces have undergone several organizational changes over the past three decades, brought about to some extent by the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into NATO in the early 1950's. However, most of them (as has generally been the case in most armies) have been introduced as a result of conflicts the U.S. Army has experienced during this period — the Korean war and the Southeast Asian war — and the battlefield experiences of the Israelis during the Middle East wars of 1967 and 1973. These were all conventional wars that have had relevance for U.S. military planners responsible for developing our forces to meet the conventional threat in Europe. These experiences have led to the development within NATO of mobile ground units armed with increasing numbers of effective antitank weapons. The design of tactical air forces for NATO has been moving in the direction of delivery systems which will provide the alliance with a highly mobile reserve force that can carry out attacks on massed mechanized forces.

There was a short interlude in the 1950's when efforts were made to reform the U.S. Army organization structure to reflect



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the commitment at that time to tactical nuclear war in the European theater — the so-called Pentomic division concept. These efforts to adapt to a nuclear combat environment were made prior to the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into the Red Army. However, after the appearance of the Soviet weapons, the concept of the Pentomic division was abandoned, and the Pentagon returned to an organizational structure similar to the one with which it ended the Second World War.[29]

The changes that have taken place over the years since the demise of the Pentomic concept have incorporated substantial improvements in NATO's capability to resist the Pact's massed conventional mechanized forces. However, because of the ever increasing technical sophistication needed to accomplish this objective, the alliance ground forces have had to increase their dependence on support forces. NATO armies now have an extremely large portion of manpower tied down to support functions and static facilities, leaving relatively few personnel in the divisions who can be used directly in combat.[30] NATO's reliance on such a large static support tail and the existence of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons seem starkly contradictory, for this logistics capability is highly vulnerable to Soviet tactical missile attacks.

The long logistics tail of the NATO armies is consonant with prevailing allied strategy, which anticipates that any combat with Pact forces will be a protracted conflict similar to World War II, the Korean war and the Southeast Asian war. This strategy is further confirmed by the existence of NATO's large stocks of combat material stored throughout Europe, plus its continued adherence to an individual troop replacement policy similar to that used in World War II.[31]

This long war concept is not by itself a weakness in philosophy, provided NATO can afford the expense of the added material needed to support it. But there is a potential weakness in organizing for this type of war, since it leaves the alliance quite vulnerable to a highly-mobile, fast-moving, Soviet surprise attack — especially one supported by tactical nuclear missiles.

NATO's tactical nuclear capabilities, while encompassing a variety of useful weapon systems, have been organized around the

[29] Heisenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
[30] Recently, steps have been taken toward reducing the U.S. "tooth-to-tail ratio" deficiency.
[31] Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 12; Canby, *op. cit.*, p. 3.



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concept of an extended conventional war, not one that might be initiated by Soviet nuclear attacks:

(1) NATO's tactical air forces are concentrated at airfields (on the order of one hundred), nearly all of which are within reach of Soviet tactical missiles.[32]

(2) NATO's mobile tactical nuclear missiles and self-propelled 155mm and 203mm artillery weapon systems are usually parked in a limited number of large casernes (as are most of NATO's armored vehicles), thereby enhancing their targetability to Soviet tactical missiles.[33]

(3) NATO's (U.S.-controlled) tactical nuclear warheads are kept, during peacetime, in a limited number of well-guarded storage areas at large military installations to thwart terrorist "bomb-nappers" and Pact saboteurs (in time of East-West crises) and are only dispersed under extreme crisis conditions.[34]

This highly vulnerable condition of NATO's tactical nuclear capabilities was recognized some ten years ago by Henry Kissinger, who observed:

Considering the extreme vulnerability of the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent and the fact that the Soviets would not attack without expecting to win — if there is large-scale aggression . . . the Soviets have every incentive to neutralize NATO's nuclear arsenal by launching an attack against it.[35]

*USSR-WTO*

The Soviets' principal advantage is that they appear to have the objective of seizing the initiative, as reflected by the offensive design of their force organization and its doctrine. This battle philosophy is primarily an inheritance from their World War II experience.

By the end of World War II, the Red Army had become masters of mechanized warfare, chewing up the German panzer divisions time after time in the greatest clashes of combat formations the world has ever seen. In the Battle of Kursk in 1943, nearly 10,000 Soviet and German tanks engaged in combat over a period of only five days, resulting in a crushing defeat for the German armies. With such resounding success and no subsequent wars to condition this experience, it is clear why the Soviets continue to emphasize swift, highly mobile armored offensive tactics.

The Soviets embraced tactical nuclear weapons at a time when

[32] Heisenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[35] Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 180.



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they were concentrating on strategic ballistic missile development and production to offset the West's superiority in strategic bombers. Also, at that time, the USSR had massively deployed air defense missiles to negate the U.S. bomber threat. Soviet industry was missile-oriented. Thus, the deployment of mobile nuclear missile launchers with existing mechanized forces would seem to have been a natural marriage.

The swift-strike capability of tactical nuclear missiles was in concert with the tactics developed by the Red Army during the Second World War. Little change had to be made in doctrine to accommodate them. The tank and other mechanized vehicles, with minor alterations, would afford useful protection against nuclear weapon effects. As indicated earlier, the Soviets have, since the deployment of their first tactical nuclear weapon systems in 1957, carried out an intensive program of providing their armored vehicles with radiation protection and training their troops to survive in the nuclear environment.[36] Additionally, while adapting its forces for nuclear combat, the Red Army has continued to use a unit replacement technique and to require its combat units to carry with them sufficient stores (food, fuel and ammunition) to carry them through the battle[37] — practices that existed during the Second World War and have been extended to the present-day environment.

It is important to realize that the apparent basic Soviet doctrine involving the concept of a swift mechanized offensive following a nuclear attack from mobile missile launchers may well have placed the Kremlin in an inflexible posture regarding nuclear and conventional theater warfare. By relying principally on mobile tactical missiles as "the basis for the firepower of the Ground Troops,"[38] the Soviets may have put themselves in a position of either quickly using battlefield missile forces or risking the loss of those assets in any prolonged conventional combat with NATO.

Whether this seeming inflexibility can be construed as a Soviet advantage or disadvantage hinges on the depth of the commitment to a nuclear strategy. Pertinent to this issue has been Soviet behavior in the Middle East, where Moscow has sent advanced-technology assistance to Arab nations: sophisticated air defense systems, advanced combat aircraft, and, most relevant, tactical

[36] Canby, *op. cit.*, p. 7; Chuikov, *op. cit.*
[37] Canby, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[38] Grechko, *op. cit.*, p. 33.



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surface-to-surface missiles — in particular, Scud.[39] During the October 1973 war, it was reported that the Soviets had brought in nuclear warheads for the Scud missiles deployed in Egypt.[40]

Whether they would actually employ nuclear Scuds on behalf of Arab allies, should another war break out in the Middle East, remains a moot question. Yet, possibly reflecting an Israeli assessment of this possibility, Washington has decided to supply Israel with a substantial number of Lance missiles — whose military effectiveness with conventional warheads, as in the case of Scud, is most dubious.[41]

NATO has more than twice as many nuclear-capable, offensively-oriented tactical aircraft as nuclear missile launchers. These aircraft, deployed at fixed bases, are highly vulnerable to nuclear attack and perhaps even to airborne attack with conventional armament. (This is in contrast to the defensively-oriented U.S. nuclear artillery systems, the 155mm and 203mm tubes, which are both numerous and difficult to destroy. A nuclear-capable piece looks like any other.) The tactical nuclear missiles, if found, may also be quite vulnerable to simple conventional strafing attacks.

The Soviets long have recognized this situation. In his book, *Military Strategy,* Marshal Sokolovsky notes: "Tactical aviation could be especially effective in destroying the enemy's means of nuclear attack, primarily his missiles, on the field of battle."[42] Although that statement was made in 1962, only recently have the Soviets begun to deploy tactical aircraft with sufficient air-to-ground effectiveness (range times payload) to carry out such a ground support mission.[43] U.S. and allied air forces have always possessed a superior air-to-ground tactical air capability. Therefore, the principal concern of Soviet tactical aviation, until recently, may well have been to provide air defense for these highly vulnerable tactical missile forces and other army units.

## VII

Critically affecting the possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack against NATO is the problem that such action might succeed in

[39] *Report of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress (1974) . . ., op. cit.,* p. 13.

[40] *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* November 5, 1973, p. 13. Because of Scud's relatively poor delivery accuracy, this weapon would seem to make little military sense if it is limited to high-explosive payloads.

[41] *Ibid.,* February 17, 1975, p. 46.

[42] V. D. Sokolovsky, *Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts* (London: Pall Mall, 1963), p. 232.

[43] Canby, *op. cit.,* p. 7.



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bringing U.S. strategic nuclear forces into play against the USSR.[44] The United States long has pledged to unleash its strategic nuclear force to defend its NATO allies, and a concern by the Kremlin that this guarantee might be implemented could serve to negate in substantial measure the apparent military advantage of a nuclear surprise attack strategy.

Related to the release of U.S. strategic weapons against the Soviet Union is the question of how the Soviets regard their strategic forces in the context of war with NATO. In the past, Soviet doctrine has tended to regard strategic and tactical forces as inextricably linked: war with NATO would essentially be total in scope, involving a full-scale strategic exchange with the United States.

On the American side, whether a strategic nuclear coupling with a conflict in Europe remains in force can be confirmed or denied only by a U.S. president, for he alone is responsible for a release decision and the nature and extent of such release. On this subject, during at least the past ten years, U.S. presidents have been conspicuously silent. This is thoroughly understandable. It would be crippling to NATO political unity were U.S. strategic guarantees explicitly withdrawn, and it could lead to a domestic political disaster in America were they explicitly upheld.

However, if U.S. presidential intentions must remain uncertain (with whatever deterrent value might accrue from this seeming ambiguity), NATO Europe is placed in a difficult situation: even were the U.S. pledge implemented in response to a Soviet surprise nuclear attack against NATO, this might be of little consolation should such an attack have succeeded in paving the way for a quick military conquest of Western Europe. In this sense, it should be realized that U.S. strategic nuclear guarantees are of (uncertain) deterrent value only: in all probability, their actual implementation would be of little direct benefit to NATO's military defense. And, at the same time, it could be argued that such implementation could have an extremely negative impact on the United States, which would have provoked a thermonuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, holding no tangible benefits for its allies and totally unwanted consequences for its own populace.

Whether the Soviets still adhere to the belief that war with the

[44] As discussed previously, the U.S.-NATO expectation is that initial use of nuclear weapons against advancing Soviet and Pact forces holds only a small risk of a Soviet nuclear response.



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West is bound to be total and, therefore, would simultaneously attack both the United States and Western Europe is a question as unresolved as that of U.S. presidential intentions. (Of course, if the Kremlin launched tactical and strategic nuclear attacks on both sides of the Atlantic, a U.S. strategic response would be virtually inevitable.) However, in recent years, particularly since the signing of the SALT I accords, there has been a dearth of remarks in Soviet military literature upholding the indivisibility of tactical and strategic conflict with the West. This does not mean that there has definitely been a fundamental shift in Soviet doctrine, but the absence of doctrinal assertions does suggest a modification of former beliefs.[45]

Putting doctrinal considerations aside, unless the Soviets held a clear-cut strategic first-strike capability (which the U.S. government vehemently denies to be the case), the "logic" behind any decision to couple tactical and strategic operations against NATO Europe and the United States would be as questionable as for the White House to launch nuclear strikes against the USSR in defense of Europe. Such a move would not be likely to enhance the success of the attack against NATO Europe and might result in a great deal of damage to the Soviet Union itself.

Given current and projected U.S. and USSR strategic force levels, there is little probability that, in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack against NATO, either side would have compelling reasons to couple its strategic weapons into the conflict. We can only speculate as to what the U.S. president or the Soviet party chairman might do, were such a moment of truth to materialize. However, it is far from clear that the strategic coupling assertions made by Washington and Moscow a decade or more ago retain any validity today.

## VIII

From the above analysis, it is clear that a net assessment of U.S. and Soviet tactical nuclear capabilities, available to the European theater, is an extremely difficult task to undertake — unless it is done in the framework of a Soviet doctrine centered around initial pre-emptive nuclear attack. Were this mode of attack to be the basis of the Soviets' strategy, and given NATO's current peace-

[45] That there may be a doctrinal change affecting the "escalation" problem in the context of theater warfare was suggested in Secretary Schlesinger's congressional testimony last year: "In their exercises the Soviets have indicated far greater interest in the notions of controlled nuclear war and non-nuclear war than has ever before been reflected in Soviet doctrine. As I indicated earlier, I think the doctrine is undergoing change. . . ." *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Hearings, op. cit.*, p. 183.



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time posture, they would appear to have deployed ample numbers and types of tactical nuclear weapons, virtually guaranteeing military success. Indeed, U.S.-NATO policies and force deployments may well have encouraged the Soviets to develop forces and tactics based on a doctrine of surprise nuclear attack.

The net assessment problem, in essence, has to do with what appear to be highly different views between Washington and Moscow on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons: The United States regards their use as a back-up to an unsuccessful conventional defense; the Soviets regard them as the primary firepower for their ground forces, with strong intimations for first-use on their part. The United States, however, has chosen to impute a conventional option preference to the Soviets; and this, in turn, has been the dominant factor dictating the nature of NATO's posture and the role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO's defense.

At issue here is not so much the correctness of a *threat* assessment as the correctness of assessing Kremlin *intentions* behind the military threat Soviet forces — nuclear and conventional — pose to NATO. In order to reach valid conclusions regarding NATO's ability to survive in the event of a surprise nuclear attack, it is hardly necessary to have a highly accurate assessment of the Soviet *military capability* to accomplish this task. The intelligence does not have to be all that good; in fact, it is already more than good enough. However, NATO's survival is directly related to its ability to determine accurately Soviet *intentions* regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on the West. How accurate has this determination been?

For the reasons set forth in this article, it is distinctly possible that Soviet intentions are not at all those projected to them by the United States. If this is so, NATO's security and survival have been premised on unrealistic grounds.



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# AMERICAN LABOR'S CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD AFFAIRS

*by Roy Godson*

IT is now more than five years since the AFL-CIO withdrew from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. During the intervening years it has modified its "liberal" foreign trade policy and continued its refusal to meet with labor officials from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in spite of changes in U.S. policy toward these countries. These developments have tended to give the impression that the AFL-CIO believes America's problems can be solved unilaterally. Given the domestic upheavals of the 1960's, mass dissatisfaction with U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, and contemporary economic problems, many at home and abroad have been tempted to conclude that U.S. labor is increasingly unwilling to involve itself in world affairs.[1]

This article argues, however, that the AFL-CIO, the mainstream of American labor, has followed a policy of consistent engagement without regard to the twists and turns of U.S. foreign policy. Irrespective of their validity, the overall principles of labor's policy have remained unchanged, particularly since the 1930's. Despite lulls and surges of activity and changes in tactics, the AFL-CIO's basic commitments remain the same. This presentation will first describe contemporary AFL-CIO policy, which can be explained for the most part by reference to the foreign policy perspectives of the leadership, and will then delineate the consistent set of beliefs

[1] A number of commentators maintain that American labor and the American people in general are turning inward. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, recently stated: "It is symptomatic that today in our own country the group most opposed to effective international cooperation are the trade unions, even though for many years the unions had been very intelligently dedicated to cooperation with Europe and Japan, very much in the forefront of shoring up an alliance against Soviet expansionism." ("From Utopia to Apocalypse," *Art International: The Lugano Review,* November 1974, p. 71.)

See also, syndicated columnist Clayton Fritchey, "Labor and Foreign Policy," *Washington Post,* April 6, 1974; Selig Harrison, "Labor's Ties Abroad Wearing Thin," *ibid.,* April 3, 1974. A well-known labor journalist, noting the retirement of the AFL-CIO's long-time Director of International Affairs, concluded that it was the "end of an era" and that the new director was a "fortress American type." (*John Herling's Labor Letter,* June 8, 1974.) On American isolationism in general, see Donald R. Lesh, editor, *A Nation Observed: Perspectives on America's World Role* (Washington: Potomac Associates, 1974).



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that American labor leaders have developed over the years. Unless there is a fundamental alteration in these perspectives, or potential oppositionists within the movement grow much stronger, American labor can be expected to continue its traditional policy irrespective of "fashionable" trends at home or abroad.

## AFL-CIO Policy

Since the days of the AFL's first president, Samuel Gompers, U.S. labor has maintained that the interests of American workers are related to developments abroad. Although some union leaders, and for a while the CIO leadership, differed in their interpretation of these interests, the basic foreign policy orientations of key labor officials have not altered.[2] During the late 1930's, the AFL, and CIO, and later the AFL-CIO began to devote much more of their attention and resources to international affairs.[3] In the postwar period they also secured millions of dollars of government assistance for labor's international programs in addition to their own substantial contributions.

It is possible to discern three guiding principles in labor's policy: first, hostility to what the AFL-CIO regards as totalitarian and other anti-democratic forms of government; second, the maintenance of strong U.S. military forces and effective alliances to deter "aggression" and maintain "peace"; and third, moral and material support for foreign trade unions and other elements throughout the world that it believes are pro-democratic. We will also treat of labor's increasing concern with new trends in world trade, investment and production.

### *Hostility to Anti-Democratic Political Forces*

From its inception, the American labor movement has time and again reiterated its opposition to "imperialism," "totalitarianism" and "authoritarianism." Colonialism, whether practiced by the United States or other nations, has been denounced since the American occupation of the Philippines.[4] After World War II, American labor criticized many European governments as well as

[2] For a discussion of the currents of opinion among the early leadership of the AFL, see Philip Taft, *Defending Freedom: American Labor and Foreign Affairs* (Los Angeles: Nash, 1973). As Taft notes, the pioneer internationalist AFL presidents, Samuel Gompers and William Green, were not always able to overcome the isolationist sentiments of those who objected to the AFL being involved in European affairs.

[3] See *ibid.*, especially Chapter III.

[4] The AFL's criticism of the U.S. government for intervening in Mexico, Cuba, the Philippines and Central America is discussed in *ibid.*, pp. 31-34, 193-196.



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its own for not vigorously opposing what it viewed as European domination in Africa and Asia. Today, it continues to protest against what it sees as the remnants of colonialism, the white minority regimes in southern Africa. The most recent AFL-CIO convention in October 1973 not only called upon Washington to protest against "the repression and exploitation of the majority of the population" in southern Africa and urged the repeal of the Byrd Amendment (which allows the importation of Rhodesian chrome and other strategic materials); it went further than previous conventions in calling for the extension of economic sanctions to South Africa (and the then Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique) as well as the provision of aid to black Africans "both inside and outside South Africa who are engaged in a struggle for the recognition of trade union rights for black African workers."[5]

Criticisms are not confined to the old European colonialism. The new and rising "colonialist" powers — the Soviet Union and Communist China — are condemned frequently in AFL-CIO publications, as for example: "The Free World has granted independence to 1,153,452,053 people and 13,223,124 square miles and the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese have subjugated 172,107,000 people and 1,977,254 square miles and are seeking more. Who Is The Imperialist?"[6]

Paradoxically, however, the AFL-CIO maintains that democratic governments and trade unions must sometimes involve themselves in the affairs of other states when the latter are seriously threatened by foreign intervention or by domestic totalitarian forces aided by foreign powers. As a result, American labor has occasionally been put in the position of supporting Western efforts to prevent what it believes to be Soviet- or Chinese-inspired attempts to gain control of noncommunist governments. Besides supporting U.S. and other governmental efforts to mold or influence events in such situations, it has played a direct and often successful role in many parts of the world, including postwar France, Italy, Germany, Japan, North Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Its outstanding contribution was cooperating with anti-communist European trade unionists in preventing the Soviet Union from using organized labor to wreck the Marshall Plan, impede NATO

[5] Resolutions 29 and 90 adopted at the AFL-CIO 10th Constitutional Convention, October 18-23, 1973.

[6] "Who Is The Imperialist?," AFL-CIO Publication 148, Washington, D.C., 1971.



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and perhaps even seize power in France and Italy during the late 1940's.[7]

In U.S. labor's opposition to various types of governments which it calls "totalitarian," it has refused to recognize or treat their labor organizations as genuine trade unions. Since 1917 it has insisted that Soviet and East European labor organizations should be viewed as instruments of the communist party and agents of the government, and thus should not be accorded the status of a genuine nongovernmental trade union movement. Even though other major national centers such as the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the German Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) now disagree, the AFL-CIO still maintains that contacts and exchanges with Soviet labor organizations will only strengthen the totalitarian regime internally. In addition, it insists that such actions will create the illusion in the West that the Soviet "unions" are genuine, thus contributing to a false notion that there has been a real relaxation of tension between the USSR and the Western states and making it possible for communist parties and communist-controlled labor organizations in the West to masquerade as respectable political partners. Even when many European and other trade unionists argue that contacts with Soviet and East European labor organizations are necessary to deal with relatively new international forms of production such as multinational corporations, the AFL-CIO stands opposed. Contact and cooperation with these organizations, it maintains, are not in the interest of the international labor movement. At the last AFL-CIO convention in October 1973 a resolution restated this position:

> Today the giant multinational corporations are cooperating with communist dictatorships. The Labor Fronts behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains cannot be effective partners in any contest with the multinationals, for they have no right to strike or to take any effective action against their government, which is their sole employer.[8]

For tactical reasons labor has occasionally favored the American government's conditional support of one "totalitarian" element in

[7] There are few studies of American labor's involvement in specific countries. Exceptions include William A. Douglas, "U.S. Labor Policy in Peru — Past and Future," in Daniel A. Sharp, editor, *U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), pp. 317-337, and this writer's "Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The American Federation of Labor in France, 1945-1952," *World Affairs*, Winter 1973, pp. 208-231. The only AFL-CIO staffer who has written extensively about his work abroad is Serafino Romualdi, *Presidents and Peons* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967).

[8] Resolution 173 adopted at the 10th Constitutional Convention, October 1973. In a February 18, 1975 Executive Council Statement, the AFL-CIO condemned the "Disintegration of Free Trade Union Principles in Western Europe" and viewed with "disgust" West European trade union fraternization with "communist labor fronts."



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order to defeat another, e.g., U.S. support of the USSR in World War II and of Tito's resistance to Moscow after the war. Nevertheless, American unions remained overtly hostile to the communist regimes in the USSR and Yugoslavia. Their position is that though democratic governments in some circumstances may have to associate and cooperate with a totalitarian government, governmental and nongovernmental criticism of nondemocratic regimes must continue — an important point the AFL-CIO thinks the Nixon and Ford administrations have failed to understand. Moreover, the fact that the United States or any other government recognizes and deals with a "totalitarian" counterpart does not mean that the labor movement must copy its government's course in this respect.

Accordingly, although some West European governments and democratic socialist and trade union circles now want to cooperate with European communist parties and the labor organizations they control, the AFL-CIO remains firmly opposed. Unification, "unity of action," and other types of cooperative programs, especially with the French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) or the Italian Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), will, in its view, confuse workers in these countries about the identity and goals of the communists who control their organizations. This will enable the communists to undermine the leadership of noncommunist trade unions and add little or nothing to the strength of the noncommunist labor movement.[9]

Although the AFL-CIO is also critical of authoritarian rulers, such as the colonels who ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974 and the current Chilean generals, it does not consider them a primary threat to world peace since these men and their governments do not seek world domination.[10] Regarding the transitional societies of the Third World (e.g., Southeast Asia and most of Africa), the AFL-CIO takes the position that sometimes, by refraining from certain types of public criticism and supporting incipient labor organizations, the seeds of a democratic society are being planted and in time these may blossom into more pluralistic governments.

*Support for Western Military Forces*

American labor has always preferred the resolution of international disputes through internationally inspected and supervised military disarmament and without the use of armed force. But

[9] February 18, 1975 Executive Council Statement.

[10] Resolution 174, for example, adopted at the 10th Constitutional Convention, criticizes the practices of the Chilean generals. On the Greek colonels see Resolution 90, October 1973, and the AFL-CIO Executive Council Statement of May 1967, in *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News,* June 1967.



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since the rise of the nazis and fascists in the 1930's, American unions have favored the existence of military forces strong enough to deter other states from attacking the United States or countries whose independence is believed to be vital for U.S. security.

Thus, the AFL-CIO, while favoring the military commitments the United States has undertaken in Europe and Asia, has criticized what it regards as the Nixon-Ford Administration's failure to check the growth of American neo-isolationism, the "euphoria of détente" in the West, and the growing military strength of the Soviet Union. It often has maintained that it favors "genuine détente" and the mutual, balanced and inspected reduction of forces, but its leaders believe the current détente to be illusory. The treaties concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States with the Soviet Union, the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in their view, have only served to allow the Soviet Union to bolster its economy and proceed with its foreign policy objectives and military buildup.

American labor contends that if in the future there is to be peace and genuine détente, the Soviet leadership must not only make concessions to match those already made by the West in arms control negotiations, but must improve the political and social conditions of the people living under its control. Only under these circumstances can the West "stand down." Meanwhile, the United States and its allies must maintain and even increase their strength as well as keep their commitments, particularly to NATO.[11]

At the same time the AFL-CIO thinks it may be necessary, for tactical reasons, to protect countries which it views as less than democratic in order to ensure the survival of trade union elements within them. Hence, it supported American military and economic assistance to South Vietnam. It maintained that the United States should have continued its assistance, even in early 1975, to help prevent the South Vietnamese and their trade union movement from falling under the control of the "totalitarian" forces of North Vietnam allied to the Soviet Union and China.[12]

[11] Resolution 175 adopted at the 10th Constitutional Convention. For the complete AFL-CIO analysis of, and record of support for, the Atlantic Community, see proceedings of its conventions and the monthly *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*.

[12] The Executive Council and the conventions consistently supported American efforts to prevent South Vietnam from falling under communist control and called on Washington and the international labor movement to support Tran Quoc Buu's Confédération Vietnamienne du Travail (CVT) as the best method of improving political and economic conditions in the country. Although there was confusion



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*Cooperation with, Support for, and Aid to Foreign Trade Unions*

Particularly since the 1930's, American labor has cooperated with and supported "free trade unions" abroad. Although there have been changes in tactics, American unions have supported (a) the global organization of national trade union centers, (b) the global organization of unions in a given industry, known as an international trade secretariat (ITS), and (c) the organization of strong trade unions in other states.

In 1945, when many national labor centers (including the CIO) were still affiliated with the communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and affiliation therewith was encouraged even by the U.S. and British governments, the AFL dissented and directly supported trade union elements in Europe, Asia and Latin America that also refused to cooperate with communist labor organizations. At the same time, the AFL encouraged individual American unions to join and involve themselves in the work of their respective international trade secretariats[13] to prevent them from falling under WFTU control and to help in the rebuilding of war-torn European economies. By the end of the 1940's, most of the WFTU's noncommunist affiliates had withdrawn from the organization to join with the AFL in a new international, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).[14]

From then until the late 1960's, American labor worked with the ICFTU. By the mid-1960's, however, the organization was showing signs of internal strain. The AFL-CIO, a substantial financial contributor, became increasingly unhappy about the way in which ICFTU funds were being spent; it also felt that the ICFTU was involving itself in an internal AFL-CIO dispute with the United Automobile Workers of America, and it believed that some of the European affiliates in particular had abandoned a basic founding

about AFL-CIO President Meany's views on Vietnam after he said in a television interview in late 1974 that he no longer believed he had been right in supporting President Nixon's and President Johnson's handling of the war, American labor's support for the CVT and for military and economic assistance to South Vietnam remained unchanged. See, for example, Meany's letter to President Ford, *AFL-CIO News,* January 18, 1975; also, the Executive Council Statement on "Indochina," February 21, 1975, which was adopted with only one of the thirty-five Council members dissenting. Reported in the *Washington Post,* February 22, 1975.

[13] All the unions in a given industry can belong to an international trade secretariat; e.g., the transport workers' unions throughout the world can affiliate with the International Transport Workers Federation.

[14] See Taft, *op. cit.,* pp. 147-150; John P. Windmuller, *American Labor and the International Labor Movement 1940-1953* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954); and the writer's *Non-Governmental Organizations and World Politics: The American Federation of Labor in Post War Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).



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principle of nonfraternization with totalitarian labor "fronts." For a number of years it sought unsuccessfully to secure changes in the ICFTU's activities, and in 1969 it finally decided to leave the organization.[15]

The AFL-CIO has not turned its back on the international labor movement, however. First, it has stepped up its efforts to strengthen the various ITS's by encouraging American affiliates to play a greater role in their respective secretariats. Today, in contrast to the early postwar period, when few American unions had ITS connections, approximately half of the AFL-CIO unions, comprising about 60 per cent of the total membership, are affiliated with fifteen of the sixteen major secretariats. During the past two years the AFL-CIO has initiated a number of conferences and planning sessions to coordinate American involvement and has begun publication of a newsletter on the activities of the ITS's.[16] American unions have also played a significant part in electing the new officers of one of the most important secretariats, the International Metalworkers Federation. In the future more American involvement appears likely.[17] The AFL-CIO believes that if the ITS's remain global in focus and are not "diluted" with membership from communist labor organizations, they can play a major role in offsetting the activities of multinational companies and in strengthening labor organizations in the Third World.

American labor, however, is concerned about what it views as the growing isolationism of the European unions. It fears that the new European Confederation of Trade Unions and the pressure to set up new European trade secretariats will weaken the global secretariats, and consequently labor movements in the developing areas as well.[18] It fears also that the pan-European orientation of the new movement may open the way first to West European communist unions and ultimately to East European and Soviet labor organizations.

Second, the AFL-CIO continues to maintain bilateral and multilateral relations with many national union centers and bilateral and multilateral assistance programs to primarily non-Western

[15] Taft, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-162.

[16] *International Trade Secretariat News Briefs.*

[17] *John Herling's Labor Letter,* July 13 and July 27, 1974; German Information Center, *Relay from Bonn,* October 25, 1973. For an extreme "left" account of AFL-CIO involvement in the IMF, see the British *Engineering Voice,* October-November 1973, p. 7.

[18] In February 1973 major European unions affiliated with the ICFTU created a new union structure stressing the common bonds of all European unions rather than the principles of democratic trade unionism. Some European and non-Western labor bodies fear that the new organizations will divert attention and resources away from the ICFTU and the global trade secretariats.



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unions. With one or two exceptions it is the only national center that keeps an office in another continent. In addition to working in Europe, moreover, it maintains an annual high-level exchange with the leadership of the Japanese national center (DOMEI); and through a variety of activities, including hundreds of trips each year by American union leaders to non-Western states and visits of non-Western labor leaders to the United States, it probably has more contact with Third World unions than the Europeans in the ICFTU.

The AFL-CIO also provides more material assistance to Third World unions than any other noncommunist national center[19] through three regional institutes created in the 1960's (the American Institute for Free Labor Development for Latin America and the Caribbean, the African American Labor Center, and the Asian American Free Labor Institute), as well as through ORIT, the ICFTU's regional organization for Latin America. This assistance is used primarily to finance two types of programs: (1) labor education projects to improve the skills of Third World union leaders — sometimes educational programs are held in the home countries of the trade unionists involved, sometimes unionists are invited to the United States for advanced training at American labor education centers; (2) community development projects run by local trade unions, such as housing, health clinics, schools, credit unions and cooperatives.

Since its merger in 1955, the AFL-CIO has spent a total of $22.8 million, or approximately 12.1 per cent of its total expenditures, on international affairs.[20] The annual outlay increased from approximately 6 per cent in 1955 to 22 per cent from 1961 to 1963,

[19] From interviews with current or former officials of the German DGB, British TUC, Swedish LO and TCO. Unfortunately, few European unions publish financial statements on their international activities. Israel's Histadrut, which maintains offices on several continents, spends approximately $1 million annually or about half of the current AFL-CIO expenditure on international affairs. *Annual Budget of the Histadrut* (Tel Aviv), 1973.

[20] These calculations are based on (a) the expenditures of the International Affairs Department, (b) the "International Affairs" expenditures in the "Statement of Special Purposes Fund, Income, Expenses and Balance," and (c) contributions to international and foreign labor organizations as well as domestic groups concerned with the international affairs listed in the Special Purposes Fund. All are accounted for in the Executive Council reports presented to AFL-CIO conventions.

In addition to direct AFL-CIO expenditures, approximately half of the 110 unions are paying over half a million dollars each year in dues to their respective trade secretariats, and many are supporting special secretariat projects. Finally, a number of unions are supporting labor organizations or labor related projects in other countries. The outstanding example is American trade union support for Israel and the Israeli labor federation, Histadrut. American unions have given approximately $21 million to various Histadrut projects and bought over $100,000,000 worth of Israeli bonds. *Annual Report of the American Trade Union Council for Histadrut* (New York, November 1974).



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and has now dropped back to approximately 6 per cent of total AFL-CIO expenditures, or $1.9 million annually.[21]

Domestically, the AFL-CIO supports its foreign policy objectives by lobbying both in the Congress and in the Executive branch of government. The AFL-CIO and individual unions make their views known to Congressional committees and pressure the State Department, the White House, and other governmental agencies to ensure that foreign economic assistance is channeled to support labor's friends in non-Western areas. Like their German counterparts in the DGB, American unions have been successful in raising substantial sums from their government. Even though the AFL-CIO is sometimes critical of the United States' national security policy, labor's regional institutes have been receiving an average of approximately $7 million annually from the Agency for International Development (AID) since the early 1960's. In addition, since 1968, AID has been giving AFL-CIO unions approximately a million dollars annually in grants to help them strengthen their respective international trade secretariats.[22] American labor also obtains government assistance for several hundred trade union exchanges each year.

In addition to securing direct assistance for trade union programs in international affairs, labor lobbyists play a further role in supporting AFL-CIO policy resolutions. Although national security issues as a rule have not been included in the important AFL-CIO ratings of Congressmen and Senators,[23] George Meany and his associates will frequently make their views known to legislators and senior officials in the Executive branch. By working

[21] The decline in the mid-1960's coincides with increasing support from the U.S. Agency for International Development to the AFL-CIO's three regional institutes set up in 1962, 1965 and 1968. Also, since it withdrew from the ICFTU in the late 1960's, the AFL-CIO has ceased paying dues to the international labor body and no longer contributes to the ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund.

[22] *AID Projects: Commitments by Field of Activity, FY 1955-1970* (August 1971), *Operations Report FY 1970-1971,* and *Operations Report FY 1971-1972;* undated but all published by Statistics and Reports Division, Office of Financial Management, AID. Also, interviews with officials of the three institutes, the American Institute for Free Labor Development for Latin America and the Caribbean, the African American Labor Center, and the Asian-American Free Labor Institute.

The Federal Republic of Germany provides another outstanding example of government/labor cooperation on development assistance. Although precise figures are unavailable, the German DGB cooperates closely with government-supported programs.

[23] Exceptions that may indicate a change in AFL-CIO practice are the 1973 and 1974 "Reports on Congress." A national defense issue (construction of Trident submarines in 1973 and exports of military significance in 1974) was included each year in eleven key votes providing the basis of labor's "report card." Some Senators (e.g., Humphrey and Mondale) had less than perfect records because of their votes on these issues. *AFL-CIO News,* September 7, 1974 and January 19, 1975.



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with friends on Capitol Hill and in the bureaucracy, labor, in the view of friends and enemies alike, has become a significant factor in national security policymaking.[24]

It should be noted, however, that until now American labor has devoted only small amounts of its educational resources to gathering domestic support for its foreign policy preferences. Although the weekly *AFL-CIO News* and monthly *American Federationist* occasionally carry articles on international affairs, the subject is just beginning to be accepted as part of labor's regular education and publication programs.[25] International affairs resolutions are passed at conventions, but until now little effort has been made to convey labor's policy in this area to the membership or the general public.

Yet abroad, American labor focuses considerable attention on gathering support for its position. By sending leaders to international meetings and through various publications, the AFL-CIO's views have become well known. An eight-page monthly, the *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News,* distributed internationally to approximately 80,000 subscribers, carries resolutions and analyses. A four-page monthly, published in Spanish and Portuguese editions with a circulation of about 27,000, carries articles from the American labor press. On occasion special publications are translated and distributed throughout the world.

The AFL-CIO also advances its preferences both through the management of the three regional institutes and by supporting its friends abroad. Its officers man the boards and staffs of the institutes and dominate the program development and administrative processes that annually provide labor and vocational training, cooperatives, credit unions and housing for hundreds of thousands of workers in non-Western areas. AFL-CIO and institute staff also promote the interests of fledgling union organizations in these

[24] In the 1974 Congressional defense debate, AFL-CIO President Meany's article, "How Much Is Enough? Further Defense Budget Cuts Imprudent in Uncertain World," was widely circulated on Capitol Hill as well as throughout the country in the *AFL-CIO News* of June 8, 1974. According to Senator Mansfield's "caustic" remarks, the AFL-CIO also was lobbying against his efforts to secure legislation requiring a 125,000-man cut in U.S. troops stationed abroad. (*Washington Post,* June 6, 1974.) See further, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's address at the AFL-CIO's 10th Constitutional Convention, October 18, 1973; Dan Morgan, "Labor's Hierarchy Rejects United States Policy of Détente," *Washington Post,* December 9, 1973; quotations from the Labor Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance, in Bernard Nossiter's "Labor and Government Cooperate on Foreign Policy," *ibid.,* April 28, 1969.

[25] "Report on the AFL-CIO/International Labor Program International Affairs Education Questionnaire" (Washington: Georgetown University International Labor Program, October 1, 1973).



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areas by capitalizing on the federation's influence in Washington. By interceding directly with a host government or indirectly through the U.S. government, American labor frequently has been able to influence non-Western governmental behavior in relation to local unions.[26]

*International Economic Policy*

In spite of these activities, some still maintain that the U.S. labor movement is becoming isolationist. A major reason for this appraisal is the modification in the AFL-CIO's international economic policy. In the mid-1960's, the leadership began to reassess its support for "free trade." After a few years it concluded that the growing internationalization of production, and in particular the rapid spread of multinational corporations and banks, was adversely affecting the U.S. economy generally and large segments of American labor especially. The new system of world production was leading to a situation where American capital, technology and raw materials were being sent abroad, and relatively cheap manufactured imports were entering the United States. This was resulting in the loss of American jobs and reliance on foreign sources of supply, sometimes for a whole industry, to the point of undermining the American economy and destroying a number of unions.

In the view of labor leaders the theory of comparative advantage was not really applicable in the new situation. Even if once there had been "free trade," which many of them doubted, other governments were interfering with the world economy in various ways — restricting trade through tariffs and nontariff barriers, subsidizing industries, managing economies. In this situation, the terms "free trade" and "protectionism," they believed, were meaningless. Other countries had a variety of laws to regulate international trade and meet the challenges of the world economic situation. The United States had to follow suit.

To meet what the leadership saw as a new situation, the AFL-CIO changed some tenets of its policy. The most controversial changes concern regulation of and sometimes restrictions on U.S. trade and investment and the export of American technology. In-

[26] Among outstanding examples are the Tunisian government's reversal of its decision to oust the Tunisian UGTT leadership in the mid-1960's, the South Vietnam government's decision to release arrested union leaders in March 1968, and the Philippines government's decision to do the same in the summer of 1973. See ICFTU, "Report on the Eighth World Congress, July 5-7, 1965" (Brussels, 1965), pp. 562-570; *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, April 1968. For a critical view of the AFL-CIO's efforts see Richard Dudman, "Agent Meany," *New Republic*, May 3, 1969, p. 15.



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stead of continuing to urge simply an increase in trade on an open and fair basis, the federation now pushes for domestic legislation designed to (1) regulate, and in some cases restrict, U.S. imports and exports of agricultural and industrial goods, raw materials and technology; (2) modernize U.S. trade provisions and other laws to regulate the operation of multinational corporations and banks — in particular, there should be a "comprehensive system" of reporting on investment abroad, licensing of production and any other technology transfers, "clear labeling" on imports of products and components to mark the country of origin, and "strict enforcement" of all consumer legislation on imports; and (3) eliminate incentives and subsidies that encourage U.S. firms or capital to move abroad. Specifically, it wants (a) the cessation of tax deferrals of income earned abroad and of any tax credits multinationals and banks receive from investment abroad, and (b) repeal of several items of the Tariff Code that "encourage the foreign production and assembly of goods for sale in the U.S."[27]

While calling for unilateral U.S. measures to deal with the problems posed by new global forms of production, American unions have continued to press for long-term international solutions.[28] One approach, which the AFL-CIO adopted many years ago, is to promote closer cooperation among trade unionists throughout the world and particularly those in a given industry. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why American unions devote a great deal of time and energy to the support of the international trade secretariats and the development of strong unions abroad. But though this has improved international cooperation and information exchanges, and it is admitted that much more can still be achieved, the AFL-CIO also argues that this approach is inadequate given the present state of the international labor movement. Genuine trade unions, collective bargaining, freedom of association and the right to strike, the Americans are quick to point out, are nonexistent or barely able to exist in many countries. In addition, they observe, in a number of countries where unions flourish, heterogeneous cultural norms and domestic legislation make it next to impossible to engage in international collective bargaining, or sometimes even the international coordination of bargaining.

[27] The single best source on American labor's modified policy is Duane Kujawa, editor, *American Labor and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Praeger, 1973).

[28] An example was the speech by Director of Research Nat Goldfinger at the AFL-CIO Conference with Trade Unionists of the Emerging States, Washington, D.C., October 8-10, 1973.



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A second component of the AFL-CIO's global strategy is international regulation. For over a decade it has urged the development and implementation of international norms and machinery to regulate the world economy. The great need is for an "international code of conduct, for accountability, for fair labor standards, for a fair investment code, for improved trading rules. . . ." If this is not met, the AFL-CIO believes that the multinational corporations and banks will continue to go their way free from international regulation or supervision.

In the absence of a strong international labor movement and international law and regulatory machinery, American labor is pushing hard for U.S. governmental action. The AFL-CIO maintains that unless some changes are made soon, more extreme measures will have to be taken. As President Meany put it:

> We of the AFL-CIO seek a strong and growing American economy that is an integral part of the world economy. We are not isolationists and have no intention of becoming isolationists. We are convinced that the practical alternative to senseless isolationism is the adoption of realistic government policy to meet America's needs in the world economy of the 1970's. A prosperous America is essential for the prosperity of the nations with whom we have continuing economic relationships.[29]

In sum, although American labor contends that changes in the world production process have undermined major components of its postwar international economic policy, it has not abandoned its international orientation. In searching for global solutions to the problems posed by the new forms of production, American unions continue to press for international fair labor standards, strengthened global trade secretariats and strong local unions. Meanwhile, they seek new U.S. regulations to prevent what they see as the erosion of the whole American economy as well as their own domestic base.

## Perspectives of the Labor Leadership

To understand why American labor devotes so much attention to international affairs it is essential to understand the leadership's objectives and underlying theories of domestic and international politics and its opposition to the views of the minority groupings that do not share these perspectives.[30]

[29] George Meany, "A Modern Trade Policy for the 70's," Address to the Aluminum Association of America, October 26, 1972.

[30] It is assumed here that political behavior is rooted in an individual's values, identification and expectations; see Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), and William T. R.



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Since the creation of the AFL in the 1880's, the goal values of American trade union leaders have been global democracy and free trade unionism, peace and stability, and economic and social justice. Their theories of domestic politics lead them to conclude that democracy and free trade unions are closely linked. They believe democracy needs trade unions to remain stable, strong and "progressive." They maintain that trade unions, by representing the interests of the work force in economic, social and political spheres, ensure that major problems and discontents will not be ignored and thus cause upheavals that will threaten democracy. For them, the reverse of the coin is also true. Genuine trade unions cannot long survive without democracy. Although they recognize that some trade unions have been able to exist in less than total forms of dictatorship, AFL-CIO leaders believe that in the long run a strong trade union movement can survive only in what they see as a democratic environment.[31]

The leadership believes that domestic communists and other totalitarian groups such as nazis, fascists and falangists try to win control of and destroy democratic governments. Communist and other totalitarian movements, it maintains, begin as small, militant, well-organized groups united by a common ideology and a hierarchical party structure. They operate in a democratic environment in which most workers, although opposed to totalitarianism, are disunited. Moreover, the inability of some democratic societies to solve social and economic problems, or at least alleviate miserable social and economic conditions, facilitates totalitarian takeover.[32]

Fox, *The American Study of International Relations* (Columbia, S.C.: Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina, 1968). The key policymakers of the AFL-CIO are the President and Secretary Treasurer and the thirty-three union presidents who sit on the federation's Executive Council.

[31] Meany's speeches and AFL-CIO resolutions frequently make these points. For example, "What we want for ourselves at home — political democracy, social justice, economic security — we want for all people. We think that is a pretty worthy objective for American foreign policy." Transcript of an Address by AFL-CIO President George Meany at the Eighth Annual Award Dinner of the Jewish Labor Committee, New York City, January 15, 1975.

For a more detailed statement of this view, see William Green, *Labor and Democracy* (New York, 1939), *passim*. For a recent restatement, see Joseph A. Beirne, *Challenge to Labor: New Roles for American Trade Unions* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1969), *passim*. Green was President of the AFL from 1923 to 1952. Beirne was President of the Communications Workers of America, a member of the Executive Council and Chairman of the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Committee until his death in 1974.

For an AFL-CIO account of how the absence of free trade unions destabilizes a democracy, see Irving Brown's article on France, "The Crisis of May, 1968," *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, September 1968. Brown was the AFL's European representative after World War II and was reassigned to the post in 1973.

[32] Statement of William Green, U.S. Senate, *Hearings, U.S. Assistance to European Economic Recovery*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, January 8, 1948, p. 837. For the



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The post-World War II communist movement seemed particularly menacing to AFL leaders. In their view, the defeat of Nazi Germany left Moscow-directed communism as the main danger to democracy and world peace. Furthermore, they concluded that it was much more difficult to combat communism than nazism and fascism, since communism posed as the champion of labor and masqueraded as a higher form of democracy.[33]

For American labor, communist parties in democratic countries, depending on local conditions and a normal peacetime atmosphere, have two available strategies. One is overt, the other covert. The overt strategy is to win by violent revolution. Alternatively, they can camouflage their aims, enter into united fronts with non-communists, and infiltrate a nation's major parties, social and economic groups and institutions. Through such tactics they count on preparing for the final assault and seizure of power. "Boring from within," AFL leaders believe, is designed to lead to control of strategic institutions such as the trade unions, which the well-coordinated minority can then use to destroy democracy. This, as they see it, was the communist strategy in the United States.[34]

Based on their experience since the 1920's, AFL leaders concluded that the communists would use trade unions for a variety of political purposes. First, by disseminating propaganda, they would try to secure the election of communist candidates for national office, or at least neutralize the effectiveness of anti-communist office-seekers. The organizational talent, the muscle and the financial resources of labor could be influential and even decisive in shaping the political attitudes of workers. Second, the communists could use the unions to infiltrate the government of a modern industrial state. Many high-ranking union officials, they were aware, served on government industrial and economic commissions as nominees of the trade union movement.[35] The political, as opposed to the economic, strike was a third weapon the communists would use if they could gather enough support in the labor movement.

By the end of the 1930's many American labor leaders were familiar with the use of trade unions to support candidates and

prewar views of the AFL, see Green's *Labor and Democracy, op. cit.*, pp. 186-187. See, also, article by Irving Brown, *New Leader*, January 22, 1952. In interviews, too, Meany and other AFL-CIO leaders have expressed the view that miserable economic and social conditions lend themselves to totalitarian takeover.

[33] David Dubinsky, "World Labor's New Weapon," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1950.

[34] Green, *Labor and Democracy, op. cit.*, p. 91.

[35] In an interview David Dubinsky referred to the disastrous effects of the infiltration of nazi sympathizers into the French government in 1939-1940. See "Answers to Questions by Eve Curie," June 10, 1947, available in the AFL-CIO archives.



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causes as well as political strikes. The events of 1948 in Czechoslovakia convinced them that the unions could also be used directly to overthrow democratic governments. The key industries were transportation, communications and electricity. Once controlled, these industries could be used in two ways. First, political strikes in these areas could paralyze the economy and perhaps help to secure the entry of communist ministers into a coalition government. The communists would then insist on taking over the police and armed forces. If their demands were denied, they could still insist that determined anti-communists did not control these strategic ministries. Second, during the critical period of actual takeover, control of the key industries could be used to facilitate the "putschists" or impede the government's efforts to maintain itself. In some circumstances, by using organized labor to deny the government access to printing presses, and radio and television to mobilize workers or transportation to mobilize armed forces, such actions could be decisive.[36]

U.S. labor leaders also concluded that trade unions could be an important means of consolidating and maintaining power in the aftermath of a coup, revolution or invasion. They maintained that the nazis, communists, fascists and falangists all set up labor fronts as soon as they had seized power in order to ensure their continued domination of the work force.[37]

There appeared to be only two major methods of preventing the communists from seizing control of democratic institutions and governments from within. Alleviation of the "unbearable" social and economic conditions that totalitarian groups exploited was most important. But a second method was to prevent the communists from winning positions of influence or participating in the activities of these institutions.[38]

In American labor leaders' theories of international politics the

[36] During World War II, American labor leaders became familiar with the paramilitary use of organized labor. See A. E. Jolis, "The OSS and the Labor Movement," *New Leader*, August 31, 1946; Carey Ford, *Donovan of the OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 240-243; R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), *passim*. For Meany's account of labor's role in the 1948 Czech coup, see Joseph C. Goulden, *Meany: The Unchallenged Strong Man of American Labor* (New York: Atheneum, 1972), p. 137.

[37] See, for example, Joseph Mire, "Labor Under Hitler," *American Federationist*, April 1933, pp. 15, 28-31; also, the AFL's International Labor Relations Committee, "What Happened to Trade Unions Behind the Iron Curtain," American Federation of Labor, 1947.

[38] Dubinsky, "Answers to Questions . . .," *op. cit.*; Green Senate Statement, *op. cit.*, p. 137; Matthew Woll, "World Issues and the AFL," *American Federationist*, May 1948, p. 11. See also, Green, *Labor and Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 93. AFL-CIO leaders vigorously expressed these views in interviews and repeatedly pointed to the inability of democratic forces to regain control of communist-dominated unions.



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major actors on the world stage are nation-states, international organizations, multinational corporations and national and international labor groupings.[39] For them nation-states are the basic units of the international system, but international governmental and nongovernmental organizations also can be powerful. International labor organizations can engage in many of the political activities open to national trade unions. They can issue propaganda, organize international political strikes and boycotts, intervene in local trade union disputes and engage in paramilitary activities.[40]

AFL leaders viewed the main struggle in the world as the conflict between the "totalitarian" and the "democratic" ways of life. In the 1930's, this took the form of a struggle between the nazis and their fascist allies and the democratic states.[41] After World War II, the determining pattern of international interaction, in their view, was the struggle between the Soviet Union and the West.[42]

Even before World War II, American labor leaders had been concerned about Soviet Russia's global ambitions. Immediately after the war, they concluded that the Kremlin's strategy was to refrain from provocative actions in Western Europe so that the United States would be unlikely to attack the USSR or interfere with its consolidation of power in Eastern Europe and might even withdraw its forces from Europe. Following the imposition of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, and a possible American troop withdrawal, a weak Western Europe would be ready to fall under communist and Soviet pressure.[43]

Although Moscow may have altered its global strategy after it was thwarted in Western Europe and began to devote considerable attention to former European colonial areas, the AFL-CIO leadership believes the establishment of hegemony on the European continent is still a primary, if not the main, Soviet foreign policy objective.[44] This would be just as dangerous to contemporary

[39] See, for example, William Green, "American Labor and World Affairs," *American Federationist,* July 1943, pp. 9-11.

[40] See Lewis Lorwin, *The International Labor Movement* (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), pp. 78-84, 165-194; AFL Executive Council Report, *Proceedings of the Sixty Fifty Convention,* Washington, D.C., 1946, pp. 57-69; Jolis, *op. cit.;* C. L. Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 385.

[41] Green, *Labor and Democracy, op. cit.,* especially pp. 185-194.

[42] Matthew Woll, "American Labor and the World Struggle for Freedom," Address at the Economic Club of Detroit, Michigan, February 26, 1951.

[43] For a more detailed description of AFL views, see this writer's *Non-Governmental Organizations and World Politics . . ., op. cit.*

[44] The most complete analysis of the leadership's current perceptions can be found in the monthly *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News,* the Executive Council reports, and the convention resolutions.



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American interests as it was during the early postwar period.

Labor interprets today's emphasis on "détente" and "peaceful coexistence" as another version of a tactic Moscow has used many times since the 1920's. The Soviets have frequently been soft, or peaceful in manner, either when forced into this position by overwhelming pressure or while attempting to lull noncommunists into lowering their political and military defenses. Moreover, to the Kremlin peaceful coexistence appears simply to mean switching from the use of military force to ideological forms of warfare, a quite different interpretation from the American one. The AFL-CIO leadership is convinced that the Soviets currently are trying to repeat their successes of the 1930's "Popular Front" period and the "postwar honeymoon," with the aim of transforming the Soviet Union and its local allies, Western communist parties and communist-controlled trade unions, into respectable political partners.

The major Soviet target is the NATO alliance. Moscow seeks to undermine Western cohesion and do away with the American nuclear and conventional umbrella over Europe and the Middle East. Ideally, the Soviets would like to end all American presence in Europe, but they will go a long way toward achieving their objectives if they can create considerable doubt among the allies that America is willing to ensure European independence.

American trade unionists have also been concerned about the considerable Soviet and Chinese efforts to condemn and remove Western influence from the Third World by capitalizing on the legacy of colonialism and the emergence of authoritarian regimes in many parts of the developing world.

AFL-CIO leaders also believe that right-wing dictatorships that deny their citizens economic and social justice undermine the health and vitality of democracy and trade unionism everywhere. Maintaining power by eliminating those institutions that stand in their way and by frequently brutal suppression, these governments afford a well-organized communist minority the opportunity to rally all those opposed to the regime, propose far-reaching "democratic" reforms, ally themselves with other parties — even those that are anti-communist — and eventually assume control of the coalition. Flaunting their so-called anti-colonialist or anti-dictatorial reputation as well as the organizations they create, the communists can then pose as the champions of democracy.[45]

[45] The clearest statement of this thesis is in an essay by Irving Brown, "American Policy and the Third World: Lessons Learned from Vietnam," in *Labor and International Affairs,* Vol. 2 (Washington: Georgetown University International Labor Program, 1973).



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*The Strategic Importance of Organized Labor*

The AFL-CIO leadership is convinced that the Soviets are continuing their campaign to gain control of all trade unions and anti-colonialist forces. In Western Europe, in the aftermath of World War II, the local Moscow-oriented communist parties were quite successful in dominating the main trade union organizations in several countries, including France and Italy. That the communists were unable to exploit fully their control of organized labor, the AFL-CIO believes, was in large part a result of the activities of American and democratic European trade unionists. The leadership continues to feel that should the Soviets control major sections of the European labor movement they will, if they have the opportunity, work through the trade unions to dominate the continent.

This applies, too, to other parts of the world. Soviet control of strategic non-Western areas such as the Middle East would endanger Western Europe and Japan. Both of these centers receive almost all of their oil from the Middle East and thus would be subject to economic blackmail. In addition, if the Middle East or parts of Africa, Asia or Latin America fell under the domination of a dynamic dictatorial power, the rest of the developing world and even some of the democracies might feel that dictatorship was the wave of the future, just as many in Europe and the United States considered nazism and fascism to be in the 1930's. Ultimately, if this process continued unchecked, the United States would find itself adrift in a sea of dictatorships.

AFL-CIO leaders are convinced that U.S. unions and other nongovernmental forces have to become involved with the democratic nongovernmental forces in Western Europe and the Third World. They believe that only genuinely nongovernmental forces in the United States have the credibility and know-how to strengthen their counterparts in other countries and prevent them from falling under the control of dictatorial elements. Governments, they reason, cannot be accepted as credible representatives of the workers' interests. Nor do government bureaucrats have the skills necessary to build genuine nongovernmental institutions.

Moreover, labor leaders insist, early U.S. nongovernmental involvement in Africa, Asia or Latin America is far less dangerous and far less costly for the United States than governmental involvement at a later stage. American trade unions can work with their foreign counterparts without involving the U.S. government. In this way there is far less danger that Washington will find itself



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inadvertently committed to defending a government it initially may have wanted to aid only in a minor way. Further, American nongovernmental aid, even if the government contributes to it, is far less costly to the United States and to working taxpayers than military assistance at a later point. For example, supporting trade unions in other countries is obviously less expensive than the type of military aid the United States has disbursed in Southeast Asia.

Although it means a major diversion of their resources and energy, American labor leaders continue to feel that they have to play a global role. They have mobilized their own resources and supported trade union and political movements in various parts of the world. They have encouraged the U.S. government to support these forces. Sometimes, as in Western Europe after World War II, the Administration has followed their lead; sometimes, as in Vietnam in the 1950's, southern Africa in the 1960's and Europe today, they think it has not.

*Foreign Policy Opposition*

There are three broad groupings of AFL-CIO union leaders who do not completely share these perspectives. However, they are relatively weak and have not engaged in concerted action.

(1) The strongest grouping is more isolationist than the leadership. Although it is difficult to specify those who identify with it today, a significant section of labor has been so inclined since the time of Gompers. From Gompers' death until the late 1930's the isolationists were quite strong, but since that time the internationalists have persuaded their colleagues that involvement is necessary. Approximately half of the 110 AFL-CIO unions now are affiliated with their respective trade secretariats and about half of the union presidents on the thirty-five-member Executive Council follow international developments and keep their unions engaged in international activities. The remainder for the most part have no clear-cut differences with the leadership. Some believe that Meany, a student of foreign affairs and the international labor movement for over thirty years, is safeguarding labor's interests abroad, and there is little they can or need do about it. Others believe that the danger to democracy and free trade unionism is not as grave as the internationalists maintain, or they conclude that AFL-CIO efforts are of little value and foreign policy can be left to the U.S. government.

This grouping has not prevailed, however, chiefly because many



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of the most important AFL, CIO and AFL-CIO leaders have been internationalists, e.g., Presidents Samuel Gompers, William Green and George Meany, senior Vice Presidents Matthew Woll, George Harrison and David Dubinsky, and other leaders such as Sidney Hillman, James Carey and Walter Reuther. Today not only Meany's power, but his personality and knowledge of the subject deter the essentially disinterested from challenging him. As the federation's constitution does not require the more isolationist leaders to implement AFL-CIO policy actively in their own unions, they usually prefer to let Meany have his way on what they regard as a relatively unimportant issue.

(2) The second group is weaker but has somewhat more developed policy preferences. Particularly since the 1930's a section of the American labor movement has regarded itself as "leftist." Some members of this group have believed that communism is only an aberrant form of socialism posing relatively little danger to democracy and free trade unions. Others, while less sanguine about the danger of communism, have concluded that sometimes by cooperating with communists one of the main threats to peace and progress could be checked — whether it was fascism, militarism and capitalism, or, in contemporary language, the military-industrial complex. In the 1930's and 1940's this perspective prevailed in the CIO but lost ground in the postwar years. After the AFL and CIO merged in the mid-1950's its minority status was further confirmed. However, there are still some staffers and officials, for the most part in ex-CIO unions, who have not changed their views.

(3) A third grouping regards itself as "liberal." It consists of union officials who, in the late 1940's and 1950's, approved of AFL and CIO support for U.S. containment policy and American labor's global conflict with communist labor organizations, but who today regard the continuity of these principles in AFL-CIO policy as out of step with the times. As this group sees it, there have been fundamental changes in the communist movement and other facets of world politics which the AFL-CIO leadership has been slow to grasp. It would like the AFL-CIO to abandon its support for "Cold War" containment policies and strengthened military forces. It believes American labor should promote détente with the Soviet Union and China by meeting and working together with labor organizations in these countries.

On occasion these views are supported by one or two of the thirty-five members of the Executive Council. At the biannual conventions, however, the resolutions of this grouping have been



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either amended or dropped by the Resolutions Committee. Only occasionally do any "liberal" delegates challenge the Report of the Resolutions Committee, let alone vote to amend it.[46] Even the isolationists, who do not wholeheartedly endorse the prevailing view, refrain from siding with this faction.

## Conclusion

No signs of disengagement from world affairs can be discerned in recent AFL-CIO Executive Council and convention resolutions and there have been no changes in the perspectives of the leadership on the international activities of the AFL-CIO. A shift in labor's international economic policy has not meant abandonment of its commitment to long-term global international measures. It is true that the AFL-CIO has withdrawn from the ICFTU, but at the same time American labor has intensified its efforts to strengthen the global trade secretariats and trade unions in the non-Western world. While there has been a drop in funds the AFL-CIO itself devotes to foreign affairs, American unions still spend more than any other noncommunist labor movement to support their objectives. AFL-CIO leaders also continue to devote substantial amounts of their time and energy to foreign affairs and to making their views known and felt in Washington and abroad. Thus, despite changes in tactics, there is little reason to conclude that American labor is turning its back on the rest of the world.

This consistent policy can be explained by the labor leadership's unchanged outlook on the world scene. Several generations of leaders have accepted and acted on these perspectives and principles so that to some extent they have become institutionalized.

On the other hand, over a period of time there could be a shift in a future leadership, particularly if it were pressed by a more influential opposition. At minimum, no leader for some time to come can be as influential as Meany is today. Without his personality as well as his knowledge and skill, many of those who for opportunistic reasons give him their support might be inclined to abstain

[46] At the 1973 convention, for example, Resolution 32, submitted by delegates representing the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Workers, while criticizing Soviet repression, endorsed the Nixon Administration's "important steps to open communication with the People's Republic of China and strengthen contacts and exchanges with the Soviet Union." Moreover, it urged the AFL-CIO to reconsider its refusal to meet with Soviet labor officials. This resolution was dropped by the Resolutions Committee, and Resolutions 171 and 173, sharply criticizing the Nixon Administration's policy and reaffirming the AFL-CIO's policy on exchanges, were placed before the convention and adopted without challenge. See "AFL-CIO Resolutions 1-174" and "Policy Resolutions Adopted by the Tenth Constitutional Convention," AFL-CIO Publication No. 3, December 1973.



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or, in some instances, support the opposition. Particularly if the opposition groups coalesce in attempting to reduce AFL-CIO involvement in international affairs, and do not try to bring about a radical change in policy, their strength may increase. If it does, it is quite possible that a future leader may prefer not to press for continued heavy involvement in international affairs if this weakens his position on issues in which he has more interest. Thus, although the AFL-CIO continues to follow the broad strands of policy established many decades ago and shows few major signs of withdrawal today, the outlook for the future is more uncertain.



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# THE POLITICS OF STAFFING THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT*

*by Seymour Maxwell Finger and John F. Mugno*

THE quality of the UN Secretariat is becoming a more important issue as statesmen increasingly recognize the international character of urgent problems — food shortages, inflation, explosive population growth, environmental deterioration, use of the oceans, the pressure of infinite demand on finite resources — and speak of "planetary management." The open question is whether it will be the United Nations Secretariat that aids in formulating common policies and administering programs, or whether numerous specialized organizations, such as INTELSAT, will create the political community needed to deal with these issues of "planetary management."[1] If the UN is to help design and administer programs to meet these global needs, there must be a political consensus among a certain minimum of member states, and the member states must have confidence in the ability of the UN's professional staff to do the assigned task competently.

Since 1970 three studies and one symposium have examined the personnel policies of the United Nations.[2] Each focused, with different emphasis, on the administration of policies and the conditions of service (salary, study leave, career development, and the like) for professional staff. None, however, investigated how member states find and recommend candidates for posts in the Secretariat, or how member states aid their candidates. The UN's

*The authors are grateful to many UN officials and other diplomats who gave their time to help them better understand the workings of the UN personnel system. Attributing to these people their ideas would demonstrate the validity of the authors' belief that the United Nations has some highly skilled staff members. However, their need for confidentiality has been recognized and their wishes respected in this matter.

[1]This question is analyzed by Richard Gardner, "The Hard Road to World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1974, pp. 556-576.

[2]Robert Rhodes James, *Staffing the United Nations Secretariat* (Sussex, England: Institute for the Study of International Organizations, monograph, 1970); *Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel Problems in the United Nations*, A/8454, October 5, 1971 (New York: UN, 1971) (hereafter cited as the Bertrand [J.I.U.] Report); *Report of the Special Committee for the Review of the United Nations Salary System*, A/8728 (New York: UN, 1972); and Richard Gardner, editor, *The Future of the United Nations Secretariat* (New York: UNITAR, 1972). The Gardner Report is hereafter cited simply as Gardner.



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personnel problems cannot be adequately explained unless the role of member states is considered.

The problem of Secretariat quality is three-pronged: high-quality personnel must be found; they must be selected for appointment and promotion; and they must find the UN a sufficiently attractive employment opportunity for them to agree to be hired and retained. These three aspects form a coherent whole. If the conditions of professional service were improved, the quality of the professional staff would not *ipso facto* improve unless the UN and member states institute a more systematic search for qualified new applicants. If well-qualified recruits were found, they would not invariably be hired unless member states minimize their political role in the appointments process. If an efficient recruitment program for use by UN member states were devised, candidates would not join the professional staff unless the conditions of service are competitive with what they could demand in another market.

## The Quality of the Professional Staff

Previous studies of UN personnel practices are dominated by two themes: (1) that although it is neither fair nor accurate to characterize all of the professional staff as incompetent, quality is not what it could be, and (2) that many policy changes are needed to improve the quality of the staff.

On the first theme, Richard Gardner, editor of a 1972 account of a symposium at which Secretariat problems were discussed by UN officials (including the current Assistant Secretary-General of the Office of Personnel Services), academics, and members of national missions to the UN, reported:

> Our group agreed that a major effort is needed to improve the quality of the Secretariat. While the UN contains many excellent staff members, there was general criticism of existing personnel policy, which has done little to attract able young people, to root out "dead wood," to reward ability and initiative and to provide opportunities for career development.[3]

Robert Rhodes James, writing in 1970, noted "the undeniable decline in Secretariat standards in recent years" and warned that, unless a more active recruitment program is instituted, "the Secretariat will continue to recruit a lower standard than the United Nations is entitled to." In his conclusion he clarified and softened these criticisms by saying: "It is not the conclusion of

[3]Gardner, p. 26.



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this section that the Secretariat is an incompetent organization . . . the conclusion [is] that . . . it is not as competent as it ought to be — and could be."[4]

In their report to the Special Commitee for the Review of the United Nations Salary System, P.A. International Management Consultants stated: "Repeated claims for representation of nationalities are also reported to have caused over-staffing and the creation of non-jobs." The consultants further noted that "Complaints about the UN being a dumping ground may well be correct."[5]

In the *Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel Problems in the United Nations,* Maurice Bertrand affirmed that many Secretariat Directors desired "drastic changes [in personnel policies] . . . in order to make available the competent staff they need."[6] (In testimony before the 1971 Salary Review Committee, many of these Directors pointed out the existence of overstaffing — but always in other departments.)

Bertrand also noted, in an effort to establish some more measurable basis for the claim that staff quality needs improvement, that in 1971 about 12 per cent of D-1[7] and 13 per cent of D-2 grade staff had no university education, and that another 8 and 15 per cent, respectively, had two or less years of university training. Thus, 20 per cent of the D-1 and 28 per cent of the D-2 level staff have less than three years of university education, "i.e., have not reached the level of B.A., *license,* etc." While a university degree is no guarantee of knowledge and wisdom, nor its lack an assurance of their absence, this situation (which Bertrand termed "abnormal") raises questions about the ability of staff supervisors as a group to understand and guide the increasingly technical tasks of their subordinates. Furthermore, as 31 per cent of the P-4 and 18 per cent of the P-5 staff have never completed even one university course (with an additional 7.5 and 16 per cent, respectively, having completed less than three years of university study), there are questions about the ability of middle-level personnel to utilize the new, more sophisticated methods of economic, sociological and

[4]James, *op. cit.,* pp. 8-9, 17, 24. James now serves on the Secretary-General's staff.
[5]*Report of the Special Committee for the Review of the United Nations Salary System, op. cit.,* Vol. III, pp. 13, 15.
[6]Bertrand (J.I.U.) Report, p. 17.
[7]The UN professional staff is graded from P-1 (Professional) (the most junior post) through P-5, then D-1 (Director), D-2, Assistant Secretary-General, Under Secretary-General, and Secretary-General. These designations reflect salary levels and, generally, the amount of responsibility an official takes on. The only reasonably accurate answer to the question of what a P-5 or D-1 is, for example, is financial, and even then there is some overlap, the highest salary steps of one grade being more remunerative than the lowest steps of the next higher grade.



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statistical analysis the UN must employ if it is to deal effectively with the tasks it faces or may be asked to face.[8]

Excepting Bertrand's statistics on educational attainment, the opinion that the quality of the UN professional staff is not what it could be rests on the observations of Secretariat personnel, diplomats, or the authors of the various reports, and these observations are necessarily limited in scope. The difficulty is inescapable; the methodological problems involved in systematically measuring the performance of the current staff against that of the staff of ten or fifteen years ago, against the cadres of some national bureaucracy, or against some other standard, are insurmountable. But even when the nonsystematic character of the observations is taken into account, they carry considerable weight because so many observers within and outside the UN share them.

Our interviews with Secretariat personnel, including people in the Office of Personnel Services and on the Staff Committee, support these opinions of the staff's quality. Almost invariably the feeling is that the quality of the UN's professional staff is not what it could reasonably be expected to be. For example, two former officers of the Staff Committee[9] agree that the quality of the Secretariat's staff is declining, and an administrator in the Office of Personnel Services states that the UN has "never hired the cream of the crop," adding that it "has settled perhaps too easily for average quality personnel."

The second common theme of the previous studies is that many changes are needed in personnel policies and Office of Personnel practices if the UN is to find and attract well-qualified candidates for professional posts.

The studies have put forward similar suggestions designed to make the UN a more attractive employment opportunity. They recommend developing a career service with promotions based on merit, raising salaries to competitive levels (especially for the most junior professionals), offering study leaves to improve the intellectual caliber of the staff, improving the pension plan and taking related measures to improve the "conditions of service."[10] To find more candidates, the UN is urged to advertise more in public media and to circulate notices of vacancies more effectively to

[8]Bertrand (J.I.U.) Report, pp. 51-52.

[9]The officers of this organization are elected by the staff to represent their interests in negotiations with the UN's "management" concerning, mostly, the conditions of service.

[10]See James, *op. cit.*, p. 9; Gardner, pp. 26-29; Chapter 8 of *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System*, Vol. I, DP/5 (Geneva: UN, 1969), and the whole of the Bertrand (J.I.U.) Report, especially Chapters 5 and 7.



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member governments. To keep better track of applicants and recruitment sources, fuller use should be made of computers.[11]

Interviews with a range of Secretariat professional staff confirm that the UN's personnel policies and practices must bear a share of responsibility for the quality of recruits. However, these shortcomings do not fully explain why the quality of the professional staff is below reasonable expectations.

### The Politics of Secretariat Appointments

The missing part of the explanation revolves around what Secretariat personnel term "political pressure" — the effort by a member state, or group of states, to have one of its nationals, or a national from a regional or linguistic group, appointed to a specific post — and the Secretariat's general submissiveness to this pressure.

In the UN context, the term "political pressure" should be differentiated to reflect its two components: "cronyism" and politics. This distinction is necessary because, although each component poses a threat to the organization, they vary in their seriousness and manageability. On occasion it may be difficult to untangle the two strands without a thorough investigation involving contact with government officials other than mission personnel.

Frequently, "cronyism"[12] takes the form of political pressure. A foreign minister, UN ambassador or other government official may have a relative, friend or acquaintance (often in the country's Permanent Mission) who relishes the idea of living and working in New York City, is attracted to a UN salary that appears generous to a national of a non-OECD country, or is taken with the notion of working in an international organization.[13] As pressure to appoint in such cases is likely to be the effort of one government official, there would be no difficulties with his government were the UN to resist the pressure, unless he is quite influential within his government.[14]

[11]Gardner, p. 29; Bertrand (J.I.U.) Report, pp. 116-117, 155.

[12]We are not making judgments about the morality of such practices. We recognize that they are acceptable in many societies. If the benefits of "cronyism" to certain individuals are weighed against the costs in organizational efficiency and effectiveness, however, the harm done by such practices becomes apparent.

[13]Or the diplomat may want to reward a friend for some favor. In addition, getting UN appointments for his countrymen is an easily measurable indication of an ambassador's effectiveness in a career where success is often ambiguous, and it may enable him to impress his Foreign Office.

[14]UN officials may sometimes appoint government officials' "cronies" to further the organization's goals. During the effort to negotiate a cease-fire to the October 1973 Middle East war, for example, the relative of an Arab foreign minister was appointed to a low-level post as a gesture of good will.



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The second component of "political pressure" is pressure exerted to achieve government goals.[15] A member state, or group of states, may make it a foreign policy goal to have a certain number of nationals serving in what it considers key posts of the Secretariat, generally posts at the Director level or above.[16] Frequently such pressure denotes an assertion of ownership — that the post "belongs" to and should be filled only by Soviets, Americans, or Frenchmen, for example. It is also manifested in efforts to fill a post vacated by a national of another country. These activities should be distinguished from the efforts states make to place their nationals in the Secretariat by offering candidates and allowing the UN to choose its employees and the posts they will fill. Such efforts are helpful to the recruitment program and a legitimate function of a member state; they are consistent with the will of the UN's members as expressed in General Assembly resolutions concerning personnel questions, especially those detailing geographic distribution formulas.

No records indicate when political pressure is the true reason for a personnel decision. It is generally exerted informally. Mission personnel or a group of ambassadors may visit the Secretary-General or other UN officials to discuss either a job for a particular individual or their concern about the representation of certain nationalities on the professional staff. Conversations at social gatherings, at informal luncheons and over the telephone are other common methods for conveying pressure. The written comments in the official files mentioning qualifications and nationality are in such cases often rationalizations, and it is necessary, therefore, when estimating the extent of political influence, to rely on individual observations and opinions. The consensus in various missions, on the Staff Committee, in the Office of Personnel Services, and in substantive departments is that political pressure is a significant factor in the appointments process.[17] A knowledgeable

[15]Legitimate claims for "more equitable geographic distribution" are not at issue here; no state or region monopolizes truth or ability, and the UN Secretariat will operate most effectively if it includes a worldwide range of viewpoints. Article 101 of the UN Charter provides that "Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographic basis as possible," and numerous resolutions of the General Assembly have stressed "equitable geographic distribution."

[16]Member-state efforts to fill D-1 and higher posts are noted by virtually everyone; some, including mission officials, see the extension of these techniques down to the P-3 level.

[17]The current Chairman of the UN Staff Committee calls it the "dominant" factor: ". . . there is the feeling that, in its actions [the actions of the appointment and promotion machinery], the dominant factor is the political, with the results dependent on the effectiveness of pressures, both internal and external, that may be applied." *Staff Committee Bulletin,* SCB/351, April 3, 1974.



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senior official estimates that in perhaps 10 per cent of all appointments governments do more than formally and routinely recommend a candidate.

The strongest pressure is exerted for posts at the D-2 level and higher, although administrative generalist posts — which in 1971 accounted for 30 per cent of all professionals except interpreters and translators[18] — at all levels are likewise targets. Most of the UN's jobs are for specialists, but for administrative generalists, such as protocol, information or program management officers, it is difficult to specify qualifications beyond a certain minimum. This ambiguity allows mission personnel an arguing point should some UN official resist their demands; it also allows the official some discretion in reconciling the pressure he feels.

One UN official commented, "It is not so much that the political pressure is intense, but that our resistance is so low." To understand why this is so it is necessary to examine the behavior and attitudes of officials in the UN's highest posts, to ask what their rewards are and to whom they are accountable for their actions, and to assess the impact of the example they set. The most senior officials in the appointments process are the Secretary-General, the Under Secretary-General (USG) for Administration and Management, the Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) administering the Office of Personnel Services, the Director of the Division of Recruitment, and, under him, the chiefs of the Recruitment Programmes Section (a P-5), the Secretariat Recruitment Service (a D-1) and the Technical Assistance Recruitment Service (a D-1).[19] Along with officials of similar rank in the substantive departments, these are the people who receive the telephone calls and visits from the missions.

Officials in the top three bureaucratic levels are acutely conscious of the political role of member states in the UN's operations. The Secretary-General, at the time of his appointment, represents a political common denominator; he is a candidate acceptable to all although not the first choice of some.[20] A new Secretary-General

[18]Bertrand (J.I.U.) Report, pp. 55-56.

[19]*Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel Problems in the United Nations and Major Recommendations of the Administrative Management Service*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/C.5/1601, Annex, September 6, 1974.

[20]Arthur W. Rovine's discussion of U Thant's election in *The First Fifty Years: The Secretary-General in World Politics* (Leyden, Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, 1970, pp. 344-350) illustrates the maneuvering among governments that occurs before a candidate is selected. Article 97 of the UN Charter stipulates that "The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council," and such a recommendation has been interpreted as a substantive issue. Substantive issues can be vetoed by any of the Security Council's five



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will be selected partly because he is a conciliator; there is slight chance of approval for a candidate who has expressed strong views on important issues, since among the five permanent members of the Security Council virtually all important issues are regarded as controversial. Any successful candidate must be aware of the bargaining and negotiating that occurred before his selection, and especially aware of the influence of these five members in the organization. The consequences of the attitudes promoted by the selection process are apparent in the personnel administration field. For example, since the current Secretary-General's inauguration in January 1972, senior officials and Staff Committee officers have fruitlessly urged him, as they did his predecessors, not to involve himself in questions of appointments below the ASG level.

USG's and ASG's are appointed directly by the Secretary-General and generally reflect the various political groupings within the organization. For instance, when the current ASG for Personnel Services, a Tunisian, resigns, there will doubtless be great political pressure to replace him with another French-speaking African. The USG and ASG posts have become associated with certain nationalities, or regional or language groups, and although there may be "trades" affecting which nationality or group is represented in which post, the overall balance within the upper levels is likely to change only slowly.[21]

Eleven of the twelve USG's and five of the seven ASG's (at headquarters in New York) came to their posts from outside the UN system, usually from national government service. Of the other two ASG's, one had served a short time first as a D-2, and one had spent several years as a D-2 before being promoted. Only the twelfth USG can be considered to have risen through the ranks. Of the officials holding the twenty most important posts in the organization (including the Secretary-General), perhaps four or five will retire from the UN with no plans to return to the service of their national government, and at least eleven may be interested in maintaining the option to return to government service.

Officials in USG and ASG posts most likely know that they were chosen as representatives of certain cultural and political interests, and often regard it as their proper duty to promote these interests. Such a conception of a senior UN official's duty appears to reflect

permanent members (United States, Chinese People's Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and France).

[21]In the 1955-1965 period more rapid changes occurred as the membership almost doubled, and the balance in these senior posts was adjusted to reflect the changes within the General Assembly.



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the attitudes of the member states as expressed in the General Assembly and in private contacts with the Secretary-General.[22]

Moreover, because these senior posts are associated with certain nationalities, if a USG or an ASG were removed from office his country and its allies might pose some hard questions about his removal. In the current context, to stand up to this pressure would require the support of the Secretary-General, and to date, except for some public statements recognizing the need for quality personnel in the Secretariat, the Secretary-General's actions do not indicate that he regards personnel issues as important enough to risk antagonizing a group of member states.[23]

As the Secretary-General is understandably too busy to keep a close watch over the range of personnel actions, and the USG for Administration and Management has financial and administrative service responsibilities in addition to his supervision of the Office of Personnel Services, the ASG for Personnel Services and his subordinate, the Director of Recruitment, are buffeted by strong pressures. They are prominent targets because they are the highest officials in a position to monitor appointments and promotions within the entire organization, and they command sufficient resources to make, or approve, resolutions of personnel requests. These liabilities are inherent in their posts, and are for the most part independent of the particular situation of the incumbent.

Personal factors may work either to increase or diminish the institutional vulnerability of these two officials. Vulnerability is increased if a fixed-term staffer, unfamiliar with personnel administration, who has worked on substantive political questions for his national government, is appointed to the post. Such officials are initially likely to deal with personnel issues as they have handled other issues, that is, as political questions to be answered by balancing competing interests. Even if such an official becomes more professional in his handling of personnel matters, when he leaves the post his experience will be lost to the UN and, *ceteris paribus,* a new appointee may have to begin the learning process.[24] Vulner-

[22]Robert W. Cox ("The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization," *International Organization,* Spring 1969, pp. 218-219) noticed these residual group ties in the ILO, and wrote of "a tendency toward 'feudalism' characteristic of international secretariats."

[23]General Assembly Official Records, 28th Session, *Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 1974-1975,* Supplement No. 6, A/9006 (New York: UN, 1973), p. lix, states that 55 per cent of the UN's annual regular budget is for salaries and common staff costs. These questions therefore deserve a higher priority.

[24]While some analysts, notably David Kay in "Secondment at the UN: An Alternative View" (in Robert Gregg and Michael Barkun, editors, *The United Nations System and Its Functions* [Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1968]), have



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ability to political pressure tactics might be lessened if the fixed-term appointees were experienced personnel administrators, or if career officials familiar with the UN personnel system were appointed to these posts.

In general, for the next two levels below an ASG — the D-2's and D-1's — susceptibility to political pressure is varying but frequently substantial, as 55.9 per cent of the D-2's and 31.9 per cent of the D-1's are fixed-term appointees.[25] The position of fixed-term staffers at the D-1 and D-2 levels is virtually identical with respect to vulnerability to pressure tactics. Their vulnerability stems from their need to maintain good relations with the government to which they will return and, in many cases equally important, with their superiors so that they can do their job.

However, the career D-1 officer must be more aware of and amenable to the pressures of member governments than the career D-2 officer, who has little chance of promotion to an ASG post. Currently, there are 132 career D-1 staff and thirty career D-2 staff.[26] Assuming stability in the proportions of career to fixed-term staff, a current career D-1 could reasonably assess the probability of his being appointed to a D-2 post as approximately one out of four. Furthermore, as it is widely believed that the D-2 level is thoroughly politicized, a D-1 who wishes to be promoted will be inclined, whenever possible, to "play the game" and satisfy the demands of the member states.

The ability of member states to influence officials at these levels is diminished because D-1 and D-2 officials are much more likely than ASG's or USG's to be technocrats, e.g., professional statisticians or computer experts, with some notion of professionalism and pride in doing a good job. The more technical the tasks of his department, the more likely the officer is to be a technocrat who resists political pressure to appoint an incompetent to his staff. This factor in the organizational life of the UN, coupled with the difficulty in establishing precise qualifications for administrative generalists, tends to concentrate the less able in a few departments where the head is too weak, or uncaring, to object, or where historically such people have been placed. "Accept him. He is at least

noted the benefits of fixed-term appointments, one clear disadvantage in UN administrative posts is that, assuming it takes two years of a four- or five-year term for the average fixed-term ASG or USG to learn the job, 40 or 50 per cent of the organization's life will be spent with personnel directors inexperienced in UN personnel administration.

[25] *Composition of the Secretariat*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/9724, September 27, 1974 (New York: UN, 1974), Annex, pp. 17, 19.

[26] *Ibid.*



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as well qualified as the others working in that department," is a common argument in these cases.

## The Exercise of Political Influence

The first example of overt political screening of candidates for UN service officially recognized by the United Nations was the U.S. loyalty check. Under Executive Order 10422, issued in January 1953 by President Truman, U.S. nationals undergo a "loyalty check" conducted by the U.S. government before they can be hired by the UN.[27] The USSR, however, was the most frequent user of political pressure to have its nationals appointed and promoted, and continues to use these tactics. It has set a pattern that many other states now imitate.

Fundamentally, the USSR has never shared the concept of an international civil service capable of independent action, which some members including the United States and the United Kingdom avowed in the UN's early years and still support in their statements. The USSR regards the UN Secretariat as an intergovernmental body that provides conference services when nations meet for discussion;[28] in the Soviet view, which is shared by some other members, the use of political pressure to effect personnel decisions is legitimate.

As a consequence of this philosophy, the USSR provides the Secretariat only with fixed-term appointees for periods of from three to five years.[29] This practice virtually ensures that it will be under-represented, in terms of its "desirable range,"[30] because the UN must devote the bulk of its resources available for recruiting Soviet nationals to finding replacements for those who leave each year.[31] This is not the situation with respect to the United King-

[27]Technically, the UN can ignore the results of the "loyalty check," but no one we spoke with in either the UN or the U.S. Mission could recall an instance when "security risk" findings were ignored.

[28]For example, see the Hammarskjold statement in Wilder Foote, editor, *Servant of Peace* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 354.

[29]Of the 181 Soviet nationals on the Secretariat's professional staff subject to geographic distribution in 1974, one has a permanent contract, and the remaining 180 are on fixed-term appointments. A/9724, *op. cit.*, Annex, p. 14.

[30]The desirable range is a target the organization uses in projecting its recruitment needs. It is calculated by allowing a certain minimum of posts (one to six) to each member state, then distributing 200 posts among regions to reflect population distribution, and finally allocating the remaining posts among members according to their contribution to the UN's regular budget. This procedure results in Kenya, for instance, having a desirable range of one to six posts, and Japan a range of 108 to 151 posts.

[31]Sydney Bailey ("The United Nations Secretariat," in Evan Luard, editor, *The Evolution of International Organizations* [London: Thames and Hudson, 1966], p. 102) makes a similar point when noting that "a sustained effort is needed



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dom, France or the United States, whose nationals may freely accept career appointments.

Moreover, the Soviet Union accurately perceives an over-representation of certain Western countries in the Secretariat relative to their "desirable ranges." The average over-representation has been eighteen posts for the United Kingdom since 1963 and fourteen for France since 1966. The United States was under-represented in 1962, 1963 and 1968, but has otherwise been within its range since 1964. Eastern Europe, however, including the USSR, has been under-represented in the Secretariat by an annual average of fifty-eight posts since 1962, although for most of the 1962-1973 period, and especially for the latter portion, the under-representation of the region can be attributed to an average USSR shortfall of sixty-nine posts, while Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia were generally over-represented.[32]

Thus, the three Western permanent members of the Security Council, throughout the UN's first two decades, ordinarily saw little need to promote a specific candidate's interests because as a group they were well represented within the Secretariat. The USSR has sought to remedy its inadequate representation by generally insisting that each candidate it proposes be accepted, rather than by proposing many candidates.

Finally, Moscow became still more interested in its "representation" within the Secretariat, and especially in the highest posts, in the late 1950's and early 1960's when, under Dag Hammarskjold's leadership, efforts were launched to make the UN more than "static conference machinery," as he described the Soviet vision of the organization. This interest continues despite the fact that Secretaries-General have been less bold since Hammarskjold's death. Representation is still seen as insurance against unwanted Secretariat action on political, economic or social issues, or as an opportunity to prompt the Secretariat to enunciate a particular position on these issues.[33] Other member states, includ-

merely to maintain the number of East Europeans at the present level." In the year ending June 30, 1973, 36 Soviet nationals left the Secretariat and 44 were appointed (*Report of the Secretary-General on the Composition of the Secretariat,* A/9120, September 21, 1973 [New York: UN, 1973], Annex, p. 22), but, reflecting a vigorous effort by the UN and the Soviet Union, in the year ending June 30, 1974, 21 Soviet nationals left professional staff posts subject to geographic distribution, and 42 were appointed to such posts (A/9724, *op. cit.,* Annex, p. 23).

[32]*Composition of the Secretariat,* A/8831, October 6, 1962 (New York: UN, 1962), Annex, Table 19; A/9120, *op. cit.,* Annex, Table 8.

[33]Leland Goodrich ("The Political Role of the Secretary-General," *International Organization,* Autumn 1962, p. 734) noted that "Even in the League period, when the Secretary-General and his staff behaved very much in the tradition of British



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ing many of those from Asia and Africa, now view the situation in much the same light, and also use political pressure to resolve personnel questions.

*Effectiveness of Political Pressure*

Pressure exerted for appointments is in general effective. States rarely lose out over the long run. If more than one state desires the same post, UN officials try to find other ways — perhaps another post — to make up for any slight to the loser. Conflict over appointments has become more regulated, insofar as D-2 and higher posts are concerned, as states have recognized certain posts as "American," "Soviet," or "French-speaking African," meaning that people of these nationalities have first call on the job.

Member states use two related themes publicly and privately when urging the appointment of certain individuals or demanding that certain nationalities be appointed more frequently.[34] They stress that they are "under-represented" and that this is contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter (especially the second part of paragraph 3 of Article 101), to the nature of an international organization, and to resolutions of the General Assembly. A few states, particularly the Soviet Union, also allege that because representation is inequitable, the reports of the Secretariat are biased. Second, they may claim, especially when job requirements are ambiguous, to have the best qualified candidate.

But "under-representation" is a valid argument for relatively few states. In March 1974 the UN had 135 members, of which thirty were under-represented according to the geographic distribution formula.[35] However, sixteen of these states had none of their nationals working in the Secretariat, and many of them may

civil servants, demands for wide geographic distribution, especially in the higher echelons, were repeatedly made and generally respected. There should be no surprise that the demand is now much more insistent with the development that has taken place in the Secretary-General's role."

[34]So far as we can determine, no member state bluntly threatens to reduce its regular budget contribution or withdraw from the organization if it cannot have its way on a personnel question. However, threats may be much plainer in international organizations funded by voluntary contributions. Robert A. Pastor ("The Platonic Acorn," *ibid.*, Summer 1974, p. 386) reprints a Peace Corps memorandum revealing that the State Department threatened the United Nations Development Programme Director with the withdrawal of a U.S. contribution of $200,000 to the UN Volunteers unless an American was appointed as one of the professional officers to be hired. In a July 1974 interview, an official at the U.S. Mission to the UN stated openly that the U.S. government "has a say in who goes in at the top levels" in the Fund for Drug Abuse Control because of the American role in setting up the fund and the size of its contribution.

[35]Recruitment Division memorandum, *Recruitment Planning — Geography*, June 1974.



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not be trying to place their citizens on the professional staff. Therefore, perhaps as few as fourteen states, seeking to find work for their nationals in the Secretariat, are in a position to use the "under-representation" argument.

Either of these themes is nevertheless effective, because the Secretary-General and the Under Secretaries-General have given priority to political, economic and financial issues without institutionalizing safeguards to keep politics out of the appointments process. Moreover, by readily yielding to the demands of member states on personnel questions, the Secretary-General has set an unfortunate example which is easy for other senior officials to copy.

Other UN officials cannot alone resist the pressure exerted by member states. A senior official who consistently resists, besides having his career prospects threatened, would be by-passed by the pressuring government and the decision would be placed in his superior's hands. Thus, officials often believe that resistance would achieve little, except to affect adversely their chances for promotion because they had made life unpleasant for both their superiors and a member state, whereas cooperation might enhance the possibility of promotion.

Sometimes the people governments pressure to have appointed or promoted are rejected. Usually when this happens the candidate is of such dubious quality that he obviously could not manage the post sought, and the UN officials providing the resistance are secure within the organization, take an interest in this particular post, and are willing to incur displeasure. Or it may be that another government has exerted more effective pressure.

*Consequences of Political Pressure*

The use of political pressure to influence appointments has become more and more common,[36] and its adverse effects are increasingly obvious. These developments now pose a significant threat to the organization's well-being, primarily through their effect on the effectiveness of the staff.

First and foremost, as mentioned earlier, the Secretariat is burdened with some personnel who cannot do their assigned task as well as could reasonably be expected, and who are by-passed and

[36]This judgment is shared by the current Chairman of the UN Staff Committee. Speaking before the Joint Advisory Committee, he said, "I would be less than candid if I did not convey to you the pervading fear in the Secretariat — spreading through all levels of staff — that the international civil service is, with ever increasing speed, being transformed, wittingly or unwittingly, into a 'multi-national' civil service, as Member States either individually or in blocs seek to establish areas of influence and control in the Secretariat." *Staff Committee Bulletin, op. cit.*, p. 5.



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worked around by their more gifted colleagues. The inefficiency created has posed three related challenges to the effectiveness of the Secretariat and its existence as a "principal organ" of the UN.[37]

The first challenge has been to the morale of staff members. Officials openly criticize some of their colleagues as incompetent, or less competent than they should be. Only a few Secretariat personnel protest the judgment rendered on their organization, and on them, in the Bertrand and James reports.

Some observers believe the growing use of political pressure also challenges the arguments made for an international civil service. The international civil servant is thought to be more objective in his work than a fixed-term employee who will return to his government, but to the extent that promotion depends on political connections, some career officials may be no less beholden than their fixed-term colleagues to their governments for future advancement.

The growing use of political pressure, finally, has had financial costs for the member states. The wealthiest states bear the heaviest cost, for they are not receiving a full return for their contribution. The developing states also pay a cost, for they are not receiving full benefit from this portion of the precious few resources devoted to assisting them; the consequences of this go far beyond a bookkeeper's ledger. Whether member states will be distressed enough with the Secretariat's performance[38] to reduce the amount of their financial contribution is an open question.

### The United Nations Appointments Process

In most cases, a candidate's government plays little part in his appointment. His (or her) application is received by the Division of Recruitment, perhaps accompanied by a form letter stating that his government fully supports his candidacy. His credentials are then evaluated by the appropriate substantive department. If the substantive department declares that he is unqualified for any foreseeable vacancies, his application will circulate no farther.

If the candidate is evaluated favorably, but there is no suitable post available, his name is entered on a computerized Candidates' Roster maintained by the Division of Recruitment.

[37]Articles 7 and 101 of the UN Charter.

[38]Bertrand finds that there is "an undeniable uneasiness" between the member-state delegations and the Secretariat because "The same questions come before the General Assembly again at each session; study groups undertake tasks of an administrative nature which it would normally have been the Secretariat's affair to clear up completely in advance. It often takes several years to arrive — or fail to arrive — at decisions which could have been taken right away if the preliminary gathering of information had been done in time." Bertrand (J.I.U.) Report, p. 17.



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If he is favorably evaluated for a vacant post, a Recruitment Officer prepares a "presentation draft" containing a summary of his qualifications, a copy of the job description, and a memorandum written by the Recruitment Officer. The memo notes the substantive department's recommendation, states where the Recruitment Division has looked for candidates, justifies the choice of this particular candidate rather than some other, gives his nationality, cites the geographic distribution figures for that nationality, and contains a recommendation for appointment from the Office of Personnel. This is sent to the Chief of the Secretariat Recruitment Service, the Director of the Division of Recruitment, and the ASG for Personnel Services for their approval.

When political pressure is absent, these three officials can base their decision on the applicant's qualifications and nationality, meaning that if a candidate is from an over-represented member state, he must be superior to all candidates from under-represented states. The officials may either approve the candidate for the post at the salary level sought, approve him for the post but at a lower salary level, or request the Recruitment Officer to provide more candidates. If they approve the candidacy, the "presentation draft" is forwarded to the Appointments and Promotions Committee/Board.

*Candidates with Strong Political Support*

The appointments process is different for candidates with strong political support. Sophisticated member states desiring to intervene in the Secretariat hiring process will do so at the earliest possible moment, and will either simultaneously approach someone in the substantive department and in the personnel department, or go directly to the Secretary-General. Thus the system by which decisions to appoint are made has at least six potential points of access: the Secretary-General, the USG for Administration and Management, the ASG for Personnel Services, the Director of the Division of Recruitment, the Chief of the Secretariat Recruitment Service (SRS), and officials (especially USG's, ASG's and Directors) in the substantive department where the state wishes to place the candidate.

If the member state has secured a commitment from the Secretary-General, it is difficult for anyone else in the UN bureaucracy to resist, although some officials may try to persuade the Secretary-General that some other accommodation — perhaps appointment to a different post — should be attempted.



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However, a member state may first approach a substantive department or the Personnel Office, retaining the option of appealing to the Secretary-General. If the substantive department resists the appointment, it may seek to have the unwanted candidate appointed to another department (perhaps one in which the head objects less forcefully), or at worst, to a less important post within the department. These strategies, according to knowledgeable observers, have resulted in a few departments receiving a large share of the least able appointees.

If the Office of Personnel Services chooses to resist the appointment, personnel officers may seek to convince the member state to withdraw the candidate, or they may refuse to accept him. In general, the solution to this controversy depends on how much pressure the state is willing to apply (will it go to the Secretary-General, for example?), the availability of an acceptable alternative post, the degree to which the substantive department resists, the ability of the Personnel Office to resolve these disagreements, and, underlying these factors, the quality and nationality of the candidate.

*The Appointments and Promotions Committee/Board*

In any case, after the "presentation draft" is approved, it is sent first to the Appointments and Promotions Committee (for actions involving P-4 or lower posts) and then to the Board (which passes on all appointments and promotions below D-2). Their approval is normally assured. An informal accounting indicates that rejection of a candidate is "very rare," the Committee giving a negative recommendation to perhaps two of every fifty applicants, and the Board advising that one of fifty not be appointed.

The Committee and Board each consist of seven members, all of whom are appointed by the Secretary-General, although at least two members are chosen from among nominees submitted by the Staff Committee.[39] Either Committee or Board can recommend that applicants not be appointed or that they be appointed at a level other than the one the "presentation draft" suggests. After its deliberations, the Board submits an advisory opinion to the USG for Administration and Management. The USG usually signs for the Secretary-General, although formally the latter approves all appointments. Acceptance of the Board's advisory opinion is common, although not certain.

Two simple changes in these procedures would help to lessen

[39]UN Staff Rule 104.14.



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the effectiveness of political pressure by transforming the Appointments and Promotions Committee/Board into a protector of Secretariat quality. First, the Secretary-General and the USG for Administration and Management could state unambiguously that they will always accept a negative advisory opinion by the Board as binding. If they should reject the Board's recommendation to appoint or promote someone, they could be required to justify their decision to the Board in writing. At the Board's discretion, this justification might be made public. This would largely remove these two top officials from the formal process by which people below the D-2 level are appointed and promoted.

The Secretary-General would still be involved in appointments at the D-2, ASG and USG levels. For these positions he can now appoint anyone he chooses. However, he must not only insist that they be qualified to direct their prospective departments;[40] he must create practices to ensure that qualified people are found. For example, he could cast a wider net for candidates and, helped by member states, look in government departments other than the foreign ministry, or in nongovernmental organizations.

Second, Board members should be protected from political pressure. They should continue to ask questions about the candidate's qualifications for the post, his nationality and how it affects the geographic balance within the organization, why this specific candidate was chosen, and where the Personnel Office searched for candidates. These questions should be standard, and their answers should be submitted in advance of the Board's meeting. In addition, before the meeting, on the basis of the "presentation draft," Board members should have the opportunity to submit anonymous requests for clarification or more information. Requests for information should be honored when the Board meets, with a nonvoting member acting as an advocate to point out whether the substantive department or Personnel Office is avoiding direct answers to the questions asked. This advocate, who might also be an officer within a few years of retirement, could be given the duty of answering the Personnel Office's presentation in favor of each candidate by making a case against each appointment. The Board would then vote by secret ballot (a majority decision could be required, with a minimum of five members forming a quorum) to recommend: (a) appointment at the suggested salary level, (b) ap-

[40]A/C.5/1601, *op. cit.*, p. 7, indicates that the Secretary-General "recognizes the importance of exercising particular care in his choice of individuals to serve in posts at the Under Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General level."



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pointment at a different salary level, (c) placement on the roster to be considered for other posts, or (d) outright rejection.

If the Board were truly to guard the Secretariat's quality, UN officials and member states would soon learn that candidates who might previously have been acceptable for a post because of their political connections will be so no longer. States might at first continue to pressure officials to present relatively unqualified candidates to the Board, but they would soon see the futility of this strategy.

*The Supply of Candidates*

These proposals may blunt the force of political pressure, but they alone will not eliminate it. Unless the Board members know that another candidate can be put forward relatively quickly to fill a vacant post, they will be reluctant to reject the less qualified if the substantive department declares it needs the post staffed immediately. Such pressure can be alleviated by insisting on longer advance notice from the departments and by requiring an ample supply of qualified candidates. It is the task of the Office of Personnel Services to supply them.

The Personnel Office did this job poorly and is only now improving its operations.[41] Before January 1, 1974, the UN distributed quarterly a Circular of Vacancies to the various missions to the UN and national recruitment services. This format was too bulky for effective government use, given the number of staff that governments assign to UN recruitment, and lacked important information — e.g., when the vacancy was to be filled, the deadline for applications, whether the post was to be filled through recruitment or promotion, and a reasonably precise delineation of the requisite qualifications.

Now, several times each month, the Office of Personnel Services distributes to missions sheets of vacancy announcements that contain sufficient information. Each sheet of paper deals with one post, with the information written in English on one side and French on the other. Interviews with the staff at some missions indicate that they find this gradual flow of information to be more manageable. They can now immediately forward to the foreign ministry job descriptions they think are of interest. It is hoped that this more efficient publicity system will save time and yield more applicants than the previous procedures. Those found by this method

[41]This judgment is shared by Gardner, p. 26, Rhodes, *op. cit.*, p. 8, and Bertrand, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-105.



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and evaluated favorably by the substantive department, but for whom there is presently no vacant post, are placed on a computerized roster (established in April 1973), thus creating an inventory of qualified candidates.

The earlier, more time-consuming procedures gave the substantive departments great influence in the appointments process, and consequently made them an effective and commonly used point of access, especially by over-represented states. It was then routine for a department to inform the Office of Personnel Services of a vacancy at the same time that it nominated a candidate, and stress that it needed to fill the post at once. With no time for the Personnel Office to find other candidates, the one nominee was usually appointed.

In the spring of 1974, the Personnel Office sought to change this and asked that substantive departments give the Recruitment Division six months' advance notice about coming vacancies. Furthermore, the Recruitment Division demanded that a vacancy notice be circulated to missions and other organizations for at least two months to facilitate the finding and consideration of several candidates for each vacancy.

The Recruitment Programmes Section is now working to build a geographically and occupationally indexed, computerized recruitment sources register.[42] When this register is operational, if the UN needs a chemical engineer or an economist, for example, it will be able to send a vacancy announcement to professional societies and universities, as well as governments, in countries that are under-represented or likely to have available people with the needed knowledge.

The increased ability of the Office of Personnel Services to furnish alternative candidates appears to have lessened the power of the substantive departments to appoint any candidate they choose, and to have given the Board the option of rejecting solitary candidates the departments propose for urgently needed posts.

*Under-utilized Recruitment Techniques*

Two other methods of finding candidates have not been adequately exploited. First, additional competitive entrance examinations to fill P-1/P-2 posts could be given in the UN's working languages every two or three years, perhaps on a regional basis, and used to establish thresholds below which a candidate would be

[42]A/C.5/1601, *op. cit.*, p. 6.



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considered unacceptable for UN service.[43] Above this threshold, which could be different for native and non-native speakers of the working language, candidates could be evaluated and selected according to their other credentials; those successful would be put on the roster. The use of such examinations in under-represented countries or regions, coupled with good prospects for career advancement and language training, provides an alternative means to political pressure for achieving "geographic distribution."

Second, the UN should advertise its vacancies in the public media more frequently. As Bertrand observed, it has been negligent in this regard. The use of advertising media with specialized circulations — in addition to the vacancy announcements distributed to governments and some organizations — is a good technique for attracting prospective candidates who are not usually reached through the established channels.[44]

The vacancy announcement system ensures that member states know of each vacancy, but advertisements in more specialized media would be directed at a different target, a particular worldwide skills market. To publicize vacancies for economists, for example, it would be sufficient perhaps once each year to place a notice in appropriate professional journals, published in the UN's six official languages. The advertisement could list specialized fields, though a general statement would probably be sufficient as economists constitute 21 per cent of the professional staff, and the need to recruit them is therefore large, varied and continuous. Administrative generalists, another 23 per cent of the professional staff,[45] could be attracted through professional journals and magazines dealing with personnel, public and business management issues.

## The Role of Member States in the Recruitment Process — A Case Study

UN officials need the assistance of member states if they are to improve the quality of the Secretariat. Members must decide how effective a Secretariat they want and weigh the gains from securing positions for "cronies" and the financial cost of new personnel

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7, indicates that the further use of competitive examinations is under study by the Secretary-General. The first competitive examination was given in Italy in January 1974, the second in the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1974, and a third is scheduled for Japan sometime in 1975.

[44] Bertrand (J.I.U.) Report, p. 116. The UN has, however, successfully recruited twelve economists for a special program by placing advertisements in *Le Monde* and the London *Economist*.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56; the statistics are for 1970.



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policies against the cost in effectiveness of current policies. If they decide for an effective Secretariat, they must then help to provide qualified candidates, refrain from interfering in the appointments and promotions process, and support the Secretary-General in his efforts to prevent others from interfering.

The policies of most member states and their missions have hampered the UN in finding, appointing and retaining well-qualified personnel. Ideally, the processes by which nationals are recruited for UN service should be studied and compared in eight or ten member states representing a spectrum in terms of size, culture, geography and political and social systems. Since this was not possible, the United States was selected as a case study because (1) American procedures are fairly open and not hard to document, (2) Americans in the U.S. UN Mission and the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs are cooperative, and (3) the United States provides almost 20 per cent of the UN professional staff (the largest national group by a factor of three) and pays 25 per cent of the regular budget (the three Soviet republics rank as the second largest contributor, paying 15.14 per cent). Inquiries about the practices of other states indicate that, in broad outline, the following observations are generally applicable to the developed Western states and, with some exceptions reflecting the different political systems, to the East European states as well.

State Department and U.S. Mission officials cite domestic political considerations as a partial explanation of their interest in having Americans appointed to UN positions, and especially to the highest posts. A State Department memorandum, *Employment of Americans in International Organizations* (September 1973), prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, demonstrates the basis for their concern. It quotes the Committee's Report on the Department of State Authorization Act of 1973, which noted that "in many organizations the U.S. has not filled its allocated number of positions and these have therefore been filled by other nationals," and that "even where U.S. citizens are employed by an international organ, they are frequently so in rather low-ranking positions."[46] The State Department assumes that unless it can make a good showing on appointments for the Committee, the U.S. contribution to the UN regular budget or voluntary programs may be reduced.

[46]This comment encompasses international organizations with headquarters in Europe, where the percentage of Americans employed is much lower than at UN headquarters.



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International political considerations are another important determinant of the United States' interest in placing its nationals in the Secretariat. U.S. government officials assume, and this view seems to be widely held in the Secretariat, that Soviet Secretariat officials are in close contact with their government, and in fact receive instructions about matters of policy. Consciously reacting to this perceived threat, U.S. officials make a strong effort four or five times a year (about forty Americans join the Secretariat each year) to place U.S. nationals[47] in what the U.S. Mission believes are key posts in the UN. They say they do not give these people special instructions on what policies to promote, and the mission's contact with the vast majority of Americans employed in the Secretariat is apparently minimal to nonexistent. Rather, it seems that Washington relies on the professionally trained American being a product of the American culture and its regard for private enterprise and political, economic and social stability.

Concern over certain appointments was demonstrated when the position of Director of Political Affairs in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs became vacant. The United States insisted that it be filled by another American. This policy was acceptable to the Soviet official who heads the department; such demands fit the Soviet conception of the role of Secretariat officials.

The Americans, however, appear to be overreacting to the Soviet presence in the Secretariat, both practically and philosophically. Soviet citizens constitute only 6.8 per cent of the professional staff subject to geographic distribution; U.S. nationals form 19.55 per cent. The figures for supervisory (P-5 and higher) posts are 6.1 and 17.3 per cent, respectively. Of the 2,312 professional staff subject to geographic distribution, East European nationals hold 10.99 per cent of the total posts, and 10.75 per cent of the P-5 and higher posts, while U.S., Canadian and West European nationals constitute 45.2 per cent of the total, and 39.4 per cent of the P-5 and higher staff.[48] Thus, as a practical matter, the American response seems exaggerated: the position of the United States, Canada and the West European states in the Secretariat is approximately four times superior to that of all the East European states.

Philosophically, in using its influence to effect individual appointments the United States has both contributed to the acceptance of such tactics and compromised its own belief in an objective international civil service, consequently lending legitimacy to the

[47]Which individual is actually put forward for the post may reflect "cronyism."
[48]A/9120, *op. cit.*, Annex, Table 8.



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Soviet conception of the Secretariat as an "intergovernmental" organ staffed by partisans. This is contrary to the American interest if the United States intends the UN to play an effective role in world affairs.

A response more in consonance with the principles espoused by the United States would be for it to recruit Americans for UN service more effectively and to support the Secretary-General fully in efforts to lessen the importance of political pressure. The State Department can meet the challenge posed by Congress through these same methods, for an effort to find qualified Americans and present them for UN service should assure the United States of adequate representation within the Secretariat.

In addition, the U.S. government should abolish the loyalty clearance tests to which it subjects its citizens prior to their employment by an international organization. Instituted by order of President Truman in 1953, this procedure remains as a monument to Cold War fears. No U.S. official involved in finding personnel for the UN will justify the check's current use. It is not clear what its benefits are; apparently few people are rejected for UN service for failure to achieve clearance. The disadvantages, however, are readily apparent: there is an administrative and financial cost in conducting each check, a cost the understaffed Mission and the State Department's UN Personnel Policy and Recruitment Office can ill afford; UN recruitment officers will sometimes prefer a candidate of another nationality to an American because the clearance process can add months to the recruitment time, especially if the candidate has ever visited or lived abroad; the test may discourage some people from applying for UN service; and it provides a blatant example of political screening for any member state seeking justification for interference in the UN's personnel policies.

The U.S. position on helping the UN to recruit effectively is also determined by the amount of resources made available for the task. Measured in these terms, supplying personnel for the UN appears to have low priority, for in Washington and New York there are but two full-time employees[49] (plus several who occasionally assist) concerned with UN, as well as UNDP and UNICEF, recruitment.[50] Although exact comparisons are difficult to make,

[49]As of April 1974.

[50]It is not known how many of the successful American applicants were channeled through the U.S. government or how many applied directly to the UN. However, one senior UN personnel officer estimates that about 30 per cent of successful U.S. applicants for Secretariat posts are government-nominated, and candidates for the senior posts are almost always in this class.



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Western Europe, with a supply of available personnel equal to that of the United States, has six recruitment services in operation. (However, they concentrate for the most part on technical assistance recruitment; the U.S. officials focus on the Secretariat.)

To aid its search for candidates, the State Department's UN Recruitment Staff does have a noncomputerized roster of 3,000 names, mostly self-selected and mostly *not* government employees. When a government agency, such as the Cost of Living Council, is phased out, however, many of its staff submit applications for international service. In addition, the Recruitment Staff has access to Civil Service Commission files which list about 2.6 million federal employees. As one American UN official says, if that search mechanism worked as designed, the United States could present fifteen qualified candidates for each vacant post. However, it is not nearly that effective, so when the U.S. government receives a direct request from the UN to recruit for a specific post, it normally sends three or four candidates.

This same official also believes the UN Recruitment Staff relies too much on asking government departments whether they have available people with certain qualifications. He feels that the tendency, which probably exists in most bureaucracies, is for these departments to submit the applications of people they wish to be rid of, not those of their best people.

The U.S. government, and other governments, must search more effectively for UN applicants. A computerized roster should be maintained, for it is the only feasible means of maintaining an inventory of candidates and speedily responding to the UN's requests for personnel. This roster must be built up by contacting private organizations, universities, foundations and business, as well as organs of the state and federal government. Moreover, when a specific vacancy arises, resources should be expended to contact placement officers at universities, employment counselors at executive recruiting agencies (if need be, the government could pay any fees involved), and state and federal employment advisers. For the most junior posts — as the government is now considering — perhaps ten to fifteen candidates each year who have passed the Foreign Service entrance examination could be presented to the UN.

The United States and the UN have similar tasks — to utilize more sources for recruitment and to speed the recruitment process — and their methods could be similar. Informing more people of UN vacancies should result in more candidates, and shortening the



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time it takes to recruit an American should give the UN a better chance of hiring an American before financial circumstances, for example, prevent him from waiting the average six to nine months for a definite UN offer and force him to accept another job. Elimination of the U.S. loyalty clearance procedure would reduce recruitment delays by up to three months.

Another important factor hindering recruitment of U.S. citizens has been the decline, during the past decade, of the United Nations' public image. This is especially unfortunate because it is the consequence of political issues and overlooks the great bulk of the UN's work; as one writer has pointed out, "95 per cent of the UN System-wide resources are expended on economic, social and technical forms of cooperation, with only 5 per cent devoted to the political and security areas."[51] A large part of any campaign to tap new recruitment sources in the United States must make it clear that the UN is not only, or even primarily, concerned with peace and security issues, but with the great range of economic and social issues that confront the world community, with the "management of interdependence."[52]

## Conclusions and Recommendations

This study was prompted by an interest in one question: Why were the generally sound analyses and recommendations contained in the UN personnel studies done during the past four years by Maurice Bertrand's Joint Inspection Unit, Robert Rhodes James, Richard Gardner, and the Salary Review Committee largely ignored? The answer, in part, is that some people and governments profit from the status quo, and that political interference in the appointments and promotions process, as well as a lack of awareness by some member states of the consequences of their political pressure tactics, underlie many of the personnel problems. *No substantial improvement can be expected without a serious commitment by member states and the Secretary-General to the attainment of the highest degree of "efficiency, competence and integrity" in the staff as stipulated in Article 101 of the Charter.*

Many Secretariat officials share the perception that they are virtually helpless when faced with member states using their influence to have candidates appointed, and have no choice but to "play the game." This is not true. Although actors in the UN bureauc-

[51]Samuel De Palma, "A Call for Further Studies on the Dynamics of International Organization," *International Organization,* Autumn 1973, pp. 560-561.

[52]Miriam Camps, *The Management of Interdependence* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1974).



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racy are discussed in past studies (and often self-described) as if they were not to be held accountable for their actions — as if they were merely sensitive thermometers responding automatically to each variation in the political temperature — those bureaucrats who use, nurture and accept political pressure tactics are not bowing to the inevitable; they are choosing the easier, more comfortable route.

The Secretary-General should not only speak out for the principle of Secretariat independence but act in consonance with that principle. He should revise the appointments process to lessen the effectiveness of political pressures and move merit criteria to a foremost position in the decision to appoint. Such changes will help to prevent states from using the Secretariat to promote minor national interests, reward friends and relatives, or remove unwanted officials from home ministries.

The cooperation of member states is essential if the UN's personnel system is to be reformed. Fundamentally, member states must supply the UN with qualified candidates, refrain from using their influence to interfere in the appointments and promotions process, and be willing to pay enough to establish competitive conditions of service.

What if nothing is done to curtail the use of political pressure to effect appointments? The answer to this question has been foreshadowed in the demoralization of the Secretariat, the suspicions with which member states view each other's personnel interventions, and the increasing use of non-UN multinational communities to discuss global issues. The UN may be sidelined by the nations of the world as people sideline cars that have ground to a halt with sludge-filled engines.

Many important considerations enter into a state's choice of which international institution or mechanism to use in dealing with a problem; for example, the number of states with a significant interest in and influence on the problem, voting mechanisms, negotiating attitudes and parliamentary procedures.[53] The competence and integrity of the Secretariat too are likely to be increasingly important in determining whether states will use the UN or will turn to other institutions or mechanisms.

If the member states and the Secretary-General do not have the political will to deal decisively with this problem, if they cannot break away from the old path, there will be little reason for mem-

[53]De Palma, *op. cit.*, pp. 557-561.



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ber states to vote additional money to the UN or refrain from political interference in the appointment process.

However, if member states and the Secretary-General desire to blunt the force of political pressure, the following steps should be taken:

(1) Member states should individually examine the costs and benefits of their use of political pressure in the appointments process. That some members fail to restrain themselves should not serve as a pretext for other members to abandon principle and join in the political corruption of the Secretariat.

(2) The Secretary-General should announce that the Secretariat will, in accordance with Article 101 of the UN Charter, adhere strictly to high standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, and institutionalize procedures for achieving these goals.

(3) The Secretary-General should avoid involvement in appointments below the D-2 level, except for his personal staff. It should be understood that he will not even discuss such appointments with Permanent Representatives or their subordinates. Such a policy would better allocate his time and energy for the crucial tasks of executive leadership, policy direction and crisis management.

(4) For the higher posts, D-2, Assistant Secretary-General and Under Secretary-General, the Secretary-General should secure more than one nomination for each post, and also obtain the opinion of a panel on the professional qualifications of the applicants. Making public each candidate's qualifications should decrease the vulnerability of the Secretary-General to political pressure.

(5) For posts below the D-2 level, the Appointments and Promotions Committee/Board should take responsibility for protecting the Secretariat's quality and integrity. Their finding that an applicant is not qualified for a position, or a promotion, should be final. Accordingly, procedures for providing them with adequate information on candidates should be improved. To assure their independence, safeguards to protect the members of the Appointments and Promotions Committee/Board should be institutionalized.

(6) The Secretariat and member states should undertake additional measures to find and attract qualified candidates, making full use of threshold entrance examinations, computerized rosters, contacts with professional associations and the communications media. In short, there must be more active and effective prospecting for candidates.

(7) Those who accept career appointments should have adequate opportunity for advancement to the organization's most senior positions.

(8) Conditions of service for staff must be competitive with those qualified professionals can command elsewhere. Incompetence is never cheap. Rather than argue about which organization or country provides an appropriate standard for comparison, it should be recognized



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that the great majority of skilled professionals are geographically mobile and will move to where the conditions of service are best. Moreover, if surplus jobs are eliminated, funds would be freed to make necessary jobs competitive, thus resulting in a smaller, more efficient Secretariat. Even if additional funds are necessary, the cost would be small both in absolute terms[54] and compared to the importance of getting the job done well.

(9) Member states should supervise more closely the activities of their mission personnel so as to root out pressures to appoint "cronies."

(10) The United States, in particular, should abolish its cumbersome, costly and useless loyalty clearance procedure. This anachronism from the McCarthy era produces delays that discourage the employment of qualified Americans, provides an excuse for other members to do political screening, and serves no valid conception of American security. Other member states should discontinue any similar practices, overt or covert.

There will be resistance to these reforms; it would be an illusion to think otherwise. People in missions as well as in the Secretariat have conducted their affairs according to certain mores because they have profited thereby or found it too risky to resist. It falls to the Secretary-General to speak for the organization and to place the broad interests of its members against the parochial interests and antiquated practices of those who conspire to deny effective officers to the Secretariat. The political costs of the current practices are quite apparent, though not as easily measured as the minor expenditures member states devote much time to quibbling over.

The current condition of the Secretariat and the impediments to its effectiveness are the product of decisions taken by UN and government officials to conduct their affairs according to certain rules. These decisions are not immutable. Whether this vital UN body can play an effective role in dealing with international problems will depend in part on the rejection of past personnel practices and the adoption of practices more in keeping with the philosophy of an independent Secretariat.

[54]The amounts under contention are actually quite small. The total UN annual regular budget in 1973 was 225 million U.S. dollars (less than three-tenths of one per cent of the U.S. military budget that year), of which $125 million went to salaries and common staff costs. *Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 1974-1975, loc. cit.*, and *The Military Balance 1973-1974* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 74.



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# UN PEACEKEEPING AND THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT*

*by N. A. Pelcovits*

AN unexpected sequel to the October 1973 war in the Middle East was to bring UN peacekeepers back to the area. Many thought the inglorious departure of UNEF I in May 1967 — when U Thant reluctantly recalled the force at Nasser's behest — had not only exposed the fragility of peacekeeping in general but signaled the requiem for serious UN peacekeeping efforts to contain the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Certainly few imagined that the UN would be entrusted with any military mission beyond that of supervising a cease-fire. A UN military presence of sorts had operated on the cease-fire lines after the 1967 war. Some 200 unarmed military observers from the Jerusalem-based UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), originally set up to monitor the truce after the 1948 war, were deployed along the Suez Canal and the "forward defended localities" on the Golan. They could do little more than keep score of violations and were by-passed or arrested by advancing troops (as well as sustaining casualties) during the October fighting.

That the United Nations would be enlisted for vital security assignments in backstopping the disengagement arrangements was all the more surprising in light of the nine-year impasse in the General Assembly's peacekeeping committee over rules to govern peacekeeping operations. The committee had been established in 1965 after the Assembly recoiled from taking away the Soviet vote (Article 19 of the Charter) when Moscow refused, on political grounds, to pay its peacekeeping assessments for the Congo and UNEF I. The hope was that a U.S.-USSR accommodation on ground rules would stimulate use of UN peacekeeping to contain local conflicts. Instead, the protracted exercise in the peacekeeping committee underlined differences and intensified controversy whenever a peacekeeping issue arose in the Security Council. The U.S.-led group wanted to codify the Hammarskjold doctrine of wide latitude for the Secretary-General in recruiting a force, naming the

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commander and managing an operation once it had been launched; the Soviets (with French support) were suspicious of undue American influence in the Secretariat and insisted that key operational decisions remain with the Security Council even after launch.[1]

Despite these negative auguries, a consensus was quickly reached in the Security Council to send a military presence to the Middle East not only to monitor the truce but to interpose during the disengagement process. In time, the UN took on unprecedented tasks of policing buffers and inspecting arms zones. American officials, including those not reputed to be UN devotees, consider the peacekeeping machinery "indispensable," with a potential for later stages of interim settlement. Moscow grumbles about cost but supported the renewal of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) on the Egyptian front for the fourth time — albeit for a shorter term at Egyptian insistence — in April 1975 and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan for a second term at the end of November 1974; what is more, it is paying its assessed share of the cost. China is withholding its payment but also its veto. The rest of the world has rarely shown such unanimity in backing a UN peacekeeping effort.

Part of the reason for quick action in the Council was that Washington saw in a UN force of middle powers a timely riposte to the Soviet gambit for joint American-Soviet military intervention to stop the Israeli advance on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Moreover, the nonaligned backed this solution as a way of averting great-power confrontation and helping the Arabs. The main reason, however, was simply that there was no alternative. No other instrumentality was available to carry out the diplomatic understanding between the major powers on how to contain the conflict; nor was any other mechanism acceptable to the contending parties as sufficiently reliable and impartial. The meshing of bilateral diplomacy outside the UN with efforts inside proved to be the critical element in getting the peacekeeping effort underway.

Another part of the reason for turning to the UN was historical circumstance. UNTSO observers were already on the spot, and the truce supervisory corps was reactivated and strengthened (to 300 officers) to define and police the cease-fire lines. UNEF II got underway expeditiously by drawing on the UN force in Cyprus. Within forty-eight hours of authorization, a cadre of nearly 600 Finnish, Irish, Austrian and Swedish troops was flown from Nicosia

[1] At the same time, the peacekeeping debate did help to clarify the political and operational boundaries for UN action.



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to the Suez Canal area to interpose between Egyptian and Israeli forces and arrange the disengagement. Subsequently, in the disengagement agreement of January 18, 1974, UNEF was assigned the task of supervising deployment of forces to the new lines and then manning the Sinai buffer zone and verifying compliance with ceilings on men and arms in the limited arms zones. UNEF units and UNTSO observers were recruited for the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) to carry out roughly similar duties under the terms of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement of May 31, 1974.

An assessment of how well the peacekeepers have done so far may be instructive in determining how durable and serviceable the force is likely to be and how it enters into the calculations of the concerned parties as the dates for renewing the mandates near. Besides, because it is a "hard case" that tests to the utmost the UN's capacity to deal with politically-charged and operationally complex disputes, the Middle East experience says something important about the potential (and the limits) of UN peacekeeping in other conflicts and other places.

Prospects for re-enlisting the force in later stages depend on how the Arabs and Israelis read the balance sheet of UN effectiveness. Both strength and vulnerability flow from the close link between disengagement agreements and the peacekeeping mechanism: strength comes from the adversaries' explicit acceptance of the UN's authority to police the security arrangements; vulnerability from the fact that the terms of the disengagement accords were left ambiguous in many aspects so as to close the bargain. Moreover, left unresolved is the overwhelming question: Do the disengagement agreements fall apart like a house of cards if the UNEF and UNDOF mandates are not renewed?

Imperfections in the peacekeeping machinery make for another set of constraints that so far have proved manageable but could in time impede effectiveness. If the peacekeeping mission is to continue to serve as a viable international mechanism for containing the conflict while negotiations proceed, remedial action is imperative. UN peacekeepers are fully aware of their dependence on the solidity of the structure built by outside diplomacy. The United Nations is constantly testing the edges of its authority, and while it sings a reassuring tune, it realizes how vulnerable it is to changes in the world balance of political and military forces and to any breakdown in the negotiating process.



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## II

In many ways, experience with UNEF and UNDOF has been remarkably like that of a dozen or so other UN peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, Cyprus, the Congo, Kashmir, Yemen and elsewhere. Familiar axioms of successful peacekeeping were reinforced: that it is essential to sustain the political consensus among the major powers and to link this to Security Council action; to nourish the cooperation and confidence of the parties, both in the formulation of the mandate and in the conduct of the operation; to keep the troop contributors satisfied; and to give the Secretary-General wide executive latitude in running the operation while ensuring that he is constantly tuned in to the political sensitivities and ultimate political authority of the Security Council. Above all, the meshing of classical, bilateral diplomacy outside the UN with efforts inside the organization was shown to be crucial. To a greater degree here than in any precedent case, success inside the UN framework, both in lining up world political backing and in designing workable peacekeeping machinery, depends on outside diplomacy to maintain an equilibrium and understanding responsive to the political needs of the major powers and the parties to the dispute.

Unique to the current operation, and likely to have the most lasting impact on future peacekeeping, is the organic connection between the disengagement agreements negotiated by the parties (with the United States playing a strong intermediary role) and the UN's mandate. The peacekeeping forces are governed not only (and not so much) by Security Council decisions and the operating rules of the Secretary-General. The UN must interpret and implement provisions in the accords dealing with separation of forces and observance of arms limits. Even policing methods are specified in considerable detail in the Syrian-Israeli documents. Thus, the UN force in this case not only supervised the disengagement *process* — it carried out similar functions in Yemen in 1963 and on the Indo-Pakistan border in 1965 — but is charged with continuing tasks of controlling the buffer zones and inspecting the flanking limited arms and forces zones.

How this came about is worth reviewing, because the structure of the peacekeeping machinery, and particularly the connection between the mandate and the disengagement accords, can have implications for the future.

The Moscow understanding on a cease-fire was embodied in



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Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, directing the parties to hold their positions and start "immediately after the cease-fire" to implement Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 in all its parts and negotiate a just and durable peace. UN observers were deployed out of UNTSO centers in the area, mostly from Cairo, to supervise the cease-fire. When the truce failed to hold, the UNTSO corps was increased (Resolution 340 of October 25) and officers were dispatched, as unarmed point men, to define the cease-fire line so that UNEF could take positions between the Egyptian and advancing Israeli forces. One part of the peacekeeping structure, therefore, is an expanded UNTSO corps of about 300 officers.

The second and main component of the peacekeeping machinery is the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), set up by Resolution 340 to police the cease-fire lines and interpose between the disengaging forces. Established for an initial period of six months, the force was to continue thereafter "provided the Security Council so decides" (Resolution 341 of October 27, 1973). Though its use on the Syrian front was not excluded, it was understood that the immediate need was to deploy UNEF on the Egyptian front, given the complexity of the cease-fire line, the plight of the Egyptian Third Army, and the expanding Israeli salient west of the canal. The initial cadre flown in from Cyprus was increased by new recruitment to over 7,000 (since reduced to just over 4,000). Lieutenant General Ensio Siilasvuo of Finland relinquished his command as Chief of Staff of UNTSO and was named commander of UNEF.

The basic charter of the force remains the "terms of reference" drafted by the Secretary-General (S/11052/Rev. 1, October 27, 1973) and approved by the Security Council. But since the end of disengagement and redeployment to new lines early in 1974, the terms of the disengagement accord of January 18, 1974 largely determine UNEF's assignment and, in many respects, its operating procedures. The arrangement provides for a UN-manned and controlled zone of disengagement in the Sinai (about six to nine kilometers wide) to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces, and for periodic UN inspection of flanking security zones in which forces and arms are limited to prescribed levels and types, as well as a wider zone to be free of missiles and missile launchers. UNEF executes its tasks with "the cooperation of the military observers of UNTSO." While there is no set division of labor, in the main the observers carry out the periodic inspections of the limited arms



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and missile-free zones, and battalions of the force police the buffer, provide the show of military presence, and run the logistics.

In the case of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan — the third component — the UN's role is even more intimately linked to the American-mediated agreement of May 31, 1974. The Security Council authorized UNDOF for an initial period of six months (Resolution 350 of May 31, 1974) specifically to implement the agreement and the associated accords annexed to the resolution. It was set up as an "observer force," a hybrid label suggested by the American intermediary to reconcile Israeli demands that the UN police the lines as an interpository force and Syrian resistance to any authority beyond observation and reporting. The agreement was signed at Geneva "under the aegis of the United Nations" and "with the participation of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union."

UNEF terms of reference apply, but it is the disengagement accord and associated documents that really govern, laying out the scenario for phased disengagement, the size of UNDOF (about 1,250), and its functions. Security arrangements are similar to those on the Egyptian side except that the buffer zone is not under UN jurisdiction. The Syrians insisted on reclaiming sovereignty and restoring civilian administration in the "zone of separation." For the Israelis also, the return of civilian life was to be a test of normalization and token of good faith. UN battalions are stationed in the area and patrol it. But their task is complicated because the threat of military intrusion is more immediate than in the Sinai and more difficult to discern and control. The accord also prescribed the permitted level of forces and arms (tanks and artillery of a certain caliber) in areas adjoining the zone of separation. In the Golan, certain types of heavy artillery are proscribed in a wider zone, and adjacent strips are to be free of missiles and missile launchers. Inspection procedures as well as the extent of freedom of movement, including patrol roads to be used, were specified in considerable detail.

What we have, then, is a complex security mechanism that imposes unprecedented and arduous policing responsibilities on the international force. How well has the UN performed? What are the vulnerabilities? Does experience warrant adapting the security arrangements to later stages of disengagement, or as a model in other local conflicts?

Having subscribed to the UN role as part of their disengagement



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plan — indeed, having insisted on UN policing as a condition of agreement — the parties have had reason to cooperate. In the Sinai, violation of the zone of disengagement has been minimal, presumed to be inadvertent, and intruders have been evicted without trouble. The buffer thus helps to build confidence in the solidity of the disengagement. On the Golan, the UN's assignment is more complicated in the zone of separation since its authority vis-à-vis the local administration is somewhat ambiguous. It must comply with applicable Syrian laws and "not hamper the functioning of local civil administration." Also, its ability to discern and deny access to the Syrian "military" has presented problems, as have minor and sporadic violations, but so far within tolerable limits.

The main value of the Sinai buffer, and to a lesser degree the Golan zone of separation, has been that it has reduced the risk of miscalculated encounter. Nadav Safran, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in October 1974, judges that at best the UN troops complicate the decision of a potential attacker by forcing him to choose between ordering them to step aside, and thus giving warning to the opponent, or driving through them and incurring the onus in the eyes of the world. The utility of the force should not be exaggerated, but may be greater than Safran suggests. Smarting from the bad name the first UNEF got in 1967 when it hastily withdrew, the doctrine at UNEF headquarters and among the battalions is that the force would hold its ground and refuse to leave if asked. At the least, the matter would be referred to New York. Should the force stand fast, even though it may not actively resist, an attacker must contemplate the possibility of inflicting casualties. While there is no equivalence in the political price the Security Council would exact from Israel as against Syria or Egypt in the event of an attack through the buffer (and many Israeli officers disdain the deterrent effect of UN troops), Israel values the UN force as a concrete token of world interest in maintaining the truce. More important, any breach of the UN zone would inevitably prompt reaction by the great powers, including the United States.

UN officers and others on the spot differ on how effectively UNEF actually controls the Sinai disengagement zone (several cynically volunteered to infiltrate a fully armed battalion into the zone undetected), but the net judgment is that it has imposed restraints and helped to build confidence. Its credibility depends to some extent on whether it is perceived as deploying a "sufficiency" of manpower with the determination and mobility to



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apprehend intruders. Given this condition, an expanded buffer zone as part of an agreement for a second-stage pullback would be manageable. Not surprisingly, a buffer is more workable in the desert than in populated areas where policing is more complicated. Further, a buffer under UN control, as in the Sinai, is more manageable than a demilitarized "zone of separation" under civilian administration, as in the Golan.

The adjacent limited arms and missile-free zones are useful complementary features in the security arrangements. UN officers and others on the spot will, in unguarded moments, admit that arms limits have not always been observed, that inspection procedures (whereby UN observers accompanied by liaison officers cover a set area on a set schedule) are far from foolproof, and that verification of the missile-free zone is without much meaning since missiles can be readily wheeled in and launching pads easily prepared. But so far no serious violations have been charged. On balance, the system of limited arms zones adds to a sense of security by extending the area of separation and making it more complicated for antagonists to get at each other. It is at least a partial deterrent to imprudent conduct. More important, any significant buildup would sound the alarm and provide some warning against surprise attack. Should an expanded limited arms zone prove more negotiable than an expanded buffer, a measure of confidence could be added by having the inspections carried out by mixed patrols consisting of UN inspectors and liaison officers from both sides, as against the present system of liaison only from the side being inspected.

## III

If the organic link between the disengagement accords and the UN mandate is the strength of the Middle East operation, it is also a source of weakness. Imprecise provisions written into the Syrian-Israeli accord as the price of agreement — and Secretary of State Kissinger's seeming acceptance of contrary interpretations — have proved troublesome. Differences of interpretation have sparked controversy over the UN's authority and what can be expected from the force. Its effectiveness has consequently been impaired. As noted, the zone of separation is under Syrian civilian administration but off limits to the military. How to operate so as not to "hamper" the civilian administration poses difficulties. And who is to be considered "military"? (At one point, officials from the Syrian Defense Ministry were barred, to wry amusement in Jerusa-



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lem.) The Israelis have even opposed the entry of Syrian military personnel to clear mines from the southern sector of the zone, though this operation would take place under UN supervision. Interpretation of the prohibition against heavy artillery (defined in terms of range and gun caliber) in the limited arms zone has also been troublesome, the Israelis claiming that it implicitly forbids mortars of even greater caliber and range.

Moreover, the hybrid designation of UNDOF has resulted in conflicting pressures on the UN — by Israel that it operate as a "force," using coercion if necessary to stop unauthorized entry, and by Syria that its tasks be limited to observation and reporting and that the UN avoid intrusive activities in the zone of separation. The public Syrian-Israeli protocol says the function of the force is to "use its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire"; an interpretation accepted by the parties but not made public authorizes UNDOF to deny access to military forces in the separation zone. So far, the UN has successfully walked a tight line between the conflicting interpretations, relying mainly on UNTSO observers to man observation posts and carry out inspections and on the Austrian and Peruvian battalions to police the zone of separation and patrol access roads. Clearly the lesson is that the "creative ambiguity" urged by peacekeeping experts and practitioners may be an asset in defining the terms of reference of a peacekeeping force, thus allowing it to adapt procedures to changing circumstance. But where the UN must interpret its role in a truce or disengagement agreement imprecision becomes an impediment, since the parties have differing and often contrary expectations of the UN's role. Given the delicate balance of the Syrian-Israeli military disengagement, trying to clarify ambiguities would tend to be destabilizing. But in any later stage, corrective interpretations, such as whether mortars are to be treated as artillery, should be a subject for negotiation.

Ironically, Israel has been the advocate of an activist role, stronger authority and a longer term for the peacekeeping presence, despite deep distrust of the UN because of political action against her in the deliberative bodies. This is natural in the circumstances, given her great stake in maintaining the present lines as long as possible. Partly, however, Israel's position reflects concern that a decision by the other side not to renew the mandate of the UN force could be read as repudiation of the disengagement agreement and signal militant intentions. This concern goes beyond the effect of ambiguities involving the force's internal operations or the ex-



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tent of the UN's authority, to the fundamental issue of whether the political underpinnings of the peacekeeping mandate are eroding.

The most troublesome ambiguity — and political destabilizer — that flows from connecting the UN's mandate to the disengagement accords is this: Would failure to renew the mandate mean repudiation of the disengagement agreement and invalidate both the obligations assumed by the parties and the responsibilities of the UN? And, if the disengagement accord is no longer operative, will the parties no longer be restrained from building up military capacity on their side of the cease-fire line and adopting a posture of confrontation? For that matter, would the cease-fire still hold?

Though it has not surfaced in diplomatic or public discourse, such uncertainty is destabilizing and hardly conducive to a favorable negotiating climate. The political war of nerves rises to fever pitch as the deadline for renewal approaches.[2] Peace prospects are not advanced by alarmist speculation that failure to renew would create a "vacuum" in the area, implying both that the disengagement agreements would become invalid and that the UN would abdicate its responsibilities for policing the cease-fire lines.

Nowhere do the disengagement accords indicate that they are to be considered term agreements. The Syrian presumes the existence of UNDOF to police its terms but does not say that if the policeman leaves his beat the disengagement contract is invalidated. The closest both the Egyptian and Syrian agreements come to putting an apparent limit on duration is in stating that the disengagement accord is not to be regarded as a "final peace agreement" (the Syrian accord omits "final") and constitutes a "first step" (the Syrian omits "first") toward a "final, just and durable peace" (the Syrian omits "final") on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973. No timetable or deadline is implied. Moreover, both agreements put first in the order of obligations assumed that the parties "will scrupulously observe the ceasefire . . . and will refrain from all military actions against each other" (the Egyptian agreement adds "paramilitary" action) from the time of the signing of the document. There is no hint that the cease-fire collapses if the mandate runs out.

Political wisdom suggests removing the uncertainty so that negotiation will not take place under artificial deadlines. Two points need to be clarified. One is that obligations assumed by the par-

[2] Tension mounted even higher when Egypt announced that it would consent to renewal of the mandate after April 24, 1975, for three months rather than the usual six.



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ties in the disengagement accords, insofar as they are not tied to specifics of the UN peacekeeping operation, remain binding whether or not the mandate is renewed. The other is that while the UN military presence (UNEF and UNDOF) has to be periodically reactivated, the cease-fire remains in force, whether or not it can be effectively policed.

It cannot be convincingly argued that the UN's responsibility to supervise the cease-fire vanishes when the mandate of the peacekeeping force expires. The cease-fire was decreed by the Security Council on October 22, 1973 (Resolution 338) and reaffirmed the next day (Resolution 339) to apply to both fronts before UNEF got its charter (Resolution 340 of October 25) and long before UNDOF was created. Should the Council fail to renew the mandates, the parties are nonetheless bound by the cease-fire, and the UN is obliged to use existing machinery to supervise observance.

## IV

It is not generally realized that UNTSO remains in being as a mechanism for supervising the cease-fire even if UNEF and UNDOF are dismantled. This consideration is a strong argument for keeping UNTSO independent and separate from the UNEF/UNDOF peacekeeping structure. On grounds of managerial efficiency, a superficial case can be made for integrating the three components. Why three separate commands and administrative establishments when operational tasks are so intertwined? Why put up with administrative overlapping and bureaucratic rivalry?

Actually even from the managerial perspective integration would not necessarily be productive. In practice, UNEF's Chief Administrative Officer in Ismailia coordinates administration of the whole complex.[3] More important, General Siilasvuo (officially just the UNEF commander) exercises "supervisory authority" over UNDOF and is de facto chief of the entire peacekeeping mission. Contacts with the parties at the highest ministerial and military levels are pursued by Siilasvuo, and his role in this regard has been sanctioned by the Secretary-General.

An undercurrent of bureaucratic tension can be sensed between UNEF and UNTSO: UNEF resents what it considers an entrenched UNTSO establishment (disposing more observers than it can efficiently deploy), and UNTSO is convinced that its elite and

[3] Integration has not been trouble-free. UNDOF's peculiar administrative and logistical problems — affecting in particular the special needs of the Canadian and Polish logistical contingents — have not always been adequately satisfied out of Ismailia.



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skilled officer corps carries out observation and inspection assignments for which the troops are unsuited. The difference reflects more than bureaucratic rivalry and goes to the heart of the UN's function. UNEF sees interposition as the key and an armed force as the only credible manifestation that the UN will stand its ground. UNTSO officers argue that the main utility of peacekeeping is as a "presence," to observe and sound the alarm rather than to interpose or show muscle. Moreover, it is UNTSO doctrine that if UNEF and UNDOF were dismantled, the military observers could fill the breach. Some have developed an Ozymandias complex:[4] in due course, the sands will cover UNEF's traces, UNDOF will disappear, and UNTSO will inherit the UN's peacekeeping responsibilities in the area.

While much of this is bureaucratic fantasy, it contains a hard core of realism. UNTSO can indeed be perceived as the continuing instrument of the UN's residual responsibility to supervise observance of the cease-fire. Its authority stems both from the 1948-1949 mandate and from recent Security Council resolutions, explicitly recognized in Resolution 339 of October 23, 1973, which authorized enlargement of the corps to monitor the cease-fire. In the event of a breakdown of the disengagement arrangements or, more likely, a delay in renewing the force's mandate while diplomatic influence is brought to bear in the Security Council, there need not be a peacekeeping vacuum in the area. UNTSO could be strengthened and called on to man the cease-fire line. Admittedly this is no substitute for a peacekeeping force, and its departure would be unsettling. But UNTSO provides an international presence to validate and monitor the cease-fire while diplomacy tries to restore the security arrangements that bolster the disengagement agreement.

## V

Any decision to re-enlist a UN security backstop for later stages of disengagement and interim settlement will depend not only on a solid political consensus. Solutions will have to be found to certain persistent problems that could erode the effective functioning of the Middle East operation in the future. Many of these are vulnerabilities that afflict any peacekeeping mission but are troublesome to an uncommon degree in the politically sensitive Arab-Israeli conflict.

*Short-term mandate.* Paradoxically, the provision for a veto-proof

[4] See "Ozymandias of Egypt," by Percy Bysshe Shelley.



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term (six months), which was intended to quiet concern about premature withdrawal, has become a source of instability. A six-month mandate is probably the limit of what is politically acceptable to the Arab states and to key powers in the Security Council, notably the USSR and France. Even reliable troop contributors like Canada are reluctant to sign on for a long term, though they can usually be counted on to re-enlist.[5] Besides, six months is a reasonable term for updating and accountability (though commanders in the field would feel more comfortable if they could plan for a longer stay, say one year). Yet, a short fixed term contains the seeds of contention as the end of the period nears and parties jockey for renewal or change in the mandate. Tension was further aggravated when the Security Council in April 1975 (with the United States reluctantly acquiescing) bowed to Egypt's insistence and extended the mandate for only three months. Israel's continuing concern has been repeatedly underlined. Jerusalem has declared that a substantial pullback in the Sinai in the next stage of disengagement must be contingent on a UN stay of several years.

Even an open-ended mandate, however, would not ensure durability. As happened in May 1967, if the underlying political consensus unravels so will the peacekeeping operation, no matter what the Security Council resolution provides: troop contributors will pull out and members will withhold their payments. Basically, any acceptable formula must balance Israeli concern about impermanence against the countervailing interest that the UN presence not become a permanent fixture freezing an unacceptable situation. Making sure the force stays is likely to depend more on progress in negotiating a settlement and on sustaining confidence-building measures on the ground than on firmer legal provisions in the mandate.

*Impartiality and a credible show of force.* To maintain credibility, the UN force must constantly nourish a reputation for competence, toughness and evenhandedness in policing the buffer and the limited arms zones. Each side reads slackness in the UN's asserting authority on *its* side as a mirror image of what the other side is getting away with. When oil drums on demarcation lines are moved or ceilings on arms exceeded (even to a minor extent)

[5] Some Canadian officials are also concerned about the unsettling impact of a short-term mandate whose renewal is subject to shifting political attitudes of the parties and their Security Council supporters. Effectiveness of peacekeeping, they argue, requires balancing political considerations (consent and confidence of the disputants) against the needs of the force and troop contributors to be able to count on the mandate's durability.



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and the UN fails to take corrective action, the side that reaps advantage can only assume the same is happening on the other side, and credibility suffers.

The peacekeeping presence is symbolic and token, since it is bound to lack coercive power to stop a determined attacker, particularly on the Arab-Israeli battleground where it would inevitably be outgunned. All the same, size and show of force are important — to demonstrate seriousness of purpose, pose a deterrent, raise the political cost to an attacker, and expose him to the risk of inflicting casualties on UN troops. It makes a difference that the parties credit the UN with the will and capacity to "push out" intruders (as some commanders describe their function), handle minor infractions, observe and report on serious violations, and pose uncertainty in the minds of military planners in Damascus, Cairo and Jerusalem about whether the force will hold its ground. If a "critical mass" is important, it must be concluded that any substantial cut in the size, arms and mobility of the force could erode confidence.

As UNEF's capacity to police large areas in the Sinai diminishes, because of units leaving and not being replaced, both its flexibility and its reputation for impartiality, authority and reliability could suffer. As of mid-January 1975, five line battalions (with only half of the manpower actually on line) were stretched out to cover the Sinai buffer zone that had been policed by nine battalions eight months earlier.[6] While protesting that the thinned-out force was adequate to the task, officers on the spot admit that in the touchy Middle East situation credibility depends on the adversaries perceiving the force to be adequate, determined to control the buffer, and meticulous and evenhanded in carrying out inspections.

Doubts about whether manpower is adequate have been aggravated by lack of watchtowers and light tracked vehicles to facilitate observation and patrolling. On the Golan, the observation posts are on high ground, but the problem in the Sinai will become more acute if a second-stage pullback results in an expanded buffer. At the least, more attention needs to be paid to the trade-off between more men and more sophisticated equipment for observation and mobility. The use of light tracked vehicles (some units have been experimenting with adapting snowmobiles to sandmobiles but

[6] Two UNEF battalions — the Austrian and Peruvian — were assigned to UNDOF at the beginning of June 1974 along with elements from the Canadian and Polish logistics contingents. The Nepalese contingent was repatriated without replacement during August and September, and the Panamanian at the end of the year.



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with indifferent success) and of watchtowers would reduce numbers needed for effective observation and inspection.[7]

*Inducing troops to stay.* As experience with UNEF I showed, nations will withdraw their troop contingents if the parties fall out. Instability is also implicit in the standard agreement between troop contributors and the UN which, in practice, allows national contingents to be pulled out at will. Whether for reasons of state,[8] or because nations become weary or change their political mind about participating, or because of dissatisfaction with the rate or promptness of reimbursement, when troop contributors pull up stakes the force structure and its mission are disrupted — with repercussions that weaken its reliability.

In general there has been a tendency to minimize the drain on manpower and resources involved in organizing and sustaining UN contingents. Canada, for example, had to pull specialists out of diverse units of its armed forces to put together the support unit of 1,100 men who share the logistical assignment with the Poles — and this at a time when its defense forces had been stripped down. Lack of systematized procedures and preparedness (e.g., field manuals on agreed scales for equipment), as well as cumbersome and wasteful UN administrative and requisition procedures, are additional disincentives.

Moreover, the longer an operation lasts, the less it can count on contributors keeping their men in the field. Arrangements with troop contributors need to be more attractive and more lasting. The problem has been partly taken care of by the General Assembly's decision in 1974 to reimburse troop-contributing countries at a level of $500 per man per month regardless of rank (with an additional $150 for technicians), though certain Western countries whose costs were above this scale were not totally satisfied. The result has been to aggravate the financial difficulties, as noted below. When contracting with troop contributors, the UN should at least insist on reasonable notice (say, ninety days) before troops are pulled out so that replacements can be found.

*Financing.* Inadequate and uncertain financing could impede the force in the future. For a time it seemed that the financing scheme of everyone paying an equitable share would satisfy. The

[7] The obvious solution, air inspection by helicopter and fixed-wing light aircraft, is excluded because of security sensitivity on the part of the adversaries; there is also apprehension that trigger-happy troops will not distinguish UN aircraft from that of the foe.

[8] For example, the Irish withdrew their battalion in May 1974 to police troubles back home.



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major powers — defined as the permanent members of the Security Council — and (in a lower bracket) the twenty-three other developed nations are taxed on a progressive scale, so that the United States pays about 29 per cent as against its regular assessment of 25 per cent, while the poor pay at lower than normal rates. But in practice the financing problem is far from solved. The Soviets object to rising costs and less developed nations want the rich to pay a still larger share. China, as well as Albania, Libya and Syria, refuse to pay because of political opposition to UN peacekeeping in general or this operation in particular. Some just withhold payment. Defaults and rising costs resulted in a deficit of $19.8 million the first year, and troop contributors were not paid fully or on time. Estimates for troop reimbursement (at the higher rates) and direct costs had to be revised sharply upward, from an annual rate of $60 million to $80 million. To meet current bills and make up the deficit the United Nations will have to find close to $100 million this year, which in UN terms is a lot of money. Thus, increased costs and pressure to economize may affect efficiency and compel the UN management to make do with a smaller force than the command judges necessary. It is not out of the question that political decisions — such as renewal of mandate of size of force — may be affected by the financial pinch.

*Force composition and freedom of movement.* An unanticipated bonus of the Middle East operation is that the UNEF "terms of reference," drafted by the Secretary-General and approved by the Security Council, pragmatically settled certain issues on the conduct of peacekeeping operations that had long been deadlocked in the UN's peacekeeping committee. In recent years, the delegations on that committee had been edging toward the idea that any code of "guidelines" would have to be couched in general terms and adapted on a case-by-case basis. Now, the UNEF guidelines provide a practical model that is likely to become the general pattern for future operations.[9] The key issue has probably been settled once and for all: that the Secretary-General will name the commander, recruit the force and write the operational rule book in consultation with and subject to approval of the Council, but exercise full management in the field. However, he will act "under the authority of the Council" and refer to the Council decisions that "may affect the effective functioning of the force."

[9] However, as of April 1975 the peacekeeping committee had been blocked from taking formal action to codify the UNEF rules as model guidelines for the future, mainly because of Soviet opposition.



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The compromise on force composition did not satisfy everyone and may be troublesome. The Secretary-General selected contingents for UNEF "in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned" (the latter a standard proviso) but was enjoined to bear in mind "the accepted principle of equitable geographic distribution" to satisfy long-standing communist and Third World insistence on greater participation by non-Western troops.[10] After much diplomatic bargaining, UNEF contingents were recruited from a wide geographic spectrum; NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are represented by Canadian and Polish logistical units.[11] Geographic balance has assured broad political support. In the process, efficiency, and particularly political acceptability to the parties, may have been devalued. While there need be no contradiction between effectiveness and broad geographic participation in a multinational force, for the intermediate term it will be difficult to ensure that the geographic principle does not impair efficiency. For the longer term, as countries gain experience in the field, wider participation can be had without sacrificing efficiency.

"Acceptability to the parties concerned" is another matter, since peacekeepers rely on the confidence and cooperation of the parties. It is also related to freedom of movement. In this case, it was difficult to put together a balanced force acceptable to Israel since many Asians and Africans rushed to sever diplomatic relations following the October war, and only the Rumanians kept their ties with Israel (which was the reason Moscow refused to accept them as eligible to represent the Warsaw Pact nations). In the end, the compromise formula that was worked out left unsettled the need for flexibility in deployment of national battalions. Of the nine line and logistical contingents, four (Ghana, Indonesia, Poland and Senegal) do not recognize Israel and were estopped from operating on territory she controls. The same was true for some UNTSO observers, notably the Soviet. This, in turn, hampered the freedom

[10] Actually, in the past Asian and African troops served in the Middle East and the Congo, as did Yugoslavs; but Soviet-bloc troops had been blackballed and in Cyprus only Western troops were acceptable to Makarios.

[11] The decision not to include forces from "permanent members" was taken on American insistence. Although Secretary of State Rogers at one time wavered on this point, and some still have visions of a joint force policing a Pax Sovietica-Americana, the dominant view in U.S. officialdom has been that putting U.S. and Soviet troops into the Middle East is a volatile mix and it is important to keep the Soviet troops out. As a compromise, which some U.S. policymakers view as a troublesome precedent, thirty-six Soviet officers were added to the UNTSO corps of observers and the number of U.S. officers was raised from eight to thirty-six. Since the Israelis refuse to accept the Soviet officers on territory they control, their area of assignment has been limited — and to even things out, so has the area of deployment of U.S. officers.



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of UN troops to move about in carrying out their duties. Force commanders rightly contend that to function as an "integrated and efficient military unit," as the terms of reference require, they must be able to deploy units anywhere in the area of operation, even on territory controlled by the party that has not "accepted" the particular unit.

The Soviet delegation and many of the nonaligned in the Council insist that the UN force should not be restricted in its movements. But Israel has remained firm in refusing to accept on territory she controls troops from countries that do not recognize her. Polish logistical units were permitted to transit Israel from Sinai to Golan, but not to operate on the Israeli side. Indonesian, Ghanaian and Senegalese battalions must operate from Ismailia-Suez bases and cannot be transferred to the northern sector of the Sinai buffer since they would have to be based on the Israeli-held side. Two principles clash: that the force "must operate with the full cooperation of the parties concerned" and that the force, as noted, "must function as an integrated and efficient military unit." Israel is probably being subjected to a special rule. It is unlikely that in other cases similar political pressure would be directed against a party to a conflict which finds certain units "unacceptable."[12] Meanwhile, it would be to Israel's interest to be more accommodating on freedom of deployment since she has everything to gain from effective and impartial exercise of the UN's authority in carrying out the security provisions of the disengagement agreements.

## VI

Up to now UNEF and UNDOF have been effective in carrying out their mission under difficult conditions. But they are fragile and vulnerable to operational and political hazards. The requisites for survival are far from assured. Obviously the fundamental condition for survival is that the understanding between the superpowers, reflecting parallel interests, be sustained. All the same, like other pieces of détente, this parallelism has limits: American and Soviet interests are in accord on the minimal conditions of

[12] Some contend that UNEF II has diluted the principle of "acceptability" once and for all, and that in future disputants will have less say in the composition of the force and the authority of the commander to deploy his troops once they have consented to receive a UN peacekeeping force on their territory. Reporting to the Security Council in April 1975, the Secretary-General took an unusually tough line on restrictions to freedom of movement: UNEF contingents must serve on "an equal basis" and "no differentiation can be made regarding the UN status of various contingents." (S/11670, April 12, 1975.)



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maintaining the cease-fire, but diverge on the scenario for negotiation and on the outlines of a durable peace. Disturbance of the precarious political bargain between Moscow and Washington could upset the entire system.

But beyond this, the integrity and survival of the force depend on preserving the cooperation and confidence of the contending parties, as Secretary-General Waldheim and the field commanders constantly stress. Even more than in other peacekeeping operations, trust in the UN's impartiality and reliability is crucial. Though many question UNEF's will and capacity to stand fast in the face of massive intrusion or attack, so far all sides have suspended their disbelief and adhere to the creative myth that the force will carry out its assignment. All sides must see their interest in cooperating. Otherwise, restraints weaken and short-term military advantage is sought in anticipation of another round.

"Peacekeeping," after all, is not "collective security" in the classical sense of a punitive or coercive mechanism against the aggressor, even though the Soviets sometimes try to link the two. It is a military presence auxiliary to political action, designed to hold the line for peaceful adjustment by imposing restraints on the will to resume fighting. As John Holmes has pointed out, the UN "force" accomplishes its mission not by force at all but by the persuasion of its presence.[13] It always goes in with consent and can stay only so long as it retains the confidence and cooperation of the parties in dispute. This is true to an uncommon degree in the Middle East conflict.

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the Middle East experience is that a peacekeeping mission, especially when linked to a disengagement plan, has a short half-life. It is most useful and acceptable in the early stages. Time wears down the consensus, erodes the enthusiasm of troop contributors, shifts the power balance. With time it becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile the opposing interests of the side that wants the UN to provide stability and a calming atmosphere for negotiation and the side that fears UN peacekeepers will freeze the disengagement lines. Momentum on the diplomatic front is essential if confidence-sustaining measures on the ground are to work.

A final lesson may be in order. The peacekeeping mechanism that may serve to police a truce or an interim disengagement plan does not warrant use as a model for a permanent or semi-permanent

[13] John W. Holmes, "The Political and Philosophical Aspects of U.N. Security Forces," *International Journal,* Summer 1964, pp. 291-307.



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force to guarantee a settlement. Troop composition becomes a more sensitive matter as does the inducement for troops to remain for a long term. Security measures in a settlement might need to involve troops of the parties themselves through, for example, mixed commissions or joint patrols. Credible commitments from major powers (especially the United States), either bilaterally or in a multilateral context, become part of the calculus. Above all, nothing in the history of conflict or peacekeeping refutes the long-held view in American officialdom regarding the fundamental requirement for effective outside guarantees: The principal guarantee of peace must come from a peace agreement, signed by both sides, which inspires confidence that it will be carried out because of mutual commitment to normalizing relations and intrinsic security arrangements that satisfy the long-term security needs of the antagonists. Outside guarantees can at best be additive and supportive of mutual obligations and supervisory measures written into a peace settlement. Regrettably, nothing on the horizon indicates that the Middle East parties or the major powers are ready for such a settlement, so it is premature to begin designing an international guarantee force.



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# PROSPECTS FOR A URANIUM CARTEL

*by Mason Willrich and Philip M. Marston*

FOLLOWING OPEC's successful cartelization of the world oil market, attention has turned to the possibility of forming other international producer cartels in various raw materials. A uranium producers' cartel is, however, rarely mentioned. This article examines that possibility.

First, we outline the nuclear fuel cycle and the basic supply/demand outlook for the worldwide nuclear power industry. In so doing, we identify the likely actors on both sides of a uranium cartelization scheme. Next, we examine the central question of whether such a cartel is a practical possibility. Finally, we take up the implications of possible uranium cartelization for U.S. foreign policy.

## World Uranium Market

The use of nuclear fission to generate electric power involves a complex series of interrelated steps known as the nuclear fuel cycle. The power reactors currently in commercial use are based on the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle. One type of reactor, the light water reactor (LWR), uses low-enriched uranium as fuel and ordinary water as moderator. Another type, the heavy water reactor (HWR), uses natural uranium as fuel and heavy water ($D_2O$) as moderator. The high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR), a type of power reactor based on the thorium-uranium-233 fuel cycle and using high-enriched uranium as fuel, is now being commercially demonstrated and may be widely used in the future. In addition, breeder reactors, which produce more fissionable fuel than they consume as they generate electric power, are under intensive development in a number of countries.

The fuel cycle for the LWR involves uranium exploration, mining and milling, enrichment, fuel fabrication, irradiation in a power reactor, chemical reprocessing, recycling produced plutonium and depleted uranium, and disposal of radioactive waste. For the HWR, the enrichment step is omitted, but a heavy water manufacturing plant is required. For the HTGR, the uranium is highly enriched (to over 90 per cent uranium-235) and uranium-233, instead of plutonium, is the fissionable by-product of thorium



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conversion. Like plutonium, the by-product uranium-233 may eventually be recycled as fuel.

Nuclear energy embodies a basic duality deriving from the fact that the steps in the nuclear power fuel cycle are substantially the same as those required to produce fissionable materials for nuclear explosives. The use of nuclear power inevitably involves the processing, production and use as fuel of large amounts of materials — plutonium and high-enriched uranium primarily — of which small amounts are sufficient to make nuclear explosives.

Nuclear electric generating capacity is rapidly increasing worldwide. (See Table I.) The world's total installed nuclear power capacity will increase from under 100,000 megawatts in 1975 to over 360,000 megawatts in 1985. The 1985 figure represents power reactors that are already operable, under construction or ordered, although some delays in construction schedules may occur. More than 80 per cent are LWR's requiring low-enriched uranium fuel.

Nuclear power growth is likely to continue at a high rate throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, especially if world fossil energy prices, currently led by OPEC's oil prices, remain high. Rapid growth of nuclear power means that demand for uranium, the essential raw material for fuel, will increase dramatically. Because of the long lead times for power reactor construction, this demand should be highly predictable if the nuclear power industry is able to overcome its current difficulties with financing and public acceptance.

The nuclear fuel supply situation depends on three basic factors: world uranium resources, the productive capacity of uranium mines, and the capacity to enrich uranium for use as power reactor fuel.

U.S. reserves of uranium ore (producible at costs up to $30 per pound) appear adequate to meet the estimated domestic demand for nuclear fuel at least through 1990. Uranium production capacity, however, is clearly not adequate at present to meet forecast increases in demand. Moreover, without an extensive exploration effort that results in large additions to uranium reserves in the relatively near future, the ratio of current requirements to proven reserves is expected to decline before the 1990's to the point where the United States will not be able to support rapid nuclear power growth. Indeed, there is uncertainty whether even a large-scale exploration effort will uncover the needed low-cost reserves.

The lead time for exploration and development of new mines is about seven or eight years. Currently, the domestic uranium



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TABLE I

NUCLEAR ELECTRIC GENERATING CAPACITY

(in megawatts)

| | *In Commercial Operation*[1] | *Under Construction or Ordered* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|
| *United States* | **31,000** | **190,000** | **221,000** |
| *OECD (excluding United States)* | **24,100** | **86,100** | **110,200** |
| Austria | | 692 | 692 |
| Belgium | 390 | 3,190 | 3,580 |
| Canada | 2,512 | 6,236 | 8,748 |
| Finland | | 2,160 | 2,160 |
| France | 2,888 | 18,478 | 21,366 |
| Federal Republic of Germany | 3,908 | 16,198 | 20,106 |
| Italy | 547 | 2,814 | 3,361 |
| Japan | 4,537 | 11,016 | 15,553 |
| Netherlands | 532 | | 532 |
| Spain | 1,073 | 7,262 | 8,335 |
| Sweden | 1,020 | 6,329 | 7,349 |
| Switzerland | 1,006 | 4,847 | 5,853 |
| United Kingdom | 5,332 | 6,450 | 11,782 |
| *Communist Countries* | **4,009** | **7,825** | **11,834** |
| Bulgaria | 440 | 1,320 | 1,760 |
| Czechoslovakia | 110 | 1,320 | 1,430 |
| Hungary | | 880 | 880 |
| Rumania | | 440 | 440 |
| USSR | 3,459 | 3,250 | 6,709 |
| Yugoslavia | | 615 | 615 |
| *Developing Countries* | **1,044** | **15,200** | **16,244** |
| Argentina | 319 | 600 | 919 |
| India | 600 | 1,140 | 1,740 |
| Iran | | 4,200 | 4,200 |
| Korea | | 1,764 | 1,764 |
| Mexico | | 1,320 | 1,320 |
| Pakistan | 125 | | 125 |
| Philippines | | 1,252 | 1,252 |
| Taiwan | | 4,924 | 4,924 |
| *World* | **60,153** | **299,125** | **359,278** |

[1]As of December 31, 1974.
*Source: Nuclear News,* Mid-February 1975.

market is highly uncertain. It has not yet recovered from the 1960's, which were marked by excess production capacity as uranium requirements for nuclear weapons fell off and before uranium demand for civilian power increased substantially. Even now, uranium productive capacity is not expanding rapidly. Purchasers in the United States may therefore find themselves seeking uranium from foreign producers in the 1980's.[1]

[1]For a recent assessment of the uranium supply situation, see John F. Hogerton, Remarks before the Atomic Industrial Forum Conference on Energy Alternatives, Washington, D.C., February 19, 1975.



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Despite the professed goals of Project Independence, present U.S. policy is to lift the existing embargo on imports of foreign uranium gradually, beginning in 1977, until complete removal of all uranium import controls is achieved by the early 1980's. Several U.S. electric utilities have already made purchases of foreign uranium for future delivery. Partial U.S. dependence on foreign supplies could be temporary, since it would be due to a shortage of developed mines, not of uranium resources.

Across the globe, the resource and production picture is similar to that for the United States. Although a depressed world market is beginning to pick up, it is still troubled by a historical condition of oversupply. Yet, as a result of nuclear power growth, a uranium mining capacity shortage may emerge in the 1980's. The distribution of uranium demand and supply at the international level are a primary concern. Here, we find that the main producers will not be the principal consumers.

The primary uranium consumers will be the countries with the largest nuclear power programs. Aside from the United States, these are the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, France and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, Italy and Taiwan will also require substantial amounts of nuclear fuel for their power programs, and another dozen countries will be significant consumers.

The principal uranium producers, aside from the United States, will be Canada, South Africa, Australia, Gabon, Niger, France and perhaps Sweden. (See Table II.) French production will be sufficient at best to supply most of the nation's domestic needs, and Sweden's reserves are in the intermediate cost category of $10 to $15 per pound. The uranium controlled by South Africa is located both in South Africa, where it is largely associated with gold deposits and produced as a by-product in gold mining, and in Namibia (Southwest Africa). Excluding the United States, three countries — Canada, South Africa and Australia — have approximately two-thirds to three-fourths of the world's proven low cost (less than $10 per pound) uranium reserves and production capacity.

Until the early 1970's, the U.S. government enjoyed a monopoly position in commercial sales of low-enriched uranium produced in its vast gaseous diffusion plants. Recently, however, the Soviet Union is reported to be offering enrichment services at prices 5 per cent under the U.S. price and on more flexible commercial terms. Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, under the tripartite URENCO project, are now ag-



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TABLE II

WORLD URANIUM SUPPLIES

(figures in Short Tons $U_3O_8$)

| | *Annual Production Planned for 1975* | *Annual Production Attainable by 1978*[1] | *Low Cost Reserves* |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 19,000 | 34,000 | 337,000 |
| Canada | 8,500 | 14,000 | 241,000 |
| Australia | 1,000 | 6,000 | 92,000 |
| South Africa | 5,000 | | 263,000 |
| France | 2,300 | 2,600 | 47,500 |
| Niger | 1,950 | 1,950 | 52,000 |
| Gabon | 780 | 1,560 | 26,000 |
| Argentina | 210 | 670 | 12,000 |
| Mexico | 300 | 450 | 1,300 |
| Yugoslavia | | 300 | 7,800 |
| Portugal | 148 | 220 | 9,600 |
| Sweden[2] | 155 | 155 | |
| Italy | 120 | 120 | 1,600 |
| Japan | 40 | | 3,600 |

[1]Given favorable market situation and adequate lead time.
[2]Production based on resources available at $10 to $15 per pound of $U_3O_8$ (uranium oxide).
*Source:* OECD and IAEA, *Uranium Resources Production and Demand*, August 1973, p. 17.

gressively pursuing the development and commercial demonstration of the gas centifuge process as an alternative to diffusion. France is taking the lead in Eurodif, a multinational enrichment venture to construct a large gaseous diffusion plant in Europe. South Africa is reportedly developing its own enrichment capability using an undisclosed process.

Gaseous diffusion involves complicated technology and requires a huge plant capacity and vast amounts of electric power. The centrifuge process, while also technologically complex, is economical in smaller plants and requires substantially less electricity. Another separative technique now under intensive scientific investigation in a number of countries (including Israel and Australia) is the laser. If successfully developed, a laser technique would require much less electric power than the centrifuge process and could probably be used efficiently on a small scale.[2]

For our purposes, it is significant that those countries with large uranium resources potentially available for international export presently lack enrichment capabilities. The technology for all en-

[2]For general information on uranium enrichment, see *Hearings on Future Structure of the Uranium Enrichment Industry, Phases I, II and III*, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Congress, 93rd Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions (1973, 1974).



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richment methods is still a closely guarded secret within the various national and international programs (1) because of its military significance for the production of high-enriched uranium for weapons, and (2) because of its commercial significance for the production of low-enriched fuel for LWR's, and high-enriched fuel for HTGR's and possibly the initial cores of breeders.

Since LWR's are expected to account for the vast bulk of the world's nuclear power capacity for the next two decades at least, world demand for enrichment services will increase commensurate with the growth in nuclear power. Beginning in the mid-1980's, enrichment capacity will have to be rapidly expanded if nuclear power programs around the world are to be fully fueled.

These worldwide distributional characteristics and trends in nuclear resources and capacities serve to identify the key actors in the world uranium market. The principal uranium exporters will be Canada, Australia and South Africa, with Gabon and Niger in secondary roles. The largest importers will be West Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and perhaps France, followed by other countries with substantial nuclear power programs.

If present policies are maintained, the United States will likely import part of its needs. To the extent that it relies on imports, it will increase the pressure of world demand on uranium supplies. The Soviet Union is likely to remain self-sufficient in uranium.

## Uranium Cartelization Possibilities

Is a uranium producers' cartel possible? If so, what is the likelihood of actual cartelization? In analyzing the possibilities, we consider the potential purposes of such a cartel, and the requisite economic and political conditions. In assessing the likelihood, we explore how the producers might weigh the choice between pursuing their interests independently or in concert.

### *Cartel Purposes*

The uranium producers may view a cartel narrowly as a way to get a better deal, economically, for their exports, or they may view it broadly as an instrument to enhance their political leverage in the international system. These two views are not necessarily incompatible.

An initial step to obtain a better economic deal would be to stabilize uranium production and hence its price at a "fair" level. A further step would be to cut production and keep the ore in the



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ground in order to force prices steeply upward as uranium demand grows with large increases in nuclear generating capacity.

Another way to get a better deal would be to acquire a commercial uranium enrichment capacity. Enrichment accounts for about one-third of the total costs of nuclear fuel. Exporting enriched uranium, rather than uranium ore, would thus substantially increase the producer's revenues. Furthermore, if the producer's own nuclear power program were based on reactors requiring enriched fuel, a domestic enrichment capability would constitute an essential step toward nuclear power self-sufficiency.

Alternatively, a producer might seek to use control over uranium supply and price as a bargaining chip in international relations, with an eye on some other foreign policy goal. Monopoly power in the uranium market might be used to advantage in other areas of trade or in a variety of political negotiations.

Through their membership in the OPEC cartel the Arab oil producers have gained political leverage that they have employed quite effectively in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the October 1973 war. This leverage has resulted largely from the embargo possibility. In the case of uranium, however, an embargo threat is not likely to provide a source of effective political leverage for various reasons.

It is difficult to imagine a vital interest shared by Canada, South Africa and Australia that would conflict with the interests of Western Europe or Japan so sharply as to raise a uranium embargo to the level of political credibility. The three principal uranium exporters share a common culture with Western Europe and are themselves industrially advanced. They would also be vulnerable to countermeasures by the principal uranium importers affecting much larger trade interests than uranium. In all these respects their position is different from that of the Arab oil producers.

Even if a clash of vital interests between the exporters and one or more importers were to emerge, however, substantial technical difficulties would still have to be overcome before uranium could be effectively embargoed. It normally takes about two years for uranium to move from a mine through the nuclear fuel cycle to a power reactor. Thus, a uranium embargo would not translate into reduced electric power generation for a considerable period. Whereas an emergency oil stockpile amounting to a few months of current consumption is a major undertaking, it is quite easy, though economically costly, to stockpile a few years' worth of nuclear fuel.



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Finally, the potential goals of a uranium cartel present an interesting dichotomy in relation to the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation. On the one hand, a cartel might be used to further a nonproliferation policy if, for example, it were to require uranium importers to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), or to accept other safeguards against diversion of uranium from a civilian power program to use in nuclear explosives. Although Canada and Australia are NPT parties, South Africa has thus far refused to subscribe. On the other hand, an enrichment capacity would bestow on the uranium producer a nuclear weapons option in a form that could be exercised with minimum disruption to its own commercial nuclear activities. If the weapons option were exercised, there would be little risk of foreign interference, given the uranium producer's self-sufficient domestic nuclear posture.

*Cartel Conditions*

Is it possible for a uranium cartel to be organized in order to achieve one or more of these various purposes? The formation and successful operation of an international cartel depend on a number of underlying economic and political conditions, some essential, others merely helpful.[3] Even the presence of all the requisite economic conditions will not guarantee the formation of a cartel; a common political willingness is the ultimate requirement.

*Demand elasticity.* A cartel cannot hold together to increase price if demand falls proportionately. Uranium demand must therefore be relatively inelastic.

The initial concern is with short-term demand, that is, demand over a period of about two to four years. OPEC's performance shows that incredible wealth can be amassed in a few short years of total control over price when demand is highly inelastic. Thus, if the goal of a uranium cartel were simply to realize large revenues, short-term demand inelasticity would suffice. If the cartel's goal were enhanced political leverage over the years, however, long-term as well as short-term demand would have to be relatively insensitive to price.

Future uranium demand is likely to be quite price inelastic. As consumer countries rapidly grow more dependent on nuclear fuel for electricity, demand for uranium will be strong. As this growth occurs, the fraction of total demand dependent on new

[3]For a list of these factors, and an analysis of OPEC along these lines, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Oil Is the Exception," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1974, pp. 68-83.



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reactor orders will decline, tending further to stabilize demand. Moreover, the economics of nuclear power are such that the cost of uranium is a relatively small factor in the overall cost of the electricity produced. Accordingly, even substantial increases in the price of uranium will result in only small increases in the cost of power. For example, quadrupling the uranium price would increase the total cost to the consumer per kilowatt-hour of electricity by only a small fraction.

Demand inelasticity is reinforced by the institutional structure of the electric power industry. Uranium buyers will be mainly electric utilities that are publicly owned or heavily regulated though privately owned. Within their respective service areas they occupy monopoly positions and are under legal duties to provide adequate electricity to all customers. Most of them are permitted to adjust their rates automatically in order to reflect changes in fuel costs without specific governmental approval. Therefore, if confronted by large uranium price increases, utility purchasers would have few incentives to seek ways either to obtain uranium from alternate sources or to cut back their own demands. In any event, nuclear power is likely to remain economically attractive due to the increases in fossil fuel costs.

The nuclear power fuel cycle has a number of characteristics that could introduce flexibility into short-term uranium demand. These possibilities must be weighed against the factors tending to make short-term demand inelastic.

The plutonium produced during irradiation of uranium fuel could be recovered and recycled. Widespread plutonium recycling in existing types of power reactors would cut demand for uranium ore as much as 15 to 20 per cent. Plutonium recycling has not yet occurred on a commercial scale, and any decision to go ahead with it will be controversial in view of the health hazards and diversion risks arising from large plutonium flows.

Additional flexibility is present in the uranium enrichment process. Enrichment plants could be operated in such a way as to reduce the amount of uranium ore required as feed material to produce a given output of enriched fuel. For example, the uranium input for a given output could be reduced by more than 15 per cent if the amount of uranium-235 left in the enrichment plant tails was reduced from 0.3 per cent to 0.2 per cent. To accomplish such a reduction, however, would substantially increase the electric power required. There is a trade-off between uranium input and



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electric power input in order to produce a given amount of enriched uranium from a particular plant.

Stockpiling uranium ore and preproducing enriched uranium could also introduce flexibility into the demand picture — though preproducing is expensive since it involves maintaining large inventories of a product with considerable money invested in it as a consequence of the enrichment process.

On balance, short-term demand for uranium ore seems likely to be quite inelastic within a broad range of prices.

Over the long term, however, demand or at least the growth rate in demand may well slacken. The HWR and the HTGR require less uranium than the LWR, and the market share of these reactor types might increase in the future. Moreover, widespread use of breeder reactors would ultimately cut uranium demand enormously. However, a large base of LWR's will be installed by the time the breeder is expected to be introduced commercially, in the late 1980's in Europe and the 1990's in the United States, and it will not have a substantial effect on uranium demand for at least a decade afterward. The breeder is thus unlikely to cut into uranium demand within the next twenty years or so — a long time from the perspective of a uranium cartel.

*Supply elasticity.* A second basic condition for a successful cartel is that supply also be insensitive to price. If, at an increased price, alternative sources of supply become available, the cartel will no longer be in control.

Large uranium deposits are highly concentrated in a small number of countries, although small reserves are widely scattered around the world. It would be impossible to exploit alternate sources of supply in the short term, since, as mentioned previously, the lead time required from exploration to production of milled uranium oxide is seven to eight years.

Alternative sources of supply could be developed over the long term, but there would be difficulties. For example, uranium deposits outside of the cartel countries could be developed. However, European and American firms might hesitate before making large investments in mining operations that could be rendered worthless by a decrease in the cartel's price. As with oil, a guaranteed price floor might be required from the importing country governments in order to provide sufficient incentive for exploration and development of new deposits. Moreover, the new uranium producer government might decide to seize the new mine and join the cartel. In any event, by 1980 the uranium supply situation will



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probably be tight due to the extremely rapid increase in nuclear power capacity and the failure of uranium production expansion to keep pace.

From the foregoing, we conclude that there is a "window" of several years where both uranium supply and demand will be quite inelastic. The flexibilities inherent in the industry would have been used up and the long-term alternatives would not yet be available.

*Number of producers.* Cartelization is easier if there are only a few producers, especially producers of large quantities. A limited number of large producers heightens awareness of possible control, facilitates communication and negotiation among potential members, and reduces the risk of one member cheating on the cartel. A small number of producers may also limit the diversity of interests among the cartel members and increase the likelihood of developing a common political willingness to act.

In the case of uranium, only three countries, Australia, South Africa and Canada, will account for over 80 per cent of world uranium production available for export in the late 1970's. Adding Gabon and Niger, the figure rises to over 90 per cent, a much higher concentration than for the top five oil exporters. This situation tends to favor cartelization.

*Consumer resistance.* Consumers may resist cartelization, and the effectiveness of the means available to them can be important. With respect to uranium, the likelihood of consumer resistance would depend on a number of factors. If the cartel's purpose was to force a price increase, consumer resistance would be influenced by the political rhetoric accompanying cartelization, the strength of the importers' economies at the time, and especially by the range of price increases sought. As indicated earlier, due to the relative insensitivity of total power cost to uranium prices and to the institutional position of electric utility buyers, there is probably a fairly broad range in which the price could be raised without engendering substantial resistance. Consumer countries could easily bear the slight increase in electricity costs that would result from even a large increase in uranium price.

Against the probability that a "safe" price range will exist, we must balance the effectiveness of the retaliatory measures at the disposal of importers should the safe range be exceeded. The situation here differs from that of the OPEC cartel. The OPEC countries, although anxious to obtain many goods in trade, are not dependent on trade with the oil importers for their livelihood. The



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economies of the uranium exporters, however, are highly dependent on the importers for a constant flow of nonnuclear trade. Increased uranium prices could easily be offset (perhaps more than offset) by retaliatory price increases on goods the exporters need. But it may be politically difficult for the importers to retaliate unless the uranium price increase is large. This reinforces a conclusion that serious consumer country resistance is unlikely within a fairly broad range of uranium price increases.

If a purpose of the cartel was to negotiate for the transfer of enrichment technology and the allocation of a substantial share of the future world market for enrichment services, consumer resistance would vary from one country to another, depending in part on the consumer's own enrichment capabilities and plans. For example, one country might have recently invested $2 billion in a huge gaseous diffusion plant that would not operate at full capacity if the cartel's enrichment ventures were successful. Another country might have begun work on a small centrifuge plant but find that it could manufacture and export centrifuges instead and let the uranium exporter do the enriching. As noted previously, Great Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany are jointly pursuing the commercial development of the centrifuge method of uranium enrichment, while France is leading a consortium of countries in a multinational enrichment venture using French gaseous diffusion technology.

*Political interest.* In addition to the requisite economic conditions, political willingness is a *sine qua non* for cartelization. There are indications that the governments of Australia, South Africa, Canada and France (based on French interests in Gabon and Niger) have already agreed to a uniform approach to the world uranium market. This approach may include a "prices in effect" policy, which means that uranium purchasers under long-term supply contracts will be required to pay the prevailing market price at the time of delivery.[4] Moreover, there is ample evidence that each of these countries is fully conscious of its position as a raw material and energy exporter, and of the world uranium outlook in particular. Each of them has separately expressed its concern over prices and has been investigating enrichment possibilities on its own or with various future fuel importers.

Australia approved no new export sales of uranium from late in

[4]*Hearings on Proposed Modification of Restrictions on Enrichment of Foreign Uranium for Domestic Use,* before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Congress, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session (1974), especially pp. 47-48. See also "It Worked for the Arabs . . .," *Forbes,* January 15, 1974, pp. 19-21.



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1972 through 1974, and government officials have indicated that uranium should not be exported at current low prices, it being "a good time to wait." Australia has been working on enrichment technology independently while negotiating on and off with Japan for capital and centrifuge technology in return for a long-term supply of enriched fuel. More recently, Australia has also approached the European enrichment ventures.

In Canada, new export guidelines require (1) electric utilities to have a fifteen-year forward supply of uranium under contract for their nuclear power plants and (2) uranium producers to maintain an additional forward supply of reserves beyond existing contracts before exports will be allowed. Further, prior to export, uranium must be converted to the highest form possible. This means presently the conversion of uranium oxide to fluoride, a step that will bring Canada about 3 per cent more of the fuel cycle revenues. Steps have also been taken to develop a commercial enrichment capability. In July 1974, the Canadian national government, the Quebec provincial government, France and several private firms reached agreement to begin studies of an enrichment plant in Quebec, which would use French gaseous diffusion technology. Finally, proposed legislation would limit foreign investment in any Canadian uranium mining venture to a maximum one-third interest.

South African policy appears to be moving in a parallel direction. However, the South African government has worked alone on enrichment technology, rather than in cooperation with a potential importer. The successful start-up of a pilot enrichment plant, utilizing an undisclosed process, has been officially revealed. Recently the government announced agreement with a private West German company to provide assistance in the construction of a commercial-scale enrichment plant using the South African process.

*Cartel or Independent Action?*

The three principal uranium exporters are thus already pursuing several cartelization possibilities. The question is, how will they evaluate the strategic political choice between independent action and cartel formation?

With regard to uranium price, the desirability of cartelization would depend on whether the countries involved preferred a firm market price or whether they would attempt to seek the highest possible revenues, incurring downside risks in the process. The



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main advantage of a cartel is its firmness of control over price, but the price it can charge is limited by the threat of entry of new supply sources, the downward pressure on demand resulting from an exorbitant price, and the risk of consumer country retaliation.

It is helpful to have an idea of what price control could mean to the uranium exporters in concrete terms. At an arbitrary price of $50 per pound the revenues earned on uranium exports would still amount to only a small percentage of total export earnings for both Canada and Australia. For example, if the maximum attainable uranium production by 1978 was exported at $50 per pound, it would constitute 5 to 6 per cent of the total value of exports for both countries in 1973. For South Africa the comparable figure would be closer to 20 per cent of 1973 exports. Accordingly, the potential for increased revenues from uranium exports, although of interest to the producers, seems not to justify action that would seriously endanger other more important foreign trade interests.

Although cartelization to achieve uranium price control is a possibility, policies of independent action are likely to be lucrative without endangering other national interests. As mentioned earlier, in the late 1970's uranium demand will probably pace supply in a sellers' market, pushing prices upward without concerted action. Even in the last year or two, prices have increased steeply. The average price per pound for uranium to be delivered in 1980 has risen from $7.80 in 1973 to $11.40 in 1974. Prices of around $20 per pound for deliveries in the early 1980's and even some prices as high as $26 per pound have been reported.

We must not conclude, however, that the substantial price increases recently experienced will lead to the exploitation of abundant higher-cost uranium resources. A price of $15 per pound in late 1974 dollars is only slightly above $8 per pound in 1964 dollars. It thus appears that uranium prices may have reached a commercially viable level only in the past year.

The need for a concerted approach to price escalation is based on the assumption that, if one exporter unilaterally raises prices, the others can expand their production and take over the market share of the higher priced exporter. This condition will not exist in the uranium mining industry owing to the long lead times involved in increasing uranium production and the small number of large producers. Given the strong demand expected in the 1980's, any one exporter is likely to be able to raise its price and still retain its share of the market.

Therefore, one exporter could make an independent judgment



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regarding the importance of uranium relative to its other economic and political interests, and then act unilaterally on price with substantial success. Other exporters might follow suit without an express or even implied agreement. For several years at least, the benefits of a cartel price might be largely obtained without the difficulties of formal organization and the risk of confrontation with the uranium importers.

Turning to the problem of obtaining domestic enrichment capacity, once again the choice between cartelization and independent action seems to tilt away from cartelization. Starting in the mid-1980's and continuing into the early part of the twenty-first century, there will be a continuing need for additional enrichment capacity. The proportion of new capacity that will be supplied by each country is undecided.

The United States is not likely, nor is it expecting, to maintain its virtual monopoly in commercial enrichment for power reactor fuel. The nature and extent of foreign entry into the enrichment field, although it will certainly be substantial, is as yet unclear. The Europeans and Japanese, given their present state of technology development, could probably develop and expand enrichment capacity rapidly enough to meet the future needs of the non-communist countries, aside from the United States. Further, the Soviet Union has entered the market, having executed enrichment service contracts with France, Sweden, Spain and other states.

In general, however, the situation remains fluid. Countries are not yet so committed to their announced plans that they cannot back out or revise them. In particular, the respective size of importers' and exporters' enrichment industries can be adjusted. Both the technology involved and underlying political considerations seem to tend toward a shift of planned enrichment capacity from the uranium importers to the exporters.

The French-Canadian project would be based on gaseous diffusion technology, a method requiring large amounts of electricity to operate. A hydroelectric plant in Canada may satisfy that requirement more cheaply than fossil or nuclear power plants in France. Moreover, West European countries will require additional enrichment capacity beyond the initial Eurodif plant to be constructed in Europe. They might well favor nuclear interdependence with Canada, and exchange their capital and enrichment technology for an assured long-term supply of Canadian enriched uranium. With regard to French interests, construction of an enrichment plant in Quebec province would enable France to in-



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crease its prestige and influence in French-speaking Canada, a goal Paris has muted since de Gaulle, but not abandoned. Finally, the French would like to have their gaseous diffusion technology adopted abroad for commercial reasons as well as for national pride and prestige.

A Japan-Australia uranium enrichment relationship also has much to recommend it. The centrifuge method could be used. The main economies of scale in this method are in the manufacture of the many centrifuges required, rather than in the large separative work capacity of individual enrichment plants, as in the case of diffusion. The Japanese might limit their domestic enrichment capacity and export centrifuges in return for a long-term supply of enriched uranium from Australia. Japan is already highly dependent on Australia for a number of raw materials and agricultural products. If it were part owner of enrichment plants built in Australia its security in the matter of nuclear fuel supply would be increased. Moreover, both countries could then share in the profits of an enrichment venture that could supply nuclear fuel materials to a number of other nations.

An alternative or an additional possibility for Australia would be an interdependent arrangement with the British-Dutch-West German enrichment venture, URENCO. Also, the French have been discussing enrichment with the Australians as well as the Canadians.

If any of the many possibilities for importer-exporter enrichment cooperation bear fruit, the incentives for the uranium exporters to choose cartelization in order to enhance their bargaining power for enrichment technology would be substantially reduced. However, even if none of the possibilities for enrichment cooperation moves forward, serious difficulties would remain in implementing a cartel scheme intended to pry enrichment technology loose from the importers.

As in the case of price control, the increased revenues for uranium exporters that would be derived from enrichment seem insufficient, compared with the overall trade balances involved, to justify the risks of retaliation or other political complications implicit in cartelization. Besides, it is difficult to imagine how the exporters would reach agreement among themselves on the allocation of additional increments of enrichment capacity in their respective countries.

Finally, and most important, the transfer of any complex industrial technology from one country to another requires deep in-



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volvement over long periods of time. This would be especially true of technology that is shrouded in secrecy because of its national security implications. A uranium cartel might well destroy the political basis for the intimate long-term cooperation on which enrichment technology transfer must rest if such a transfer is to be successful.

On balance, therefore, we conclude that the principal exporters would probably be able to raise uranium prices almost as much through independent action — "conscious parallelism," in the anti-trust vocabulary — as through cartelization. As to technology transfer and participation in enrichment, they would probably gain substantially more through independent action than through cartelization. Nevertheless, from the exporters' viewpoint the cartel possibility, or latent threat, could be exploited (1) to weaken consumer country resistance to unilateral uranium price increases, and (2) to increase consumer country willingness to exchange enrichment technology for assured access to uranium supplies over the long term.

## U.S. Foreign Policy Implications

Thus far we have focused on the world market for uranium and enrichment services as it may evolve in the future apart from the United States. In conclusion, we turn our attention to the implications for U.S. foreign policy.

For the next decade at least, the United States will have by far the largest nuclear power capacity of any country or region, accounting for 40 to 50 per cent of world capacity. This means that U.S. domestic demand for both uranium and enrichment services will constitute a large fraction of total world demand. Fortunately, U.S. uranium reserves appear adequate, U.S. enrichment capacity is large and expandable, and U.S. enrichment technology — both diffusion and centrifuge — may well be superior to any other presently developed or close to commercial demonstration. Given this nuclear power posture, what options are available?

With respect to uranium, the United States could continue to rely exclusively on domestic resources, increasing its production capacity through intensive exploration and expansion of mining operations. Or, it could more or less abruptly shift from self-sufficiency to substantial dependence on foreign uranium supplies.

Given the size of its demand in comparison with total world demand, its reliance on imports for a modest amount of its future requirements would have a major impact on the world uranium



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market. It would enter the market at a time when rapidly growing demands from the industrial countries of Western Europe and Japan would already be in the process of converting a buyers' into a sellers' market. The U.S. entry would drive world prices even higher, place strains on existing supply relationships between the principal uranium exporters and the other industrial importers, and increase fears of a cartel. The implications of substantial U.S. reliance on foreign uranium imports thus seem reminiscent of the problem created in the world oil market in the late 1960's and early 1970's when the United States rapidly enlarged its oil imports.[5]

Yet, as noted earlier, present U.S. policy is to allow uranium imports beginning in 1977. We conclude that such a policy should be re-examined. The government should consider strengthening the incentive structure for the domestic mining industry so as to ensure that the United States avoids becoming a large uranium importer. Acceleration of U.S. domestic production would be in the security and long-run economic interests of not only the United States, but also the industrial countries of Western Europe and Japan, which have no alternative to reliance on foreign sources for their nuclear fuel supplies.

With respect to enrichment, the United States could seek to retain as much as possible of the world market for enrichment services by rapidly expanding its own capacity well beyond future domestic requirements and by continuing to offer long-term international enrichment contracts on favorable terms. Alternatively, it could tailor its enrichment capacity primarily to meet the requirements of its domestic nuclear power plants. Coupled to the latter alternative, it could choose either to stay out of enrichment ventures launched in foreign countries or to offer U.S. technology to such ventures on more or less favorable terms.

Given the capital requirements, the technological complexity, the economies of scale, and the security significance of commercial enrichment ventures, international coordination and cooperation in developing new enrichment capacity seems to accord with the common interests of the principal uranium importers and exporters. Since 1971, the United States has offered to share its diffusion technology with foreign enrichment ventures under multinational ownership and appropriate international safeguards to ensure

[5]In this respect, the recently announced export sale of U.S. uranium ore for conversion to uranium hexafluoride in Great Britain, enrichment in the Soviet Union, and fabrication and use as fuel in nuclear power reactors in West Germany is puzzling.



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against diversion to weapons use. Moreover, uranium enrichment is now an integral part of U.S. proposals for long-term cooperation under the International Energy Agreement concluded in 1974, and cooperation within such a framework would embrace centrifuge as well as diffusion technology.

Regardless of what the United States may do to try to maintain its present enrichment dominance, other countries are likely to proceed with the development of alternative sources of enrichment, placing security of supply above economics. Moreover, we have observed that there are distinct economic and political advantages in locating some enrichment plant capacity within the principal uranium exporting countries.

Accordingly, in moving forward with the International Energy Program, the United States should offer its best available enrichment technology — diffusion, centrifuge, or a combination of both — to foreign enrichment ventures that are multinationally owned or operated and internationally safeguarded. The U.S. offer should be part of a broader effort to promote the future development of nuclear power on an interdependent basis. This would include multinational ownership and operation under international safeguards of key nuclear facilities such as chemical reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants, which would be located on the same site.

A strong economic justification exists for such international cooperation in nuclear fuel reprocessing and fabrication: as in the case of enrichment, the economies of scale are such that a few large plants would be able to service the world nuclear power capacity outside the United States for the next two decades and perhaps longer.

But the political case for nuclear power interdependence appears to be even more compelling. Multinational ownership and joint operation of the key processing facilities that are essential to support national nuclear power programs would go far toward harmonizing the particular needs of nations for nuclear fuel supply security. Beyond this, the general interests of the world community would be served by the development of nuclear power in such a way that nuclear weapon proliferation need not follow.



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# INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER RESOURCES: THE CASE OF MANGANESE NODULES*

*by Jack N. Barkenbus*

PRESENTLY, as the risks and dangers of the resource interdependence among nations become manifest (as they have in the matter of oil), there is an understandable urge to return once more to national self-sufficiency. Talk of self-sufficiency often assumes that we can, with minimal sacrifice, revert to a less complicated time when national resources met national needs. This assumption is open to serious question, however. The resource requirements of a highly developed economy and society are of so great a magnitude today that talk of self-sufficiency, without considering the consequences it would have upon economic growth, personal life style and environmental preservation, is academic.

This article presents a case study of the international controversy surrounding deep-sea manganese nodule mining — a potential means of somewhat reducing resource dependency for many industrial nations. It will show that even when we as a nation go to the deepest floor of the oceans to gather essential mineral resources, interaction with the community of nations cannot be avoided. It also posits that any attempt to ignore or by-pass the interests of this community of nations invites serious international conflict.

## Mineral Needs

One of the most obvious areas of resource interdependence involves the production, supply and industrial consumption of minerals. This interdependence has grown on account of the voracious consumptive appetites of industrial societies for non-renewable mineral resources. The growth of oil consumption is well known. It is less well known that mineral consumption since World War II has equaled the total mineral consumption that took place prior to that time; or that the world's demand for

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industrial metals continues to climb at an average annual rate of from 4 to 6 per cent.

The degree of mineral resource dependency for industrial countries is still related to their individual resource bases. The United States, for example, remains a relatively mineral-rich nation and could with the proper lead time, government subsidies, advancing technology, and an extensive recycling system, decrease its mineral dependence to some extent. There undoubtedly would be adverse economic and environmental consequences to be paid, however. If we are unwilling to pay this price, our imports of valuable industrial minerals will grow significantly in the coming decades. (See Table I.) Whereas U.S. imports of all non-fuel minerals cost this

TABLE I

U.S. DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS OF PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS WITH PROJECTIONS TO YEAR 2000

(per cent imported)

| *Raw Material* | *1950* | *1970* | *1985* | *2000* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aluminum | 64 | 85 | 96 | 98 |
| Chromium | n.a. | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Copper | 31 | 0 | 34 | 56 |
| Iron | 8 | 30 | 55 | 67 |
| Lead | 39 | 31 | 62 | 67 |
| Manganese | 88 | 95 | 100 | 100 |
| Nickel | 94 | 90 | 88 | 89 |
| Phosphorus | 8 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Potassium | 14 | 42 | 47 | 61 |
| Sulfur | 2 | 0 | 28 | 52 |
| Tin | 77 | n.a. | 100 | 100 |
| Tungsten | n.a. | 50 | 87 | 97 |
| Zinc | 38 | 59 | 72 | 84 |

*Source:* Data are derived from U.S. Department of the Interior publications. Found in Lester R. Brown, *World Without Borders* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 194.

nation $6 billion in 1971, at current prices this figure is likely to rise to approximately $20 billion by 1985 and $44 billion by the turn of the century.[1]

Many other industrial nations, such as Japan, West Germany and France, have virtually no alternative to large-scale dependency

[1] U.S. Department of the Interior, *Mining and Minerals Policy, 1973: Second Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior under the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970* (Washington: GPO, 1973).



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for industrial minerals because of their limited resource base. This can be contrasted with the Soviet Union, which is only minimally dependent upon mineral resources outside its borders.[2] Mineral dependency, therefore, varies from country to country, but its saliency is particularly strong for Japan, Western Europe and even the United States.

## Mineral Supply

The oil price hike and embargo vividly revealed the serious economic disruption that can arise from the control and supply of essential minerals, and its success, in terms of producer objectives, has spawned a number of potential imitators: (a) seven prominent bauxite exporters have formed the International Bauxite Association (IBA), and one member, Jamaica, has already demanded and received a sixfold increase in its export earnings; (b) the major copper producers of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper-Exporting Countries (CIPEC) have recently agreed upon an export quota system which would involve a reduction in copper exports; (c) tin producers are demanding a sharp increase in the internationally guaranteed floor price maintained for this commodity; (d) iron ore producers recently held a conference in Geneva to discuss means of coordinating price strategies; (e) phosphate producers have in the past year tripled their prices, and more increases can be expected. Finally, the special session on raw materials held by the UN General Assembly in 1974 called upon developing countries to form commodity associations in order to exercise full "sovereignty" over their natural resources.

The purpose of this action is to create a "new international economic order" more attuned than the old to the needs of the developing nations. If it is true that a historic turning point has been reached in the demand and supply of mineral commodities, the chances of mineral supply collusion to raise prices — and further the development of a new international economic order — are greatly enhanced. One economic analyst claims there has been a transformation from a buyer's to a seller's market, saying: "Shortages of supply have replaced shortages of demand as the dominant force in world economics for the first time in almost 50 years, and

[2] Of thirty-six minerals crucial to industrial processes, the Soviet Union is self-sufficient in twenty-six; the United States is currently self-sufficient in only seven. Nazli Choucri and James P. Bennett, "Population, Resources and Technology: Political Implications of the Environmental Crisis," *International Organization,* Spring 1972, p. 196.



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the power position of suppliers and consumers has thus changed dramatically."[3]

The possibility this presents, of a fiercely competitive struggle between nations over essential resources, has contributed to the discomfort of numerous public officials in the industrial states. Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, has warned that

> The struggle over oil prices may be followed tomorrow by a similar struggle over the prices of other important raw materials. And since what is at stake is not just pawns on a chessboard, but the peaceful evolution of the world economy and the prosperity of the nations of this world, we need a politically sound philosophy if we are to win this dangerous fight.[4]

A search to find such a philosophy and an examination of means to eliminate or at least diminish the dangers of resource dependency is now underway. This examination has taken several nations to the depths of the oceans, where recent technological developments have made extensive mineral exploitation appear feasible. Unfortunately, however, the exploitation of various essential minerals found in manganese nodules of the oceans has served to heighten international tensions, not to decrease them. The following description of this fascinating technology and the international controversy that has accompanied its development is intended to illustrate the pitfalls and potential dangers of attempting to find and exploit alternative mineral resources.

## Manganese Nodules

Manganese nodules are generally small metallic lumps varying in size from pebbles to rocks four inches or more in diameter. They are found most extensively, but not exclusively, in the Pacific Ocean, lying on the ocean floor at depths of 12,000 to 20,000 feet. Though scientists still debate precisely how the nodules are formed, it is known that they are found predominantly in areas of oxygen-rich waters and low sedimentation. It is also known that they exist

[3] C. Fred Bergsten, "The Threat Is Real," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1974, p. 85. A challenge to this thesis has been posed by two World Bank economists, Bension Varon and Kenji Takeuchi, "Developing Countries and Non-fuel Minerals," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1974, pp. 497-510. The likelihood of effective non-fuel mineral producer cartels is foreseen in two articles by Bergsten, "The Threat from the Third World," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1973, pp. 102-124, and "The New Era in World Commodity Markets," *Challenge*, September/October 1974, pp. 34-42. For an opposing view see Raymond F. Mikesell, "More Third World Cartels Ahead?," *Challenge*, November/December 1974, pp. 24-31.

[4] Helmut Schmidt, "The Struggle for the World Product," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1974, pp. 437-451.



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in abundance — perhaps 1.5 trillion tons in the Pacific alone — and that they are, in a sense, renewable resources (growing slowly at rates of between 1 and 100 mm per million years).

First discovered by the scientific crew on the *HMS Challenger* in 1873, the nodules attracted little except scientific curiosity until the 1960's. With the discovery, then, that they contained not only manganese, but also nickel, copper and cobalt — metals essential for an industrial society — they understandably attracted more attention.[5] However, two major technological obstacles stood in the way of commercial nodule mining. The first need was for an efficient and reliable gathering system that could literally scoop the nodules off the bottom of the ocean at great depths. Second, once gathered, the nodules had to undergo a yet undevised metallurgical process. During the 1960's, a few companies conducted research designed to overcome these obstacles, as well as to locate the richest deposits in the oceans. The major companies involved were Summa Corporation (owned by Howard Hughes), Deepsea Ventures (a division of Tenneco) and Kennecott Copper. While each invested millions of dollars to find technological breakthroughs, by the late 1960's the general consensus was that large-scale mining was still nearly two decades away.[6]

Since 1970, however, the technological pace has quickened. U.S. companies have been joined by stiff international competition. The Japanese government has provided considerable finanical support to a commercial association called the Sumitomo Group. The West German government is also providing substantial funding to a commercial association of firms named the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Meerestechnischgewinnbare Rohstoffe (AMR). Also active in the field now are the French Société le Nickel and the International Nickel Company. Because of the exceedingly high entry costs for this new mining field — estimated at approximately $300 million — there has been a proliferation of international consortia in the last year or so. Kennecott Copper formed a five-member consortium (involving Japanese and British companies) to develop a nodule recovery system. Deepsea Ventures formed a consortium of Japanese, European and U.S. firms to conduct exploratory and experimental work. The Canadian-based International Nickel

[5] Though their composition varies, a representative composition of Pacific Ocean nodules of possible commercial interest will include: 25 per cent manganese; 1 per cent nickel; .75 per cent copper; .22 per cent cobalt. F. L. LaQue, "Deep-Ocean Mining: Prospects and Anticipated Short-term Benefits," *Pacem in Maribus-I*, Vol. 4 (Malta: The Royal University of Malta Press, 1971), p. 46.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 51.



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Company has also recently formed a consortium of international partners.

Two basic systems have been developed to gather the nodules. The most popular, and most expensive, is a hydraulic recovery method whereby nodules are literally vacuumed through extended hydraulic pumps suspended beneath a mining ship. The Summa Corporation has opted for an expensive variant of this model and is now testing the system in the Pacific.[7] Deepsea Ventures has chosen a less expensive model and also plans deep-water tests of its technology in 1975.

The Sumitomo Group has conducted several mining tests using the second basic mining system — the continuous line bucket method (CLB). This involves specially designed buckets hung on a plastic line which, lowered to the ocean floor, collect the nodules by being dragged across the seabed. It is obvious that this system is simpler and less expensive.

Once collected, the nodules can be brought back to land-based processing plants where several recently derived metallurgical techniques can be utilized to separate the metals (depending upon which metals are to be recovered). With the increase in technical capability that has been spurred by growing international competition, many observers now believe it may be possible to begin commercial exploitation in 1976 or 1977.

## National Interest

As we have noted, the manganese nodule contains several metals vital to industrial capacity and national defense. Copper is used extensively in electrical and allied industries. Cobalt, manganese and nickel are all ferroalloy metals (additives to iron) essential in the manufacture of steel. Moreover, for the most part these are metals industrial nations are now forced to import in large quantities.

The United States now imports approximately 85 per cent of its annual nickel consumption, 98 per cent of its manganese,[8] and 93 per cent of its cobalt. While we currently import only a little

[7] We now know that Summa, with the help of the CIA, was doing more in the Pacific than testing its mining system. While mining was Summa's "cover" for its main mission of raising the Soviet submarine (or for other espionage purposes, yet unpublicized), there is little doubt that Hughes scientists have also raised the technological state-of-the-art of deep-sea mining and still may play a major role in its development.

[8] One scholarly attempt to measure the U.S. dependency for all minerals highlighted manganese, saying, "Manganese is essential to steel production, and, in view of the source countries — Brazil and Gabon — it may be the most likely mineral constraint for the U.S. in this century." Choucri and Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 195.



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over 10 per cent of our copper needs, this percentage is likely to increase dramatically in the future (see Table I). Western Europe and Japan are scarcely better off. Western Europe is forced to import virtually all of its copper and nickel. Japan is almost totally dependent on imports for copper, cobalt and manganese.

In sum, manganese nodule mining is one means by which the dependency relationship for vital resources can be diminished.[9] It could also have a significant balance of payments impact. World prices for the four important metals found in the nodule have risen considerably in the past ten years. Nickel and copper prices, for example, have more than doubled since 1965. Whereas in 1970 the United States spent over $600 million to import cobalt, manganese, copper and nickel, by 1972 the total bill came to over $1 billion.[10]

## International Conflict

With the vast number of manganese nodules littering the ocean floor, there appears, on first analysis, to be little cause for conflict over these plentiful resources. Nevertheless, the potential for conflict is real, and basically inheres in two interrelated factors: (1) economic uncertainty, and (2) the equivocalness of existing domestic and international law in regard to deep ocean mining.

Despite the fact that the nodules can be found in abundance, there is as yet no certain method to predict that one will gather what are termed "high-grade" nodules, i.e., those containing relatively large concentrations of copper and nickel (the metals most likely to be commercially recovered initially). Sampling by several oceanographic institutions has found the Atlantic Ocean nearly deficient of high-grade nodules. Sampling in the Pacific has located several high-grade nodule concentrations southeast of Hawaii, falling between 0°-20°N latitudes and 120°-140°W longitudes. It is thought that most commercial exploration has focused upon this area, though the commercial enterprises are not talking, for obvious reasons. While general sampling has considerably narrowed areas of exploration, irregular patterns of high- and low-grade

[9] Expropriation is another serious concern of mining companies in mineral-producing countries. As one proponent of deep-sea mining has stated, "The risk of expropriation or failure of reliable production through political unrest does not hang, as a sword of Damocles, over the marine sources of supply." John G. Laylin, "The Law to Govern Deepsea Mining until Superseded by International Agreement," *The San Diego Law Review,* May 1973, p. 440.

[10] Robert M. White, "Sounding Our Ocean Future," an address at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Conference on the Oceans and National Economic Development, Seattle, Washington, July 17, 1973.



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nodule distribution even within the preferred areas are causing exploration headaches.

The importance of gathering only high-grade nodules cannot be underestimated, as it may be the key to economic feasibility. Even though deep ocean mining may be technically feasible in the near future, it is as yet uncertain whether its costs will be competitive with those of land-based mining. If the cost of land-based mining decreases on account of technical developments, or due to the mining of new sites — the mining of lateritic surface deposits for nickel, for example — the ability of marine mining operations to compete is in doubt. In a situation requiring that only high-grade nodules be mined to assure economic viability, international competition for these nodules may therefore be intense. Some authorities claim that only one out of five seabed mining ventures will be able to survive over time. Given the lack of mining security under current international law, the potential for dispute over high-grade nodules is heightened.

There is presently considerable debate over existing international law as it pertains to deep-sea mining. The official U.S. government interpretation of international law relating to deep seabed resources states that anyone can legally carry on deep-sea mining (beyond territorial water jurisdictions) without a license or lease, provided he conducts these activities "with reasonable regard" to the equal rights of others. Under this interpretation, the deep ocean seabeds are no nation's property (*res nullius*), but the resources found there can be subject to national appropriation. The difficulty with this interpretation, from a mining perspective, is that in a competitive situation it provides virtually no security of claim. Since the property belongs to no one, anyone or any nation with the capability can move into a particularly rich mining area without providing compensation or notice to other concerns mining the same area.

In November 1974, Deepsea Ventures announced that it had claimed exclusive mining rights, for up to fifty-five years, over 60,000 square kilometers of seabed in the northeastern Pacific Ocean. The announcement was accompanied by a request to U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for "diplomatic protection" of its claim. The State Department's reply was that while the U.S. government recognizes the lawful right of any mining venture to gather deep seabed minerals, it nevertheless cannot provide "diplomatic protection" because it "does not grant or recognize exclusive mining claims on the seabeds beyond the limits of national juris-



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diction."[11] Whether Deepsea Ventures will begin mining without government protection remains to be seen.

### International Concern

If the government's response to mining interests in this country has disappointed corporate leaders by what they perceive as its cautiousness, the U.S. position has, nevertheless, been viewed as antagonistic by much of the international community, and Third World nations in particular. In several UN working sessions, the United States' interpretation of international law — allowing the legal appropriation of deep seabed resources — has been challenged. Contrarily, it is claimed that the deep ocean seabeds belong to everyone (*res communes*) and therefore are subject to no nation's appropriation without everyone's permission — in other words, permission through a proper international body. To support this interpretation, various "moratorium" resolutions, adopted overwhelmingly in the General Assembly, have forbidden mining prior to the establishment of an international regime. One such moratorium declared that

> pending the establishment of an international regime: (a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the seabed and ocean floor, and the sub-soil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; (b) no claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recognized.[12]

The proposed activities of such companies as Deepsea Ventures, and probably Summa Corporation as well, are in clear violation of the "moratorium" resolutions, and the fact that Washington has done so little to restrain these enterprises has led to perceptible international animosity.

### *Law of the Sea Conference*

To settle the mining dispute and to create a new, comprehensive ocean law, governments turned to the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. Representatives of nearly 150 nations met in Caracas, Venezuela in the summer of 1974 to forge a comprehensive international agreement covering ocean activities. But while considerable debate and drafting of alternative treaty articles

[11] *Ocean Science News,* November 22, 1974, p. 1.

[12] Quoted by Christopher W. Pinto, "Problems of Developing States and Their Effects on Decisions on Law of the Sea," in Lewis M. Alexander, editor, *Law of the Sea,* Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, R.I., June 26-29, 1972, p. 7.



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took place, no substantive results were forthcoming. Consequently, additional sessions have been scheduled, one in Geneva in the spring of 1975, and another in Caracas during the summer. The issue agenda that national delegates to the conference must consider is large, dealing not only with deep seabed mining but with matters such as the limits of territorial waters, fishery disputes and settlements, the conduct of scientific research, and the passage of military vessels through international straits. Though each issue area is subject to some degree of international dispute, a high U.S. representative to the conference acknowledged recently that controversy over the deep seabed mining issue presented the largest obstacle to the successful negotiation of a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty.[13]

*International Seabed Authority*

There is widespread international consensus on the desirability of creating a new international agency to deal with deep-sea mining, to be named the International Seabed Authority. Within this Authority would be four principal organs: an assembly or plenary body, an executive council, an operational arm, and a dispute settlement body. Consensus breaks down, however, over the degree of regulatory authority with which the Authority and its various organs should be empowered. Indeed, the central issue in the negotiations, as Christopher W. Pinto of Sri Lanka (Chairman of the Seabed Committee's Working Group) has stated, is *"the degree to which the new organization, through its appropriate organ, will control the activities of the entity actually carrying out exploration or exploitation."*[14]

Two polar alternatives have been placed before the delegates at the Law of the Sea Conference in regard to the regulatory powers deemed necessary: The first proposal would give the Authority merely the power to register and license, in a nondiscriminatory fashion, public or private entities wishing to undertake mining. Under this system, access to mining sites for technically qualified mining operations would be guaranteed, leaving the Authority with only a minimum of supervisory control and independent action. The major supporter of this interpretation is the United States, which views the Authority's essential task as one of bringing order and security to the new mining enterprise. The U.S. argu-

[13] *Ocean Science News*, November 22, 1974, p. 2.
[14] Statement by C. W. Pinto before Committee I of the Law of the Sea Conference, July 11, 1974. (Pinto's emphasis.)



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ment is that providing the Authority with strong regulatory powers would unduly limit private enterprise's investment in this area, and, consequently, limit the pace of mineral exploitation.

The other proposal would provide the Authority itself with the sole right to explore and exploit the deep seabed. While private mining groups could still be active participants in the mining enterprise, the Authority would retain firm regulatory authority over mining and establish the conditions under which private entities could operate. Under this system, private corporations would be fulfilling "service contracts" to the Authority, with the possibility of joint ventures ensuing between the corporations and the Authority's operating arm. The Authority would also retain the sole power to select applicants for mining. This alternative is primarily appealing to developing nations and was supported by the "Group of 77" at the Caracas Conference.

The developing countries view the creation of the International Seabed Authority not as a means of providing security for the mining enterprise, but instead as a means of ensuring that the riches of the oceans be the "common heritage of mankind," thereby benefiting the international community. It is their contention that substantial international control over seabed mining is essential to guarantee proper distribution of the benefits. Expressing a dominant philosophy among the poorer nations, Andres Aguilar, Venezuela's Ambassador to the United States, has said, "To developing nations the concept of common heritage implies not only sharing in the benefits to be obtained from the exploitation of the resources of the area, but also, and above all, an effective and total participation in all aspects of the management of this common heritage."[15]

### Adverse Impacts from Deep-Sea Mining

Related to the issue of the Authority's jurisdiction is the second major international concern regarding deep-sea mining, namely, its potential adverse economic effect on mineral exporting countries. Since the development of several poorer nations is highly dependent upon earnings derived from mineral exports, the representatives of these states have expressed anxiety about the competition they might have to bear from seabed minerals. In response to the apprehensions of exporting countries such as Peru, Zambia, Zaire and Gabon, several studies have been undertaken to forecast the

[15] Andres Aguilar, "How Will the Future Deep Seabed Regime Be Organized?," in John K. Gamble and Giulio Pontecorvo, editors, *Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of the Oceans* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974), p. 47.



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TABLE II

HYPOTHETICAL MINERAL PRODUCTION FROM NODULES BASED ON FULL UTILIZATION OF THE PLANNING GUIDELINES
(in metric tons)

| | *Nickel* | *Manganese* | *Cobalt* | *Copper* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Potential production starting in 1980 | | | | |
| minimum authorization | 42,000 | 320,000 | 5,500 | 36,000 |
| maximum authorization | 84,000 | 640,000 | 11,000 | 72,000 |
| Potential production by 1985 | | | | |
| minimum authorization | 175,000 | 1,300,000 | 23,000 | 150,000 |
| maximum authorization | 350,000 | 2,600,000 | 46,000 | 300,000 |
| Estimated world demand: 1980 | 914,000 | 12,900,000 | 44,000 | 11,650,000 |
| 1985 | 1,220,000 | 16,400,000 | 70,000 | 14,900,000 |
| Share of world market in 1980 | | | | |
| minimum authorization | 4.6% | 2.5% | 12.5% | 0.3% |
| maximum authorization | 9.2% | 5.0% | 25.0% | 0.6% |
| Share of world market in 1985 | | | | |
| minimum authorization | 14.3% | 7.9% | 33.0% | 1.0% |
| maximum authorization | 28.6% | 15.8% | 66.0% | 2.0% |

*Source:* United Nations Secretariat, *Economic Implications of Sea-Bed Mineral Development . . ., op. cit.*, p. 53.

magnitude of seabed mining production over time.[16] Given the technical and economic uncertainties surrounding the mining enterprise, it is difficult to perceive the contribution marine mining might make to future market supplies, but the studies did reach general consensus on the percentage of world demand that could be supplied by manganese nodule mining in the near future. Table II provides the likely range of market impact for each of the important minerals contained in the manganese nodule. As can be seen, nodule mining over the next ten years will affect the market only minimally in terms of copper supply, somewhat more with regard to manganese and nickel, and substantially in the case of cobalt.

According to a spokesman for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), likely seabed production by the year 1980 would reduce developing country export earnings

[16] United Nations Secretariat, *Possible Impact of Sea-Bed Mineral Production in the Area Beyond National Jurisdiction on World Markets*, A/AC.138/36, May 28, 1971; *Economic Implications of Sea-Bed Mineral Development in the International Area: Report of the Secretary-General*, A/Conf.62/25, May 22, 1974. Also, several reports were prepared by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) during 1974; see TD/B/483, TD/B/484 and TD/B/449.



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by about $360 million.[17] Though this figure was disputed by the U.S. delegation, much discussion at Caracas focused on how the international community might mitigate this potentially adverse economic impact on developing nations.

Two contrasting approaches were suggested to deal with the negative effects from seabed mining: compensatory and preventive. Under the compensatory approach, financial assistance would be provided to those countries most affected. There would be no prior controls placed on the mining enterprises to prevent adverse impacts, but once such effects were discerned, financial payments to disadvantaged nations would be forthcoming. The preventive approach, on the other hand, would call for a prior attempt to eliminate any negative impact or disruption. The development of the seabed industry would be carefully controlled and regulated. Possible production controls include setting a maximum annual limit on the tonnage of nodules taken, limiting the number of exploitation licenses, or placing "tax brakes" on the amount of nodules exploited.

UNCTAD clearly favored the preventive approach, as did developing country mineral producers generally and several other developing nations. The UNCTAD spokesman pointed out that "Income likely to accrue to the proposed International Seabed Authority would fall short of the potential export earnings forgone by established developing countries. The likely revenue of the Authority would be insufficient to compensate those countries."[18]

The United States strongly supports the compensatory approach. Representatives claim that the implementation of production controls can seriously retard necessary investment and unduly delay the gathering of these new and essential resources — thereby denying the benefits of mining to all consuming nations. To place restrictive production controls on the development of the industry before a problem exists, it is claimed, is the wrong way to approach resource exploitation.

In summary, the differences that arose during the Caracas Conference during the summer of 1974 in regard to mining were substantial and there was little movement toward accommodation. Whether compromise will be attainable at upcoming meetings remains to be seen.

[17] Statement by G. D. Arsenis, on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, A/Conf.62/32 (mimeo, n.d.).
[18] *Ibid.*



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## Domestic Legislation

The lack of substantive progress at Caracas toward reaching international accord has provided impetus to mining supporters in this country who would simply by-pass the Law of the Sea Conference. For the past three years the Senate Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels (of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs) has held hearings on a federal bill which, if passed into law, would allow the U.S. Department of the Interior to lease specific areas of ocean seabed beyond national jurisdiction. In its latest form the bill (S.1134) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue licenses for the mining of seabed blocks, comprising 40,000 square kilometers. Applicants would pay a fee of $50,000 for exclusive rights to mine each block. In addition, an "investment guarantee" clause states

> To the extent that an international agreement, binding upon the United States, shall differ from the requirements of this Act, *the United States shall be responsible* for complying with all fees and payments required under the regime and shall provide the licensee with compensation in an effectively realizable form representing the value of the investment taken or impaired by virtue of the differing requirements.

The bill has gathered the support of the American Mining Congress as well as of all U.S. companies currently involved in manganese nodule operations. In July 1974 the Interior Committee unanimously reported the bill out of committee for full Senate consideration. It never came to a vote in the Ninety-third Congress, however, due to the decision of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to examine it more carefully, and due to the opposition of the current U.S. Administration. Executive branch officials have attempted to forestall a Congressional vote, not wishing to jeopardize the ongoing Law of the Sea negotiations.

## Conclusion

How and when the legal status of manganese nodule mining will be resolved is difficult to predict. It should be remembered that the Law of the Sea Conference will consider a full and complex agenda of issues, of which deep-sea mining is only one. The conference is likely to produce considerable compromise across several issues, involving trade-offs on one for the satisfactory resolution of another. Nevertheless, the response of the international community to the matter of deep-sea mining contains implications that go beyond the immediate issue in question.



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Negotiations to determine the nature of the legal framework for regulating mining ventures should provide some indication of how nations will respond to the issue of resource interdependence. If intransigence characterizes them, it is certain that resource interdependence will be a serious problem throughout this decade, and probably for much longer. If mutually satisfactory compromise is achieved, it will be a welcome sign that agreement can be reached on difficult resource questions.

In the past, industrial nations have been able to hold down the costs of essential minerals through new technology, resource substitution, and the development of alternative sources of supply. Given the present political climate, these means can no longer ensure a steady, and cheap, supply of resources free from possible recrimination, as this case study has demonstrated.

Though the dangers of mineral interdependency are now well recognized, policy directions to reduce them remain subject to debate. In the United States, thus far, discussion has focused upon variants of three basic policies: (a) national self-sufficiency; (b) using the threat of economic or military retaliation; (c) recognizing the necessity for global interdependence and the development of cooperative policies among the industrial and Third World nations to eliminate potential dangers. The first alternative may no longer be possible, and even if it is, may involve substantial costs that American society is unwilling to pay. The second alternative will lead to global cold war and polarization, at best. The third alternative is obviously the most desirable — though there should be no illusion that such an alternative would come without costs. From both the U.S. and the global perspectives, recognition of, and accommodation to, mineral interdependence appear to offer the only practical solution to the problem over time.



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# THAILAND'S KRA CANAL: SITE FOR THE WORLD'S FIRST NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL ZONE

*by W. F. Libby*

THE government of Thailand took a wise and farsighted move on September 21, 1972 when its National Executive Council authorized the preparation of a Preliminary Survey Report by four well-known American consultant firms[1] to determine the feasibility of constructing a sea-level canal across the central portion of the Kra Isthmus. At that time there was no "energy crisis," nor was there much prospect of the Suez Canal being reopened. But the October war between Israel and Egypt and Syria drastically reshaped world affairs. First of all it brought about a fourfold increase in the cost of crude oil, and there is little prospect that prices will ever return to their 1973 levels. Second, the war between Israel and Egypt was settled in such a way as to make possible serious preparations to modernize and reopen the Suez Canal. When this work is completed — in June 1975 according to Egyptian President Sadat — ship traffic will begin flowing through the canal, underlining the requirement for a truly modern maritime infrastructure to handle the rapidly growing ocean commerce of the world. Such an infrastructure would include not only the Suez but also the Kra Canal, thus linking Europe and the Middle East with the fast-growing industrial areas surrounding the Pacific Basin.

The consultant firms completed their work on September 1, 1973, more than a month before the October war. They recommended a 103-kilometer long, one-way, sea-level canal, capable of accommodating 500,000 d.w.t. (deadweight tonnage) oil tankers. Although convinced that the project is technically feasible, they pointed out that it would be the largest construction job in history, requiring the movement of some 2.8 billion cubic meters of earth — a task far larger than building the Great Wall of China.

The consultants did not confine their studies to conventional methods of construction. They also looked into the use of nuclear

[1] Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton, in cooperation with the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory; and Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., in cooperation with the Hudson Institute.



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engineering techniques, concluding that if the political situation permitted peaceful nuclear explosives to be used to construct the western forty-five kilometers of the canal, the total cost could be reduced from US$5.6 billion to $3.5 billion — *with complete safety to the work force and the surrounding population.* Moreover, if this nuclear option was feasible, the canal could be built within eight to ten years, rather than the twelve years estimated for conventional construction.

Whatever else they may have done, the October war and the resulting energy crisis have suddenly propelled the world forward into the nuclear age. The generation of electric power from nuclear reactors is being thought of less often as a possible hazard; it is now regarded as a necessity. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in a report prepared prior to the events of 1973, estimated that the total installed nuclear power generating capacity of the United States, Western Europe and Japan would increase some twentyfold between 1973 and 1990.

Thailand's Kra Canal, even if work on it began in 1975, would not be completed until the 1985-1990 time frame. Therefore, its sponsors have planned to install two large-scale nuclear power generating plants to handle the electrical requirements of the industrial areas which will be built in conjunction with the two great port cities at either end of the canal. But, according to the plans of the canal's designers, these two power plants would be only the beginning of what will rapidly become the world's first "nuclear industrial zone."

This is not science fiction or futuristic fantasy. When one designs a canal for the twenty-first century, as these imaginative Thai and American planners have done, it must be built for the nuclear age. Much study and planning lie ahead, as those of us who have been associated with this exciting project from the beginning fully realize. The work is proceeding, and leading experts from across the globe will be mobilized for the task. Though detailed blueprints have yet to be drawn, the outline of this first nuclear industrial zone is beginning to emerge, and it is now possible to give a brief, simplified glimpse of a few of its major components. Clearly, existing technology makes it possible for the following basic nuclear installations to be built: nuclear power plants, an isotope separation plant, a reprocessing plant for the chemical separation for re-use of valuable radioactive materials contained in the "nuclear waste" from atomic reactors, and a food irradiation plant for an entirely new food processing industry.



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II

One of the most important and urgent justifications for constructing the Kra Canal without delay is that it would facilitate the shipment of fossil fuel from the Middle East oil-producing countries to Japan, the major consumer of fuel oil in the Pacific. By 1985, Japan's estimated requirement for oil will have increased from 290 million tons in 1973 to over 500 million tons per year.

Certainly a worldwide search for new oil fields and an investigation into the future availability of petroleum are essential, but it is quite clear from projections drawn up by a number of reputable and reliable groups that, regardless of the availability of oil, we desperately need to develop atomic power. There are signs that we are exhausting our sources of fossil fuels, and in most countries we have long since tapped the most accessible sources of hydroelectric power. It is fortunate that at this particular time we have achieved a dramatic revolutionary breakthrough — the generation of electric power from atomic reactors — for mankind probably could not continue to advance toward higher levels of economic development without atomic power.

It seems almost certain that as the United States comes to rely on atomic energy for electric power so will the rest of the world, particularly the developed countries. The shortage of fossil fuel is going to be acute for them. But eventually every nation will be driven toward atomic power by the simple fact that there are better uses for the diminishing quantities of fossil fuels than running power generators. A prime example is transport.

Thus far, no one has developed a practical design to build an airplane that can fly on atomic power. It still requires fossil fuel. Nor does anyone really know how to run an automobile with atomic power. Despite the claims for electric cars, it will have to be proven that they are adequate. So fossil fuels remain necessary for driving cars and flying airplanes and for heating and petrochemical purposes. More and more fossil fuels will be required to provide the raw materials for making plastics, rubber items, many kinds of textiles, and various other replaceable products. Hence we are fortunate that science has made it possible for us, in effect, to burn rocks in nuclear reactors, and perhaps some day to burn water to make electric power.

Projections indicate that within this century, as we move into the atomic age, practically all new electric power stations will be atomic. This does not mean that they will necessarily follow pres-



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ent designs. Today only a small part of the available uranium within the nuclear core of an atomic power plant is consumed. We would hope to develop techniques, so-called breeder reactors, to burn the entire uranium at our disposal, and at the same time make the much more abundant thorium combustible.[2] Some day we may learn how to burn the deuterium in sea water — a truly inexhaustible energy source.

But whether these newer technological developments are successful or not, the world is certain to acquire a gigantic new atomic power industry. This will require massive installations which do not now exist.

To be specific, the United States now has an installed electrical generating capacity of some 350 million kilowatts. Were this converted entirely to atomic power it is estimated that with present techniques (i.e., without breeder reactors) the United States would have to burn some 70,000 tons of uranium oxide ($U_3O_8$) per year. After being mined, this material must be processed by isotope separation plants, which would have to be huge, both in physical size and in capital investment. The processing of 70,000 tons of uranium oxide for isotope separation would require a capital investment of approximately US$5 billion and similar annual operating costs.[3] To separate isotopes is not a cheap or easy thing to do, but at the present time, without the breeder reactor, it is the technique preferred.

Looking ahead to a similar large-scale conversion to nuclear power in the Far East, we can see no better place to put one of these giant isotope separation plants than in the Kra Canal's nuclear industrial zone. They require a great deal of real estate and are a tremendous drain on electric power. Large atomic power plants will be needed to furnish the electricity to run the isotope separation plant so as to have a totally contained unit. Into it would be fed the tens of thousands of tons of $U_3O_8$ for conversion into the enriched uranium required for the fueling of many other atomic power plants that will then be in operation. The IAEA estimates that between now and 1990 the Western nations and Japan will have to raise their separative capacity to ten times the

[2] A "breeder reactor" is one that produces more fissionable material than it consumes. It is theoretically possible, through proper design of the breeder reactor, to produce more plutonium (a man-made fissionable element) than the original amount of uranium 235 (the only natural element that can be used for a self-sustaining chain reaction) consumed within the reactor core during a given operation.

[3] One has only to see the giant U.S. plants at Oak Ridge and Portsmouth to get an idea of their enormous size, the great expense of building and operating them, and the vast amount of electricity required for their operation.



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present level. This alone will require an investment of roughly US$15 billion.

Today in the United States available processing equipment can handle about 30,000 tons of $U_3O_8$ per year — less than half of what is needed for America's projected load. However successful the development of breeder reactors turns out to be, or however successful the scientists are in perfecting controlled thermonuclear reaction (learning, in effect, to burn deuterium), the lead time and installation of equipment for such new processes in an atomic industry of such magnitude — 350 million kw electrical — is on the order of twenty years. In the short run, therefore, it will be necessary to build new isotope separation plants on an unprecedented scale, not only in the United States but around the world. In Japan, for instance, there is already considerable interest and know-how in the technology of isotope separation.

It is vitally important to find new and cheaper ways of separating isotopes. The centrifuge technique is developing rapidly in Europe and may soon be competitive with the American gaseous diffusion technique. But whatever improvements or new processes are discovered in the future, substantial investments will have to be made, and made relatively soon in order to meet the requirements generated by the growth of atomic power.

Seventy thousand tons of uranium $U_3O_8$ per year would produce, in steady state, some 12,000 tons of enriched uranium of about 3 per cent concentration in the burnable isotope, uranium 235. From these 12,000 tons of enriched uranium about 400 tons of fission products and about the same weight of plutonium would be produced each year through the normal operation of U.S. power reactors.

Plutonium, like uranium 235, is a burnable fuel and is valuable as an atomic fuel. The extraneous fission products that accumulate in the atomic power core, together with the depletion of the uranium 235, eventually shut down the reactor. Then the old core must be taken out and be replaced by a new one. However, this does not mean that all the fuel has been exhausted. It is possible to dissolve the core, chemically separate the fission products, and recover the unburned uranium 235 and the plutonium for re-use. But this reprocessing of 12,000 tons of highly irradiated fuels will involve a chemical operation of great magnitude. Where better to undertake it than in the proposed Kra Canal nuclear industrial zone?



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The practical limits of our present technology illustrate the magnitude of the industrial investment that will be required and the problems that must be faced. First, we must find the uranium, 70,000 tons of it per year, and this is a fairly big order. But even assuming that this amount can be delivered, it would cover only an interim period; these requirements probably will be multiplied over and over again as time passes. Finding uranium may be somewhat more difficult than finding crude oil. In the past, the harder we looked for crude the more we seemed to find, but this may not be true for uranium. Many experts feel that uranium[4] is more like nickel or platinum in that there is a finite amount available. Fortunately, there is also a vast amount of uranium in the ocean and in ordinary rock, and as our energy requirements increase we may have to develop the technology to permit us to go after it.

Even if the breeder development is successful, the need for chemical processing will remain just as great for some time to come. While under such circumstances new isotope separation plants may not have to be built, it seems likely that those in existence would be kept operating to sustain the thermal burner reactors of present-day design which are expected to last thirty years or more.

In the event the breeder does not work, we may be forced to extract uranium from sea water or from ordinary phosphate rock or shale or even granite. If it does work, will it be economical and competitive? If we go on improving our thermal uranium burner, we may be able to burn very low grade uranium ores, but this would require mining operations of gigantic proportions.

The problem of dissolving the core and separating the fission products and the plutonium from the uranium has been carefully studied. In fact we have had considerable experience with this technology — enough to know that it is feasible but will also be a major undertaking. Capital investment required for the chemical processing facilities to handle 12,000 tons of irradiated fuel per year will be substantial. Moreover, they should be located well away from residential areas, not because of the threat of explosions but because there are other potential hazards that must be strictly controlled. With 400 tons of fission products, many of them radioactive, one must be certain that no spills occur and careful about the storage and safeguarding of the "radioactive waste."

[4] They are referring to the high grade ore of something like one-tenth or two-tenths per cent by weight.



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## III

Although at present there are no plans for utilization of the so-called waste products from nuclear reactors, with time we are going to find practical uses for many of them. Two examples may be cited to illustrate how useful they could be. Out of the 400 tons per year of fission products likely to result from the operation of atomic power reactors, perhaps ten tons consist of xenon gas. Xenon is now produced by liquefaction and distillation of air. Because little of this is found in the air, it is quite expensive to make. There are a number of uses for xenon, but almost all of them are impractical today because of the high cost. Doctors consider xenon a good anesthetic, but it is not used widely because of its costliness. However, if a real effort is made to separate the ten tons of xenon from these fission products, it could become a relatively cheap product.

The halogenated hydrocarbons now used in anesthetics are dangerous to some patients. Certain individuals' systems seem to hydrolyze them, producing such chemicals as trifluoracetic acid, an extremely dangerous material to have in your body. Xenon will not form any of these noxious chemicals. It is nonexplosive and safe.

One of the radioactive fission products is an isotope of krypton. Krypton, a noble (inert) gas, cannot be contained in solid or liquid wastes. For the last decade, every country with atomic energy facilities has been dissolving its irradiated uranium and permitting the krypton to bubble out and go up the stack into the atmosphere. Thus, were the krypton in the atmosphere tested today it would prove to be radioactive. Such policies will have to stop. When the demands of atomic energy reach the point where tens of tons of radioactive krypton are being released into the atmosphere every year, it will become a problem that can no longer be ignored. The krypton will have to be contained and bottled. If this is done, xenon will be found in the same bottle since xenon is also a noble gas. By a simple process, it will then be possible to separate the krypton and thereby obtain cheap xenon.

For another example, let us consider the use of mild doses of radiation for the preservation of food. For many years a group of senior scientists around the world has been calling for the adoption of this technique which could transform the food industry. The U.S. government has spent many millions of dollars researching the quality of irradiated foods and has found no evidence of anything harmful about them. In fact, the opposite is true. They are



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clearly superior, as they are preserved without altering the taste or destroying the freshness.

Anyone raised on a farm knows the difference between an apple freshly picked and one that is bought in a store days or weeks later. The same applies to fresh fish and fish after a week in the market. Fish that is deep frozen also loses much of its quality of freshness. But food treated by gamma radiation can be kept fresh for weeks. This process would open up fishing fields that cannot now be used at all. The great fishing grounds off the northeast coast of Australia, for instance, would be available if fishing ships were equipped with gamma ray sources to irradiate the catch.

The gamma ray isotopes from the annual 400 tons of fission products, if used for this purpose, would go a long way toward processing all food used in the United States. It could also develop new markets for the less developed countries. IAEA studies indicate that the world's consumable food supply could be increased by 25 to 30 per cent if we could avoid the post-harvest losses accepted as normal today. Food irradiation could significantly curtail this unnecessary waste, and would help to improve the quality of life throughout the world.

What is stopping us from using gamma radiation for this beneficial purpose? For twenty years the officials who have the statutory authority to decide whether or not we can safely eat irradiated foods have been inhibited by their fears of radiation in general. I am convinced that they will eventually conclude that this process is safe. Then a new worldwide food processing industry will evolve and develop a need for cheap gamma ray sources.

The present method of conducting experiments on food processing is costly. In the United States cobalt 60, an expensive gamma ray source, is used. The cesium 137 that will be produced in quantity in the rapidly growing atomic power industry will be much cheaper and has a forty-year life. A cesium 137 irradiator, once installed, would last for the life of a fishing ship. On the basis of known chemical technology, the separation of cesium presents no problem at all; it can be separated, kept encapsulated so it will not escape, and then made into quite inexpensive food irradiation sources.

Of course, any technological development involves hazards. The fact that people have to become accustomed to the practical application of scientific discoveries seems to be the main problem facing the new food irradiation industry today. Eventually, and hopefully



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soon, this can be solved through a combination of public education and strict adherence to the highest standards of quality control.

## IV

There is a great opportunity for the proposed Kra Canal to become the site of the world's first nuclear industrial zone. It can provide a home for a new atomic industry that will accelerate the development of Southeast Asia. It could contain an isotope separation plant powered by large, modern atomic power plants; fuel processing plants to separate plutonium and other fission products by chemical techniques; engineering plants to build new fuel assemblages (incorporating the unburned uranium 235 and possibly the newly created plutonium) for refueling atomic power plants throughout Asia; and irradiation facilities to support an entirely new food processing industry.

Nuclear energy for peace can truly blossom in Southeast Asia if the Kra Canal and its nuclear industrial zone become a reality.



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# THE ROLE OF OUTSIDERS IN THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT*

*by Sheldon W. Simon*

CAMBODIA was the last of the four Indochina states to become fully involved in the war in Southeast Asia, and, up to the end of the fighting in April 1975, it remained the only country in the region for which not even a theoretical armistice had been signed. In the two years since the Paris negotiations, which stipulated that there should be no further foreign intervention in Cambodia, hundreds of people were killed or wounded daily in continued fighting made possible through aid from outsiders.

The persistence of hostilities reflected the fact that a relative military equilibrium developed following the 1973 American bombing halt, between a U.S.-funded and -trained republican army of approximately 60,000 combat troops (out of an estimated 200,000 soldiers) and a Khmer Rouge adversary of approximately the same size. As of autumn 1974, Phnom Penh controlled most of the cities, large unbroken tracts of land such as those bordering Thailand, including the provinces of Battambang and Pursat, and perhaps 60 per cent of the population, three million of whom (half the Cambodian population) were refugees. The Khmer Rouge controlled a somewhat larger area, and the status of the remainder of the country was perhaps best classified as "under contention."[1] Less than six months later, the Khmer Rouge had defeated the republican army and completed the conquest of Cambodia.

The rapid victory of the Khmer Rouge between January and April 1975 preceded and paralleled similar developments in South Vietnam. Causes of the Khmer Republic's collapse included its own corruption — many soldiers refusing to fight after not being paid for months — and the superior discipline, leadership and *supplies* available to its opponents. As in the case of South Viet-

* This study concentrates on the period from the fall of 1973 through the collapse of the Khmer Republic in April 1975. For an analysis of the Cambodian conflict from its 1970 inception through the cessation of U.S. bombing in August 1973, see the author's *War and Politics in Cambodia: A Communications Analysis* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1974).

[1] Sydney Schanberg, "Cambodia's Little War: 600,000 Casualties," *New York Times — Week in Review*, September 8, 1974.



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nam, U.S. aid to Cambodia diminished just at the time that Moscow and Peking increased aid to their Indochinese clients. Perhaps the most determinative factor was the Viet Minh decision in early 1975 to open up the supply pipeline to their Khmer Rouge allies whom they had previously kept on a somewhat short logistical leash. The decision to permit the Khmer Rouge to launch an all-out effort for final victory in Cambodia may have been based on a comparable decision to move for a full-scale military conquest in South Vietnam, thus ensuring that the Khmer Rouge would not gain control of Cambodia too far in advance of the Viet Minh's seizure of power in the south. If North Vietnam wished to develop a hegemonic position in Indochina, a communist military victory in Cambodia had to be roughly simultaneous with that of the Viet Minh in South Vietnam. Otherwise, Khmer Rouge tendencies toward independence could develop more rapidly than Hanoi desired while the latter was still embroiled in its own military efforts.

Although most of the Vietnamese communist forces left Cambodia following the 1973 Paris agreement, parts of the eastern provinces remained under their control and continued to serve as bases for operations in South Vietnam, especially through the Parrot's Beak, and as transit routes for supplies into the Mekong Delta. The role of these forces could become a major point of contention between the Viet Minh and the Khmer Rouge if the former does not agree to withdraw its troops in the aftermath of the Vietnam hostilities.

For its part, the United States assigned approximately one hundred officers to Phnom Penh to supervise military aid and observe the course of the war. U.S. economic aid paid for the transport ships that supplied Phnom Penh via the Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers. American military transport planes airlifted supplies to republican troops when they were surrounded.

The continuation of American involvement until the spring of 1975 should be seen in the context of Washington's "interlocking parts" interpretation of the Indochina war and its belief that Hanoi was pressing to obtain the hegemonic position among the four countries. Only in Cambodia could the United States bring direct military pressure to bear on the North Vietnamese (at least until the August 1973 bombing halt) without immediately endangering the cease-fires in Laos and Vietnam. Moreover, Cambodia's possible fall was foreseen as a severe psychological shock to South Vietnam, in addition to presenting Saigon with a serious



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military problem should the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) be reopened to communist traffic. By providing the Lon Nol government with the capability to sustain its own defense, the United States hoped to create a political and military stalemate conducive to a negotiated settlement, leading to a neutralized Cambodia which would not upset the status quo in either Vietnam or Laos.[2] By 1974-1975, however, it had become problematical whether the U.S. Congress would provide the wherewithal to sustain the government's strategy and whether, in any event, the noncommunist political structure in Cambodia was effective enough to utilize even the minimal aid provided.

The purpose of this article is to examine the character of the Khmer Resistance's relations with its external backers, particularly North Vietnam and China, and to assess the insurgents' potential for politico-military success as well as their receptivity to the compromise, negotiated settlement desired by the United States. There will also be some discussion of Lon Nol's government and its American backer in order to present the complete political context in which the Resistance operated until April 1975.

## The Politics of External Support in the Cambodian Insurgency

### *Components of the Insurgency*

The 1970 Indochinese People's Summit Conference formally linked the "liberation movements" of noncommunist South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to North Vietnam for the first time since the 1951 Indochina Communist Party Conference. But unlike their counterparts in Laos and South Vietnam, the Khmer insurgents had neither a long history of operations in the countryside nor the advantage of North Vietnamese control mechanisms dating back to the 1950's. Rather, they consisted of a somewhat disjointed combination of (a) Sihanoukists (Khmer Rumdo); (b) intellectual and middle-class elements who had become increasingly disillusioned with the corruption in Lon Nol's regime; (c) peasants who were either cajoled or coerced into the insurgency with appeals to their national pride against the American and South Vietnamese "invaders"; and finally, the only true communist elements of the coalition — (d) the Khmer Rouge, who had fought against Sihanouk for two decades, and (e) a cadre of perhaps 6,000 Cam-

[2] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam: April 1973*, A Staff Report for the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad (Washington: GPO, June 11, 1973), p. 2.



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bodians who had gone to Hanoi in 1954 with the Viet Minh and returned with them in 1970-1971.[3]

Each of these components brought to the insurgency its own motivation, group organization (or lack thereof), and attraction to or repulsion from its North Vietnamese mentors. The Khmer Rouge and dissident intellectuals were said to be influenced by the French Communist Party and to have Soviet sympathies; the Hanoi-trained cadres were seen as the DRV's spokesmen; and the Sihanoukists were simply nationalists and perhaps even anti-communists. According to U.S. government observers, by 1973 severe dissension had broken out in southern Cambodia between the Khmer communists and Khmer Rumdos over the former's successful takeover of FUNK (the National United Front for Cambodia). Specifically, several bloody clashes were reported by refugees who fled into South Vietnam because of the Khmer Rouge's forced population relocation, denigration of Sihanouk (who still remained popular in the countryside), land collectivization and forced rice purchasing program, and overall effort to assert rigid controls over the life styles of people in the areas under its control. Refugees told, for example, of the prohibition of travel beyond one's village without Khmer Rouge permission, forced membership in mass organizations, and the requirement to wear Viet Cong-style black pajamas instead of traditional, colorful Cambodian garb.[4]

There is general agreement that most of the North Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia — with the exception of the eastern provinces adjoining South Vietnam — in early 1973. The withdrawal was an earnest sign of Hanoi's willingness to abide by the Paris agreement (at least in Cambodia) and perhaps also to decelerate the insurgents' military progress; from North Vietnam's perspective, the premature fall of Phnom Penh could have created an onerous administrative responsibility in the governing of Cambodia before the unification of Vietnam or the establishment of effective control over the Khmer insurgent movement. An additional consideration, encouraging a reduced North Vietnamese profile, may be found in numerous accounts since 1972 of friction between North Vietnamese advisers and their Khmer associates

[3] For a good, brief background discussion of the group composition of the Khmer insurgency, see Elizabeth Becker, "Who Are the Khmer Rouge?," *Washington Post*, March 10, 1974.

[4] *Ibid.* See also the detailed report by Kenneth M. Quinn, "The Khmer Krom Program to Create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodia," unpublished State Department paper, February 19, 1974, especially pp. 1, 4, 7, 30, 33, 34.



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near the Vietnam border, as well as between Khmer Rouge hard-liners and Sihanoukists. Indeed, Kenneth Quinn concluded, after conducting numerous refugee interviews over several months in 1973 at the South Vietnam-Cambodia border, that a primary goal of the Khmer Rouge was to drive the Vietnamese communists out of Cambodia. Thus, a major reason for forcing Cambodians to move away from the border regions was to reduce Vietnamese influence in Khmer Rouge-occupied areas. By contrast (and in conflict with many reports other than Quinn's), the Khmer Rumdos were actually seeking Vietnamese communist aid against their supposed communist compatriots.[5]

North Vietnamese media and high-level government statements have consistently purveyed the line of "militant solidarity of the three Indochinese peoples . . . fighting side by side and coordinating with and assisting one another" as the formula for "final victory." Heaping scorn on Western efforts to effect compromise settlements in Indochina, the DRV military press branded them "perfidious, bankrupt schemes" designed "to divide the Indochinese people."[6] Reassuring its Cambodian allies, the Vietnam People's Army paper declared that "the people and army of Vietnam will do all they can to assist the fraternal Cambodian people till total victory is won for their just struggle."[7] These attestations coincided, however, with the above-mentioned stream of reports over friction between the North Vietnamese and the Khmer liberation forces.

*Sihanouk's Viewpoint*

From exile, Prince Sihanouk expressed his disillusionment with the North Vietnamese in the fall of 1973, when he complained to T. D. Allman of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* that active support from them had ceased for over a year and that Hanoi was encouraging negotiations with the Americans and Lon Nol. He attributed the DRV's altered behavior to fear that an insurgent victory in Cambodia could bring American retaliation on Hanoi.[8] Whether the Prince's explanation was genuine or designed to embarrass the North, this author thinks Hanoi's reduced support was

[5] See, for example, Fox Butterfield, "Reds Still Clash Inside Cambodia," *New York Times*, September 9, 1973. See also Quinn, *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 5, 32.

[6] *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* (Hanoi), November 30, 1973.

[7] *Ibid.*, December 11, 1973.

[8] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 1, 1973, p. 13. Needless to say, I found no evidence of North Vietnamese encouragement of negotiations in Hanoi's own media output as presented in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia/Pacific*.



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attributable more to its overall Indochina plan (which subordinates Laos and Cambodia to Vietnam) than to any apprehension over renewed American military intervention, especially after the U.S. Congressional injunction halted American bombing in August 1973. Sihanouk acknowledged this interpretation himself when he pointed out that "the transport of arms between the two Vietnams does not require the taking of Phnom Penh."[9] Moreover, Hanoi's support for the rejection of a negotiated settlement by the Resistance in 1974 either contradicts Sihanouk or demonstrates that the Viet Minh changed their position and became more optimistic about a long-run military victory.

In the course of 1974, Sihanouk's dissatisfaction with North Vietnamese strategy continued. He contrasted the "huge military and financial aid from the United States" sent to Lon Nol with the "lack in arms and ammunition . . . of our people's army." Insisting that he remains the spokesman of the RGNUC (Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia) and that his presence in Cambodia "would be very useful" to the liberation front, he averred, nevertheless, that the Khmer Rouge fear him because of his popularity among the peasants and opposition to the communization of his country.[10] Once again, it is difficult to determine how much of Sihanouk's analysis of the insurgent and North Vietnamese attitudes was accurate and how much represented a self-serving attempt to thrust himself on U.S. decision-makers as the essential component of any Cambodian solution. As he posed the issue in a letter to the *Far Eastern Economic Review:* ". . . the question remains . . . whether the Cambodian problem can be resolved, and, above all, if an authentic independence can be restored to the country without the participation of myself."[11] Clearly, the Prince has not yet excluded himself from a key political role in Cambodia's future.

### *The Khmer Rouge Gains Control*

Sensitive to allegations that they were merely North Vietnamese puppets, Khmer Rouge leaders increasingly stressed their independence from Hanoi. FUNK's Minister of the Interior, Hou Youn, was even reported to have asserted that "the Vietnamese must respect our rights."[12] Moreover, the top-level insurgent gov-

[9] Sihanouk interview, *Le Monde,* October 27, 1973.
[10] Sihanouk interview, *Far Eastern Economic Review,* January 7, 1974, pp. 22-23.
[11] Sihanouk letter, *ibid.,* January 28, 1974, p. 6.
[12] From a Cambodian book by a former Phnom Penh teacher who spent part of 1972-1973 with the Khmer Rouge; see Becker, *op. cit.*



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ernment, created in November 1973 to provide an alternative to Phnom Penh in the United Nations, and located in the northeastern part of the country, included among its listed ministers neither Hanoi-trained cadres nor Sihanoukists. Ieng Sary, the number-two man on most lists and a Hanoi-style communist, chose only leaders outside Sihanouk's personal entourage to move from Peking to the "liberated area" of Cambodia, effectively separating the Prince from the politics of the movement. There was little more than a Khmer Rouge diplomatic corps remaining in Peking. Khmer Rouge propaganda leading up to the fall 1974 UN vote maintained: "We are a complete state, totally independent politically, militarily, and economically. We have power, an army and sufficient finances. In brief, we have a complete administrative regime . . . without being dependent on any foreign country."[13]

FUNK particularly began to stress its independence in January 1974, while congratulating itself over the CPLAF (Cambodian People's Liberation Armed Forces) dry-season military performance. FUNK soldiers opened a series of military fronts around Phnom Penh, while abandoning the siege of the capital. Pointing up the lessons of its "victories," five of the Front's six points emphasized its independence from outside manipulation, averring that the insurgents "are masters of their own destiny."[14] Concurrent with this emphasis on self-reliance came reports of large streams of refugees leaving Khmer Rouge zones and complaining of a much more rigorous discipline imposed by the Cambodian communists than by their North Vietnamese counterparts who had withdrawn months before.[15] The actual leader of the Resistance, Deputy Premier and Defense Minister Khieu Samphan, indirectly acknowledged this unwanted exodus when he railed against Phnom Penh "spies, pacification agents, pirates, agitators and commandos that the CIA has sent to the liberated zone to rally the inhabitants."[16]

Many in the fighting forces who defected from the insurgents in the spring of 1974 were Sihanoukists (Rumdos) who had had enough of both North Vietnamese influence within the Front and the heavy-handed indoctrination and terror of the Khmer Rouge.[17]

[13] Khieu Samphan interview with the Cambodian Information Agency (AKI), September 27, 1974.

[14] Voice of FUNK Radio, in Cambodian, January 19, 1974.

[15] Philip McCombs, "Life with Cambodian Rebels: Short Hair and 'Cheap Stuff'," *Washington Post*, February 3, 1974; Becker, *op. cit.*; Quinn, *op. cit.*

[16] Khieu Samphan address carried by AKI in French, October 1, 1974.

[17] Mike Snitowsky, "The Dividends of Defection," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 18, 1974, pp. 10-11; *Christian Science Monitor*, March 13, 1974; Quinn, *op. cit.*



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There was even a report of armed clashes between Khmer Rouge and North Vietnamese forces near the South Vietnamese border over distribution of food supplies and command areas in Cambodia.[18] Nevertheless, it is unlikely that large numbers of disenchanted revolutionaries found the Lon Nol regime's corruption and ineptitude an attractive alternative to Resistance factionalism and terror.

While friction continued both within the insurgent movement and between the insurgents and their North Vietnamese allies, important changes reflecting leadership conflict occurred inside FUNK. Initiated by the Khmer Rouge, these were designed to separate Sihanouk from his external backers in Peking, while strengthening the image of the Front's independent — if pro-Hanoi — orientation. The origins of these maneuvers go back to the ostentatious November 1973 RGNUC shift from Peking to the "liberated region" of northeast Cambodia — where, incidentally, it would be much more susceptible to North Vietnamese influence. The purpose of the shift was partly diplomatic/propagandistic: to refute the claims of Lon Nol's defenders that the Front operated a government-in-exile and hence was unworthy of consideration for Cambodia's UN seat. The proclaimed transfer of ministries to the Cambodian jungles, however, served not only FUNK's diplomatic ends but also Khieu Samphan's political desires. Throughout 1974, reports from insurgent-held territory described the systematic removal of pro-Sihanouk cadres from local leadership positions and their replacement by Khmer Rouge stalwarts.[19]

Sihanouk's monopoly of diplomatic representation abroad was broken when a Front delegation, led by Khieu Samphan and consisting entirely of Khmer Rouge (i.e., with no Rumdo representation), embarked on an extensive tour of socialist and Third World states in the spring and summer of 1974. The tour was given abundant publicity by both Peking and Hanoi, and although Samphan dutifully referred to Sihanouk as head of state, it was apparent where actual insurgent decision-making resided. *People's Daily* referred to Samphan's visit as "the first important delegation to China from the interior part of Cambodia," implicitly discounting earlier visits from pro-Sihanouk individuals.[20] One report went so far as to claim that Sihanouk had been reduced to the role of part-time interpreter during Khieu Samphan's visit and did not

[18] *Washington Post,* March 29, 1974; *Christian Science Monitor,* March 11, 1974.
[19] *New York Times,* April 30, 1974; Quinn, *op. cit.,* pp. 4, 6.
[20] *People's Daily* editorial, April 1, 1974.



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participate in the talks held by Premier Chou with the Khmer Rouge leader.[21]

During the Peking visit, which lasted almost two months, an agreement was reached on China's gratis provision of military aid to the insurgents for 1974.[22] Extensive talks were held to "clarify the policy of independence, neutrality, and non-alignment which Cambodia pursues . . .," in which Sihanouk apparently did not participate, according to the name list released by NCNA on May 24 and 27. When specifically queried by a Western reporter about how Cambodia could retain nonalignment, given its heavy dependence on both Hanoi and Peking, Samphan replied:

> In this war we have made great sacrifices. And for what have we made these sacrifices? It is not so that we can be dominated by those who are our friends, but so that we may be truly independent. We are not the slaves or the satellites of anybody.[23]

In a joint communiqué with the DRV on April 1, 1974, just before its visit to China, the RGNUC delegation emphasized the self-sufficiency of its armed forces as a "solid base of the Cambodian revolution."

In short, beginning in 1974, it appeared that the Khmer Resistance leadership was concentrating on legitimating its independence from its backers and excluding Sihanouk from even a significant diplomatic role. Insofar as the Khmer Rouge could promote their own predominance in Cambodian politics to the leaders of sympathetic countries, they could render Sihanouk's exile role redundant and perhaps undermine his last bastion of support in Peking.

### Military Aspects of External Support

Any definitive political settlement for Cambodia was obviously dependent on the relative military successes of the antagonists. The steadily improving military fortunes of the insurgents disinterested them in a negotiated settlement, and the reduced participation of Vietnamese communist cadres in the fighting since mid-1972 certainly diminished Hanoi's ability to influence either the military tactics of the Resistance or its political decisions.

Although the insurgents issued no complaints against their Vietnamese allies, Sihanouk did not hesitate to point out deficiencies in Hanoi's supply of weapons, claiming on more than one occasion that "our North Vietnamese friends are no longer willing to help

[21] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 13, 1974, pp. 26-27.
[22] New China News Agency (NCNA), May 26, 1974.
[23] *Christian Science Monitor*, April 9, 1974.



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us by transporting supplies from the Chinese to the borders of Cambodia."[24] Such revelations must be viewed cautiously, given Sihanouk's distrust of both the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge and his desire to promote his own indispensability. At the same time, allegations of insufficient supplies proved a convenient (and plausible) explanation for insurgent inability to take and hold any major Cambodian city in over four years of fighting — until the 1975 offensive. Moreover, the prolonged presence of an RGNUC "financial and economic delegation" in both Hanoi and Peking during October and November 1974 suggested that the insurgents may have been pressing their case on both allies for the kind of material support necessary to achieve total victory.

Limited North Vietnamese supplies probably were a major determinant of Khmer Resistance tactics. These alternated between sporadic attacks on such centers as Kompong Chom, Takeo, Kompong Speu, Oudong and Phnom Penh when artillery could be concentrated, as during the last half of 1973, the spring of 1974 and the 1975 winter offensive, and the more usual guerrilla interdiction of supply routes into the capital and other government centers, which entailed dispersal of weapons and personnel over several fronts. In some cases U.S. weapons taken from FANK (the National Cambodian Armed Forces) partially compensated for the inadequacy of North Vietnamese supplies. Captured U.S. artillery, for example, was used in the sieges of Kompong Chom and Phnom Penh. Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese reportedly refused to come to the aid of their Cambodian allies when the latter's 1974 siege of the capital stalled, suggesting once again that Hanoi was unenthusiastic about Cambodia's military collapse before either a political or military settlement in Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese explained the protracted character of the Cambodian war and rationalized slow insurgent progress by referring to the "massive introduction of weapons and war material to the Lon Nol clique at a rate of $1 million a day" from the United States, "plus American orders to secretly send so-called volunteers to Phnom Penh."[25] According to Hanoi:

> Under American officers, the Lon Nol army is doing all the combat tasks while Thai mercenaries have to see to the transportation by air of weapons, gas, and food to the Lon Nol army, and the training of spies and commandos, and the defense of certain places along the north-

[24] See *The Guardian* (London), September 18, 1973; Agence France Presse (AFP) (Hong Kong), September 20, 1973.
[25] Radio Hanoi, in Vietnamese, January 9, 1974.



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western borders, and the Saigon mercenaries are given the tasks of protecting the Sihanoukville port, helping Lon Nol troops in holding some frontier areas, and escorting convoys on the Mekong River.[26]

In sum, Hanoi depicted the insurgents as fighting not merely a weak, demoralized and disorganized Phnom Penh army but also a broad sampling of American strength in Southeast Asia, including contingents from South Vietnam, Thailand and even Taiwan. FUNK also accused the United States of building up from 3,500 toward a total of 10,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel in Cambodia, who "are directly in command of military operations on all battlefields."[27] Peking repeated these allegations.[28]

Unlike Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan and the Hanoi-oriented Khmer Rouge leadership displayed no reservations about the adequacy of North Vietnamese backing. Samphan publicly praised the DRV on several occasions for its "continuous support" and promised that the liberation forces would "persist . . . whatever the difficulties."[29] The disparity between the postures of Sihanouk and Samphan reflects their differing constituencies. The Khmer Rouge, lacking a popular base in Cambodian society and dissociating themselves from Sihanouk in the occupied areas — though not yet in international diplomacy — needed the North Vietnamese to supply matériel and advisers despite some local suspicion about long-term Vietnamese communist ambitions for Cambodia. Sihanouk, on the other hand, displayed his distrust of the North Vietnamese from the early days of the rebellion in 1970. If the Prince has any future in Cambodia, it will be derived from his charismatic relationship to the peasantry, his symbolic personification of national unity, and his ties to a Chinese government that is probably unenthusiastic over the prospect of a Khmer Rouge regime closely tied to North Vietnam.

In 1974, however, even the Chinese began to hedge their bets through their effusive reception of Khieu Samphan and his exclusively Khmer Rouge delegation from the Cambodian interior. Sihanouk — as noted — was absent through much of the visit. Peking's warm welcome coincided with reports of an intensification of communist — as distinct from nationalist/anti-American —

[26] Vietnam News Agency (VNA) (Hanoi), February 18, 1974.
[27] RGNUC Propaganda and Information Ministry statement broadcast by the Voice of FUNK in Cambodian, March 22, 1974. See also the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) (Pyongyang) report of Khieu Samphan's speech in North Korea, April 7, 1974.
[28] NCNA, March 24, 1974.
[29] Khieu Samphan interview carried by Radio Hanoi, March 30, 1974.



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indoctrination in Resistance-occupied areas.[30] This onerous new regimen accounted for the sizeable number of recent "political" refugees who during 1974 moved into provincial centers controlled by FANK and should be distinguished from those who had fled earlier in order to escape the fighting.[31] Refugee accounts from those who fled Khmer insurgent areas in 1974 reveal extensive atrocities by the Cambodian communists, who appeared more sanguinary, doctrinaire and vindictive than their Viet Minh predecessors.[32]

### External Economic Aid for the Antagonists

Economic dislocation resulting from more than four years of warfare afflicted both sides. As mentioned previously, conflicts over the distribution of rice harvests reportedly led to limited military clashes between the Vietnamese communists and the Khmer Rouge. On the other side, the Lon Nol regime was heavily dependent on U.S.-funded air and river transport to supply the centers under its control with food and fuel. As one exasperated American diplomat put it: "You cannot imagine how much time we spend just seeing that barges full of rice and gasoline make it up the Mekong to Phnom Penh."[33]

Control over economic resources became increasingly important to the insurgents as they saw their offensives stall from lack of supplies while their responsibilities increased because more territory and population had come under their aegis. Thus, in mid-1974, the RGNUC nationalized foreign-owned rubber plantations for the first time, offering to sell the latex "to anyone who desires to purchase it . . . in conformity with the present and future market."[34]

FUNK propaganda claimed not only that the economy in the "liberated areas" was thriving but that agricultural stocks were produced "in more than sufficient quantities for [our] own consumption and even for export to our neighbors and brothers of liberated South Vietnam and Laos."[35] If the Khmer Rouge are exporting rice and other foodstuffs — voluntarily or otherwise —

[30] James M. Markham, "Cambodia's Military Situation Worsening, with No Peace Talks in Sight," *New York Times,* April 28, 1974.
[31] *Far Eastern Economic Review,* May 27, 1974, pp. 26-27; Quinn, *op. cit.*
[32] Donald Kirk, "Khmer Rouge's Bloody War on Trapped Villagers," *Chicago Tribune,* July 14, 1974.
[33] *New York Times,* March 3, 1974.
[34] RGNUC Deputy Prime Minister's office communiqué, carried by Voice of FUNK in Cambodian, July 20, 1974.
[35] Sihanouk statement broadcast by AKI in French, July 12, 1974.



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to their Indochinese cohorts, this may well alleviate some of the pressure on North Vietnam, which has an annual grain deficit of around one million tons. Over the long run, access to Cambodia's rice-rich Battambang province could render Hanoi "self-sufficient" in grain. Both the Khmer Resistance and China are undoubtedly cognizant of this possibility and its implications for future Cambodian economic independence.[36]

Economic warfare was an important component of the insurgents' overall struggle against Phnom Penh. By cutting supply routes as large numbers of refugees streamed into government centers, the Resistance triggered severe inflation that virtually wiped out the economic security of the salaried middle classes, the Lon Nol regime's original base of political support. Prices were estimated to have risen in government-controlled areas by 275 per cent in 1973 and an additional 40 per cent in the first quarter of 1974.[37] In more explicit terms to a Cambodian consumer, between early 1970 and the end of 1973 the cost of rice shot up 20 times, pork 20 times, chicken 30 times, eggs 15 times, and bananas 20 times. On the pay front the picture was equally bleak. A construction worker who earned 18 U.S. cents a day before the war earned only 54 cents at the end of 1973; and an office girl at Khmer Airlines increased her pay in the same period from around $30 to only $100 per month.[38]

Cambodia's import bill more than doubled between 1970 and the end of 1973 to $214 million — a situation made possible only through the United States' P.L. 480 Commodity Import Program and contributions to the Exchange Support Fund, both of which were drastically reduced for fiscal 1975.[39] In short, the Khmer Republic was surviving economically only through U.S. airlifts into government centers and armed convoys up the Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers. American aid for fiscal 1974 included $325 million in military supplies, $170 million in food, and $75 million in other economic support.[40] The food aid included some 265,000 tons of rice, accounting for more than two-thirds of the Republic's

[36] Kenneth P. Landon, "The Impact of the Sino-American Détente on the Indochinese Conflict," in Gene T. Hsiao, editor, *Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications* (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 221.
[37] *New York Times*, April 28, 1974.
[38] Mike Snitowsky, "The Cambodian Way of Life," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 21, 1974, p. 43.
[39] Personal communication with Norman Sweet of the United States Agency for International Development, December 26, 1974. See also Nayan Chanda, "The Cambodian Nightmare," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 20, 1974, pp. 42-43.
[40] *Christian Science Monitor*, February 4, 1974.



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needs.[41] Much of the economic aid found its way into Phnom Penh's military budget via the Food for Peace program, which permitted the Cambodian government to sell U.S. commodities on the commercial market and transfer some 80 per cent of the proceeds into the military fund.

By the end of 1974, however, the patience of the U.S. Congress had reached its limit. Fiscal 1974's total Cambodian authorization of $688.5 million was almost halved to $377 million for fiscal 1975 — and this took no account of reduced purchasing power. Military aid was slashed from just under $400 million to $200 million. Only $20 million was made available for refugee assistance, $63 million for commodity imports, $15 million for exchange support, and $2 million for technical assistance and training. An additional $77 million could be provided through P.L. 480 commodities.[42] There was a pervasive belief in U.S. government circles that this sum would be nowhere near sufficient for the Phnom Penh administration to retain even its current low level of popular support. Some foresaw food riots and possible military mutiny. Neither the insurgents nor their backers were unaware of this evidence of the political and economic limitations on U.S. aid to Lon Nol's government.

### Why the Search for a Diplomatic Settlement Failed

A negotiated settlement to the war would have depended on *both* sides believing that no end to the protracted conflict was in sight and that each side's external allies were willing to continue only the level of support necessary to keep their Cambodian protagonist in the contest.

Reflecting its relatively weak position, the Phnom Penh government, under several prime ministers, sought a negotiated settlement beginning in April 1973. Each time its conditions were reduced, until in July 1974 Lon Nol offered unconditional negotiations. But while Phnom Penh — with U.S. backing — sought a negotiated end to the war, there was scant evidence to suggest any comparable interest on the part of its Khmer Rouge, North Vietnamese, Chinese and Sihanouk opponents.

The Khmer Rouge and their North Vietnamese mentors would be unenthusiastic about any settlement that would give Sihanouk an independent government role. So long as the insurgents were

[41] *Washington Post*, December 15, 1973. Prior to the war, Cambodia was a rice exporter.

[42] Congressional authorization figures were obtained through the courtesy of Norman Sweet (see note 39).



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able to consolidate control over the areas they occupied and progressively isolate the Phnom Penh regime, there was little need for them to share political authority with either Lon Nol or Sihanouk. Meanwhile, for the North Vietnamese, as pointed out above, *any* settlement in Cambodia before an ultimate disposition of South Vietnam would be viewed as a liability. Military victory for the insurgents would both drain North Vietnamese administrative resources and enhance tendencies toward political independence on the part of the Khmer Rouge. Although a negotiated settlement might not entail the same drain on Hanoi's political and administrative expertise, it would still encourage a less dependent relationship for the Khmer Resistance.

Sihanouk's discontent with the North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge was evinced in numerous interviews and explanations of his preferred outcome for Cambodia. The Prince stated in September 1973 that he wished to see his country's buffer role in Indochinese politics restored and that he would not be averse to American forces being maintained in Thailand.[43] He even indicated a willingness to negotiate directly with the Americans if Washington abjured Lon Nol and established diplomatic relations with the RGNUC.[44] But FUNK indirectly disavowed Sihanouk's feelers by recalling other statements of his denying "the right of any foreign power to become involved in the affairs of the Cambodians. . . ."[45] And when the United States tried to make direct contact with Sihanouk after the Khmer Rouge 1975 winter offensive began, the Prince rebuffed the overtures and spoke only of military victory and a Khmer Rouge government.[46]

For the Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese, Sihanouk's primary utility — as Khieu Samphan somewhat exaggeratedly put it — was "to promote broad international solidarity for our just combat and help us win the *de facto* and *de jure* recognition of the great majority of the world's countries and peoples."[47] But as we have seen, even the role of roving diplomat was circumscribed for the Prince in 1974 as Samphan himself led a combined FUNK/RGNUC delegation on an extended tour to drum up international support for their bid to replace Phnom Penh in Cambodia's United Nations seat. Nevertheless, as the Khmer Rouge marched

[43] Sihanouk interview, *Bangkok Post*, September 29, 1973.
[44] Reported by AFP (Hong Kong), October 14, 1973.
[45] FUNK statements carried by AKI in French, October 18 and November 1, 1973.
[46] *New York Times*, March 17, 1975, and AFP (Hong Kong), April 12, 1975.
[47] Khieu Samphan birthday greeting to Sihanouk, carried by AKI in French, October 30, 1973.



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into Phnom Penh, they announced that the Prince would remain as chief of state.

The ostensible movement of the RGNUC from Peking to a "liberated region" of Cambodia in November 1973 was designed to dramatize its independence for purposes of international recognition and the forthcoming UN vote. Phnom Penh managed to retain its seat by a narrow 53-50 margin (with 21 abstentions), and it is noteworthy that China was the only Asian UN member supporting the insurgents' candidacy. The major diplomatic campaign undertaken in 1974 by Khieu Samphan, who, unlike Sihanouk, has fought the war on Cambodian soil rather than from a safe, comfortable exile, was calculated to reverse the 1973 vote. In visits to eleven countries, spanning Asia, Europe and Africa, timed to coincide with the Front's military offensives during the 1974 dry season, emphasis was placed on the inevitability of an RGNUC victory and the futility of Lon Nol's continued hold on Cambodia's seat in the United Nations.[48]

Both Chinese and North Vietnamese media provided extensive coverage of the tour, perhaps in part because of the momentous diplomatic precedent that could be set if the United Nations voted to replace an incumbent by an insurgent government before a civil war had been terminated. Such an event would have repercussions all the way from Northern Ireland through the Palestine terrorist movements to the PRG in South Vietnam. In the case of Cambodia, Sihanouk argued, acquisition of the UN seat would render it increasingly difficult for the U.S. Congress to appropriate funds for a government no longer recognized in the world's most prominent international forum.[49]

Nevertheless, after an arduous UN General Assembly session in the fall, replete with arcane American parliamentary maneuvering and a good deal of political arm-twisting, Lon Nol's government managed to survive by a vote of 56 to 54 with 24 abstentions. The General Assembly appeal for negotiations by both sides was once more rejected by the insurgents and their backers — Peking, for example, insisting that the issue was strictly an internal matter for the Cambodians to resolve without outside interference.[50] Sihanouk, this time from Pyongyang, declared that his compatriots

[48] The purposes of the tour were summarized by Voice of FUNK in Cambodian, July 7, 1974.

[49] Sihanouk interview in Rumania, reported in the *Lexington* (Ky.) *Herald-Leader*, August 25, 1974.

[50] CPR delegate Huang Hua's speech to the UN General Assembly, NCNA, November 27, 1974.



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were "firmly determined to continue the armed struggle against the enemies for five years or ten years, or even for 20 years, if necessary."[51] Interestingly, his bitter condemnation of noncommunist Asian states' opposition to the RGNUC in the United Nations was excised from NCNA's version of a mid-October statement, demonstrating that the Cambodian issue took second place to Peking's current bridge building toward noncommunist Asia.[52]

Efforts by Phnom Penh, with American support, to arrange face-to-face negotiations with the Resistance remained illusive. Part of the frustration came from inability to identify those who could speak for the Resistance as a whole rather than isolated, disaffected units, some of which (the Khmer Rumdos) were willing to negotiate a transfer of allegiance.[53] Moreover, it was apparent that top-level Resistance leaders remained unwilling to consider either a cease-fire in place or a reactivation of the International Control Commission in Cambodia to monitor the activities of outsiders, as proposed by Prime Minister Long Boret toward the end of 1973.[54]

Up to the very end reports persisted of attempts to contact the RGNUC in a variety of locales, ranging from those of former premiers Son Sann and Cheng Heng in Paris to an alleged anti-Lon Nol liberation front formed in Phnom Penh that was willing to exclude Lon Nol and his advisers if the insurgents agreed to discuss a Laotian-style coalition settlement — thus turning the clock back to Sihanouk's 1970 proposals for a restoration of unity.[55] The *New York Times* revealed what appeared to be an insurgent interest in negotiations in the summer of 1973 which later evaporated, according to Secretary Kissinger, when Congress prohibited further U.S. bombing.[56] The State Department reports that Sihanouk expressed interest in talks in early January 1975 but subsequently refused to receive an emissary, perhaps because of a Khmer Rouge veto.[57]

Sihanouk displayed some sensitivity to charges by a few governments (such as Thailand's) that the Resistance was at fault for its

[51] Sihanouk speech carried by KCNA, December 3, 1974.

[52] Compare the versions of Sihanouk's speech carried by NCNA on October 19 and AKI on October 21, 1974.

[53] Refer to the press conference with Khmer Republic Information Minister Trinh Hoan on the difficulty of making contacts with the FUNK; Phnom Penh Domestic Service, January 10, 1974.

[54] Long Boret's proposal, made in an address to the Cambodian Parliament, was carried by Phnom Penh Domestic Service on December 28, 1973. It was rejected by Sihanouk two days later; AFP (Hong Kong).

[55] *New York Times,* January 13, 1974; *The Nation* (Bangkok), March 1, 1974.

[56] *New York Times,* March 6, 1975.

[57] *Summary of Negotiating Efforts on Cambodia* (Washington: Department of State, Publication No. 138, March 12, 1975).



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unwillingness to halt Indochinese bloodshed even after the Laotians had agreed to a cease-fire and there was a semblance of an international monitoring presence in South Vietnam.[58] He countered by insisting that only Washington could end the Cambodian war, by withdrawing its support from Lon Nol. Hanoi backed his position.[59]

Even the Soviets — who have played their cards cautiously by maintaining contacts with both antagonists, despite their October 1973 "recognition" of the RGNUC — increasingly publicized Khmer Rouge victories. By late summer 1974 they appeared to conclude that the insurgents' victory, under Khieu Samphan's leadership, was only a matter of time. But only in late March 1975 did they order the Khmer Republic to close its embassy and leave Moscow.[60]

## The Khmer Rouge Winter Offensive and the Collapse of the Khmer Republic

On New Year's Day 1975 the Khmer Rouge launched their heaviest and most sustained rocket attack on Phnom Penh (and such other cities as the Mekong River port of Neak Luong and the former royal capital, Oudong) in the five-year history of the war. Outside observers estimated that insurgent forces of some 10,000 were committed to the Phnom Penh squeeze. The capital's defense perimeter shrank through February and March, despite counterattacks by defending aircraft and artillery on rebel rocket positions across the Mekong River. By mid-February the insurgents controlled the Mekong from both banks, virtually halting all river traffic. Phnom Penh was effectively blockaded by both land and water as they seized Route 1 paralleling the river.

According to American and Khmer Republic officials, the increased pressure on Phnom Penh rapidly depleted FANK's ammunition supply, which had been drawn down because of the reduced 1974-1975 aid budget. In late January, President Ford asked the U.S. Congress for a supplementary appropriation of $222 million for Cambodia for the remainder of fiscal 1975. While the Ford Administration was initially optimistic about Phnom Penh's chances of surviving, "given adequate assistance," by late

[58] Sihanouk speech in Sam Neua to the Pathet Lao; Radio Pathet Lao, March 17, 1974.

[59] Banquet address in Canton, NCNA, March 23, 1974, and the *Nhan Dan* editorial of the same day.

[60] Malcolm Brown, "*Pravda* Asks Cambodian Government to Step Aside for the Insurgents," *New York Times*, August 9, 1974; *ibid.*, March 29, 1975.



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February it seemed to have revised its forecast. In a letter to House Speaker Carl Albert, the President warned:

An independent Cambodia cannot survive unless the Congress acts very soon to provide supplemental military and economic assistance. If additional military assistance is withheld or delayed, the Government forces will be forced, within a few weeks, to surrender to the insurgents.[61]

But Secretaries Schlesinger and Kissinger were reported to believe "privately" that the Lon Nol regime's chances of survival were not good, even with additional assistance. Halfhearted attempts to justify continued American support were premised on the hope that if the Khmer Republic could make it through the current dry season the communists might agree to negotiate. Yet Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib acknowledged that there was "no assurance" of this.[62] Almost as if in direct refutation of this argument, Sihanouk asserted, in an article published in the *New York Times:*

The financial aid and other types of aid from the United States to the Lon Nol regime will not in any case make us negotiate or accept a compromise with the traitors, Lon Nol and his clique. Continued aid will only worsen the war and plunge tiny Cambodia and her already miserable population into a miring of suffering, ruin, and death.[63]

Indeed, several observers speculated that the primary concern of the U.S. government was no longer to save the Khmer Republic but rather to ensure that it did not fall because of insufficient U.S. assistance. Both Ford and Kissinger stressed that "Our national security and the integrity of our alliances depend upon our reputation as a reliable partner. Countries around the world who depend on us for support — as well as their foes — will judge our performance."[64]

Reports of atrocities committed by Khmer Rouge cadres, carried by refugees into Phnom Penh, included accounts of many village notables being executed on the spot, apparently in the belief that they were Lon Nol supporters because of their positions.[65] It may be noteworthy that Khmer Rouge publicists have not di-

[61] Richard Madden, "New Cambodia Aid Asked by Ford," *ibid.*, January 29, 1975; Bernard Gwertzman, "Urgency Stressed," *ibid.*, February 26, 1975.

[62] Leslie Gelb, "Schlesinger and Kissinger See Slight Cambodia Hope," *ibid.*, February 27, 1975, and "U.S. Will Fly Rice into Phnom Penh in 30-Day Airlift," *ibid.*, February 25, 1975.

[63] Norodom Sihanouk, "On Cambodia and the U.S.," *ibid.*, March 2, 1975.

[64] Gwertzman, *op. cit.* This line of reasoning has a familiar ring to those who remember American arguments for staying the distance in Vietnam during the late 1960's.

[65] AFP (Hong Kong), January 6, 1975, and "How Phnom Penh Rides Out Attack," *New York Times,* January 5, 1975.



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rectly addressed themselves to these charges, though they countered by accusing the United States and the Cambodian air force of using U.S.-supplied CBU-55 cluster bombs, which have a devastating anti-personnel effect.[66]

By late February, Phnom Penh was being supplied entirely through an airlift whose primary component was a Defense Department civilian contractor, Bird Air. The operation had begun in October 1974 when the Ford Administration decided to phase out the politically sensitive use of the U.S. Air Force for supply flights to Phnom Penh. By mid-February, Bird Air was making up to twenty-four flights a day but this, nonetheless, was only half the number flown by the U.S. Air Force on the same run during the insurgents' 1973 offensive.[67]

The American airlift provided the political breakthrough the Khmer Rouge had been hoping for. Hanoi agreed to step up deliveries of arms and ammunition ostensibly in response to the U.S. air supply of beleaguered Phnom Penh.[68] Provided for the first time with all the supplies they needed, the CPLAF moved swiftly by employing their vaunted mobility to defeat government forces strung out along roads and equipped with armor and artillery rendered useless at close range. By the end of March, Cambodian government forces had been pushed back into Phnom Penh and a few other provincial cities where insurgent forces were able to draw up artillery and engage in an almost lavish use of ammunition — some 500 shells a day, for example, being sent into Neak Luong with the clear intention of demonstrating to the Phnom Penh authorities and the American Embassy that a similar fate awaited the capital if a surrender was not offered.

The Khmer Republic's fall on April 16 validated the Khmer Rouge strategy of the previous five years in which they would seize an area, establish a political administration, recruit new guerrillas, and repeat the process in another area. Though the Khmer Republic had 220,000 soldiers compared with an estimated 60,000 insurgents, almost all of the latter were combat troops while no more than 70,000 of the government's forces were in fighting units. In the last year of hostilities, many of these deserted when the payroll stopped.[69]

[66] Sihanouk statement of February 5, broadcast by AKI in French, February 10, 1975.
[67] Sidney Schanberg, "U.S. Doubles Airlift into Cambodia," *New York Times,* February 13, 1975.
[68] VNA and AFP (Hong Kong), February 28, 1975.
[69] John Treaster, "Communist-Led Rebel Force Combines Diverse Groups," *New York Times,* April 17, 1975.



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Sihanouk seemed to be holding his own in 1975. He was hailed by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong at a Hanoi reception as the "representative of the legality, legitimacy and continuity of the Cambodian state."[70] A month earlier, however, the Cambodian Information Agency (AKI) had announced the replacement of a number of Sihanoukist ministers resident in Peking by their Khmer Rouge successors inside Cambodia, virtually abolishing any remaining personal support for the Prince within the RGNUC, by then located in Cambodia. Thus, both FUNK and the insurgent government have been effectively insulated from his influence.[71] Nevertheless, the Khmer Rouge have confirmed Sihanouk as head of state for life; and, in a statement from Peking, the Prince declared that although the country will be ruled by the FUNK and its Khmer Rouge leaders, it "will not be a 'communist state,' but a democratic, progressive and non-aligned one."[72] The Khmer Rouge have not endorsed Sihanouk's description of Cambodia's future domestic order, their Paris representative Chau Seng saying only that there will be "a new society, certainly different from the one that preceded the fascist coup d'etat of March 18, 1970. . . ."[73]

The Prince had earlier coordinated his diplomatic activity with the 1975 communist offensive. Probably in hope of sharpening dissension within Phnom Penh's leadership, he declared, soon after the January 1 assault, that Chen Heng, Sirik Matak and Army Chief of Staff Sosthene Fernandez had expressed a desire to "go over to his side." The allegations were denied in Phnom Penh.[74] In early February, he renewed this line by telling a Swedish journalist that he was willing to accept all members of Lon Nol's government should they ask for a pardon. But, he added, his "forgive-and-forget" plan had not yet been approved by the Khmer Rouge.[75]

It was only in late March that Khieu Samphan seemed to agree to Sihanouk's idea of a general amnesty for all except "the seven traitors, Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, Chen Heng, In Tam, Long Boret, and Sosthene Fernandez." The RGNUC Deputy Prime Minister declared to all other public officials that "the FUNK opens its doors wide to you."[76] Just how well the

[70] Greeting by Pham Van Dong to Sihanouk at a February 11 Hanoi reception, carried by Radio Hanoi in Vietnamese, February 12, 1975.
[71] See the AKI announcement broadcast in French, January 14, 1975.
[72] AFP (Paris), April 15, 1975.
[73] *New York Times,* April 18, 1975.
[74] See the AFP (Hong Kong) accounts dated January 6, 10 and 11, 1975.
[75] Claes Bratt interview of Sihanouk in the *Far Eastern Economic Review,* February 7, 1975, pp. 29-30.
[76] RGNUC Cabinet press communiqué broadcast by Voice of FUNK in Cambodian, March 26, 1975.



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RGNUC will live up to its promise remains to be seen. Certainly its earlier treatment of captured populations does not bode well.

As for future relations with the Vietnamese communists, there may well be Khmer Rouge resistance to Viet Minh hegemonic designs. As early as mid-March 1975, the Voice of FUNK insisted: "Our Cambodian nation and people, FUNK and the RGNUC . . . cannot tolerate any foreign country establishing military bases of aggression on our soil."[77] Although it could be argued that this statement was not directed against the PAVN, since, by definition, its bases could not be depicted as "aggressive," a statement issued after the RGNUC was installed in Phnom Penh reiterated this admonition through a "special national congress" declaration "absolutely prohibiting any country from establishing military bases." According to Western estimates, there still may be some 20,000 North Vietnamese troops in eastern Cambodia keeping supplies flowing down the Ho Chi Minh trail.[78] If the Khmer Rouge statement is directed against North Vietnam, new Indochina tensions could be in the offing — this time pitting one militarily weak national communist movement against its erstwhile mentor and regional "liberator." It would be ironic indeed were North Vietnam to play the role of regional imperialist, its hand being bitten by the neighboring revolutionary movement it had helped to create and supply.

[77] Voice of FUNK in Cambodian, March 11, 1975.
[78] David Andelman, "Cambodia Bars Foreign Bases," *New York Times*, April 29, 1975.



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# THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

*by Avigdor Haselkorn*

THE idea of establishing an Asian collective security system was first raised by Leonid Brezhnev on June 7, 1969. Since then the typical view among Western commentators holds that "the USSR has continued, without great emphasis or success, [the] campaign to create a collective security system in Asia,"[1] thus indicating that "[l]ike most Grand Designs on a continental scale, a Soviet Grand Design for Asia is almost certainly illusory."[2]

True, some Western analysts draw attention to the possibility that "what Soviet leaders envisage for Asia is not necessarily a single multilateral security pact but perhaps a network of bilateral treaties between the USSR and individual Asian countries on the model of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship of August 1971."[3] Moreover, certain observers correctly believe that there is some link between the idea of an Asian collective security system, the Soviet-Indian treaty, the Treaty of Friendship concluded between the Soviet Union and Egypt in 1971,[4] and the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Treaty of 1972.[5]

However, even the latter group stops short of suggesting the defense connection existing between the different treaties in operational terms.[6] Put differently, one rarely encounters a macroanalysis of the direction and types of mutual strategic support among the various segments of the Soviet collective security system. This might be attributed to the preoccupation of many scholars with

[1] Ralph L. Powell, "China's Conflict with Russia: War or Polemic," *Pacific Community,* October 1973, p. 39. See also Sheldon W. Simon, "The Japan-China-USSR Triangle," *Pacific Affairs,* Summer 1974, p. 136.

[2] Arnold L. Horelick, *The Soviet Union's "Asian Collective Security Proposal": A Club in Search of Members* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, P-5195, March 1974), p. 19.

[3] Thomas W. Robinson, "Soviet Policy in East Asia," *Problems of Communism,* November-December 1973, p. 44. Also, Alexander O. Ghebhardt, "The Soviet Collective Security System," *Asian Survey,* December 1973, p. 1089.

[4] Horelick, *op. cit.,* p. 7.

[5] Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Moscow's Options in a Changing World," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1972, p. 3.

[6] A notable exception is John C. Campbell, "The Communist Powers and the Middle East: Moscow's Purposes," *ibid.,* September-October 1972, pp. 52-54.



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bilateral interactions rather than their totality — with compartmentalistic details rather than a systemic view.

The purpose of the present article is to prove the existence of a strategic link tying together the Warsaw Pact treaty, the Middle East treaties — including the recent Treaty of Friendship the Soviets signed with Somalia,[7] and those expected with Syria[8] and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) — and the Indo-Soviet treaty. By demonstrating the performance of various strategic mutual-support functions between these security subsystems, I expect to show that a Soviet collective security system is far from being an illusive Grand Design and, in fact, is largely in place, and may well be extended in the future.

To illustrate the point, we will examine two groups of interactions: the Warsaw Pact-Middle East subsystem and the Middle East-Indian subsystem. The strategic mutual-support functions to consider in these instances are of three types: (1) logistic support, i.e., the supply of military advisers, equipment and bases; (2) defensive support, i.e., a threat of direct military intervention by one subsystem in support of another — obviously an option that could be used only with regard to cases in which a part of the collective security system had been put in jeopardy; and (3) offensive options, i.e., situations in which the security system could be utilized to initiate large-scale military operations against an enemy of the Soviet Union.

## Strategic Mutual Support: The Warsaw Pact-Middle East Subsystem

### *Support for the Middle East*

The first dimension of the relationship between the two subsystems consists of strategic support given the Middle East (Egypt, Syria and Iraq) by the northwestern members of the Soviet collective security system, the Warsaw Pact.

*Logistic Support.* After the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, it was claimed[9] that Egyptian President Sadat had been prepared

[7] This treaty was signed in Mogadishu on July 11, 1974, by Soviet President Podgorny and the President of Somalia, General Mohamed Siad Barre. See Text of Joint Communiqué on Podgorny's Visit to Somalia, TASS News Release (in English), Moscow, July 12, 1974. The treaty has been ratified, but, contrary to usual practice, the text was not published in the Soviet Union until October. Brian Crozier, *The Soviet Presence in Somalia* (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, Conflict Studies No. 54, February 1975), pp. 3-5.

[8] W.A.C. Adie, "The Communist Powers and the Middle East: Peking's Revised Line," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1972, p. 67.

[9] *Jerusalem Post Weekly*, February 12, 1974, p. 18.



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as early as August or September 1972 to drop a parachute brigade somewhere in the Sinai and had actually issued orders to that effect, but his War Minister at the time, General Mohammed Sadek, refused to carry them out, probably because the Egyptian army lacked ammunition for more than three days of fighting. Yet while commenting on the war, Syrian President Asad claimed that Cairo and Damascus had planned for a ninety-day campaign.[10] This posed two important questions:

> Could the Arab leaders have risked planning a 90-day campaign if they had not had prior Soviet assurance of receiving additional munitions and equipment after the start of combat operations? Or, conversely, if the Soviet Union had limited the amount of munitions and supplies it had provided to maintain control over the actions of its clients, why did this control prove ineffectual as a restraint on the Arabs' decision to go to war?[11]

The 1973 Middle East war provides one of the best demonstrations of logistic support performed between subsystems of the Soviet collective security system. A Soviet airlift carrying supplies into Egypt, Syria and Iraq began operating on October 7, the second day of the war,[12] and reached massive proportions by October 10.[13] Within fourteen days (October 10-October 24) the Soviets flew 832 resupply missions, peaking at seventy to ninety flights daily,[14] and carried 13,000 tons of arms[15] to the three Arab states. Soviet air force pilots also flew MiG-21 fighters directly to Syria.[16] Simultaneously, some thirty Soviet merchant vessels were carrying resupplies to Egypt and Syria.[17] Two or three Soviet freighters a day docked at the port of Alexandria, and *at least one ship a day ar-*

[10] *The Economist* (London), November 3, 1973, p. 62.

[11] Foy D. Kohler, Leon Gouré and Mose L. Harvey, *The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War: The Implications for Detente* (Washington: University of Miami, Monographs in International Affairs, 1974), p. 40.

[12] *New York Times*, November 28, 1973.

[13] Galia Golan, "Soviet Aims and the Middle East War," *Survival*, May-June 1974, p. 108. Some sources say this happened by October 9: see Kohler, *et al., op. cit.*, p. 64.

[14] *New York Times*, November 8, 1973. The bulk of these missions were flown by the An-12, capable of carrying some twenty tons a distance of 1,800 nm (nautical miles). (John Erickson, *Soviet Military Power* [London: RUSI, 1971], p. 63.) Others were performed by a variety of Soviet cargo aircraft including the An-22, which can lift some eighty-eight tons a distance of 3,100 nm. or fifty tons for 6,800 nm. P. M. Dadant, *American and Soviet Defense Systems vis-à-vis the Middle East* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, P-4352, July 1970), p. 15.

[15] A Pentagon estimate, quoted in *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv), October 25, 1973. Within a *thirty*-day period the Soviets flew 934 missions carrying 15,000 tons of equipment. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, December 10, 1973, p. 16; *Strategic Survey 1973* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1974), p. 27.

[16] *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, October 22, 1973, p. 18.

[17] *New York Times*, November 9, 1973.



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*rived from other East European countries.*[18] Within a thirty-day period some 225,000 tons of arms and ammunition were thus sealifted to the two Arab belligerents.[19]

It is important to stress for our purposes that the Soviet air and sea operations depended largely on stocks of heavy weapons and ammunition concentrated in Hungary for the support of Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe.[20] In fact, a land link was established from Hungary to the Yugoslav port of Rijeka in order to sealift heavy equipment (including T-54 tanks) to the Middle East. It is estimated that at that time the Rijeka facility handled an average of 60,000 tons of material per week.[21] Further, military cargo flights were flown from a Soviet air base in Turkeve, Hungary, and from Bulgaria.[22]

The difference between the behavior of the Warsaw Pact members, "which cooperated energetically in the Soviet assistance to Egypt and Syria during the fighting,"[23] and that of NATO members moved U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger to issue a bitter complaint to the European allies. Kissinger pointed out that the American administration was upset because the Europeans had denied the United States free access to military stocks and facilities in Europe in its effort to resupply Israel with weapons, even though the Soviet Union used its military stocks and facilities in Eastern Europe to resupply Arab countries.[24]

The supply of military advisers was another requirement of logistic support met effectively by the Soviet collective security system. During the war a sizeable body of Soviet military advisers and technicians were supervising, and assessing the performance of, new weapons systems supplied to the Arabs.[25] Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements told a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee that some Soviet troops had manned anti-aircraft missile sites during the fighting, but that they had "not actively engaged themselves in hostilities."[26]

[18] *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* December 17, 1973, p. 14; *New York Times,* October 19, 1973. Unofficial Pentagon reports credited the Soviet sealift with delivering some 340 tanks to Syria by October 18. Kohler, *et al., op. cit.,* p. 64, note 27.
[19] *New York Times,* November 28, 1973; *Christian Science Monitor,* December 28, 1973.
[20] *New York Times,* November 28, 1973.
[21] *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* November 19, 1973, p. 14.
[22] *Ibid.,* and *New York Times,* October 25, 1973.
[23] *New York Times,* November 11, 1973.
[24] *Ibid.,* October 30, 1973.
[25] *Ibid.,* October 14, 1973. London's International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated 1,000 Soviet advisers in Egypt, 3,000 in Syria, and 1,500 in Iraq.
[26] *Ibid.,* November 6, 1973. On the involvement of non-Soviet military personnel in Arab states, see below.



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*Defensive Support.* As one might expect, defensive support aspects of the Soviet collective security system are revealed only when one of its subsystems comes under direct military threat. Again, the closing days of the Yom Kippur War illustrate the point.

On October 25, 1973 the United States placed its forces on alert after it concluded that Moscow was preparing to send forces into the Middle East, presumably to defend the collapsing Egyptian army.[27] Among indications of the Soviet intent was the alert of some 40,000 to 50,000 Soviet airborne troops, stationed normally in East Germany, Poland and the USSR[28] but which had been moved to potential staging areas in the southern part of the Soviet Union.[29] This was compounded by the fact that at the same time the airlift of supplies to Egypt and Syria had tapered off as Moscow apparently shifted to ships to get military equipment to the Arabs.[30] The Americans reasoned that the Soviets were diverting their cargo aircraft to pick up the alerted airborne divisions.[31]

Further, the Soviets were reported to have approached Yugoslavia for permission to fly troops over that country to the Middle East,[32] and to have transferred an airborne division from Tula (about 100 miles south of Moscow) to a base near Belgrade. The staff of that division was alleged to be in Damascus.[33] Another reported move was of an air transport unit of approximately thirty aircraft from Prague to Belgrade.[34] In addition, a huge movement of Soviet rail traffic in Eastern Europe, probably the most concerted in all of Europe since World War II, was detected by the Americans on October 12, moving to the *east* — away from Soviet bases in Central Europe; this raised suspicions that the Soviets were moving war matériel to airports to support an airborne intervention.[35]

[27] For an assessment of the possible global consequences of such an intervention, see Brian Crozier, "Soviet Aims in Desert War," *Soviet Analyst,* November 1, 1973, pp. 1-2.

[28] *New York Times,* November 25, 1973.

[29] *Ibid.*, October 26 and 27, 1973.

[30] U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger revealed that the Soviet resupply effort had "diminished to zero flights." *The Times* (London), October 27, 1973; *New York Times,* October 28, 1973.

[31] One source reported that some Soviet troops were actually in flight to the Middle East when the American counter-alert was announced. *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* November 5, 1973, p. 7.

[32] *New York Times,* October 28 and November 19, 1973.

[33] *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* November 19, 1973, p. 14.

[34] *Ibid.* This transfer provided a logistic base for the Soviets approximately halfway between their forces in East Germany and Poland and the Middle East. Belgrade is on a direct line between Poland and Hungary and the presumed destination of these forces, and about 500 miles closer to the eastern Mediterranean than is Prague.

[35] *New York Times,* October 30, 1973.



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Concern was felt, too, about the possibility that Moscow might move in some of its "naval infantry"[36] from ships stationed in the Mediterranean. A naval infantry brigade of some 3,000-4,000 men is regularly deployed in each of the four Soviet fleet areas,[37] and there were reports that the Mediterranean contingent had been augmented during the war.[38]

In assessing the Soviet capability to intervene in defense of one of its collective security subsystems, several points should be considered. First, Soviet military doctrine stresses the airborne arm's ability to intervene in sudden crises either with paratroops or with infantry landing on friendly fields. Second, these forces have been expanded rapidly in recent years. Whereas Western intelligence estimated three years ago that there were seven Soviet airborne divisions, the present estimate is at least twelve and possibly thirteen, with a mobilized strength of 7,500 each.[39] Third, the expansion of the airborne forces has gone hand in hand with development of the Soviet airlift capability. It is estimated that the Soviet air force can currently move three airborne divisions in one lift over short or medium range,[40] and some sources say this capability is being expanded to handle the rapid deployment of five airborne divisions.[41] This will probably be achieved by the introduction of the new Il-76,[42] which seems capable of carrying some 250 troops over 5,000 kilometers (2,800 nm).[43] One hundred of these craft reportedly have been ordered.[44]

However, some military analysts who studied Soviet options for

[36] For general discussions of these forces, see John F. Meehan, "The Soviet 'Marine Corps,'" *Military Review,* October 1972, pp. 84-94; J. L. Moulton, "Seaborne and Airborne Mobility in Europe," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* Naval Review 1974, p. 127.

[37] *Strategic Survey 1971* (London: IISS, 1972), p. 29; *New York Times,* November 10, 1973.

[38] The *New York Times,* October 19 and 26, 1973, estimated that it had grown to 6,000.

[39] John Erickson, "MBFR: Force Levels and Security Requirements," *Strategic Review,* Summer 1973, p. 33; *New York Times,* October 26, 1973; *Military Review,* March 1975, p. 98. For a general discussion of these units, see Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Airborne Troops," *Military Review,* April 1973, pp. 66-70. Attention should also be given to the role they played in the following Soviet exercises: Dnieper in 1967, Dvina in 1970, and in particular Yug in 1971. See John F. Meehan, "Soviet Maneuvers Summer 1971," *ibid.,* April 1972, pp. 14-21.

[40] *Military Review,* April 1973, p. 100. Some estimates put this number at three to four divisions. Erickson, *Soviet Military Power, op. cit.,* p. 63. For more conservative estimates see Moulton, *op. cit.,* p. 129, and *The Military Balance 1970-1971* (London: IISS, 1970), p. 8.

[41] *Military Review,* April 1973, *loc. cit.*

[42] *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* May 28, 1973, p. 49.

[43] *Ha'aretz,* June 2, 1971.

[44] *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* June 11, 1973, p. 57.



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military intervention in the Middle East[45] suggest that units other than airborne would be more effective in the Sinai and in Syria. They point to the sustained tactical mobility required in both areas, mobility a Soviet airborne division does not possess. Moreover, it is said that as far as desert operations are concerned, Soviet military planners see close coordination with regular ground forces as a necessity, and they would probably not commit an airborne division without having available reliable link-up forces in the form of tank or motorized rifle units. Accordingly, Graham H. Turbiville reaches the conclusion that

> The most combat effective Soviet intervention force to be used in the desert regions of the Middle East would be composed of regular Soviet tank and motorized rifle units. While such units could not be quickly transported to the Middle East in their entirety, *personnel from a desert-trained tank division in the USSR could be transported in fewer than 100 An-12 aircraft flights.* Major items of equipment to include *tanks, APCs, artillery and logistic support vehicles would certainly be available in Egypt or Syria from the huge Soviet equipment stocks already provided to the Arabs.* Thus several Soviet motorized rifle and/or tank divisions could be flown in, reconstituted and converted to battle in a matter of days. The commitment of regular ground units, in *conjunction* with airborne troops and naval infantry, could decisively determine the outcome of combat operations in the Sinai or Syria.[46]

Finally, another aspect of defensive support furnished by Moscow to the Middle East security subsystem has to do with the introduction — under Soviet control — of SCUD-B SRBM's into Egypt. Two brigades of these missiles had left the USSR for Egypt *with crews* on September 12 and two more were airlifted to Cairo West Airport in An-12 transports after the October 22 cease-fire had collapsed.[47] The deployment of the missiles in Egypt in the first place could be construed as deterrence against possible Israeli strategic air strikes, whereas the urgent dispatch of Soviet missile reinforcements to Cairo — once an Egyptian military collapse became imminent — probably constituted a Soviet signal warning Israel against pursuing the battle and/or mounting a direct threat to the Egyptian capital. Thus, this move should be regarded as a limited, but significant, direct Soviet intervention in the war aimed

[45] Notably Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Desert Operations," *Military Review*, June 1974, pp. 49-50.

[46] *Ibid.* (Emphasis added.) Soviet equipment stocks in the Middle East reveal another aspect of Egypt as "a Soviet forward base area." *Strategic Survey 1971*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[47] *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, November 5, 1973, p. 12; November 12, 1973, p. 11.



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at providing *specific* defensive support to a threatened security subsystem.

There is little doubt that, given the willingness to act, the Soviet collective security system possesses a capability enabling the Warsaw Pact to perform satisfactorily a range of strategic mutual-support roles in behalf of the Middle East subsystem.

*Support for the Warsaw Pact*

We now turn to the second dimension of the interaction between these two subsystems, namely, demonstrations of strategic support provided to the Warsaw Pact by the Middle East.

*Logistic Support.* Clearly, the naval facilities Egypt and Syria have made available to the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet help its main mission of countering the strategic strike capability of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.[48] Besides, the "provision of naval facilities at Alexandria and Mersa Matruch (Egypt) has enabled the Russian fleet to increase the number of its ships in the Mediterranean without placing a strain on the limited resources available for replenishment at sea."[49] It is therefore significant that in December 1972 (five months *after* the expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt), President Sadat extended the 1968 agreement on the right of the Soviet navy to use Egyptian port facilities, which was to expire in March 1973.[50]

Moreover, though Soviet-Syrian relations have not yet solidified into a friendship treaty similar to those signed with Egypt and Iraq, some observers draw attention to the military agreements concluded between the two countries. Specifically cited are the military agreement signed between the Soviet Union and Syria on May 14, 1972 and the security arrangement of September 1972.[51] Because of these agreements the Soviets were allowed to build improved naval facilities at two Syrian ports — Latakia and Tartus. A number of reports have also mentioned that a large Soviet submarine harbor is being built at Ras Shamra. Without doubt, naval facilities on the Syrian coast afford the Soviets even greater flexi-

[48] *Strategic Survey 1971, op. cit.*, pp. 31-32. For a comprehensive analysis see Ciro E. Zoppo, "The American-Soviet Mediterranean Confrontation and the Middle East," in Willard A. Beling, editor, *The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1973), pp. 201-236.

[49] R. M. Burrell, "Opportunity Knocks for the Kremlin's Drive East," in Morton A. Kaplan, editor, *Great Issues in International Politics* (Chicago: Aldine, 1974), p. 472.

[50] Kohler, *et al., op. cit.*, p. 35. Some sources say forty to eighty Soviet warships, oilers and supply ships are usually found moored in Alexandria's harbor or tied up at the docks. The situation regarding Soviet use of Port Said's facilities, however, is ambiguous. Lawrence Griswold, "Base Necessities: The World Lineup," *Sea Power*, August 1974, p. 19.

[51] Burrell, *op. cit.*, p. 479; *New York Times*, September 4, 1972 and July 18, 1974.



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bility for their operations. In fact, as a direct consequence of these developments, Soviet naval spokesmen were able to claim considerable success in deterring the unilateral exercise of Western naval power in the Mediterranean.[52]

Admittedly, the Soviet fleet's biggest operational problem in the Mediterranean is that of airpower. This might be solved to some extent by its SSM (surface-to-surface missile) strength. Nevertheless, as long as it has no aircraft carriers with fixed-wing aircraft,[53] its air support must come from land-based squadrons, which, even when these are available, sets limits on the fleet's safe radius of action. In this respect the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt in July 1972 was a serious setback for Moscow.[54] Yet it is far from certain that there are at present no Soviet pilots in Egypt and Syria and that, if needed, additional pilots would not be redeployed there.

Since the October 1973 war Soviet MiG-25's have been stationed in Cairo West Airport,[55] and the Ilyushin Il-38 maritime reconnaissance/anti-submarine aircraft with Egyptian air force markings that have shadowed NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean are believed to be operated by Soviet crews.[56] Earlier reports suggest that the Soviets had moved approximately fifteen MiG-23 fighters and a squadron of nine to eighteen Su-7 ground-attack aircraft into Algeria. If true, this might have a considerable effect on the Soviet fleet's radius of operations in the Mediterranean. Significant also for the performance of the Kremlin's collective security system is the reported use of Soviet An-22's to fly these aircraft to Egypt, where they were assembled before being flown to Algeria.[57]

Finally, it is important to stress that although NATO has a

[52] See Barry M. Blechman, *The Changing Soviet Navy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 23.

[53] For recent developments in this field see Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Naval Interaction with the U.S. and Its Influence on Soviet Naval Development* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, P-4913, October 1972), pp. 32-34, 37; John F. Funkhouser, "Soviet Carrier Strategy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* December 1973, pp. 27-37; Norman Polmar, "The Soviet 'Aircraft Carrier,'" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* Naval Review 1974, pp. 145-161; R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, "More Power to the Navy," *Soviet Analyst,* November 1, 1973, pp. 2-3; *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* May 28, 1973, p. 141; *New York Times,* November 19, 1973.

[54] At the peak of its presence in Egypt, Moscow maintained 150 Soviet-manned MiG-21 fighters, at an average of two pilots per plane, operating out of six Soviet-controlled airfields. (*New York Times,* July 19, 1972.) The SA-3 and SA-6 advanced SAM's brought to Egypt were intended primarily to protect these six air bases. J. C. Hurewitz, "Weapons Acquisition: Israel and Egypt," Paper presented in the Interuniversity Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, October 1973, p. 16.

[55] *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* November 5, 1973, p. 12; Golan, *op. cit.,* p. 112.

[56] *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* September 6, 1974, p. 27.

[57] *Ibid.,* April 19, 1971, p. 14.



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marked edge over the Soviet Union in air cover and air support for its ships, it also has the task of securing its communications along its southern flank to Greece and Turkey. The USSR by contrast has interior lines on land. NATO's land-based air strength in the Mediterranean could be drawn off in war into the land battle. Additionally, by gaining a secure foothold in Syria and Iraq, the Soviet Union has totally outflanked CENTO and is in a position to ensure easy movement by land between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.[58]

## Strategic Mutual Support: The Middle East-India Subsystem

### *Support for the Indian Subsystem*

The first dimension of this relationship involves the support the Middle East security subsystem has furnished the Indian subsystem.

*Logistic Support.* A clear demonstration of this kind of support occurred before and during the Indo-Pakistani war of December 1971. As early as November 1971, a month before war broke out, it was reported that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was offering the Indians (who had signed a Friendship Treaty with Moscow on August 9, 1971) an immediate supply of weapons, "with the most advanced missile and radar components *flown* in immediately and other matériel arriving in eight shiploads."[59]

An analysis of relevant geopolitical factors reveals that a Soviet airlift into India is a complex maneuver.[60] The only air corridor that can be safely utilized for this purpose lies over the Middle East. Two routes are available: over Egypt with a refueling stop in Somalia and/or the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen,[61] and

[58] Burrell, *op. cit.*, p. 479.

[59] *New York Times,* November 30, 1971. (Emphasis added.)

[60] For an elaboration see Edward Luttwak, "Russia and China: A Logistic View of Soviet Policy," *New Middle East,* March/April 1972, p. 50.

[61] The 1974 Friendship Treaty with Somalia and the prospect of another to be concluded with the PDRY thus acquire additional justification. Somalia is said to allow Soviet medium-range jets to operate from her territory in return for Moscow's agreement to expand the airfield at Berbera. (*New York Times,* April 9, 1973.) Soviet assistance in constructing a new military airport near Mogadishu is also reported. See testimony of Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, in *Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and Southeast Asia,* Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, March 6, 1974 (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 32. Also, *New York Times,* March 9, 1975.

As for the PDRY, the Soviets have been accorded use of facilities at a former RAF airfield near Aden. It is not inconceivable that they may even use the jet airport in Sana (in the Yemen Arab Republic) which they built in the early 1960's. Wynfred Joshua, "The Middle East in Soviet Strategy," *Strategic Review,* Spring 1974, p. 63. There are some 200 Soviet advisers in the YAR currently, according to "Aid and Subversion for the Arabs," *Soviet Analyst,* December 13, 1973, p. 2.



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over Syria with a refueling stop in Iraq. The diversity of Middle East routes and air bases provides flexibility, if political problems with a host country arise, and enables Moscow to fly jet fighters as well as transport aircraft into India. This saves the time-consuming acceptance-check flights that would be necessary if the aircraft had to be assembled in India.

All these advantages, together with those usually associated with the possession of a forward base area, were utilized by the Soviets before and during the Indo-Pakistani war. In early November twelve Soviet transport planes carried military equipment, mainly advanced versions of SAM's, to New Delhi and Bombay.[62] Moreover, during the war thirty An-22 transport aircraft used Cairo's military air base (Almaza) as more than a refueling stop in flying reinforcements to India: Sadat disclosed that Soviet cargo aircraft on their way to India *picked up Soviet equipment in Egypt.*[63] Simultaneously, the Soviets were reported transferring some of their jet warplanes from Egypt *directly* to India to replace Indian air force losses during the war. About fifteen MiG-21 fighters and Tu-16 bombers were reportedly delivered.[64] Plainly, Soviet conduct during this crisis fulfills John Erickson's expectation that " 'on the spot' airpower and a highly mobile air force operated from the Soviet Union, would probably best serve Soviet interests."[65]

Several recent revelations further indicate the existence of a logistic link between the Middle East and Indian security subsystems. Noting them, the analyst must wonder why the Soviets are maintaining a squadron of medium bombers constantly in Iraq[66] — either Tu-16's or Tu-22's, jets with a range capable of reaching India — instead of the usual deployments of MiG's and Sukhoi's as in other Arab states. Again, why are they keeping a cache of several hundred Mikoyan and Sukhoi fighter aircraft in varying

[62] Zubeida Mustafa, "The 1971 Crisis in Pakistan: India, the Soviet Union and China," *Pacific Community*, April 1972, p. 507. It is likely that spare parts for MiG-21 and Su-7 aircraft were also delivered. (See *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI 1972 Yearbook* [Stockholm: International Peace Research Institute, 1972], p. 127.) Details of the Soviet airlift into India were probably arranged when Marshal Pavel S. Kutakhov, Chief of the Soviet Air Force, visited India in October. *International Herald Tribune*, October 29, 1971; *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, November 8, 1971, p. 13.

[63] *Time*, December 20, 1971, p. 28; Anthony McDermott, "Sadat and the Soviet Union," *The World Today*, September 1972, p. 408.

[64] *New York Times*, March 31, 1972. For India's denial of the story see *ibid.*, April 1, 1972.

[65] Erickson, *Soviet Military Power*, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[66] *New York Times*, October 3, 1973 and January 25, 1974; *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, October 8, 1973, p. 11.



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degrees of operational readiness in storage in Egypt, Syria and Iraq — stock that remained untouched during the Yom Kippur War and during the massive Soviet effort to replace Arab plane losses in that war?[67]

It is conceivable that these aircraft are being kept in readiness for the possible return of large numbers of Soviet pilots in case of an emergency in the Middle East and/or the Mediterranean. Similarly, the Tupolevs may be kept in Iraq for reconnaissance over the Mediterranean in case Syria turns its back on the USSR. Nevertheless, it is also true that these capabilities enable the Soviets to defend India (and the Indian Ocean) in a relatively short period of time.

Still another dimension of logistic support between the two subsystems came to light in February 1973 when in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad large quantities of Soviet arms were seized by the Pakistani security forces, presumably prior to their transfer to the Baluchi "freedom movement." The dismemberment of Pakistan could serve not only Indian interests but Moscow's as well. A friendly, but weak, independent Baluchistani government in that area would give the USSR access to a long coastline on the Indian Ocean, controlling the entrance to the Persian Gulf and the oil shipping routes.

*Defensive Support.* The fact that India as a subsystem in the Soviet collective security system escaped direct military threat in 1971 and faced only a potential threat (the possibility of intervention by China in the Indo-Pakistani war) makes an analysis of defensive support hypothetical. Yet it is worth considering.

Clearly, the Soviets have some options for India's defense which are not available to them in the Middle East because of different geopolitical conditions. The 4,500-mile border they share with China makes the difference. Therefore, the contribution of the Middle East security subsystem to the defense of India is less certain than its logistic role. On the one hand, there are statements like the one made by Colonel General Margelov, Chief of Soviet Airborne Troops, who pointed out that airborne units may be transported as far as the "operational radius of modern aircraft."[68] The role of such Middle East countries as Egypt, Syria and Iraq in such a scenario should be clear. On the other hand, the Indo-

[67] *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, February 2, 1973, p. 8, and November 19, 1973, p. 15. For estimates of Syrian and Egyptian military arsenals after the 1973 war see *New York Times*, August 8, 1974.

[68] Quoted in Turbiville, "Soviet Airborne Troops," *op. cit.*, p. 69.



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Pakistani war seems to indicate that Moscow would not view this scenario as the preferable one.

It was reported in 1971 that the Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi, N. M. Pegov, had assured India that in case of a Chinese attack across the Himalayas, the Soviet Union would begin diversionary action in Sinkiang.[69] Some observers say that one of the reasons [70] for China's military paralysis during that war on the subcontinent was Moscow's fulfillment of its part in the Soviet-Indian treaty — not only through stepped-up military supplies but also through timely troop movements along the Chinese border.[71]

Under what circumstances, then, might the Soviets decide to airlift troops to India via the Middle East, rather than stay with the seemingly preferable options for the defense of India that they chose in the Indo-Pakistani war? One possibility is that Moscow would find it in its interest to limit any Chinese-Indian conflict to India proper — assuming that with Peking already engaged on one front it would exercise restraint on the Sino-Soviet border. Another reason might be a Kremlin conclusion that a diversionary action would have no immediate effect in relieving pressure on the Indian army.

It should be noted that there is a degree of technical irreversibility involved in Moscow's calculations. Opting for the diversionary solution would probably drastically curtail the strategic airlift capabilities available for the support of India, and vice versa. The airlift capability presumably would be committed largely to the support of Soviet forces along the Chinese border if a Soviet diversionary action entailed active fighting. To cover a further possibility, Moscow could use a sealift to defend India. For the Soviets to choose the airborne option the eruption of a new Sino-Indian war would have to come as a total strategic surprise, leaving

[69] See Vijay Sen Budhraj, "Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh," *Asian Survey*, May 1973, p. 493. Also, Wayne Wilcox, *The Emergence of Bangladesh: Problems and Opportunities for a Redefined American Policy in South Asia* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), p. 39; Angus M. Fraser, *The People's Liberation Army: Communist China's Armed Forces* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973), p. 47; *New York Times*, January 11, 1972.

[70] The other two reasons: (1) Most of China's army was committed to its northern border facing some forty-four Soviet divisions, and (2) the heavy December weather in the Himalayas obstructed Chinese mobility. See Sheldon W. Simon, "China, the Soviet Union, and the Subcontinental Balance," *Asian Survey*, July 1973, p. 651; Wilcox, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-39.

[71] Aspaturian, *op. cit.*, p. 4. Chou denounced Soviet policy in the Indo-Pakistani war as aimed at catching China between two military jaws — Siberia and Mongolia in the North and "a Soviet dominated India and Bangladesh in the South." Quoted in S. P. Seth, "Sino-Indian Relations: Changing Perspectives," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1974, p. 23.



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them unable to ship their forces in advance to India or the Indian Ocean.

To sum up, almost certainly the Middle East will be involved somehow in a projection of Soviet forces to India. If India becomes a Soviet forward base area like Egypt, for example, the need for Soviet arsenals stocked in Arab countries would diminish and the feasibility of moving personnel to India from Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions (via the Middle East) would increase. Above all, in case of an emergency, Soviet support for India would probably utilize Middle East transit points and logistic capabilities. Hence, although there is no certainty that Moscow would use the Middle East to provide defensive support to India in the near future, logistic support to that country would most likely involve the Middle East as part of the Soviet collective security system.[72]

*Support for the Middle East*

We now turn to the other dimension of the Middle East-India security interaction to examine the kind of strategic support the Indian subsystem is providing. Several recent indications testify to the growing logistic link between the two subsystems. For example, "India is said to have 30 to 40, and possibly more, instructors in Iraq training pilots there to fly Soviet supplied MiG fighters."[73] This departure from the usual procedure of using only Soviet pilots to train foreign pilots to fly Soviet MiG's indicates that Moscow deems the solidification of the link between Iraq and India of high importance to its policy of strengthening the Soviet security system. (In this respect one should also take note of Soviet eagerness to supply India with Tu-16's despite repeated Indian rejections.) Moreover, the Indian-Iraqi link is by no means limited to the air force. The nine-day visit of the Chief of the Iraqi Naval Force, Brigadier Abdu Al-Deri, to India in August 1973 at the invitation of India's Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral G. N. Kohli,[74] marked a growing cooperation between the two navies, with obvi-

[72] The overall probability of a new Sino-Indian war is low, since China's policy toward India is currently geared toward creating a sense of rapprochement in New Delhi, thus relaxing the latter's strategic need for the Soviet Union. See Seth, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-26. However, "while the bulk of the PLA is kept on the northern border, India and Bangladesh can engage in subversion in such tenuously controlled Chinese border regions as Tibet, Sinkiang and Yunnan. The reality of such an apprehension is less important than the belief in Peking that it is at least plausible as long as Dacca and Delhi are so completely beholden to Moscow." Simon, "China, the Soviet Union . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 658.

[73] *News Review on West Asia* (New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses), March 1974, p. 101; see also *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, March 26, 1973, p. 13; *Washington Post*, June 2, 1973.

[74] *News Review on West Asia*, October 1973, p. 17.



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ous implications for the Persian Gulf. Further evidence of this strategic link was contained in a November 1974 *Washington Post* report that 150,000 winter military uniforms were airlifted from India to Iraq to assist the latter in its planned winter offensive against the Kurds.

Because China's opposition to the idea of a Soviet-designed Asian collective security system has meant that "other Communist-ruled states of Asia, independent and neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict, would . . . have no part in [it] so long as it was perceived by Peking as directed against China," no Soviet statement in almost four years since the Asian system was launched has specifically mentioned North Vietnam or North Korea as a potential partner in the system. Indeed, "the USSR has carefully avoided tendering explicit invitations or requesting endorsements publicly from either Hanoi or Pyongyang, and the latter have studiously avoided the whole thing."[75]

Yet, as far as the link with the Middle East subsystem is concerned, there is growing evidence that North Vietnam and North Korea act as "silent partners" in the Soviet collective security system. Back in June 1973, a Syrian military delegation arrived in Hanoi to seek North Vietnamese military experts in the use of surface-to-air missiles built by the Soviets. What is more, en route to Hanoi the Syrian delegation stopped for a day in Moscow, where Major General Mustafa Tlass, head of the delegation (and currently Syria's Defense Minister), met with Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko.[76] Two months later, reports of the presence of North Korean military personnel in Egypt appeared. Further, during the Yom Kippur War about thirty North Korean pilots were flying base defense missions in Egypt, and North Vietnamese advisers were reportedly with the Syrian forces, probably helping them in the use of SAM's. It was also significant that, despite Moscow's silence about its role in the war, the official Soviet news agency, TASS, disclosed that Premier Kim Il Sung of North Korea had met with the Egyptian and Syrian ambassadors in Pyongyang to inform them of his government's decision "to give material assistance including military aid to Syria and Egypt."[77] In November 1974, according to the Turkish press, North Korean warships were joining the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean Sea

[75] Horelick, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.
[76] *New York Times*, June 30, 1973.
[77] *Ibid.*, October 18, 19, 1973; October 14, 1974. On the silence of the Soviet press regarding the USSR's own role during the war, see Martin J. Slominski, "Soviet Military Press and the October War," *Military Review*, May 1974, pp. 43-44, 47.



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and were participating in the November maneuvers of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.

The effectiveness of the use of proxies as a strategic option of the Soviet collective security system is shown by the fact that the United States, though successful in deterring direct Soviet military intervention on a massive scale in the Yom Kippur War, proved unable to deter the involvement of the above-mentioned proxies. Moscow may conclude, therefore, that this could constitute a viable option for the defense of its security subsystems once they come under a direct military threat.[78]

## The Strategic Utility of the System

The various functions performed by the Soviet collective security system point up its effectiveness.[79] Yet from Moscow's point of view its utility is determined directly by its ability to deal with threats posed to the USSR proper, rather than to its subsystems. However, to the extent that an effective defense of the subsystems diminishes the perceived threat to the Soviets themselves, it serves Moscow's purposes. In this respect it is significant that in the Indo-Pakistani and Yom Kippur wars Soviet justifications for assuming an active role in the conflicts were phrased in almost identical terms. On both occasions Moscow claimed that the USSR could not ignore a conflict taking place in the "immediate vicinity of its borders" and "consequently affecting its own security."[80] But theoretically at least, the distinction between threats to the system and threats to the USSR proper should be maintained for purposes of evaluating the system's strategic utility. Hence, in this section we will deal with possible utilizations of Moscow's system for the defense of the Soviet Union.

Basically, the strategic utility of the system for Moscow depends on its structure — i.e., on the contents of the various friendship treaties on the one hand, and on the number and identity of the member-states on the other. To take a purely hypothetical case, the

[78] Recent reports say there are still North Koreans and North Vietnamese pilots and technicians as well as Soviets in Syria. *Christian Science Monitor,* September 10, 1974.

[79] Moscow's supply of intelligence to its subsystems should be added to the list. For example, during the Indo-Pakistani war the Soviets launched numerous satellites to watch the war. *(International Herald Tribune,* July 25, 1972.) Similarly, Soviet intelligence activities in the Yom Kippur War included the launching of six reconnaissance satellites during a period of seventeen days, beginning October 3. *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* October 22, 1973, p. 16; October 29, 1973, p. 22.

[80] Quoted in Robert H. Donaldson, "India: The Soviet Stake in Stability," *Asian Survey,* June 1972, p. 485; Kohler, *et al., op. cit.,* p. 68; Mustafa, *op. cit.,* p. 508. For the Chinese reaction to this line of reasoning, see Simon, "China, the Soviet Union . . .," *op. cit.,* pp. 651, 657.



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incorporation of Taiwan into the Soviet security system could have a drastic effect on the security of the People's Republic of China, with obvious utility for the USSR.[81] But even without such an extreme example, it should be clear that the logistic base supplied by Egypt and Syria in the Middle East have enhanced the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet's ability to cope with the U.S. Sixth Fleet's strategic strike capability, thus improving the USSR's own security. Assuming that Moscow has built a stable collective security structure (with the possible addition of the PDRY in the near future), it remains to speculate on how the southeastern part of the system — the one stretching from the Middle East to India — can benefit Soviet security.

Two obvious cases to be considered are the relevance of this subsystem, first to the Sino-Soviet conflict, and second to the military situation in the Indian Ocean. Regarding the Sino-Soviet conflict, it has been suggested[82] that the Soviet need for the Indian subsystem is basically a logistic one. According to this theory, Chinese ability to move troops from the south and southeast to the north, after American assurances given in 1971-1972 relaxed Peking's fears of an American or American-backed invasion of the mainland from Taiwan,[83] increased China's potential for exercising pressure on an already scarce Soviet strategic reserve. The buildup of a strong Indian army equipped with modern Soviet weapons therefore constituted a cost-effective option for Moscow in its efforts to prevent additional Chinese force redeployments.

From the perspective of the present article, that logistic argument may indicate one of the *potential* strategic utilities of the

[81] See Horelick, *op. cit.*, p. 14; Ghebhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 1081.

[82] Luttwak, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50; also William E. Griffith, *Peking, Moscow, and Beyond* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, Washington Papers, No. 6, 1973), p. 33.

[83] There were only twenty Chinese divisions stationed in the Military Regions of Wuhan and Canton in 1973, compared with thirty-one in 1972, and twenty divisions in Tsinan, Nanking and Foochow compared with twenty-five in 1972. *The Military Balance 1971-1972* (London: IISS, 1972), p. 41; *The Military Balance 1973-1974* (London: IISS, 1974), p. 46.

For general accounts of the military situation along the Sino-Soviet border see Fred Sagner, "On Both Sides of the Soviet-Chinese Border," *Aussenpolitik*, English edition, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1972, pp. 165-174; Thomas W. Robinson, *The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background Development and the March 1969 Clashes* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-6171-TR, August 1970), and *The Border Negotiations and the Future of Sino-Soviet-American Relations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, P-4661, August 1971); Harold C. Hinton, "Conflict on the Ussuri: A Clash of Nationalisms," *Problems of Communism*, January-April 1971, pp. 45-59; *Strategic Survey 1973, op. cit.*, pp. 65-69; Lawrence L. Whetten, "The Military Balance," *International Journal*, Summer 1974, pp. 478-501; Harry Gelber, *Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy* (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper No. 99, 1973), pp. 1-6, 34-36.



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collective security system from Moscow's point of view, but it is deficient in several respects. To begin with, the magnitude of the Soviet strategic reserve is a matter of debate. The focus of the debate is prospective — i.e., on the impact additional force deployments (needed to counter Chinese reinforcements along the border) would have on the total Soviet posture. Some observers are convinced that the Soviet buildup in the Far East was not accomplished by transferring forces from the European front but rather by mobilization, which raised the overall number of active Soviet divisions from about 140 to 160.[84] The current Soviet force allocation is as follows: one quarter deployed against China, more than one half poised toward Europe, and the remainder — some forty divisions — constituting a strategic reserve.

Secondly, the effectiveness of such a strategy in terms of India's ability to prevent China from redeploying its forces to the north is questionable at best. It seems more accurate to say that in the current Sino-Indian military balance it is India that suffers from pathological fear of the adversary. Not that the Chinese are free from their own "Indian nightmares," but the point is that the effect of a stronger India on China's force deployment policy could be marginal. Moreover, if the Chinese reacted to such pressure by enlarging the PLA, Moscow's alleged strategy could be transformed into a counterproductive adventure. The recent expansion of the Chinese army from 110 to 120 infantry divisions suggests Peking's ability and readiness to augment its military forces.

Third, the logistic model offers a doubtful conclusion. William Griffith believes

> India remains more important for the Soviets than the Middle East. . . . the Middle East remains important for the Soviets as a transit area to Asia . . . but it may be relatively less important now that Soviet policy is primarily concerned with forging a *cordon sanitaire* of alliances around China *à la* John Foster Dulles.[85]

Although I, too, have stressed the transit value of the Middle East for Moscow, the performance of the Soviet collective security system as described herein indicates the extreme importance of the

[84] Thomas W. Wolfe, *Worldwide Soviet Military Strategy and Policy* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, P-5008, April 1973), p. 30. Also Charles Stockell, "Soviet Military Strategy: The Army View," *Military Review*, October 1973, pp. 76-77. Some observers claim that not only were there no force diversions associated with the Soviet buildup in the East, but quite the reverse happened: the Soviets reinforced both fronts simultaneously. The recent movement of 1,200 Soviet tanks into East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland is brought up as supportive evidence. Neville Brown, "The Myth of an Asian Diversion," *ibid.*, January 1974, p. 35.

[85] Griffith, *op. cit.*



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Middle East *in itself* to the Soviets, as well as its value as a crucial strategic double link in the system.

Given the present improbability of a war between the USSR and China, the relevance of India to the Sino-Soviet conflict is more political than strategic. However, should such a war break out, the Indo-Soviet treaty may well be the critical factor in ascertaining the potential strategic utility of the Indian subsystem to the Soviet Union. The unequal nature of the treaty's commitments in Moscow's favor has been noted elsewhere.[86] Yet the Indians themselves suggest that some kind of symmetry exists between *their* strategic need for the treaty and that of Moscow. In the words of one Indian military analyst:

> . . . the Soviet Union will not require Indian assistance in a war with China in which it is able to employ the full panoply of its power. But with China possessing a minimal nuclear capability already, the period for an all out cataclysmic war seems to have passed. A conventional war of the border variety where both sides use only frontier troops for fear of escalation will suit the Chinese with their great numbers and it is here that India's assistance will be most required by the Russians to draw the Chinese along the long and mountainous Himalayan frontier. Yet India could scarcely provoke a nuclear China unless it was certain that the Chinese would not use nuclear weapons.[87]

The most critical point of the controversial Sino-Soviet border, the area of the Pamirs, is close to India. On military grounds, the deployment of Soviet bombers in India, which now seems improbable, may prove to be an attractive option as far as Moscow is concerned. Soviet jet fighters in India would increase the threat to southern Chinese airfields, reduce the warning time available to them, and extend the operational radius of the Soviet air force, particularly against airfields located in southeast China.[88]

In regard to the Indian Ocean, the strategic utility of the Indian subsystem for Moscow is apparent. According to Soviet naval publications the primary reason for maintaining a squadron in these waters is to try to keep U.S. ballistic missile submarines beyond the range of industrial areas of the Ukraine.[89] In pursuit of this

[86] See M. R. Masani, "Is India a Soviet Ally?," *Asian Affairs,* January-February 1974, pp. 125-126.

[87] Ravi Kaul, "The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean," in *Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, op. cit.,* p. 198. Kaul feels that this situation calls for an independent Indian nuclear capability, but as long as India lacks a *credible* nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis China the Soviet-Indian treaty provides the essential umbrella.

[88] If reports that the Chinese are transferring nuclear and missile installations previously located in Sinkiang to Tibet prove to be correct, this might add to the list of lucrative targets for Soviet air force units operating from India.

[89] *New York Times,* October 31, 1973; January 25, 1974. With the development of



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objective, one of the new *Kiev* class carriers that the Soviet navy is building, equipped with anti-submarine helicopters, will in all probability be deployed in the future in the Indian Ocean with supporting destroyers, submarines and anti-submarine trawlers. In both the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean the Soviet fleet is striving, in the words of Siegfried Breyer, a West German naval analyst, "to reduce the offensive power [of Western navies] by committing far greater forces to the defense of the sea lanes than . . . to their attack."[90] Other Indian Ocean missions are domination of the Suez passage, exertion of influence on the oil-producing states, and posing a potential threat to the main oil lanes to the West. However, as in the case of the Mediterranean Fleet, a major prerequisite for the continuous type of presence needed to execute all these missions is the establishment of secure local logistic bases.

President Ford's recent revelation that there are three Soviet naval bases in the Indian Ocean — Aden in the PDRY, Umm Qasr in Iraq and Berbera in Somalia[91] — is therefore of much importance. The Indian role in this respect is still waiting clarification. Despite official denials India is known to be tolerant toward the free movement of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean.[92] In 1969 a Soviet delegation under Admiral Gorshkov inspected Indian harbors. Since then there have been persistent reports that the Soviets are using port facilities equipped for their type of ships in Vishakapatnam[93] and that they were granted bunkering and other naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.[94] During Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973 the Indian press confirmed

the Polaris A-3 and Poseidon SLBM's, American nuclear submarines cruising in the northwest corner of the Indian Ocean have an arc of attack extending from the western frontier of the Soviet Union almost as far north as Leningrad and including all main industrial areas from the Ukraine to the Kuzbas. However, the expected introduction of Trident SLBM's to the American arsenal in the late 1970's will probably radically reduce Washington's strategic need for the Indian Ocean for purposes of threatening the Soviet homeland.

[90] *Ibid.*, May 5, 1971.

[91] *Christian Science Monitor*, September 3 and 9, 1974. For a detailed analysis of Soviet operations in these and nearby countries, see Mordechai Abir, "Red Sea Politics," in *Conflicts in Africa* (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper No. 93, 1972), pp. 25-30; R. M. Burrell, "The USSR and the Indian Ocean," *Soviet Analyst*, January 31, 1974, pp. 4-6; Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, "The Soviet Navy and the Indian Ocean," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1974, pp. 25-35.

[92] *New York Times*, October 31, 1973.

[93] T. B. Millar, *Soviet Policies in the Indian Ocean Area* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense No. 7, 1970), pp. 17-18; Burrell, "The USSR and the Indian Ocean," *op. cit.*, p. 5; Peter Hess, "The Indian Ocean: A 'Zone of Peace'?," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, September 1974, p. 10; *New York Times*, March 21, 1972; *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, November 25, 1974, p. 22.

[94] Mustafa, *op. cit.*, p. 513; Burrell, "The USSR and the Indian Ocean," *loc. cit.*; *New York Times*, November 13, 1970.



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that the USSR had made a formal request for port facilities in that country.[95]

Some observers say that although India may consider a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean beneficial, New Delhi would nevertheless prefer that India, not the Soviets, dominate that ocean. This suggests that the most Moscow might gain would be more frequent, but still controlled, access to Indian naval facilities.[96] Assuming for the moment that this statement is correct, recent history testifies to the kind of scenarios one can expect in an Indian Ocean dominated by Indian naval units operationally integrated in a Soviet collective security system.

In April 1971 there was a Maoist uprising against the Ceylonese (Sri Lanka) government of Mrs. Bandaranaike. Common Indian and Soviet interests in putting it down were apparent, and assistance instantaneously materialized. A "protective ring" was thrown around Ceylon by *Indian* warships to prevent arms smuggling into the island, while the Soviets rushed six MiG's in to fight the rebels. The short time elapsing between the Ceylonese government's request for the Soviet fighters (and crews) and their arrival at Kutanayake military airfield (twenty miles north of Colombo) suggests that they had been airlifted via the "usual" Middle East route. A shipment of *East German* police equipment flown to Ceylon by a Soviet cargo plane must have taken the same route.[97]

Again, as in the case of the Mediterranean Fleet, in order to become an *operational* force in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet navy must secure adequate air cover in addition to a logistical base. The expected introduction of one of the new *Kiev* class aircraft carriers into the area will provide at least a partial answer to this problem, as it has in the Mediterranean. However, until then, and possibly for some time afterward, the Soviets will have to rely on shore-based air support. While, in view of the low probability of superpower conflict in these waters, the Soviet fleet can perform some of its missions, such as "showing the flag," without extensive air cover,[98] there are two developments that promise to aggravate the

[95] *Christian Science Monitor,* November 28, December 13, 1973; March 5, 1974. According to this last report, the Soviet request was turned down.

[96] William J. Barnds, "Moscow and South Asia," *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1972, pp. 30-31.

[97] See *New York Times,* April 21, 22, May 6, 8, 11, 1971; also *SIPRI 1972 Yearbook, op. cit.,* p. 134.

[98] "It . . . appears clear that the political value of a fleet arises from the mere capacity to make its presence known and is not contingent on relative military strengths (except at a time of general conflagration)." C. G. Jacobsen, "The Soviet Navy: Acquiring Global Capabilities and Perspectives," *Naval War College Review,* March 1972, p. 46. Also, James M. McConnell, *The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean*



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air cover problem: the possibility of a permanent American naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and the expected bolstering of the Soviet fleet (in numbers of vessels and/or their time-on-station) resulting from the reopening of the Suez Canal.

In this respect it will be more important, in the future, to look for new Soviet air bases in the littoral states (and to examine existing ones carefully) rather than to search for additional Soviet port facilities in the area. The implications of Moscow's policy of establishing long- and short-range air bases not only in Egypt, but in areas along the East African coast as well as in Iraq, cannot be disregarded. It could be difficult for even an American carrier force to operate in the western reaches of the Arabian Sea or the Somali Basin if the Soviets were quickly to dispatch combat aircraft to these bases — not to mention a *permanent* stationing of Soviet jet fighters there. Deployment of fighters and fighter-bombers through member-states of the Soviet collective security system — e.g., Egypt, Somalia, the PDRY, Iraq and India — is a much faster operation than sending carrier forces around the Cape or through the Malacca Strait.[99] Such a deployment might also make the improbable scenario of Soviet fighter-bombers operating from India against China somewhat more likely.

India may have still another use in the Soviet collective security system. The Soviet Union considers Pakistan an important neighbor in her geopolitical environment. Through Pakistan she could gain land access to the Indian Ocean to supply her naval units there. The strategic four-lane highway running through the mountains of northern Afghanistan, completed by Soviet engineers in July 1970, could link the USSR with the Indian Ocean, provided Pakistan granted transit facilities. In this situation India, backed by the Soviet Treaty of Friendship (to deter China), may be encouraged by Moscow, if it becomes necessary, to make use of its "free hand" against Pakistan. In such a scenario, given adequate air cover, the presence of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean would most likely blunt the impact of a possible American countermove, namely, a naval task force dispatched to the area as in 1971. The Soviets may expect that they can force the Pakistanis to adopt a more "enlightened" appreciation of the "facts of life" in the subcontinent and become more tractable with regard to Soviet strategic needs in the region.

(Washington: Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper No. 77, August 1971), pp. 7-15.

[99] Frank E. Armbruster, *The Indian Ocean Area* (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, HI-1620-P, April 1972), p. 16.



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## IMPLICATIONS

The major implications stemming from the existence of the Soviet collective security system may be summarized as follows:

(1) It is obvious that a Soviet-controlled tension policy (i.e., the cultivation of a no-war/no-peace situation) is necessary in areas essential to Moscow's security system to encourage continued participation among its member-states. Such a policy could be deliberately abandoned by the USSR (a) when opportunities for a quick success in eliminating an active or potential threat to the system present themselves, or (b) due to ineffective Soviet restraints on the subsystems.

(2) In either of the above cases, the structure of the collective security system, substantially codified in the various friendship treaties signed with Moscow, and the prospect that it may be extended to incorporate new member-states, raises the probability of what I shall term *systemic wars,* i.e., military cooperation between two or more Soviet security subsystems in case of war. Thus, we should not be surprised to find, for example, Syrian and Indian involvement in a possible Iran-Iraq war. During the Yom Kippur War the PDRY's naval units participated in an Egyptian blockade of the Bab el Mandeb Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea.[100] In the future this could be accomplished by Indian vessels substituting for Egyptian warships needed elsewhere — in addition to Delhi granting Cairo the "usual" strong political backing[101] — and air cover could be provided from Somalian air bases by local or Soviet-based pilots.

(3) Direct Soviet involvement in such wars could be expected if the military threat to one of the subsystems jeopardized its future membership — for example, in case of a military defeat which might bring down the friendly government in that country. However, proxy involvement could replace Moscow's own military intervention if the Soviets expected a strong American response. In wars not requiring active Soviet involvement, Moscow's role would probably be limited to logistic support furnished to the belligerent members of the system.

(4) The phrase often used in the West to comment on Moscow's arms aid policy — "this is the first time [such a weapon system] has

[100] *New York Times,* November 10, 1973. Some reports claim that Soviet vessels participated in the blockade as well. (Lawrence L. Whetten and Michael Johnson, "Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War," *The World Today,* March 1974, p. 109.) If true, it provides further proof of the systemic nature of the Yom Kippur War.

[101] *New York Times,* November 1, 1973. Obviously, one can draw a much larger list of systemic war scenarios with different participants.



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been supplied to any country outside the Warsaw Pact countries"[102] — is an obvious fallacy. It assumes that the Warsaw Pact is somehow strategically different from the other components of the collective security system. Notions of the hierarchical status of the subsystems should be abandoned in favor of an integral conception stressing the interrelationship among the European, Middle East and Indian components, and much more attention should be paid to the system's multi-optional character (its possible uses against the West *and* against China). It is clear that it will not be easy "to push the Russians out" of the regions involved (e.g., the Middle East).

(5) One might also envisage scenarios that will put Soviet aims for the system under strain. Thus, Sadat's "year of decision" (1971) had to be postponed — contrary to his wish — because at precisely that time the Soviets were using Egypt for their airlift into India for the fight against the Pakistanis. An Arab-Israeli war then would have been regarded by a Moscow interested in logistics as a catastrophe from the point of view of the system. Yet preservation of the system — presumably a much more important goal — entailed a high cost for the Soviets: the expulsion from Egypt seven months later.

[102] See, for example, *Strategic Survey 1973, op. cit.*, p. 44. Identical terms were used by the Western press to comment on the February 1975 visit to India of Soviet Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko accompanied by Air Marshal Pavel S. Kutakhov, Soviet Air Force Commander, and Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. "This was the first time such a delegation visited any but a Warsaw Pact country, in other words, one of Moscow's formal client-allies." *Christian Science Monitor,* February 24, 1975; *Baltimore Sun,* February 28, 1975.



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# *Reviews*

## De Gaulle and the Shaping of French Foreign Policy *

*by D. Bruce Marshall*

Virtually every study of contemporary French politics and foreign policy examines the role of Charles de Gaulle, the man who led France through some of the cruelest tragedies of her long history and who left the imprint of his personality on French institutions and on the public mind. Such influence by a single leader is unusual at any time, but particularly so in an epoch like the present when the patterns of everyday life are being dramatically transformed by complex social, economic and political forces that tend to obscure the efforts of individuals, no matter how distinguished.

Understandably, social scientists engaged in the infant discipline of international relations have sought first to map out characteristic patterns of state interaction and have concentrated on the importance of variables such as size, wealth, accountability of leaders or systemic balance to explain the regularities they observe. Eventually, however, a more complete view of international relations demands an account of deviant cases as well as an explanation of central tendencies. For those purposes much more attention will need to be given to what James Rosenau has called "idiosyncratic" variables — the values, beliefs, experiences and personality characteristics of outstanding leaders. Moreover, idiosyncratic variables may be important in explaining the actions of a whole group of middle-range powers whose leaders have discovered that, in a world of increasingly interdependent actors, nonconformist behavior can bring significant rewards. De Gaulle's France is perhaps the outstanding example of such behavior, and in treating of it the three books under review provide valuable insights into the relationships that may obtain between idiosyncratic variables and the actions of states.

When one considers the prominent role de Gaulle played in the history of the world during the thirty years following June 1940, it is curious that there has been no truly adequate biography of the man or fully satisfactory examination of his concepts of international relations. Most studies, whether by Frenchmen or foreigners, have inclined toward hagiography or denunciation. Brian

* *De Gaulle*. By Brian Crozier. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973. 726 pp. $12.50.

*French International Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou*. By Edward A. Kolodziej. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974. 618 pp. $24.50.

*Decline or Renewal? France Since the 1930's*. By Stanley Hoffmann. New York: Viking Press, 1974. 529 pp. $15.00.



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Crozier's *De Gaulle* avoids both extremes and provides a measured portrait of the man and his epoch.

A leader of heroic vision, de Gaulle set himself a heroic task: to rescue France from disgrace at the hands of Germany, to revive her democratic institutions, and to restore her status among the greater powers of the world so that she could be true to "a certain idea of France" that was her calling. He pursued these goals in his writings, in his active life as a military leader, and as a statesman. In the space of three decades, he became a legend in his own lifetime. Nevertheless, he was far from satisfied with the results of his efforts and as Crozier notes, although "nothing written today can diminish the aura of General de Gaulle's wartime exploit . . . history may well record the verdict that as a writer, he wrote too little; as a soldier, he fought too little; and as a statesman, he came too late." (p. 9.)

That is a harsh judgment, but Crozier presents a large body of supporting evidence. In a short historical prologue he examines some of de Gaulle's early writings, his career during World War I and his interwar service, particularly his relationship with Petain and his unsuccessful efforts to arouse the government of the day to the need for new weapons and new doctrines in the face of impending disaster. The bulk of this massive study is devoted to de Gaulle's epic struggle as leader of Free France during World War II. Relying on a comprehensive array of secondary sources, personal accounts, interviews and private papers, Crozier follows the evolution of de Gaulle's movement as it is set forth in *Memoires de Guerre,* comparing and contrasting the views of the various participants, filling in omissions and checking and cross-checking different versions of the principal events. This portion of the book demonstrates the biographer's immense energy and his deductive skills as historical detective. There is little new material for the specialist, but the general reader or beginning student will find Crozier's overview extremely valuable.

The later sections dealing with the years of the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle's return to power and his conduct of affairs under the Fifth Republic are, by contrast, rather fragmentary. They rely mainly on de Gaulle's *Memoires d'Espoir* and *du Renouveau,* plus the standard French sources, supplemented by interviews which, on occasion, throw light on some fascinating details of de Gaulle's outlook, tactics and personality. Intent above all on describing de Gaulle's actions, Crozier eschews analysis except to make certain normative judgments about a policy, an idea or a book. Consequently, we are never really told how de Gaulle ruled France, but rather what a historian, looking at his actions with the benefit of hindsight, thinks of his achievements.

These judgments, most of which are reserved for a short concluding section, tend to be cast in broad form so that they



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are not terribly relevant even when they seem reasonable. For example, Crozier feels that de Gaulle's greatest strength was as a "showman and mythmaker" rather than as a soldier (circumstances defeated him), orator (his style was too grandiloquent), statesman (world events escaped his control) or national leader (domestic achievements were few). The final result was disappointing, especially when viewed in light of de Gaulle's exalted aims. The fault, Crozier argues, lay in his intransigence (he did not know when to stop) and in the circumstances of the time ("his opportunities came relatively late in life and at a time when it was no longer possible for France to play the role he expected of her"). (pp. 663, 686.)

Even if one agrees with this verdict, he will still find that the failures of French foreign policy are not satisfactorily explained. Because this commendable biography focuses on the qualities of de Gaulle the man, rather than on the larger political system of which he was a part, it is more valuable as a source of descriptive material for subsequent analysis than as an explanation of how the idiosyncracies of the leader shaped the actions of the government. In the end, Crozier's argument rests too heavily on assertions about de Gaulle's personality that are not examined and on connections between his ideas and his actions that are unexplained.

By contrast with the biographical approach, Edward Kolodziej's comprehensive study of French international policy focuses on bilateral relations with other states and international organizations and seeks to relate those interactions to the goals and priorities set by de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. Transnational political activities are explicitly excluded and domestic sources of foreign policy are treated only as they appear to impose constraints on the freedom of French leaders to pursue what they define to be national goals. Thus, Kolodziej investigates the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic from the perspective of the global system of international relations and places primary stress on the limits imposed on French behavior by the actions of other states. From that viewpoint the role of de Gaulle (and of his successor, Pompidou) would probably have been minor but for the fact that during his presidency de Gaulle defined the goals of French national policy in terms that included bringing about a change in the ideologies and institutions of the postwar system of superpower duopoly. What is more, he intended to promote such a change in ways contributing to the power and prestige of France in the short run. *Grandeur* was the ambiguous label he used to describe this combination of objectives, and Kolodziej contends that there was both a logical and practical contradiction inherent in the policies he developed to pursue it.

In a compact but lucid introductory section, Kolodziej analyzes de Gaulle's writings and speeches to show how grandeur developed out of the general's per-



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sonal philosophy of history and politics, particularly his view of the nature of the nation, the state and the interstate system, and his concept of France's place within that system. He rightly stresses both the analytical rigor of de Gaulle's theories and the romantic, nationalistic preconceptions that underlay them. While these arguments are not original — the author acknowledges a special debt to Stanley Hoffmann — they are presented in a way that should be helpful to American students of French affairs who often have misunderstood the importance de Gaulle attached to preserving French "independence" from foreign influence, both as a proof of domestic legitimacy and as a means to international stability.

It was neither the perverseness of his character nor simple-minded egotism that drove de Gaulle to conclude that the facts of national interdependence — which he recognized as clearly as anyone — were more conducive to conflict than to cooperation. He deduced this from a model of interstate relations perhaps best elaborated by Rousseau in his essay on "The State of War"; it fundamentally challenges the Lockean theory of a harmonious universe of self-directed individuals which even today underlies the political doctrines of American liberal democracy. The international universe forms what Rousseau called a "mixed system" in which states are the only legitimate actors; hence, any government that accepts the hegemony of another state contributes to the imbalance of power and threatens the security of all states while simultaneously betraying the particular national "will" on which its own legitimacy rests. The pursuit of autonomy is therefore both a national imperative and a means to increased stability in a global system where conflict is unavoidable.

However, Kolodziej contends that in practice de Gaulle's quest for grandeur contained a dual contradiction. On one hand, by relying primarily on unilateral initiatives to demonstrate independence, he sacrificed the support of other European states whose cooperation was essential to the formation of a third center of power capable of rivaling the United States and the Soviet Union and challenging their "dual hegemony." On the other, by adopting immoderate means for the pursuit of narrow nationalistic ends, his policies encouraged other states to emulate French behavior, thus further undermining the stability of the global system without securing any advantage for France. The disappointing results of de Gaulle's policies, the author concludes, stemmed directly from the fact that he did the right things, but in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons.

To support these arguments, Kolodziej examines the policies developed by de Gaulle and Pompidou in three major issue-areas: relations with the two superpowers, with the states of Eastern and Western Europe, and with the Third World countries of the Mediterranean area. Looking first



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at Franco-American relations, he reviews the evolution of Gaullist policy on participation in NATO, development of an independent nuclear force, the MLF, and the increasing clash of strategic views that ultimately led to the French military withdrawal from NATO in 1966 and the effort to develop a new pattern of European security relationships independent of the United States. The 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia put an abrupt end to de Gaulle's plans for encouraging polycentrism in Eastern Europe and called into question the feasibility of his entire conception of European security, which was based on a lessening of the "two hegemonies." Together with the domestic strains caused by the student revolt and the shift in West German policy following the election of Chancellor Brandt, these changes in the global balance foreclosed the possibility that France could play the role of interlocutor between Western Europe and the Soviet Union.

Moreover, after having initiated interest in détente within Western Europe in the early 1960's, French leaders became increasingly skeptical about the consequences of the developing Soviet-American détente for Europe. In the early 1970's, the new French government under Pompidou found itself hemmed in by the continuing need for American strategic nuclear support, the danger that a precipitate withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Europe would weaken that guarantee or that it would be compromised in the course of negotiations with the USSR — plus the risk that talk of alternative strategic alignments might arouse the Soviets, interrupt the slow progress of détente in Eastern Europe, and excite German national ambitions. The result was a policy of temporizing and watchful waiting while denouncing the danger of a "superpower condominium" over Europe.

Complex problems of trade and monetary cooperation linked the preservation of a global strategic balance, with its heavy burden of military spending, to the intra-European political balance. Within Europe, France was blocked, as Kolodziej views matters, by the need to cooperate with Britain and Germany in the Common Market and with the United States to maintain stability in the world money market, even when she was in direct competition with all three for trade and investments. In this area again, de Gaulle repeatedly acted alone and often in the face of opposition from France's other partners. As the French internal economic situation grew more somber and as world conditions deteriorated, the succeeding governments have been increasingly constrained to forgo such tactics in order to avoid jeopardizing French interests in agriculture and further endangering the fragile unity within the EEC.

After the Cuban crisis of 1962 and the end of the Algerian war, de Gaulle also sought to compensate for the weakness of France's strategic position by diplomatic



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moves aimed at forming a three-power "directorate" with the United States and Britain, building European unity around Franco-German collaboration, or blocking British participation in the Common Market and preventing the formation of other consultative bodies that would include the "Anglo-Saxons." In all these maneuvers, Kolodziej emphasizes, France was as much the victim as the victor. They all demonstrated, though few noticed it at the time, that she was unable to move even the smaller states of Western Europe to accept the Gaullist design for a united Europe without the United States or Britain.

By 1967 the French were in the embarrassing position of having to defend the EEC against British efforts to circumvent de Gaulle's veto by enlarging the functions of the Western European Union, while only a decade earlier de Gaulle had insisted on giving priority to political unity in order to enhance French power at the expense of the EEC. After 1968, Gaullist policy toward Europe reached a dead end. New alignments in Germany, Eastern Europe and among the superpowers deprived France of the initiative previously enjoyed as spokesman for détente, and encouraged de Gaulle's successor to undertake a series of more modest policies aimed at developing a new, enlarged structure of European economic and political cooperation.

A third dimension of the Gaullist vision of grandeur was based on the notion of a special relationship between France and the countries of the Third World. In part a reaction against the hegemonic pretensions of the "two blocs," de Gaulle's policy of "cooperation" with the Third World was also aimed at preserving some of the ties that had linked France to her overseas colonies. Thus, the image of France as the champion of national independence among the nations of North and Central Africa went hand in hand with a search for concrete economic and diplomatic advantages. In theory at least, Paris could be "self-less and self-interested without fear of logical inconsistency or political hypocrisy." (p. 448.)

In practice, the results were again discouraging. A long war in Algeria strained relations with Morocco and Tunisia, and mounting Soviet influence in the Arab world in the face of increasing violence in the Middle East served to underscore French impotence in a region where historically French power had been substantial. The more deeply the superpowers became involved in the Arab-Israeli wars, the less room was left for France and the greater the danger that local conflicts might detonate a major confrontation from which France would find it impossible to insulate itself. Rather than capitalizing on its position in the Third World to strengthen its global role, the Pompidou government found itself carefully balancing commitments to the various states of the Middle East to minimize risks and salvage what influence it could. In those circumstances, Kolodziej insists, France was "more *deman-*



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*deur* than determiner of the interstate and internal politics of the region." (p. 551.)

In the concluding section of his book, Kolodziej gives de Gaulle full credit for grasping the dangers and frustrations of an international system based on superpower duopoly: in such a system a middle power like France stood to lose everything in the event of an overt conflict and could expect to see its interests ignored by a condominium of the superpowers. A looser system of power relationships could improve French opportunities to act with some effect upon the other states within the immediate region, and perhaps even on the superpowers. Moreover, a change in the "milieu" of international relations that gave greater scope to the traditional skills of French diplomacy was a reasonable and understandable goal. It was the Gaullist alternative, particularly the choice of modalities — the determination to act alone, the practice of the boycott, the abrupt changes of position and the resolve to use these in the service of narrow, short-run French national interests — that alienated other states whose support was essential for any long-term systemic change. Hence, Kolodziej concludes, for other states of Western Europe, "The Gaullist cure for the international disease of the Cold War was as bitter to accept as the superpower struggle itself. . . . Torn between limited resources and soaring, limitless national aims, French global policy condemned itself to pragmatic, tactical adjustments and opportune alignments. . . ." (p. 568.) With the disappearance of de Gaulle and the realignment of domestic and international forces following 1968, Pompidou's government shifted its priorities and *bonheur* replaced *grandeur* as the principal goal of foreign policy (p. 584).

Kolodziej's is a rich, rewarding book, written in a vigorous style that may occasionally offend the sensibilities of de Gaulle's fervent admirers but will never bore them. It is clearly the best descriptive analysis of the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic available in English and the most important study of the subject by an American scholar in a decade. Its strength is also a weakness, however, if one is searching for an explanation of how idiosyncratic variables shape foreign policy. Kolodziej is concerned to trace outcomes of French decisions, particularly as they coincide with the actions of other states. From that systemic perspective, de Gaulle's role remains virtually constant: he defines national aims and from time to time alters the formulation to fit changed conditions. He also acts directly on other states, presumably in pursuit of his stated objectives, but whether as spokesman or as statesman, the criterion by which his actions are judged remains their impact on other states. Since it is seldom possible to establish a clear connection between initiative and response, and because the limitations of a middle-range power are obvious, there is a built-in tendency to conclude that national



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foreign policies were ineffective.

The grandiose rhetoric of a de Gaulle may further lead an observer to underestimate the true dimensions of changes because they fall far short of the proclaimed objectives. But the real justification for focusing on the systemic level in the first place was the assumption that systemic forces are the controlling variables; hence, the finding that individual actors are mostly ineffectual flows from the choice of an analytical model as much as from the data being analyzed. This is not to say that Kolodziej is wrong in his conclusions or that his argument is tautological. Rather, it is circular. We are still left hunting for ways to examine the linkages between particular leaders and their qualities and the shape of national policies that go beyond simple responses to external pressures.

The theme of Stanley Hoffmann's book is much larger than those of the other two books. Its central question is whether the changes in France's international position, domestic institutions and social structures since the 1930's constitute "a successful response to a formidable challenge or a brave, but ultimately doomed fight against internal paralysis and external decline?" (p. vii.) Decline and renewal — a recurring theme in de Gaulle's own writings — is the focal point for a series of fourteen brilliant essays that analyze with extraordinary perceptiveness the loss of identity under Vichy, the transformation of French society in the postwar period, the search for renewed international status, and the central role of Charles de Gaulle in guiding these changes. To de Gaulle, renewal was a matter of faith and decline a fatality that challenged the skills of the greatest leaders. Both were depicted as part of a cycle that France had experienced and survived many times in her long history. Hoffmann's view is more pessimistic, but probably also more accurate; he poses decline and renewal as alternatives and suggests that despite de Gaulle's strenuous efforts, France today may be "too much the expression . . . of a traditional style whose virtues . . . are exhausted." (p. ix.) Notwithstanding a substantial renewal of French domestic life and national spirit, the nation's future remains uncertain in a dramatically altered international system. Hence, ultimate decline may have been postponed but not averted, as Hoffmann implies in his final question: "Does a nation that has discovered the limits of her possibilities still have any *projet* other than her own prosperity?" (p. ix.)

Despite the warning (promise?) that these essays are intended less as an exercise in "political science" than as personal responses to some key questions about the impact of change on modern France, Hoffmann offers a valuable model of foreign policy analysis. He skillfully dissects the role of de Gaulle and his conduct of French foreign policy. Focusing on the trends in French politics over the years since the 1930's, he examines a number of the critical linkages between de Gaulle's per-



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sonal characteristics and his conduct of national affairs that seem to have been missing from the works discussed above. Three of these are particularly relevant to that discussion: the psychological dynamics of de Gaulle's personality, the significance of *grandeur* as a link between foreign activity and domestic renewal, and the ambiguous role of nationalism as the link between French society and the outside world.

In a fascinating essay on "De Gaulle as Political Artist: The Will to Grandeur," a parallel is suggested between the patterns of de Gaulle's public behavior and the psychodynamics of his personality. The premium he placed on France's independence grew out of and reflected his private determination to "be himself," and his style of leadership reflected his striving to transcend the problems of the moment by the force of his own character. Both flowed naturally from his family background and tradition and also conformed to his personal need to overcome a sense of estrangement by raising himself above others, by "gathering up" all his faculties in the service of some greater goal of national destiny. This attempt at "psychohistory" illuminates many aspects of de Gaulle's character and permits one to escape from overly simple assumptions about the nature of his "intransigence" or egotism that render many other portraits, including Crozier's, too stark to be altogether convincing.

Hoffmann's analysis of the nature of *grandeur* also reveals the depths of meaning it held for de Gaulle personally and the varying role it played in enabling him to rule over France during two of the most difficult periods of her history. Clearly, *grandeur* was much more than a set of foreign policy aims. It was the key to de Gaulle's relation to his national mission, which he describes in the last (unfinished) volume of his memoirs (*Le Renouveau*) as that of a teacher to his pupils. It partakes of the mystical, quasi-religious quality of the priestly vocation, some of the imperiousness of kingship, but also of the aesthetic dimension of the artist's relation to his creation. Within the larger political context of the day, the search for *grandeur* became a calculated gamble aimed at making the leader's personality and individual will the tool for bringing about a revival of public confidence and national identity. As Hoffmann elaborates the argument, de Gaulle gambled on being able to effect a shift in the external environment of international relations that would open new possibilities for France and, by allowing her to play a distinctive role, provide the basis for a new domestic consensus in support of different leaders and conducive to more efficient institutions. In short, *grandeur* was in large measure "flattery for reform." (p. 196.)

For many reasons the gamble failed. The external system proved highly resistant to change, even capable of reversing some changes in the direction of polycentrism. Nevertheless, one might still conclude that Kolodziej's final judg-



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ment about de Gaulle's foreign policy (the right goals but the wrong methods and reasons) overlooks the other dimensions of national renewal to which it contributed despite its failures. While no one would argue that he intended things to work out that way, de Gaulle understood that the failure of a policy need not mean the failure of a people, and that the national spirit may even emerge strengthened and renewed from foreign encounters.

A sense of national purpose is a necessary link between the leader and the broader public that must respond to his initiatives if they are to bear fruit. Nationalism is at the heart of the crisis of French politics in recent times, and all three authors are well aware of its significance. Nevertheless, Hoffmann's analysis of the phenomenon is particularly revealing since he views the problem from a historical perspective in which the loss of national identity under Vichy provided the central trauma to which more recent policies have attempted to provide some remedy. De Gaulle's assertion of national independence can be understood as at least in part motivated by a determination to restore the sense of national identity and purpose lost during the 1930's and to instill in modern Frenchmen a new sense of national will.

In this enterprise he achieved considerable success, despite the failures in foreign policy, but he may ultimately have set France on another wrong direction because his image of her, drawn from another century, reflected values that may no longer command widespread support and conditions that seem no longer to exist. Thus de Gaulle appears to have urged Frenchmen to adopt a vision of national independence that is economically inconceivable in an increasingly interdependent system of highly industrialized societies. Moreover, even the strongest states seem to be incapable of changing the structure of the international system or effectively shaping the actions of smaller powers. Given the apparent paralysis of power at the international level, one is certainly right to ask whether and how a nation like France can hope to preserve its identity.

More broadly, if one assumes that all men require some loftier goal than simple hedonism around which to order their personal and collective lives so as to escape from the intolerable alternatives of barbarism or anomie, de Gaulle's undertaking is profoundly significant and deserves to be seriously contemplated. These three authors jointly provide one with excellent materials and the concepts to begin the task.

## Radicalism and Fascism Without Marx *

*by Albert L. Weeks*

Great books, like great minds, are likely to upset conventional thought patterns. Nietzsche spoke of the necessarily destructive na-

* *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics*. By A. James Gregor. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. 472 pp. $15.00.



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ture of the creative mind. Recasting and rebuilding require new designs and foundations, and the dismantling of old structures. Professor A. James Gregor is one such creative rebuilder. In his latest book, *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics,* he has canvassed old ground and where he found the interpretations of others deficient, which was often, he has made a "cognitive reorientation" to the materials.

The thoroughly re-examined dramatis personae of his book are Marx and Engels; Pareto, Sorel, Mosca, Gentile and Michels; Lenin, Mussolini, Stalin and Mao (but not Kim Il Sung, whose published works are available in English); Castro, Ho Chi Minh, Guevara, Marcuse, Malcolm X, *et al.* The reappraised terms, concepts or political phenomena include radicalism (left and right), consciousness, proletariat, fascism, alienation, general will and general interest, vanguard, elitism, violence-in-the-name-of-justice, futurism, the New Left, and more. The author reinterprets these familiar concepts and phenomena with extraordinary insight and originality.

In a modestly written Preface, Gregor remarks that he "lived through a good part of the student movement on the Berkeley campus," witnessing "new radicalism" in actual practice. He was motivated to write his book, he says, by the "transparently silly attempt" by some to establish unsupportable differences between fascism and radical socialism and communism. Specious distinctions, such as that radical socialism or communism is humanist, peaceful, beautiful and full of love, while its right-wing opposition (not only fascists) is the opposite, have misled the modern mind, particularly among the youth. "The sophomoric distinction between 'good guys' and 'bad guys' doesn't afford us much cognitive leverage." (p. x.) True, fascism is and was ferociously misanthropic, but to say that radical socialism is not or never could be inhumane, or that radical socialism or communism does not share some common roots with fascism is to fail to understand the essence of socialism, radicalism and the New Left. Something else impels the author: the yawning gap lately opened between today's socialists and yesterday's Marxists. Even in his own day, Karl Marx denied bitterly that a number of self-styled "Marxists" were Marxists in the true sense. That same misunderstanding between master and disciples plagued relations between Plato and Aristotle, Jesus and his disciples, Freud and his followers —to cite only a few examples.

Left and right radicalisms of the twentieth century have a common ancestry, often a similar look and sound to their postulates and proclamations. Both extremes have occasionally, if tacitly, recognized their mutual similarities. Fascists once advised their followers to study Bolshevik techniques. Mussolini called Stalin a "crypto-Fascist." Students of Bolshevism, and disillusioned communists or ex-communists, have seen striking similarities between Stalinism and



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Hitlerism, that "deadly parallel" (Trotsky's term) which any number of Soviet dissidents, like Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, have so candidly identified and described. Most modern radicalism has left the essential Marx and Engels far behind, ignoring or distorting the founders' thought.

The ancestry of Maoism, Castroism and Stalinism, as well as of fascism, does not lead back to Marx. Instead, it stems from a somewhat later "fascist persuasion" that one finds in the writings of Pareto or Mosca, Le Bon or Sorel. These ex-Marxists, revisionist or syndicalist radicals of the late nineteenth century, sought to redress essential Marxism since Marxism did not and could not accommodate itself ideologically to *non*proletarian revolution (or a nonrevolutionary proletariat!) — or to the elitism of radical, déclassé intellectuals, or to nationalism and the considerable role nationalism might play in the revolutionary mobilization and inspiration of the masses.

The twentieth-century resolution by radicals of the many problems bequeathed to Marxist-oriented socialists was of a fascist persuasion. Mussolini, who was first a socialist, assimilated the "mass-mobilizing" characteristics of proto-fascism. So did Lenin, at almost the same time as Mussolini. Lenin's major early work, *What Is To Be Done?* (1902), which was partly inspired by his reading of the Blanquist-revisionist of the 1870's, Peter Tkachev, contains many of the anti-democratic nuances of the fascist persuasion: that the proletarian masses lack true class-consciousness and are "ignorant"; that the masses stand in need of elitist-inspired indoctrination; that authoritarianism of leaders over rank-and-file revolutionaries (or over the "party") is necessary to instill military-like discipline as a substitute for "spontaneity"; that people are collectively motivated and mobilized by other than exclusively economic concerns, as taught by orthodox Marxism. By 1917 and even beyond, Lenin continued to maintain, in fascist style, that the "Party could not be guided by the temper of the masses because [that temper] was changeable and incalculable"; within three years after October 1917, he was to assert that the "dictatorship of single persons" is historically necessary.

On his part, Mussolini, twenty years of age in 1903 — the year after Lenin wrote *What Is To Be Done?* — immersed himself in the works of Sorel, Pareto and Le Bon — his combined "Tkachev." In these and the writings of Alfredo Oriani (his "Chernyshevsky"), Mussolini learned about the role to be played by the "revolutionary vanguard . . . the moral and intellectual aristocracy . . . the proletarian [*sic*] elite." Chernyshevsky, in the book from which Lenin took the title for his 1902 work, had spoken in *What Is To Be Done?* of the "new men" who would be called upon to lead the ignorant multitudes into the earthly paradise. Oriani's "messengers of the future" and Chernyshevsky's "men of the future"



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become, as Professor Gregor convincingly argues, the prototypes of the red-shirted Bolsheviki and the black-shirted fascisti of later generations.

One might ask, why did Mussolini frankly renounce Marx while Lenin continued to claim, to the horror of many Marxists, that Bolshevism was the only true and orthodox Marxist ideology?

For Lenin, it was perhaps no accident that his elitist persuasion had to be clothed in Marxist dress. After all, Ulyanov-Lenin had acquired his standing as newspaper editor and radical leader primarily on the basis of his association with the father of Russian Marxism, the venerable George V. Plekhanov. Plekhanov — until later when he became utterly disillusioned with the red-haired, passionate young agitator known as "Tulin, the old man" — regarded Lenin as an extremely talented addition to the general staff of exiled Russian social democracy. Also, in an age revering anything scientific, Lenin was quite naturally attracted to the "scientific" (better, scient*istic*) formulations of Marxism. That Marxism may be notoriously unscientific escaped him, but he knew well how to exploit the intricacies and authority of full-blown Marxism in order to present it to declassed Russian radical-elitists (who were far outnumbered by other Russian radicals) as the *philosophia perennis,* and his own Bolshevist variant as thoroughly and exclusively Marxist, ergo thoroughly scientific and "necessary" — one of Lenin's favorite terms (particularly in his *Philosophical Notebooks*).

Mussolini, in his fully Marxist phase, became aware that "classical Marxism was incapable of dealing with the issue of nationalism [in the first years of the twentieth century] in any coherent fashion." (p. 119.) Abandoning his reading of the works of classical Marxism, he concentrated on constructing a revolutionary mass-mobilizing party. He "generated his own rationale and his own legitimizing myths." Mussolini's work became an "explicit rationale and a charter myth for a totalitarian state" (p. 137); Stalinism and much of what goes under the name of "radical" thought in our own time "ventilate themes, emphases and arguments more akin to those found in Fascism than any to be found in the corpus of classical Marxism." (pp. 137-138.)

After Mussolini stripped away the strictly Marxist categories in developing his own rationale, "the notion of 'nation' began to loom larger and larger in his deliberations. . . . 'Anti-patriotism [read "internationalism" — A.L. W.] of old,' wrote Mussolini in 1914, 'has dissipated itself.'" (pp. 169-170.) He then proceeded to speak of Italy as a *nation*-proletariat, impoverished and disadvantaged. One of Mussolini's colleagues insisted that the future of the world would be dominated by a "class struggle between nations" — a conflict between "capitalist" and "proletarian" nation-states.

Stalin, like Mussolini, com-



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mitted his party to "socialism in one country," using nationalist strategies to mobilize the masses. At the same time, Stalin could speak of a future filled with struggle and war between socialist and capitalist nation-states; rightly or wrongly, he based his theses upon Lenin's fundamentals. "In effect," writes Gregor, "what had transpired in the Soviet Union was further, and rapid, involution of the modified classical Marxism that Lenin had bequeathed. Stalin opted to create a nationalistic and developmental dictatorship in a marginally developed country, employing the inherited rationale of an internationalistic revolutionary movement which had originally preoccupied itself all but exclusively with the advanced capitalist countries." (p. 131.)

Fascist-communist totalitarian similarities aside, fascism was outwardly anti-Bolshevik; anti-Cominternism was far stronger than the threads that sewed Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia together in the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939-1941. "Fascists insisted that their anti-Bolshevism was a consequence of their recognition that the Soviets had misconstrued the challenge of the contemporary world. The Soviets continued to mouth internationalist, anti-statist, and 'proletarian' slogans when the self-evident features of their regime attested to their abandonment of the entire substance of classical Marxism." (p. 183.) Much of this ideological complaining by fascists against the Soviets was motivated, not by profound differences between their fundamentally similar totalitarian conceptions, but by imperialist and expansionist Axis policies which were not unmatched by the Soviet Union's efforts to expand its sphere of influence (e.g., the secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet agreements) and its actual breaching of neighbors' borders, as in the Baltic states and Rumania in 1939-1940. With Hitler's anti-communism, of course, the "Jewish-Bolshevik" opprobrium was tailored into Nazi racism; anti-Cominternism for the German Nazis was more likely to be a mask for Hitler's own imperialist desires than the result of a tangible threat to German security posed by Stalin's Russia.

Left-wing regimes today, particularly in the Third World, and their ideologies for mobilizing nonproletarian masses, possess a by-now "familiar constellation of characteristics: [theirs] is an 'anti-imperialist' nationalism — a struggle of 'proletarian' nations against 'plutocratic' nations. It advocates a national union of 'all productive classes,' including the 'national bourgeoisie' and perhaps the 'honest gentry' against all 'anti-national, anti-popular, and capitalist' foes in the pursuit of national sovereignty and independence." (p. 187.) Formerly autonomous organizations are mobilized into disciplined transmission belts of the regime, "more often than not at the expense of the urban proletariat and the rural peasantry. . . . External intransigence and perhaps armed aggression seem to be a function



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of the success of the developmental drive and increased military capability. The 'just and revolutionary war' can become the ultimate challenge for the 'new man.' " (pp. 187-188.)

When the essence of such developmental dictatorships and their accompanying ideologies is examined in this way, the Marxist trappings of their propaganda become hollow and anachronistic. "We are left," the author concludes, "with the distinct impression that perhaps Marx was not, after all, the prophet of our time. Perhaps in a curious, but not totally incomprehensible sense, Mussolini was." (p. 188.) Or Tkachev, Lenin and Stalin were.

## Development of an International Environmental Law *

*by A. Dan Tarlock*

It is now generally recognized that the increased rates of resource depletion, energy consumption and population growth stimulated by the development and application of technology pose grave threats to the stability of the global environment. Many environmental problems are confined within the borders of a single state but many are now transnational or international. Actions initiated by a sovereign or under its control may have adverse effects on resources shared by two or more nations, or activities such as the transportation of oil or ocean mining may threaten common property resources not yet allocated to a sovereign or to an international body with the power to enforce a property rights regime—to name two of many possible problems in this area.

In response to these problems the concept of international environmental law is emerging as a discrete area of international law.[1] The task of developing an international environmental law is a formidable one, for the minimization of activities that threaten shared resources such as airsheds, rivers and oceans is difficult under existing principles of national as well as international law. Even if one assumes the existence of liability rules applicable to states and activities under their control, activities alleged to pollute the environment do not often result in discrete and easily perceived impacts. Thus, they are unlikely to trigger action by the affected state under traditional principles such as the right of self-defense or the standard of strict liability evolved under the Corfu Channel case and the Trail Smelter and Lake Lannoux arbitrations. The effects of such activities are often cumulative and difficult to detect until some future date.

Existing principles of customary international law are primarily designed to redress past injuries rather than to prevent risks of future harm. In the rare instance where a nation acts to prevent harm to shared or common

* *The International Law of Pollution.* By James Barros and Douglas M. Johnson. New York: The Free Press, 1974. 476 pp. $14.95.

[1] See Note, Perspectives on International Environmental Law, *Yale Law Journal,* Vol. 82, 1973, p. 1659.



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resources, as Canada did with its unilateral declaration of a 100-nautical-mile anti-pollution zone in the Arctic waters, the action is open to the criticism that other objectives of international law are compromised. In brief, the development of an international environmental law calls both for the recognition of new legal principles of state liability for pollution and the creation of new international and transnational institutions. For those interested in participating in this process, *The International Law of Pollution*, by James Barros and Douglas M. Johnson, is a useful starting point.

The authors, two Canadian professors, have put together an imaginative collection of national and international source materials and have laced them with insightful and readable commentary. The book consists primarily of source materials, treaties, resolutions and judicial decisions, proceeding from a series of United States Supreme Court decisions involving interstate disputes, to bilateral pollution agreements, and finally to international agreements and resolutions. Included are documents such as the Agreement between Canada and the United States of America on Great Lakes Water Quality, the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, and the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment. The selection of documents is excellent and the book provides a comprehensive introduction to international regulation of activities affecting shared resources.

The book is not, however, simply a collection of source materials arranged along functional lines. It has an important thesis. The authors argue that decent sources of precedents for an international law of pollution already exist, and the materials skillfully build their case. They assert quite correctly that "it is unlikely that an international law of pollution will emerge holistically from universal lawmaking conventions in the near future. International legal principles of environmental responsibility are likely to emerge chiefly from two sources: from international declarations and resolutions that lack form and from the express commitments and implied assumptions common to a growing variety of international environmental agreements of limited scope. But it will be easier to derive generally binding principles from either of these sources if they can be shown to be a development or modification of existing principles of international responsibility." (p. 74.)

*The International Law of Pollution* makes two primary contributions to the developing literature of international environmental protection apart from being the first comprehensive collection of documents. First, it addresses the problem of defining pollution so that injuries to sovereign interests can be prevented as well as redressed after injury occurs. Second, it suggests some possibilities for the development of customary international law



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that have been overlooked by commentators in recent years.

The authors focus primarily on Canadian-American pollution agreements and recent international conventions, but these developments are preceded by a largely fresh look at the major national and international judicial precedents holding a state liable for the activities of its citizens which cause injury to the citizens or resources of another state. The only international adjudication of a pollution dispute is the Trail Smelter arbitration. In 1938 an arbitration tribunal required Canada to pay damages to the United States stemming from the private operation of a smelter near the Washington state boundary. The tribunal found that Canada was responsible for the conduct of the activity. In addition to the payment of damages, the smelter was required to refrain from causing any future damage through fumes in the state of Washington to the extent that it would be liable to private persons under the law of the United States, because "no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties of persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence."

Actually Canada agreed to be bound by U.S. precedents since they were favorable to her on the issues of the standard of proof required and the ability of the court to compare the costs and benefits of granting relief. For this reason the general precedential value of the arbitration has been minimized. A recent English writer, for example, calls the arbitration "a rather modest contribution to the jurisprudence." [2] This is an overly narrow view of its precedential significance. As the authors carefully show, the arbitration rests on a series of U.S. Supreme Court precedents which potentially recognize the right of a sovereign to claim damage to its interests in a case where a private citizen might not, and thus they provide some basis for the recognition of a concept of anticipatory harm in international law.

More important perhaps, the general principle of the arbitration — state liability for pollution by its citizens that causes injury to citizens of another state — is being accepted in the international community. Lawyers may continue to argue whether the arbitration introduced the concept of strict liability into international law or was merely an application of the universally-followed Latin maxim, *sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes.*[3] However, as the authors point out, the Stockholm Declaration and other recent nonbinding actions have adopted and

[2] Ian Brownlie, "A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental Protection," in L. Teclaff and A. Utton, editors, *International Environmental Law* (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 2.

[3] This is a general injunction, found in all legal systems: that one must use one's property to avoid unreasonable harm to others. Unlike the doctrine of strict liability, the *sic utere* doctrine allows the benefits of the polluting activity to be balanced against the costs.



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transcended the principle and so the debate is becoming less important. One recent application of the Trail Smelter principle is the European Community Council of Ministers' recommendation that all nations in the Community enforce a policy of imposing the costs of pollution on the polluter. The recommendation is not binding on the member states but nonetheless could be the basis for a complaint by the Council against any state that aided domestic industry by barring pollution control costs instead of letting the industry pay them, on the grounds that such subsidy is liable to distort competition.

My only complaint with the Barros-Johnson book is that there is not enough commentary. Specifically, I wish the authors had included some commentary in connection with the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, enacted by Canada in 1970, which asserts regulatory jurisdiction over shipping and mining activities in Arctic waters adjacent to the Canadian mainland but not part of Canada's territorial claims. A unilateral assertion of regulatory authority rather than an assertion of sovereignty, the act represents the most significant attempt by one state to declare itself trustee for the world to protect, in the language of the preamble, "the peculiar ecological balance that now exists in the water, ice and land areas of the Canadian Arctic." It has been attacked by the United States on the grounds that it contravenes fundamental principles of international law, namely, freedom of passage on the high seas. However, thoughtful commentators have asked whether unilateral action to promote environmental quality should be encouraged in the absence of the international community's ability to agree on a regime which would share the resources of the seas but regulate exploitation so that the water masses could continue to perform their traditional life-regulating functions.[4] The debate is an important one and can be constructed from the references the authors provide, but unlike the case with more conventional environmental agreements, commentary is necessary here to guide the reader's thinking.

Barros and Johnson set out to accomplish a modest but laudable objective. Their book was "designed as a practical research tool for students of international pollution control problems." It serves this purpose well. Moreover, it provides some useful preliminary analysis for the development of principles of responsibility for activities that have adverse impact on transnational and shared resources.

## The USSR and the Third World *

*by Robert C. Horn*

Over the past several years an increasing number of scholarly

[4] See Richard B. Bilder, "The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea," *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 69, 1970, p. 1.

* *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations*. Edited by Roger E. Kanet. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 302 pp. $12.50.



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studies on Soviet policy in the Third World have appeared. This is beginning to remedy a shortage that had existed for too long. As editor Roger Kanet points out in his Preface to *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations,* however, many of these studies are too specific to provide a broad view, while others, which do present a general overview, add "little in the way of specific detail." (p. xi.) This volume tries to avoid both problems and "to provide the reader with a general overview of Soviet policy toward the developing nations and more detail on various aspects of that policy." (p. xii.) It clearly accomplishes these goals.

All of the articles are by scholars with impressive credentials who have made significant contributions to the field. Kanet himself wrote the two introductory chapters on "The Soviet Union and the Colonial Question, 1917-1953" and "Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin." The chapters with an area focus are by Arthur Jay Klinghoffer on Africa, Justus M. van der Kroef on Southeast Asia, Bhabani Sen Gupta on South Asia, John C. Campbell on the Middle East, and Roger P. Hamburg on Latin America. Examinations of three nongeographic strands of Soviet involvement in the Third World round out the volume: Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier examines economic relations, Richard W. Mansbach writes on the United Nations, and Jan S. Prybyla treats of one aspect of the Sino-Soviet split, namely, comparative Soviet and Chinese aid practices.

All of the authors provide sound analyses and thorough descriptions of the course of Soviet policy up to recent years (generally to mid-1972, although some end earlier and van der Kroef covers to mid-1973). There are, to be sure, some errors. For example, Kanet incorrectly places the famous Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to South Asia in 1954 (p. 27) instead of 1955. Van der Kroef mentions a Soviet economic credit to Indonesia of $250 million in 1961, *after* and *in addition to* the $250 million extended by Khrushchev during his 1960 visit. (p. 100.) This reviewer has never seen reference to this or evidence of it before (nor would it "square" with the figures on Indonesia's debt to the USSR). There are also some misspellings of the names of important individuals, for instance the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister (p. 136) and the late Chilean President (p. 191).

One can question a number of specific points made by the authors. Both Kanet (p. 34) and Klinghoffer (p. 56), for instance, mention that the Soviet focus in Third World policy until 1960-1961 was on communist parties rather than nationalist leaders or other factors. This seems questionable generally and is certainly not true with respect to Indonesia. One must also wonder about van der Kroef's contention that "Moscow, rather than Washington, is now being viewed as the real countervailing power [to Peking] in Asia." (p. 115.) By whom? The record indicates a reluctance by Southeast Asian leaders to regard the USSR in this light. I



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would further take issue — on the basis of some evidence — with van der Kroef's statements that the Soviets did *not* "seek to exploit the upsurge of anti-Chinese sentiment among the Burmese" (p. 82) during China's Cultural Revolution and that Djakarta's policy of *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia "generally sat well with Moscow" (p. 86). Again, this author ought to be asked for clarification on how "actively" the Chinese are "backing Burmese Communist and tribal insurgents" (p. 82).

Valkenier repeats a common refrain when she alludes to early Soviet aid programs being concerned primarily with lavish and eye-catching projects such as hotels and sports stadiums, huge steelworks, and so on. (p. 216.) That this was Moscow's intention is not borne out, even in the Indonesian case. Although a sports stadium complex is the only Soviet aid project ever completed in Indonesia (a hospital stands as a gift), the Soviets on more than one occasion tried to talk Sukarno out of the idea. Sukarno was not to be dissuaded, however, and the Soviets were compelled — unless they wanted to offend the main "target" of their Indonesian efforts — to build the stadium (in a hurry, too, so as to have it ready for Sukarno to host the 1962 Asian Games). Valkenier also contends that "closer economic cooperation" between the USSR and states of the Third World "is bound to bring the developing nations into the Soviet orbit." (p. 235.) This seems a bit too strong unless the term "orbit" is loosely defined. (Klinghoffer likewise refers to the Soviet "orbit," on p. 77, without indicating adequately what he means by the term.) Finally, does Soviet support for a communist party always mean working for the overthrow of a nationalist leader, as Klinghoffer implies? (p. 62.) Such an interpretation seems unsupported in many examples of Soviet policy toward developing states.

But these objections are mostly minor and inherent in the continuing debate regarding Soviet policy in the Third World. My only "significant" criticism of the volume concerns its "lost opportunity." The editor, recognizing the important limitation of most readers or edited collections — "Usually . . . these [articles] are reprints of articles originally written for publication separately, and there is little relationship among the questions asked or the approaches employed by the several authors" (p. xi) — sought to avoid this pitfall. All but the article by Campbell were prepared specifically for this book. At the same time Kanet admits that "some of the authors have strayed from the general format that was originally planned" (p. xi), and this is understandable and excusable. The point is, while he may be right that these articles "possess more unity than is usually the case in multi-authored studies" (p. xi), a greater degree of unity should have been imposed. I was unable to identify with certainty what the original "general format" was. This is not explained



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in the Preface or elsewhere, nor does it emerge from a reading of the chapters.

All the studies do focus on changes in Soviet policy and analysis introduced under Khrushchev in the mid-1950's and on the evolution thereafter, especially since Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964. Conclusions regarding increasing Soviet pragmatism, realism and flexibility are common to them all. Most are good overviews that interweave an examination of changing Soviet analyses, goals and means into the description of Soviet behavior. Beyond this, however, the overall organization and focus are unclear. Four chapters are subdivided numerically, four by subheadings, and two are not subdivided at all. Where there are subdivisions, they do not seem comparable from one article to another.

A useful focus might have been on the nature of influence in Soviet relations with Third World states and the limitations or obstacles to such influence. This seems to me to be a question of fundamental importance to an examination of Soviet Third World policy. To one extent or another, this theme is implicit in most of the articles. However, it is confronted explicitly only in the chapters by Campbell (who does the best job with it), Sen Gupta (who offers the useful approach of "influence-building" but then seems to muddy it somewhat by assuming certain aspects which should have been examined further; see pp. 120, 120n and 125), Hamburg and Mansbach. In sum, a format built on influence or on some other concept and clearly spelled out to the reader and adhered to by the authors would have enhanced the book's value.

Despite these limitations, *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations* is a welcome addition to the literature on Soviet foreign policy. It is valuable to have relatively current, generally competent articles on all geographical areas and certain important themes in Soviet policy in the Third World collected in one volume. A lower-priced paperback edition would make the book available for use in college courses.

## Japanese Perspectives on World Affairs *

*by Jacquelyn K. Davis*

Since World War II the United States and Japan have enjoyed a "special relationship" based upon mutual respect and friendship. Bound together by extensive economic ties, the two countries have also shared similar perceptions of the international environment and have had compatible security interests. As the global strategic balance of power increasingly appears to shift against the United States, especially in Asia, Japan has assumed even greater importance to U.S. policy in the Far East. Despite the vital U.S. interest in cultivating better relations with Japan, however, few

* *Japan: The Fragile Superpower*. By Frank Gibney. New York: W. W. Norton, 1975. 347 pp. $10.00.



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Americans have sought to understand the Japanese as a people, to learn of their hopes and fears and their attitudes toward the emerging global system.

Frank Gibney is a welcome exception. A journalist-businessman living in Japan, he presents an insightful and balanced interpretation of Japanese attitudes, life styles and expectations in his book, *Japan: The Fragile Superpower*. In a sympathetic, but often critical portrait, he probes the convergence of East and West in post-World War II Japanese society and suggests that Japan's economic resurgence resulted not only from her close relationship with the United States, but also because of the diligence and skill of her people.

The postwar resurgence is all the more remarkable because Japan is a resource-barren country and, thus, highly dependent on international trade. Curiously enough, as Gibney points out, it has occurred without the loss of traditional Japanese concepts and philosophies. Rather, the logic of modernization and technological development has been superimposed on the traditional society. An expansive urban-industrial complex exists alongside feudal traditions of earlier periods. Urbanization and the spread of mass education, both of which strengthen the tendency toward individualism, have not altered the basic fabric of the society, namely, the way in which the Japanese relate to each other and to foreigners, and their perceptions of, and responses to, those in authority. Western concepts of equality and individualism have influenced only a small percentage of the citizenry. Most Japanese still retain their paternalist views and, as a result, Japanese society is status-oriented and highly class conscious.

These societal perceptions of power and authority carry over into views of the international environment. Inspired by the concepts of ancient Confucian philosophy, the Japanese perceive an international hierarchy of nation-states, with the United States and the Soviet Union occupying the highest positions. Historic differences between Japan and Russia offered little prospect for the development of a close relationship with the Soviets in the postwar era. In contrast, since the war, the Japanese have been impressed both by U.S. power and U.S. benevolence. During the American occupation they came to view the Americans as elder brothers, as teachers to be emulated, and readily acquiesced to the American restructuring of their political and economic systems.

To Gibney, the occupation of Japan represents one of the United States' most successful postwar foreign policy initiatives. Under American tutelage, this defeated nation progressed economically and politically to become one of the world's great democratic powers. At the same time, the understanding evinced by U.S. officials, particularly General MacArthur, of the extent to which traditional values infused the Japanese spirit encouraged



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the retention of several age-old Japanese institutions, including the emperor. Such insight on the part of the Americans engendered deep respect for the United States in Japan, a respect which until quite recently remained unchanged.

Throughout the postwar period the Japanese preference for the separation of economic and political issues has encouraged an almost total preoccupation with economic issues, to the relative neglect of foreign policy and national security affairs. That Japan was able to devote her attention primarily to economic goals rather than security matters could be explained, in large measure, by the willingness of successive Japanese governments to place their complete faith and trust in U.S. security guarantees. Consequently, few Americans can appreciate the deep resentment felt in Japan over the so-called Nixon shocks.

Gibney suggests that regardless of their content, the Nixon Administration's new economic policies and the change in direction of postwar U.S. foreign policy in the early 1970's needlessly alienated the Japanese. For the first time in the postwar relationship they were so disenchanted with the United States as to question openly the credibility of U.S. alliance guarantees. Confused and angered by the veil of secrecy that surrounded the development of the new U.S. policies, the suddenness of their announcement, and especially the decision to change the Sino-American relationship, they saw the Nixon-Kissinger diplomatic maneuvering as proof that Japan was considered by the United States to be less than an equal partner. Moreover, they were fearful that Washington, in its desire to accommodate former (or potential) adversaries in an era of strategic parity, might be less than willing to deploy its military capabilities unless vital American interests were threatened. The Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on greater self-reliance by U.S. allies reinforced these fears. Inevitably the manner in which the American policies were executed gave rise to a widespread debate over the future of the Japanese-American relationship and alternative foreign policy options for Japan.

Disagreement exists regarding future foreign policy goals as well as the relationship with Washington. The stratification of Japanese society has encouraged little dialogue over political issues. As Gibney explains, "The lack of effective communication [among] government, business and the academy is not merely a social failing, it is one of Japan's most serious potential political limitations as a modern industrial state." (p. 316.) Because of the compartmentalization of the academic, governmental and business sectors, the influential forces in Japanese politics rarely interact to bring differing perspectives and fresh approaches to the discussion of issues which vitally affect Japan's future. While the "loyalties, devotion to tasks, intragroup cooperation, and sense of solidarity" that the verti-



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cal society engenders "are its obvious strengths," its compartmentalization and private principalities are its "outstanding defects." (p. 316.) Thus, postwar Japan has never produced a consensus on foreign policy issues, beyond common outrage at terrorist bombings and Arab hijackings.

The deep fragmentation of Japanese politics has prevented adoption of an ideological perspective, although the country's economic resurgence has been accompanied by the growth of nationalism. While most Japanese would wish Japan to play a greater international role, few are clear about what that role should be. The nuclear allergy still exerts considerable influence, yet most Japanese find it inconceivable for Japan to play the role of a great power unless she develops a greater military capability and, some insist, a nuclear force.

The commitment to pursue policies designed to spur economic growth is also generating discontent among her youth. Japanese youth, as the children of affluence, suffer from much the same sense of disillusionment as that which undermined America's foreign policy consensus in the late 1960's. In contrast to the Americans who were disenchanted with U.S. policies in Vietnam, Japanese young people are rebelling against what they perceive to be Japan's international image. They are increasingly unwilling to support the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's concentration on economic development to the relative neglect of the vast societal problems that have resulted from its commitment to modernization. Concern over such issues as pollution, housing, transportation and energy has assumed major significance for a new generation of Japanese who are searching for a national purpose. The Liberal Democratic Party, which has been in power since its founding in 1955, has failed to produce a dynamic leader to inspire confidence in the government, let alone encourage a Japanese consensus over a wide range of issues. But neither has any other political party in postwar Japan been able to generate mass support for its cause.

Japan's future, as the author properly suggests, depends on her success in adopting new outlooks and relationships. For one thing, the Japanese must recognize that the complexity of the issues confronting them requires efforts beyond the capabilities of any individual nation. Increasingly, they must be willing to disavow their penchant for bilateralism which seeks to satisfy more immediate interests and, instead, pursue those objectives that benefit their long-term interests. While Gibney fails to examine Japan's future international role in depth, he makes clear his view that this surely involves shoring up her relationship with the United States and participating more actively in the global search for peace and stability. At the same time, he advises, the United States and Western Europe should welcome Japan as an equal in a tri-



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lateral relationship which can benefit all parties, and future U.S.-Japanese relations should be conducted less as a senior-junior arrangement and more as a partnership.

Thus, while the United States must be prepared to accept a greater degree of independence in future Japanese foreign policy, Japan must be willing to work together with the United States and other industrialized countries in developing solutions to global problems. Despite the dramatic changes that have taken place in the international environment over the last decade, there remains a strong identity of interests between the two partners. A strengthening of their relationship through closer consultation and greater collaboration will be in the interest of both nations.


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# *Books Received*

## I. Politics, History, Economics

**The Economic Theory of Representative Government.** By Albert Breton. Chicago: Aldine, 1974. 228 pp. $8.50. Proceeding on the assumption that representative government must be understood as one of the major economic institutions of the society, a professor of economics at the University of Toronto argues that the behavior of such a government can be explained by standard and well-tested principles of economic analysis, once we realize that the market it confronts is a market for policies rather than for goods and services. Breton bases his analysis on the theory of public goods (Wicksell and Samuelson), the theory of democracy (Anthony Downs), the theory of decision rules (Buchanan and Tullock), and the theory of transaction costs, about which relatively little is known except that they are important. The bulk of the work is devoted to an examination of the forces underlying *demand* for public policies by citizens and groups and the *supply* of public policies by politicians and bureaucrats. The various building blocks are then synthesized in a single equilibrium model of resource allocation in the public sector, combined with comparative statistical displacements from an initial equilibrium.

**The Fabulous Ego: Absolute Power in History.** By Milton Klonsky. New York: Quadrangle, the New York Times Book Company, 1974. 436 pp. $15.00. Portraits of fifteen of the greatest monarchs of history who held absolute power over their subjects. The rulers selected are Sardanapalus (Assyrian, 800 B.C.), Shih Huang Ti (Chinese, 259-210 B.C.), Elagabalous (Roman, 204-222), Justinian (483-565) and Theodora (508-548), Harun al-Rashid (764-809), "The Once and Future King of Cambodia" (c. 1300), Tamerlane, Pope Alexander VI, Ivan the Terrible, Akbar the Great, The Grand Signor (Ottoman, c. 1605), Charles I, Louis XV, Catherine the Great, and Napoleon. Materials for these sketches have been gathered from accounts of writers living during or near the time of the emperors. Klonsky, lecturer and author, provides commentaries on each ruler.

**Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach.** By Howard H. Lentner. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1974. 303 pp. $8.95. Although the author discusses the influence on states of conditions in the international system, in this analysis of the theory and conduct of foreign policy his primary focus is on the actors (nations, international organizations and transnational corporations) in world affairs. The relationship between external and internal determinants of foreign policy is explained in terms of their limiting or facilitating the execution of a particular foreign policy option. After classifying actors according to their power and their degree of participation in international affairs, he examines specific types of foreign policies that may be adopted and their implications for the international system.

**The Golden Bowl Be Broken: Peasant Life in Four Cultures.** By Richard Critchfield. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. 312 pp. $10.00. Critchfield, special correspondent for the Washington *Star-News* and contributor to the *Reporter,* the *New Republic,* the *Nation* and other journals, writes with empathy of peasant life in four different cultures. From living in the midst of these peasants and traveling through their lands, he describes vividly the daily lives, attitudes,



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predicaments and hopes of a Bedouin on the Mesopotamian desert, an African Creole fisherman on the southern Indian Ocean island of Mauritius, a newly prosperous Sikh farmer in a Punjabi village in northern India, and a poor Javanese rice peasant who migrates to Djakarta to survive.

**The Law of International Cartels.** By Heinrich Kronstein. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973. 489 pp. n.p. The thesis of this work is that an integrated world market has developed to some extent in almost every key industrial sector, fortified by both formal and informal regulation, which places severe limits on the capacity of even the strongest countries to change the present market regulation by national legislation. The threefold purpose of the author is "to present sufficient examples of modern market regulations to show the existence and operations of these organizations; to show the legal institutions used in this international market regulation; and to analyze, in the case of the most important legal institutions, how this development and utilization became possible." Chapters deal with governmental regulation in international markets, the technological cartel, the raw material cartel, the industrial products cartel, the defensive cartel, and in conclusion a chapter is presented on the trend of world integration of industrial markets and the problems it poses for national sovereignty.

**The Millennium Postponed: Socialism from Sir Thomas More to Mao Tse-tung.** By Edward Hyams. New York: Taplinger, 1974. 277 pp. $10.95. A frequent contributor to British periodicals treats socialism as both a millennial ideal and a political movement. He examines the thought of prominent theorists—More, Saint-Simon, the scientific socialists Marx and Engels, the Social Democrats and the Anarchists (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin and Malatesta). He then describes how various ideas for the pursuit of the millennium were handled by practitioners in power, and the effect they had on the politics and societies of various countries. He also examines the impact of Eastern culture on communism in China, Korea and Vietnam. Finally, Hyams strikes a balance sheet on the success and failure of socialism with reference to freedom, democracy and economic justice. Among his later chapters one finds the titles: "The Vision Fades" and "Half a Loaf." The final chapter carries this heading: "The Millennium Has Been Postponed."

**Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon.** By John Dunn. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 346 pp. $14.50. An analysis of the causes and character of eight major revolutions of the 20th century — in Russia, China, Mexico, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Algeria and Cuba — each of which overthrew an existing government and established an alternative state power that proved capable of maintaining itself in power. In an introductory essay, the author discusses the ideological dilemmas of modern revolution, and in his concluding chapter he examines approaches to the ideological assessment and causal explanation of modern revolutions. Dunn is Director of Studies in History at King's College, Cambridge.

**Multilateral Sanctions in International Law: A Comparative Analysis.** By C. Lloyd Brown-John. New York: Praeger, 1975. 426 pp. $25.00. Professor Brown-John, of the University of Windsor, analyzes three cases in which international organizations applied sanctions to defuse crisis situations: the League of Nations and Italy (1935-1936), the OAS and the Dominican Republic (1960-1962), and the UN and Rhodesia (1965-present). He concludes that sanctions are important tools of international law but have been ineffectively applied in these instances, and predicts an expanded role for multilateral sanctions in the evolving world environment.



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**Political Terrorism.** By Paul Wilkinson. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974. 160 pp. $11.95. An examination of the concepts of terror and terrorism in both historical and contemporary context. The author surveys terrorist movements from the 11th century to the present and evaluates major theories and models concerning their causes, the recruitment of supporters, and the essential conditions for the success, and reasons for failure, of terrorism.

**The Politics of Trade, The Evolution of the Superbloc.** By Douglas Evans. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974. 128 pp. $12.50. Exploring the economic relationships maintained by the world's major powers, the author perceives a tendency toward the formation of exclusive commercial arrangements between each major power and a group of lesser powers. Labeling the resulting international associations "superblocs," Evans warns that the policies of the blocs are neo-mercantilist in orientation, threatening as a consequence the eruption of trade wars between them and the survival of a liberal international trading order.

**Quantitative Techniques in Foreign Policy Analysis and Forecasting.** By Michael K. O'Leary and William D. Coplin. New York: Praeger, 1975. 291 pp. $20.00. A study of the applicability of quantitative methods for foreign policy decision-makers based on collaboration between the Department of State and outside scholars. In addition to surveying the current use of social science techniques in foreign affairs analysis, the authors present six case studies employing quantitative methodologies on topics such as elections abroad, military expenditures in Latin America, international bargaining, projections of violence, and coalition behavior in global oil politics.

**Raw Material Supply in a Multipolar World.** By Yuan-li Wu. New York: Crane, Russak, for the National Strategy Information Center, 1973. 52 pp. $4.95. An examination of the problems in the transfer of raw materials from mostly lesser developed nations to the industrially advanced countries of Western Europe, Japan and the United States. The author, professor of economics at the University of San Francisco, discusses the supply of Middle East oil and looks at a variety of other minerals, such as uranium, iron, copper, nickel, tin, silver, mercury, zinc and bauxite, to analyze the implications of their transfer from a monetary and military perspective.

**Toynbee on Toynbee: A Conversation Between Arnold J. Toynbee and G. R. Urban.** New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. 113 pp. $5.95. A conversation first aired on Radio Free Europe in 1972 now becomes a slender but stimulating volume of reflections on the nature of history; Marxism and Christianity; the mixed blessings of science and technology; the roles of modern proletariats; and China and Russia in world affairs. Along the way, Toynbee warns against the victor's propaganda as history, questions the academic super-specialization of the Ph.D. industry, and muses about some of the controversial theses advanced in *A Study of History*.

**Understanding World Politics.** By Kenneth W. Thompson. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. 234 pp. $11.95. Building on realist writings of international relations, the author sets forth a framework for analyzing the world of the 1970's. Included are assessments of changing international patterns of relationships, the role of ideology in the contemporary world, and the reconciliation of idealism and realism in international politics and American foreign policy.



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II. Military Affairs, Arms Control, Technology

**The Almanac of World Military Power.** (Third edition.) By Trevor N. Dupuy, Grace Hayes and John A. C. Andrews. New York: R. R. Bowker, 1974. 387 pp. $25.00. The third edition of this comprehensive handbook on world military power contains ten regional surveys: North America, Central America and West Indies, South America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Middle East, Africa, Central and East Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and South and Southwest Pacific. Data on each country include size and types of forces, geographical and demographical material, alliance information, and "power potential statistics" such as fuel production, GNP, electric power output, and the like.

**The Causes of War.** By Geoffrey Blainey. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1973. 278 pp. $3.95 (paper). A survey of all international wars fought since 1700 in which the author examines the factors that have led nations to enter conflicts and presents a critique of existing theories of war. Included is an analysis of varieties of war, together with an assessment of the impact of technology on the propensity for, and the intensity and duration of, international conflicts.

**The Future of Technological Civilization.** By Victor Ferkiss. New York: George Braziller, 1974. 369 pp. $12.50. A critique of major conservative and liberal political theories and existing frameworks for political organization based on an examination of the impact of science and technology on society. After setting forth a conception of the world of the future, the author calls for the development of a new ecological humanism.

III. United States and Canada

**The American Left in the Twentieth Century.** By John P. Diggins. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973. 210 pp. $4.25 (paper). An intellectual historian from the University of California, concerned with the mind and moral temper of a generation, sets out to describe the styles of thought assumed by a radical intellectual movement; to explain its philosophical negation of the existing order; and to analyze the factors that account for the ultimate "deradicalization" of the Left as a generational phenomenon. Diggins focuses on not one but three American Lefts (following a competent theoretical introduction) — the Lyrical Left of the World War I era, the Old Left of the 1930's, and the New Left of the 1960's. The value of the work to political theorists lies in the author's ability to relate the ideas of American Marxist and other leftists to others in the American intellectual-political tradition such as Madison, Melville, Dewey, James, Lippmann and Eastman.

**Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism.** By Alonzo L. Hamby. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. 635 pp. $12.95. In the author's words, "This book is a study of American liberalism in the decade or so after the New Deal and an analysis of the relationship between the liberal movement and the presidency of Harry S. Truman." Hamby, Associate Professor of History at Ohio University, examines certain broad themes central to an understanding of Truman's two administrations, including — in the realm of foreign affairs — Henry Wallace and the opposition to Truman's conduct of foreign policy at the close of World War II and in the postwar period; the origins of the Cold War; the diplomacy of containment and the Truman Doctrine; the growth of anti-communism among liberals, and the Korean war and the diplomacy of stalemate.



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**Energy for Tomorrow.** By Philip H. Abelson. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975. 78 pp. $5.95 ($2.50, paper). A summary of the energy crisis, its causes and alternative ways of coping with it. The author, editor of *Science,* deals with the global perspective of the crisis and the prospects for increasing domestic energy supplies, and proposes a program of limiting imports and of resource conservation. The text contains many graphs, charts, and data tables.

**The Most Dangerous Man in America: Scenes From the Life of Benjamin Franklin.** By Catherine Drinker Bowen. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1974. 274 pp. $8.95. A selective biography of Benjamin Franklin, beginning at adolescence and continuing through 1774. The book is divided into five scenes, each depicting a particular period in his life: "The Dogwood Papers" portrays Franklin as a young man in Boston; "Franklin and Electricity" treats of him as scientist and public figure; "The Albany Congress of 1754, and Franklin's Plan of Union" concerns his activities during the French and Indian War; "Franklin in London" chronicles his exploits as America's spokesman in England; and scene five assesses his role in the great events of 1774. The book contains an extensive bibliography, a liberal sampling of Franklin's own writing, and an afterword on Franklin's character written by the author shortly before her death.

**Presidential Power and Accountability: Toward a New Constitution.** By Charles M. Hardin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. 257 pp. $7.95. Writing in the midst of the Watergate scandal and the beginning of the impeachment crisis which culminated in President Nixon's resignation, a professor of political science at the University of California traces the growth of presidential power since FDR and argues that faults in the structure of the American constitutional system require fundamental reform. Hardin accepts the need for strong executive leadership. Interested in controlling the presidency without diminishing its effectiveness, he seeks the remedy not through a mere increase in the weight of Congress at the expense of the Executive, but rather — as in the British system — by subjecting the president to the criticism of an organized opposition, with leadership centered in one person who will be continuously visible and vocal as the alternative to the president.

**Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective.** Edited by Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1973. 434 pp. $5.95 (paper). The readings in this volume have been selected to explain the behavior of the United States in the postwar world in terms of the bureaucratic politics of foreign policy and national security. The introduction by the editors describes the process by which the executive branch makes decisions and takes actions in the international arena, and it also serves as the framework for organizing the readings. The first part, the overview, contains selections by Graham T. Allison, Henry Kissinger and James C. Thompson. The other sections deal with participants and interests, decisions, actions, and interaction among nations. Some of the contributors are Edward L. Katzenbach, Ronald Steel, Warner R. Schilling, Bruce L. R. Smith, Tang Tsou, Herbert F. York, Richard E. Neustadt and Henry Brandon.

## IV. Western Europe and Atlantic Community

**The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945.** By Jay W. Baird. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975. 329 pp. $15.00. A chronological, interpretive treatment of National Socialist propaganda during the Second World War. Drawing on archival and interview materials, the author shows



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the relationship between the tide of the battle and the content and style of propaganda, and describes the administrative apparatus and personalities of the German propaganda machine. "Nazi propaganda," writes Baird, "was unique in the way it merged the practical and political with the mythical."

**Protest in Paris: Anatomy of a Revolt.** By Bernard E. Brown. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1974. 240 pp. $8.95 ($5.95, paper). In addition to recounting events in France during May 1968, the author attempts to provide a basis for developing an analytical theory of revolution by breaking down the elements of the French revolutionary coalition and placing each in its historical context. He also examines the contradictions within the coalition by employing a theory of political development and anomie. His study challenges the traditional belief that revolution can occur only in feudal or transitional societies in the early stages of modernization and demonstrates the potential vulnerability of highly developed liberal democracies.

**Spain: The Root and the Flower.** By John A. Crow. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. 475 pp. $12.50. This history and interpretation of Spanish civilization, originally published in 1963 and now updated, examines the main currents in the development of Spain; treats of the Romans, Jews and Moors, and the Christian kingdoms; pays special attention to art, literature, architecture and music; presents an account of life in the towns of medieval Spain; describes politics, the social order, belles-lettres and the fine arts in Spain's Golden Age of the 16th and 17th centuries; and depicts the rule of the Bourbons during the next two centuries. The final 200 pages, largely rewritten for this edition, are devoted to 20th-century Spain, including a discussion of the Spanish Republic of the 1930's; Franco's rule; communism and fascism; the country's recent remarkable economic progress; the problem areas of agriculture, labor and emigration; and such topics as religion, education, youth, women, and censorship and intellectual activity.

**Trade Relations of the EEC: An Empirical Investigation.** By Mordechai E. Kreinin. New York: Praeger, 1974. 127 pp. n.p. In this investigation of EEC trade relations, the author provides a brief historical background of the EEC and a theoretical review of the effects of regional integration on international trade. In following chapters he estimates annual trade creation and diversion by the original six-country EEC for 1967-1968 and 1969-1970; deals with the effects of tariff preferences granted by French Africa to the EEC (reverse preferences) and those granted by the EEC to the Associated African States and to southern European countries; and assesses the impact of EEC enlargement on international trade flows and on the General System of Preferences accorded by the EEC to the developing countries.

**World Power or Decline: The Controversy Over Germany's Aims in the First World War.** By Fritz Fischer. New York: W. W. Norton, 1974. 131 pp. $6.95 ($1.95, paper). This slim volume is essentially a restatement of the author's basic thesis of German culpability in the First World War. Professor Fischer had argued that German war aims in that conflict were expansionist from the first and became more so as the war continued, and that support for those aims was extremely widespread, rather than being limited to a small circle in Imperial Headquarters. The dispute within academic circles, particularly in Germany, over that thesis gave rise to the present book. The author defends his argument (often by attacking his critics) and provides a tighter analysis of it than appeared in the original book.



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## V. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

**The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors.** By Morton Schwartz. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1975. 214 pp. n.p. (paper). The author of this book — in the Comparative Foreign Relations Series — feels that "neither domestic nor external factors alone best explain Soviet policy but, rather, the interplay of both," but, as the title indicates, he stresses domestic or "micro-analytic" variables. He assumes "that Soviet decisionmakers do not deal with the external world *in vacuo* but that they see threats and opportunities, choose their goals and their methods in the context of an ideological-cultural-political milieu which, along with their country's economic and military resources, conditions their attitudes and goals and shapes their policy choices." The seven chapters cover environmental, demographic and economic factors; military capability; historical influences and traditions; ideological influences; domestic system needs; foreign policy formulation; and the weight and direction of domestic policy determinants.

**Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities.** Edited by Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers and Frederic Harned. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1975. 481 pp. $25.00. Prepared at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, this useful and well-organized handbook deals with seventeen Soviet nationalities — fifteen of which have their own Union republics, plus the Tatars and Jews. One chapter is devoted to each nationality, and all (except for the Russian chapter) are written to a uniform outline: territory, economy, history, demography, culture, external relations, language, media, education, cultural and scientific institutions, attitude formation, views of scholars, and current evidences of nationalism. The appendix contains a set of comparative tables for all nationalities.

**The Soviet Energy Balance: Natural Gas, Other Fossil Fuels, and Alternative Power Sources.** By Iain F. Elliot. New York: Praeger, 1974. 277 pp. $18.50. A detailed study of the Soviet energy picture as it has developed in recent decades, as it stands now, and as it may look in the year 2000. Separate chapters deal with natural gas, oil, coal, peat, oil shale, alternative power sources, and utilization of fuel. Relying mainly on Soviet data, the author provides more than 100 tables and graphs and over a dozen maps, and offers comparisons with U.S. energy sources. He concludes that although the USSR is fortunate to possess adequate reserves of many kinds of fuel, "the basic problem is that some 90 per cent of the total energy resources lie east of the Urals, while population and industry are concentrated in the Urals and in the European part of the USSR."

**Soviet-Third World Relations: Volume II, Soviet-Asian Relations.** By Charles B. McLane. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. 150 pp. $15.00. This is the second of a three-volume series in which McLane, professor of government at Dartmouth College, seeks to set forth "the *record* of Soviet ties with Asia, Africa and the Middle East. . . ." He reports on the intensity of Soviet dealings — political, military, economic, cultural and trade — with fourteen South and Southeast Asian nations. Following an introductory "Regional Perspective" focusing on Soviet relations with Asia as a whole, he discusses relations with each Asian state in turn, and includes for each a chronology of relations with the USSR in the period before 1955 and for every year since.

**Soviet-Third World Relations: Volume III, Soviet-African Relations.** By Charles B. McLane. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. 190 pp. $15.00. This data bank on relations between the Soviet Union and African states provides a comprehensive set of tables covering the period through 1972. In large part de-



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rived from materials published in *Mizan*, the book examines the ties between the Soviet Union and each country and contains comments on each African country by the Soviet press along with succinct editorial notes by Professor McLane.

**The Warsaw Rising of 1944.** By Jan M. Ciechanowski. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974. 332 pp. $19.50. An account of the revolt of the people of Warsaw led by the anti-nazi Polish resistance movement in August 1944, on the eve of the Soviet seizure of the city. The volume, originally written in Polish and containing material from the author's extensive interviews, deals with day-to-day developments in Warsaw; the political, diplomatic and ideological background of the revolt; the impact of the Teheran Conference on the planning for the uprising; and the role of the major powers, especially the Soviet Union. The author also discusses the origins of the resistance movement after the collapse of Poland in 1939 and the activities of the Polish government-in-exile in London.

## VI. Middle East and Africa

**Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents.** Edited by Ronald H. Chilcote. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. 646 pp. $25.00. This volume of documents on Portuguese African nationalist movements is an outgrowth of a project initiated in 1963 at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. The first two chapters present views representative of the Portuguese government and of the Portuguese opposition to the government. The editor then provides materials on the struggle to build a mass revolutionary movement, with special attention to leadership, organization and ideology. Chapters four to six focus on the major African movements from Angola, Portuguese Guiné and the Cape Verde, Sao Tomé and Principe Islands, and Mozambique. Chapter seven contains documents on efforts to achieve unity among nationalist groups, and the last chapter reproduces some of the major resolutions on Portuguese Africa approved by the UN and other international bodies.

**The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947-53.** By Arnold Krammer. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974. 224 pp. $10.00. An associate professor of history at Texas A&M University recounts the story of Soviet-Zionist cooperation in 1947-1948 and the subsequent deterioration of relations through 1953. Utilizing personal interviews with members of the Israeli mission to Prague and former diplomats, he pieces together the 1947 Czech arms deal and the proposal (which had the Kremlin's approval) for the formation of a Czech "volunteer" brigade made up mostly of Jews. He also examines Soviet motives for supporting the 1947 UN decision to partition the British mandate in Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state; chronicles the change in Soviet attitude that followed the creation of Israel, as revealed in newspaper and press reports; and shows how anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and Soviet Europe in 1952-1954 affected relations with the new state.

**Middle East Oil and U.S. Foreign Policy: With Special Reference to the U.S. Energy Crisis.** By Shoshana Klebanoff. New York: Praeger, 1974. 288 pp. $16.50. A survey of U.S. involvement in Middle East oil production and supply from 1919 to the months prior to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In chapters on the "Soviet Petroleum Offensive" and "Coexisting with the Soviet Union," the author examines Soviet influence in Middle East oil politics as a U.S. foreign policy problem. The last two chapters deal mainly with the repercussions of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and contemporary issues (up to 1973). In looking to the future the author, a



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former Israeli correspondent and editor, warns that in order to maintain its diplomatic flexibility in the Middle East, the United States must get rid of its dependence on Arab oil as soon as possible.

**A Near East Studies Handbook, 570-1974.** By Jere L. Bacharach. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974. 147 pp. $12.50 ($4.95, paper). Included in this collection of information about the Near East are a transliteration schema, a table of dynasties, a table of rulers, genealogical charts of ruling families, a historical atlas, calendars, a chronology covering the period from 570 to 1974, a selected glossary of Arabic, Persian and Turkish words, and a time chart to compare Muslim and Western dates.

**Nigeria: Options for Long-Term Development.** World Bank Country Economic Report; coordinating author, Wouter Tims. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 256 pp. $12.00. This volume, the fifth in a series of country economic reports, examines the basic trends and policies of Nigerian economic development and offers a "longer term outlook" of the economy through the early 1980's. The detailed analysis in the study provides a wealth of useful information on the "giant" of Africa, even though recent events (e.g., the quadrupling of the price of petroleum) have already dated many of its "future" projections.

**The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspectives.** Edited by Yassin El-Ayouty. New York: Praeger, 1975. 262 pp. $18.50. This collection of articles on the OAU treats of nearly all aspects of the organization's activities, including its attempts to deal with such issues as Southern Africa, the Southern Sudan, the Nigerian civil war and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Broadly focused essays by scholars such as William Zartman, Claude E. Welch and Boutros Boutros-Ghali examine the past, present and future of the OAU, and the diversity of their conclusions indicates the controversial role of the OAU in African politics today.

**Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East.** Edited by Richard Antoun and Iliya Harik. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. 498 pp. $13.50. In their introduction the editors assert that "The village community rather than dying out is becoming more viable because it is changing." To explore and document this process of change, fifteen sociologists, anthropologists, historians and other specialists have prepared theoretical essays, case studies and papers on region-wide trends. Among the contributors are Frederick G. Bailey, Henry Rosenfeld, Robert A. Fernea, Xavier de Planhol and Richard T. Antoun, all of whom write on current theory and literature in the field of rural politics. Examining specific cases for insights into local political processes in the rural Middle East are Emrys L. Peters, Fuad I. Khuri, Lawrence Rosen, Michael E. Meeker, Nadia M. Abu-Zahra, Iliya F. Harik and Janet Abu-Lughod. Harik, Nikki R. Keddie, Wyn F. Owen and John L. Simmons assess economic change and reform in the villages. This book is the fifth in the Studies in Development series of the International Development Research Center at Indiana University.

**Society and Political Structure in the Arab World.** Edited by Menahem Milson. New York: Humanities Press, 1974. 338 pp. $12.50. Eight studies of Arab society, originally presented in a series of colloquia held by the Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation in 1970-1971. The papers, seven of which are written by Israeli scholars, deal with Egypt, Syria, the Palestinian Arab National Movement, Jordan, Tunisia, North Sudan, military coup d'états, and nomads.



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**Survival or Hegemony? The Foundations of Israeli Foreign Policy.** By Samuel J. Roberts. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 163 pp. $7.50 ($2.95, paper). This interpretation of Israeli foreign policy begins with "A Note on the Foreign Policy of the Ancient Jewish Kingdoms of Judah and Israel," in which the author asserts that "The Jewish state of antiquity manifested an impulse toward expansion which the contemporary Jewish state is currently in the process of evincing. . . . The unfolding of modern Israel's foreign policy reveals striking parallels to the evolution of the ancient state's foreign policy." He then surveys "Zionist Foreign Policy During the Period of the British Mandate" and chronicles "The Independence Period" of 1948-1967. The final two sections are entitled "Israeli Foreign Policy" and "Israeli Imperialism: From Security to Settlement." In the introduction the author argues that "Peace might have been possible between the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine had the Zionists not insisted upon creating a Jewish state."

**A Theory of Ideology: The Tanzanian Example.** By John R. Nellis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 217 pp. $12.25. A political scientist at Carleton University (Ottawa) investigates the potential of applying a methodology drawn from the field of economics to bring some logical consistency to the highly disputed area of political ideology. Tanzania has been chosen because its "state of underdevelopment mutes complexities and variables which would have to be considered in an affluent society." Following a statement of the problem, a model is constructed and described, and its implications are fully discussed. The construct is then applied to a "real life" situation in Tanzania, with emphasis on the village settlement program. In the concluding chapters the study reverts to the model and highlights its heuristic value as well as its limitations, when seen against the Tanzanian setting.

**The United Nations and Rhodesia: A Study in International Law.** By Ralph Zacklin. New York: Praeger, 1974. 188 pp. $17.50. A staff member in the UN Office of Legal Affairs, who was formerly with the Carnegie Endowment, analyzes the issue of sanctions against Rhodesia, as applied through early 1974. With the outcome of the UN efforts still in doubt, Zacklin's conclusions are tentative, but he tends to emphasize the roles of the great powers. Greater attention is given to legal nuances than political factors, as would be expected in a study of the development of international law.

## VII. East and South Asia

**China's African Policy: A Study of Tanzania.** By George T. Yu. New York: Praeger, 1975. 200 pp. n.p. The unusual Sino-Tanzanian alliance is viewed in the larger perspectives of Chinese goals in the Third World and the African role in international relations. Because China is becoming a major power center, this comprehensive study is valuable in charting Peking's behavior in one of its first overseas ventures. There are dividends, too, in the research done by Professor Yu on the roles of Sweden and the USSR in Tanzania.

**China's Three Thousand Years: The Story of a Great Civilisation.** By Louis Heren, C. P. Fitzgerald, Michael Freeberne, Brian Hook, David Bonavia. New York: Macmillan, 1973. 252 pp. $8.95. A team of five China experts has assembled for the general reader a survey of China's history, cultural heritage, way of life, and world role. After a short introductory essay by Louis Heren, C. P. Fitzgerald treats of philosophy, religion, art, literature and learning; Michael Freeberne describes the land, people, economic growth and technological change; Fitz-



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gerald returns to recount Chinese history from the prehistorical era to 1840; Brian Hook reviews the modern history of China to 1971; and David Bonavia examines China's role in the world today.

**Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taisho Democracy.** Edited by Bernard S. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. 469 pp. $17.50. These fifteen essays by Japanese and American scholars, including introductory and concluding ones by the editors, explore the intellectual, literary, economic, diplomatic, political and social history of Japan from 1900 to 1945. The central theme is the emergence of a new individualism in Japanese society — the separation of politics and culture, the weakening of the strong Japanese self-dedication to the interests of the state, and the new emphasis on modernization in every sphere — all of which marked the transition between the reign of the powerful emperor Meiji and that of his weak successor Taisho. There are essays on three Japanese intellectuals, the role of the bureaucracy, democracy and militarism, industrial and agricultural expansion, prewar Japanese nationalism, tenant and industrial unrest, and the crisis of secularism in Taisho Japan.

**Japan, the New Superstate.** By Nobutaka Ike. San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman (distributor: Charles Scribner's Sons, New York), 1974. 121 pp. $5.95. Professor Ike's book, which originally appeared in 1973 as a volume in "The Portable Stanford" series published by the Stanford University Alumni Association, is a valuable introduction to the miraculous Japanese recovery from defeat and devastation in 1945. He examines various historical, cultural, social and economic factors and shows how these have contributed to Japan's achievement. In discussing Japan's future, he warns that her lack of fossil fuels and other essential resources may make it difficult for her to sustain rapid economic growth, but he is optimistic about the viability of parliamentary democracy and her adherence to a peaceful foreign policy.

**The Life and Times of Sukarno.** By C. L. M. Penders. Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1974. 224 pp. $12.50. Dr. Penders, an Australian of Dutch origin and senior lecturer at the University of Queensland, writes sympathetically of the personality, significance, political philosophy, career, achievements and failures of late Indonesian President Sukarno. He discusses the charismatic leader's youth, social and educational background, rise to prominence as a national leader, collaboration with the Japanese, struggle against Dutch colonialism, emergence as the first president of the new country, impatience and disillusionment with democracy, preference for strong, central governmental authority, institution of "guided democracy," growing dependence on the Communist Party of Indonesia, and his downfall following the abortive communist putsch of 1965.

**Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II.** By Stephen E. Pelz. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974. 268 pp. $17.50. An assistant professor of history at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, interprets Japanese military history of the 1930's from the standpoint of the navy rather than the army. The program of secret expansion which began after Japan's withdrawal from the naval arms limitation system generated a naval race with the United States — not immediately, because of depression restraints and the strong isolationist bloc in Congress, but at the end of the decade, when Japan displayed its intention to move south. The United States responded in 1940 with a naval building program and oil-metal embargoes. Relying on a wide array of American, British and Japanese documentary materials, Pelz argues that the Japanese made their decision to strike at Pearl



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Harbor and go to war with the United States before they lost their lead in naval armaments.

**The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41: From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor.** By Frank Dorn. New York: Macmillan, 1974. 477 pp. $17.50. Combining personal experience and military scholarship, this account of the Sino-Japanese war treats every campaign and all important engagements, including air and naval, from the July 7, 1937 Marco Polo Bridge incident and the seizure of Peking to the second battle of Changsha in the autumn of 1971 and Pearl Harbor. The author, a graduate of West Point who retired from the U.S. Army in 1953 as a brigadier general, was stationed in China as a language officer and assistant military attaché from 1934 to 1938, and then as a military observer of the war.

## VIII. Latin America

**Revolutionary Struggle, 1947-1958: Volume I of the Selected Works of Fidel Castro.** Edited by Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1972. 471 pp. $3.95 (paper). This volume includes the major letters, articles, speeches, interviews and other important pronouncements of Fidel Castro before he took power in Cuba in 1959. To put the selections in perspective, the editors have provided an unusually long introduction assessing the political history of Cuba and its anti-imperialistic, nationalistic revolutionary tradition. A supplementary bibliography is included.

**Statistical Yearbook for Latin America, 1973.** By the Economic Commission for Latin America. New York: United Nations, 1974. 760 pp. n.p. (paper, in four volumes). This yearbook replaces the *Bulletin* that had appeared twice a year since 1964. The first volume contains a lengthy table of contents, introduction, explanation of terms, and statistics on "Latin America proper" (the twenty countries from Mexico to Chile); "Latin American region" (the twenty countries plus Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago); and four subregional groupings (the Latin American Free Trade Association, the Andean Group, the Central American Common Market, and the Caribbean Free Trade Association). The other three volumes present statistics on a country-by-country basis. In each section, the statistics are organized under these headings: population, national accounts, agriculture, industry, transport, external trade, prices, balance of payments, and social statistics.

**The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921-1933.** By Dana G. Munro. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. 394 pp. $17.50. A Professor Emeritus of History at Princeton University and former State Department official traces the evolution of U.S. Caribbean policy from 1921 to 1933. During this period the United States moved from policies of active intervention — including discouragement of revolution or disorder, control of important governmental functions, and force or the threat of force — to policies under which Caribbean nations were allowed more latitude and independence in the conduct of internal affairs. Munro, in seeking to dispel several common misperceptions about this period in U.S.-Caribbean relations, assails the notion that American policymakers acted in part to maximize the profits of American businesses, and labels as erroneous the idea that Washington backed Caribbean dictatorships because these were both politically stable and pro-American.



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# *Monographs and Reports Received*

*Andrei Sakharov and the Soviet Dissidents: A Critical Commentary.* By Albert L. Weeks. New York: Monarch Press, a division of Simon & Schuster, 1975. 89 pp. $1.25.

*Arms Races, Diplomacy, and Recurring Behavior: Lessons from Two Cases.* By Barry H. Steiner. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, a SAGE Professional Paper, International Studies Series, No. 02-013, 1973. 40 pp. $2.10.

*Brazil and the United States: Toward a Maturing Relationship.* By Roger W. Fontaine. Washington, D.C., and Stanford, Calif.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, AEI-Hoover Policy Study No. 13, December 1974. 127 pp. $3.00.

*Britain at the Polls: The Parliamentary Election of February 1974.* Edited by Howard R. Penniman. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Foreign Affairs Study No. 14, October 1974. 183 pp. $3.00.

*Canada Recognizes China: The Trudeau Round, 1968-1973.* By John D. Harbron. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Behind the Headlines Series, October 1974. 29 pp. 75 cents.

*The Economic Impact of U.S. Restrictions on Trade With Rhodesia: A Preliminary View.* By Roger LeRoy Miller. Washington: University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, 1974. 29 pp. n.p.

*Economics of Inflation.* Essays by James M. O'Brien, Richard M. Young, Donald J. Mullineaux, Mark H. Willes, and W. Lee Hoskins (originally published in *Business Review* from 1970 to 1973). Philadelphia: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Department of Research, October 1974. 54 pp. n.p.

*The Efficacy of Threats in International Interaction Strategies.* By Charles Lockhart. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, a SAGE Professional Paper, International Studies Series, No. 02-023, 1973. 50 pp. $2.40.

*Energy Self-Sufficiency: An Economic Evaluation.* By the MIT Energy Laboratory Policy Study Group: Project Chairman, Melvin R. Laird; Project Director, Edward J. Mitchell. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, National Energy Study No. 3, November 1974. 89 pp. $3.00.

*Essays on Inflation and Indexation.* By Herbert Giersch, Milton Friedman, William Fellner, Edward M. Bernstein, Alexandre Kafka. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Domestic Affairs Study No. 24, October 1974. 98 pp. $3.00.

*Eximbank in the World Marketplace: Annual Report, 1974, Export-Import Bank of the United States.* Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974. 42 pp. $1.75.

*A General Empirical Typology of Foreign Policy Behavior.* By Charles W. Kegley, Jr. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, a SAGE Professional Paper, International Studies Series, No. 02-014, 1973. 75 pp. $2.80.



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*Governmental Takeovers of U.S. Foreign Affiliates: A Postwar Profile.* By Robert H. Hawkins, Norman Mintz and Michael Provissiero. Washington: Center for Multinational Studies, Occasional Paper No. 7, February 1975. 23 pp. $3.00.

*Human Factors in International Negotiations: Social-Psychological Aspects of International Conflict.* By Daniel Druckman. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, a SAGE Professional Paper, International Studies Series, No. 02-020, 1973. 96 pp. $3.00.

*The Hydra-Headed Monster: The Problem of Inflation in the United States.* By Philip Cagan. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Domestic Affairs Study No. 26, October 1974. 59 pp. $3.00.

*The Ideology of American Foreign Policy: A Paradigm of Lockian Liberalism.* By Edward Weisband. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, a SAGE Professional Paper, International Studies Series, No. 02-016, 1973. 69 pp. $2.70.

*The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapower: New Weapons and Weltpolitik in Wilhelmian Germany.* By Robert J. Art. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, a SAGE Professional Paper, International Studies Series, No. 02-019, 1973. 49 pp. $2.40.

*Israel's African Setback in Perspective.* By Susan Aurelia Gitelson. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 6, May 1974. 27 pp. 75 cents.

*The Natural Gas Shortage and the Congress.* By Patricia E. Starratt. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, National Energy Study No. 5, December 1974. 68 pp. $3.00.

*Nuclear Weapons for Western Europe?* By H. J. Neuman. The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Peace Questions, prepared for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1974. 90 pp. n.p.

*Oil and Ice: The Political Economy of Law in the Canadian Arctic.* By Gerald F. Graham. Ottawa, Canada: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Occasional Papers No. 27, December 1974. 35 pp. n.p.

*Performance of the Federal Energy Office.* By Richard B. Mancke. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, National Energy Study No. 6, February 1975. 25 pp. $1.50.

*The President's Powers: Should the Power of the Presidency Be Significantly Curtailed?* Prepared by Chester B. Earle, Valerie A. Earle, and John A. Lynch. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Legislative Analysis, College Debate Series, November 1974. 92 pp. n.p.

*Responsible Parenthood: The Politics of Mexico's New Population Policies.* By Frederick C. Turner. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Foreign Affairs Study No. 13, October 1974. 43 pp. $2.00.

*A Review of the Dimensionality of Nations Project.* By Gordon Hilton. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, a SAGE Professional Paper, International Studies Series, No. 02-015, 1973. 79 pp. $2.80.

*Review: 1974 Session of the Congress and Index of AEI Publications.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Legislative Analysis No. 1, 94th Congress, February 1975. 67 pp. $2.00.



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*The Role of U.S. Multinational Corporations in Recent Exchange Crises.* By Benjamin Klein. Washington: Center for Multinational Studies, Occasional Paper No. 6, December 1974. 39 pp. $3.00.

*Seven Tracks to Peace in the Middle East.* By Frank R. Barnett. New York: National Strategy Information Center, Agenda Paper No. 4, 1975. 25 pp. $2.00.

*Soviet Penetration of Latin America.* By Leon Gouré and Morris Rothenberg. Washington: University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, Monographs in International Affairs, 1975. 204 pp. n.p.

*The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israel War of October 1973.* By Galia Golan. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 7, June 1974. 31 pp. 75 cents.

*Soviet Works on Korea, 1945-1970.* By George Ginsburgs. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press (prepared for the Joint Committee on Korean Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council), School of International Relations, University of Southern California, Far Eastern and Russian Research Series, No. 4, 1973. 179 pp. $9.50 ($6.50, paper).

*Strategic Aspects of Seaborne Oil.* By Bernhard J. Abrahamsson and Joseph L. Steckler. Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Publications, a SAGE Professional Paper, International Studies Series, No. 02-017, 1973. 61 pp. $2.50.

*Toward a Realistic Military Assistance Program.* By Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Foreign Affairs Studies No. 15, December 1974. 48 pp. $2.00.

*United States-Israel Relations, 1967-1973: A Study in the Convergence and Divergence of Interests.* By Shlomo Slonim. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, No. 8, September 1974. 49 pp. $1.00.

*World Military and Social Expenditures, 1974.* By Ruth Leger Sivard. Leesburg, Va.: WMSE Publications, published under the auspices of the Institute for World Order, New York, 1974. 30 pp. $2.00.



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R.D. McLaurin
*American Institutes for Research*
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edited by Bernard Eissenstat
*Oklahoma State University*
320 pp. 1975 $20.00

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